Abstract
Models of two contestants exerting effort to win a prize are very common and widely used in political economy. The contest success function plays as fundamental a role in the theory of contests as does the production function in the theory of the firm, yet beyond the existence of equilibrium few general results are known. This paper seeks to remedy that gap.
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29 September 2021
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We would like to thank Salvatore Modica and three anonymous referees. We are grateful to the EUI Research Council and MIUR PRIN 20103S5RN3 for financial support.
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Levine, D.K., Mattozzi, A. Success in contests. Econ Theory 73, 595–624 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01367-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01367-4