Abstract
I propose a novel hyperintensional semantics for belief revision and a corresponding system of dynamic doxastic logic. The main goal of the framework is to reduce some of the idealisations that are common in the belief revision literature and in dynamic epistemic logic. The models of the new framework are primarily based on potentially incomplete or inconsistent collections of information, represented by situations in a situation space. I propose that by shifting the representational focus of doxastic models from belief sets to collections of information, and by defining changes of beliefs as artifacts of changes of information, we can achieve a more realistic account of belief representation and belief change. The proposed dynamic operation suggests a non-classical way of changing beliefs: belief revision occurs in non-explosive environments which allow for a non-monotonic and hyperintensional belief dynamics. A logic that is sound with respect to the semantics is also provided.
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Acknowledgements
This publication was funded by the LMU Munich’s Institutional strategy LMUexcellent within the framework of the German Excellence Initiative. I am indebted to Hannes Leitgeb, Aybuke Özgün, Ivano Ciardelli and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper.
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Bozdag, S. A Semantics for Hyperintensional Belief Revision Based on Information Bases. Stud Logica 110, 679–716 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-021-09973-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-021-09973-y