Abstract
In his (Philosophical Perspectives 1:455–480, 1987) and (Noûs, 40:361–368, 2006), Schiffer devised a puzzle about Salmón’s (in: Frege’s puzzle, MIT Press, 1986a) Millian-Russellian theory of belief reports, which Salmón resolved in his (Philosophical Perspectives 3:243–285, 1989) and (Noûs, 40:369–375, 2006). My paper has three objectives. First, I will argue that the strategy employed by Salmón (in: Noûs 40:369–375, 2006) to solve Schiffer’s puzzle and his argument for such a strategy are disputable. Second, I will raise a new puzzle, inspired by ideas from Saul (in: Analysis 57:102–108, 1997) and Braun and Saul (in: Philos Stud 111:1–41, 2002), which achieves similar results to Schiffer’s puzzle but to which Salmón’s overall strategy for resolving the latter does not apply. Third, I will contend that the import of both puzzles is neither what Salmón maintains nor the alleged inadequacy of the Millian-Russellian semantics of belief reports as Schiffer suggests, but is the failure of Frege’s Constraint—a constraint to which several conceptions of modes of presentation, including Salmón’s (in: Frege’s puzzle, MIT Press, 1986a) in terms of guises and Schiffer’s (in: The things we mean, Oxford University Press, 2003) in terms of unstructured and fine-grained concepts/propositions, are committed.
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1 Preamble: Millian Russellianism and Salmón’s theory of belief reports
Millian Russellianism is a contemporary theory of meaning, which traces its roots to ideas of John Stuart Mill (1843), Bertrand Russell (1903) and David Kaplan (1989a). According to this theory,
-
proper names and singular demonstrative/personal pronouns in contexts of use are Millian terms, i.e. terms whose semantic content (i.e. what they express) is solely their referent (in those contexts);
-
the semantic content of a predicate is an attribute (i.e. a property or a relation);
-
the semantic content of a declarative sentence in a context of use or a statement (i.e. an utterance or inscription of a declarative sentence) is a Russellian proposition, i.e. a structured proposition whose basic constituents are individuals and attributes.
In his seminal book Frege’s Puzzle (1986a), Nathan Salmón advocated a Millian-Russellian theory that assigns to belief reports the semantic content and truth conditions specified in the claims (A) and (B) respectively.
- (A)
The semantic content of an instance of the (sentential) schema ⌜α believes that Φβ⌝ (where the substituends for α and β are Millian singular terms and the substituend for Φ is a predicate) in a context of use is a Russellian proposition of the form <a, believing, <b, F>> , where believing is a two-place relation between the subject or agent a (i.e. the referent of the substituend for α) and the Russellian proposition formed by the object b (i.e. the referent of the substituend for β) and the property F (expressed by the substituend for Φ).
- (B)
⌜α believes that Φβ⌝ is true if and only if <a, believing, <b, F>> is true; in turn, the latter (and consequently the former) is true if and only if there is at least one guise g such that a is disposed to inwardly or mentally assent (BELs) to the Russellian proposition <b, F> grasped by means of g.
On Salmón’s view, a guise is a mode of presentation that has no impact to the semantic content of sentences, including belief sentences. A mode of presentation is whatever satisfies Frege’s Constraint below, with respect to which Salmón has affirmed: “I am prepared to grant … that something along the lines of … [this c]onstraint is indeed correct” (1989, p. 267).Footnote 1
Frege’s Constraint: A subject a rationally (and simultaneously) believes and disbelieves (i.e. believes the negation of) b to be such that it has (the property) F only if in (simultaneously) believing and disbelieving so (i.e. b to be such that it has F), (i) a thinks of the object b under different modes of presentation which a takes to present distinct objects or (ii) a thinks of the property of being such that one has F under different modes of presentation which a takes to present distinct properties.Footnote 2
It is important to highlight that Frege’s Constraint involves belief reports of the form (D) which contains the phrase “believes … to”, instead of the phrase “believes that” appearing in (C).
- (C)
α believes that Φβ.
- (D)
α believes β to be (something/someone) such that Φit.
Salmón (2006, p. 371) draws a semantic distinction between the de dicto schema (C) and the de re schema (D): as established in claim (A) above, instances of the schema (C) express Russellian propositions of the form <a, believing, <b, F>> ; by contrast, instances of the schema (D), where the pronoun “it” does not occur free, express Russellian propositions of the form <a, believing*, b, being (one) such that one has F> or identically <a, believing*, b, λx[Fx]> ,Footnote 3 where believing* is a three-place relation among the subject a, the object b, and the property of being (one) such that one has F or identically the propositional function λx[Fx].Footnote 4 For example, the de dicto report (1) expresses the Russellian proposition (1p), whereas the de re report (2) expresses the Russellian proposition (2p) or identically the Russellian proposition (2p*).
- (1)
Lucy believes that Aristotle is a philosopher.
- (1p)
<Lucy, believing, <Aristotle, being a philosopher>>
- (2)
Lucy believes Aristotle to be such that he is a philosopher.
- (2p)
<Lucy, believing*, Aristotle, being such that one is a philosopher>
- (2p*)
<Lucy, believing*, Aristotle, λx[x is a philosopher]>
Based on the semantic contents assigned by Salmón to (C) and (D), it turns out that in the de dicto schema (C) the Millian singular term instantiating β is substitutable salva veritate with any coreferring Millian singular term but not always with codesignative definite descriptions,Footnote 5 whereas in the de re schema (D) the Millian singular term instantiating β is also substitutable salva veritate (though not salva significatione) with any codesignative definite description. So, to reconsider the example above, even in case Lucy has the disposition to utter sincerely, on reflection and competently “I believe that Aristotle is a philosopher, but I don’t believe that the teacher of Alexander the Great is a philosopher” failing to realize that Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander the Great, “Aristotle” is substitutable salva veritate with “the teacher of Alexander the Great” in (2), not in (1) though.Footnote 6
Despite the highlighted differences between (C) and (D), it seems appropriate, from a Millian-Russellian viewpoint, to uphold thesis (T1) below, called by Schiffer (2006, p. 362) the special-case consequence.
- (T1)
Every instance of de dicto schema (C), i.e. ⌜α believes that Φβ⌝, entails the corresponding instance of the de re schema (D), i.e. ⌜α believes β to be such that Φit⌝, under the twofold assumption that β is instantiated by a Millian singular term and “it” in (D) does not occur free.Footnote 7
2 Subject matter and goals
In his article “The ‘Fido’-Fido Theory of Belief” (1987), Schiffer devised a puzzle about Salmón’s (1986a) Millian-Russellian theory of belief reports; a more sophisticated version of the same puzzle, involving reports of the form (D), was later presented by Schiffer in “A Problem for a Direct-Reference Theory of Belief Reports” (2006), while solutions to both versions of the puzzle can be found in Salmón’s articles “Illogical Belief” (1989) and “The Resilience of Illogical Belief” (2006). More recently, Salmón has slightly modified his (2006) article and republished it under the title “Constraint with Restraint” (2016), while Schiffer has replied to them in “Why Believing isn’t a Relation to Russellian Propositions” (2008) and in “De Re Subtleties” (2016). This thirty-year debate between Salmón and Schiffer is of great interest and, in my opinion, would deserve more attention from philosophers of language, logicians and linguists working on the topics of belief reports, de dicto/de re distinction, propositions and modes of presentation.
My paper focuses on the most compelling version of Schiffer’s (2006, 2008) puzzle, involving reports of the form (D), which will henceforth be exemplified by the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case (Sect. 3). A first goal of my paper is to show that Salmón’s (2006) strategy to solve this puzzling case, consisting in the rejection of thesis (T1), and his (2006) argument for such a strategy, viz. a specific counterexample to (T1), are disputable (Sect. 4). Furthermore, based on well-known discoveries about simple sentences by Jennifer Saul (1997) and related considerations by David Braun and Saul (2002), I will raise a new puzzle, the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case, which achieves similar results to Schiffer’s puzzle but to which Salmón’s overall strategy for solving the latter—consisting in the replacement of the rejected thesis (T1) with an amended version of it—does not apply (Sect. 5). I will finally argue that the import of both puzzles is neither what Salmón maintains nor the alleged inadequacy of the Millian-Russellian semantics of belief reports as Schiffer suggests, but is the failure of Frege’s Constraint—a constraint to which several conceptions of modes of presentation, including Salmón’s (1986a) in terms of guises and Schiffer’s (2003) in terms of unstructured and fine-grained concepts/propositions, are committed (Sect. 6).
3 Schiffer’s “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” puzzling case
3.1 The puzzle
Consider two rational English speakers, Jane and Ralph. Jane is aware that “George Eliot” is the pen name of Mary Ann Evans, whereas Ralph isn’t. Having heard Ralph affirm “I believe that George Eliot was a man, but I don’t believe that Mary Ann Evans was a man”, Jane acquires the disposition to utter sincerely, on reflection and competently (5) and (6) below. Hence, it is correct to report (7) and (8)—where the latter sentence is a convenient rephrasing of “Jane believes that Ralph does not believe that Mary Ann Evans was a man”.
- (5)
Ralph believes that George Eliot was a man.
- (6)
Ralph does not believe that Mary Ann Evans was a man.
- (7)
Jane believes that Ralph believes that George Eliot was a man.
- (8)
Jane disbelieves that Ralph believes that Mary Ann Evans was a man.
Within Salmón’s theory, the truth of (7) and (8) is justified by claim (B) (beginning of Sect. 1): given Jane’s aforementioned linguistic dispositions towards (5) and (6), there are two guises corresponding to these sentences under which Jane BELs respectively the Russellian proposition—(5p) below—expressed by (5) and the Russellian proposition expressed by (6). Alternatively, the truth of (7) and (8) can be justified by simply appealing to the Disquotational Principle below.
- (5p)
<Ralph, believing, <Eliot, having been a man>>
Disquotational Principle: If a normal speaker a of a language L, under normal circumstances, has the disposition to sincerely, on reflection and competently utter or assent to a sentence S of L in a context where S expresses a proposition p that a understands, then a believes that p.Footnote 8
Now, in accordance with thesis (T1) (end of Sect. 1) (7) and (8) respectively entail (9) and (10) below—the last sentence being a convenient rephrasing of “Jane believes Mary Ann Evans not to be such that Ralph believes that she was a man”.
- (9)
Jane believes George Eliot to be such that Ralph believes that she (i.e. Eliot) was a man.
- (10)
Jane disbelieves Mary Ann Evans to be such that Ralph believes that she was a man.
In turn, the de re report (10), where the position occupied by the name “Mary Ann Evans” is open to substitution salva veritate with any codesignative singular term, entails (11) below, according to Salmón’s semantics (second part of Sect. 1) and more generally according to any semantics involving de re belief reports.Footnote 9
- (11)
Jane disbelieves George Eliot to be such that Ralph believes that she was a man.
Finally, the truth of (9) and (11) leads to the following falsification of Frege’s Constraint (first part of Sect. 1): Jane rationally believes and disbelieves Eliot to be such that Ralph believes that she (i.e. Eliot) was a man (~ii) thinking of the property of being such that Ralph believes that one was a man under only one mode of presentation and (~i) thinking of Eliot without having different modes of presentation of her which Jane takes to present distinct individuals.
3.2 Three strategies to solve the puzzle: Schiffer’s, Salmón’s and an alternative strategy
Based on the exposition proposed in Sect. 3.1, which draws from Schiffer (2006, pp. 363–364, 2008, §1–§2), the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case appears to be generated by the following four elements (all of which have been introduced in Sect. 1 and explicitly mentioned in Sect. 3.1):
- (a)
Salmón’s claim (B) about the truth conditions of de dicto belief reports;
- (b)
thesis (T1);
- (c)
Salmón’s semantics of de re belief reports;
- (d)
Frege’s Constraint.
Since, on Schiffer’s view, Salmón’s theory commits to all elements (a)–(d), Schiffer concludes that the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case poses a problem for Salmón’s theory.Footnote 10 Schiffer’s (1987, 2006) solution to this puzzle consists in rejecting (a) and, ultimately, the Millian-Russellian semantics of belief reports, which he (2003) replaces with a remarkably different semantics involving unstructured and context-dependent (as regards their granularity) propositions (Sect. 6.4).
As we will see in Sect. 4.1, on the other hand, Salmón denies that his theory is committed to the conjunction of (a)–(d). Specifically, he (~b) rejects thesis (T1), in this way resolving the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case.
While acknowledging the extraordinary interest and value of Salmón’s and Schiffer's solutions, I dissent from both. After critically scrutinizing Salmón’s solution in Sect. 4 and objecting to Schiffer’s in Sect. 6, I will conclude in Sects. 6 and 7 that the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case should be solved by (~d) rejecting Frege’s Constraint. Hence, the Millian-Russellian semantics of belief reports can be retained pace Schiffer, whereas Frege’s Constraint can be revised along the lines indicated in Frege’s Constraint* below, which several theorists of mental files/nodes including Crimmins and Perry (1989), Forbes (1990), Saul (2007), and Récanati (2012, 2016) seem inclined to endorse.Footnote 11 Alternatively—that’s my (2020, 2021) proposal—Frege’s Constraint could be replaced by the Relationist Constraint below, a cognate of Frege’s Constraint* that involves the relation of cognitive coordination (characterized in fn. 12 due to reasons of space) instead of modes of presentation.Footnote 12
Frege’s Constraint*: A subject a rationally believes and disbelieves b to be such that it has F only if in believing and disbelieving so, (i*) a thinks of the object b under different modes of presentation or (ii*) a thinks of the property of being such that one has F under different modes of presentation.Footnote 13
Relationist Constraint: A subject a rationally believes b to be such that it has F and believes b not to be such that it has F only if in believing so, (iRC) a negatively coordinates (in the sense specified in fn. 12) the two occurrences of the object b or (iiRC) a negatively coordinates the two occurrences of the property F.Footnote 14
4 Salmón and the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case
4.1 Salmón’s solution to the puzzle
Pace Schiffer (1987, pp. 464–465), Salmón thinks that the truth of the de dicto reports (7) and (8) (Sect. 3.1) is compatible with the assumption that Jane is rational and with her knowledge that the names “George Eliot” and “Mary Ann Evans” corefer. He (1989, pp. 267–268, 1995, p. 219, 2006, p. 373) offers the following explanation for such a compatibility: Jane mistakes the Russellian proposition <Eliot, having been a man> for two Fregean propositions or the like as if she were a “proto- or closet neo-Fregean” (2006, p. 373), with the result of thinking of the more complex Russellian proposition (5p) (Sect. 3.1), believed and disbelieved by Jane and containing <Eliot, having been a man> as a constituent, under different modes of presentation, viz. guises corresponding to the sentences (5) (Sect. 3.1) and “Ralph believes that Mary Ann Evans was a man”, which she mistakenly takes to present distinct things, in accordance with Frege’s Constraint.Footnote 15
So far so good. But then Salmón also reckons that the truth of the de re reports (9) and (10) (Sect. 3.1) is incompatible with Jane’s rationality, given her knowledge that “George Eliot” and “Mary Ann Evans” corefer.Footnote 16 In order to avoid the allegedly problematic conclusion that both (9) and (10) are true, he (1995, p. 218, 2006, pp. 370–371) denies the implications and, consequently, the entailments from the de dicto reports (7) and (8) to the de re reports (9) and (10) respectively, thereby rejecting thesis (T1), of which the entailments in question are instances. In this way, Salmón resolves Schiffer’s puzzle.
4.2 Some objections to Salmón’s solution
Although I personally endorse Millian Russellianism and the Millian-Russellian semantics of belief reports,Footnote 17 I am not convinced by Salmón’s proposal for resolving the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case by denying the implication and therefore the entailment from (7)/(8) to (9)/(10), with the result of rejecting thesis (T1). In fact, unlike Salmón (2006), I do not think that the truth of (9) and (10)/(11) (Sect. 3.1) along with Jane’s knowledge that “George Eliot” and “Mary Ann Evans” corefer imply that she is irrational. Jane would be irrational if (12) below were true; however—and this is where, in my opinion, Salmón (2006) and I disagree—the conjunction of (9) and (10)/(11) does not imply (12) in the specific case under discussion, namely in the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case.
- (12)
Jane believes George Eliot both to be and not to be such that Ralph believes that she was a man.
By utilizing the Russellian propositions (9p), (10p) and (12p) below, which are respectively expressed by the sentences (9), (10)/(11) and (12) above, the strategy of solution I am proposing can be restated more perspicuously as follows: in the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case, (9p) and (10p) are true and so is their conjunction, hereafter labeled “(9p)&(10p)”; however, (9p)&(10p) does not imply (12p) in such a case.Footnote 18
- (9p)
<Jane, believing*, Eliot, λx[Ralph believes that x was a man]>
- (10p)
<Jane, believing*, Eliot, λx[Ralph does not believe that x was a man]>
- (12p)
<Jane, believing*, Eliot, λx[Ralph believes that x was a man & Ralph does not believe that x was a man]>
My own Millian-Russellian explanation for the falsity of the implication from (9p)&(10p) to (12p) in the case under discussion invokes the relation of cognitive coordination (and is spelled out in fn. 19, due to space limitations).Footnote 19 However, resorting to this relation is not indispensable in order to adopt the strategy I have suggested: a Millian-Russellian advocate of modes of presentation could deny the implication from (9p)&(10p) to (12p) by maintaining that two modes of presentation are associated to the two occurrences of Eliot in (9p)&(10p) whereas neither of them is associated to Eliot’s sole occurrence in (12p). It is important to add that due to her knowledge that “George Eliot” and “Mary Ann Evans” corefer, Jane realizes that these modes of presentation present the same individual, Eliot, in accordance with Frege’s Constraint* (end of Sect. 3.2) but in contrast with Frege’s Constraint.Footnote 20
So, my strategy for resolving the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case ultimately violates Frege’s Constraint. For this reason, Salmón, who advocates it, does not endorse my strategy.Footnote 21 Instead, coherently with Frege’s Constraint, he maintains that Jane (unlike Ralph) has only one mode of presentation (viz. individual guise) of Eliot, with the inevitable outcome that the conjunction (9p)&(10p) implies (12p);Footnote 22 and since the consequent of this implication, (12p), is false (otherwise Jane would be irrational, against our initial supposition), he concludes that its antecedent, (9p)&(10p), must be false as well. What is unclear to me, nevertheless, is why Salmón does not consider the alternative option of abandoning Frege’s Constraint for Frege’s Constraint*, thus safeguarding thesis (T1) and resolving the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case by denying, as I propose, the implication from (9p)&(10p) to (12p).Footnote 23
Salmón’s solution also presents another reason of concern. As pointed out above, according to him, Jane has only one guise of Eliot. On the other hand, she also has only one guise of the property of having been a man (end of Sect. 3.1). But, then, how is it possible that she has two guises of the Russellian proposition <Eliot, having been a man> and, consequently, of the Russellian proposition (5p), which she mistakenly takes to present distinct things (Sect. 4.1)? Salmón answers this question by rejecting (e).
- (e)
Propositional guises are (standardly) structured entities,
[namely, they are] entities whose basic components are [guises] of the basic components of the Russellian propositions of which the propositional [guises] are [guises.] (Schiffer, 2006, p. 365)
Indeed, once (e) is rejected, Salmón can maintain that in the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case, Jane’s two propositional guises corresponding to “George Eliot was a man” and “Mary Ann Evans was a man” are entities not constituted or not solely constituted by her guise of Eliot corresponding to both “George Eliot” and “Mary Ann Evans” and her guise of being a man corresponding to “was a man”. Some perplexities arise at this point, though: what are the additional constituents, assuming that there are any, of Jane’s propositional guises?Footnote 24 And why should a non-philosopher and ordinary thinker like Jane believe/BEL Russellian propositions under sui generis guises, lacking the structure of the believed/BELed propositions of which they are guises?
To recap, thanks to a couple of undoubtedly clever maneuvers, viz. (~b) rejecting thesis (T1) and (~e) resorting to sui generis (viz. unstructured or non-standardly structured, fn. 24) guises, Salmón is able to solve the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case. However, manoeuver (~e) appears somewhat artificial. Concerning maneuver (~b), it seems like he arrives at defending it with a reasoning by exclusion, viz. after excluding that the rejection of Frege’s Constraint and its replacement with Frege’s Constraint* is a viable option to solve the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case; nevertheless, no justification for such exclusion is provided.Footnote 25
4.3 Salmón’s argument for the strategy underlying his solution: the “Ortcutt” case
The argument that Salmón puts forward in support of the falsity of (T1) (the thesis he rejects in order to solve Schiffer’s “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case) is an alleged counterexample presented in his article “The Resilience of Illogical Belief” (2006, p. 371). Suppose that a rational subject, Ralph, sincerely, on reflection and competently utters “He is taller than he is”, pointing first to a picture portraying a man in a brown hat and then to another picture portraying a man at the beach. Failing to realize that the two pictures portray the same man, Bernard J. Ortcutt, Ralph comes to believe the Russellian proposition <Ortcutt, being taller than, Ortcutt> . Based on claim (B) (beginning of Sect. 1) and utilizing the guise corresponding to Ralph’s aforementioned utterance, report (13) below turns out to be true.
- (13)
Ralph believes that Ortcutt is taller than Ortcutt.
Of course, (13) does not imply (14) below: otherwise, Ralph would also believe the Russellian proposition <Ortcutt, being taller than oneself> , to the effect of being irrational or extremely confuse. All the more reason and more interestingly for our discussion, (13) (which is an instance of the de dicto schema (C)) does not imply and, therefore, does not entail (15) below (which Salmón (2006, p. 371) identifies as an instance of the de re schema (D)). Since “the resulting instance of [(T1), i.e. the thesis that allows the inference from (C) to (D), is] false” (2006, p. 371), Salmón concludes that such a thesis is violated.
- (14)
Ralph believes that Ortcutt is taller than himself.
- (15)
Ralph believes Ortcutt to be such that he is taller than himself.
4.4 An objection to Salmón’s argument
Salmón is certainly right in maintaining that (13) does not imply and, therefore, does not entail (15). However, it is debatable whether the falsity of this entailment provides a counterexample to (T1): whereas (13) unquestionably has the de dicto form (C), it is far from obvious that (15) has the corresponding de re form (D) required to falsify (T1). An instance of (D) is (16) below, where the two occurrences of the pronoun “he” are anaphorically linked to the name “Ortcutt” (fn. 3); yet, as we will see shortly, it can be argued—based on Kaplan (1986: Appendix B)—that (17) below, and not (15), is an appropriate paraphrase of (16). Now, if (16) (whose form is (D)) is paraphrased as (17), it turns out that (13) (whose form is (C)) implies (16), with the result that thesis (T1) is no longer falsified in the “Ortcutt” case.
- (16)
Ralph believes Ortcutt to be such that he is taller than he.
- (17)
Ralph believes Ortcutt and Ortcutt to be such that the former is taller than the latter.
The aforementioned implications can be restated more perspicuously using the propositions (13p), (15p) and (17p) below, instead of the sentences expressing them, (13), (15) and (17): in the “Ortcutt” case, proposition (13p) does not imply proposition (15p), whereas it does imply proposition (17p).
- (13p)
<Ralph, believing, <Ortcutt, being taller than, Ortcutt>>
- (15p)
<Ralph, believing*, Ortcutt, λx[x is taller than x]>
- (17p)
<Ralph, believing*, <Ortcutt, Ortcutt>, λxλy[x is taller than y]>
Let’s now focus on the aforementioned claim that (17), and not (15), is the appropriate paraphrase of (16), which is crucial for the rejection of Salmón’s counterexample to (T1). Notably, in his article “Relational Belief” (1995, pp. 213–214), Salmón himself observes that a procedure from Kaplan (1986: Appendix B) called “articulation” yields precisely such a claim as an outcome:
[A] serious flaw in Quine’s [(1956)] proposal was uncovered by Kaplan in “Opacity” ([1986: Appendix B]). … Kaplan pointed out … that Quine’s method … is insensitive to subtle distinctions in content involving the phenomenon that I call “reflexivity”. … [S]uppose Ralph is under the illusion that the man in the brown hat is taller than the man at the beach. It would seem then that the following sentence is true: [(16)]. Quine’s procedure translates this sentence into [something like (15p)] which may be read: [(15)]. Unless Ralph is insane this is false. Kaplan improved upon Quine’s scheme by employing a procedure that Kaplan calls “articulation”. Kaplan translates the problem sentence[, i.e. (16),] instead into something along the lines of: [(17p)]. This may be read: [(17)].” (Salmón, 1995, pp. 213-214—underlining mine)
So, by paraphrasing (16) as (15) in “The Resilience of Illogical Belief” (2006), Salmón appears to make the same “mistake” that a decade earlier, in “Relational Belief” (1995), he, following Kaplan (1986), ascribed to Quine (1956). Salmón’s shift is surprising and challenging to justify, leaving room only for speculative explanations.Footnote 26
Regardless, having ascertained a sharp discrepancy between Salmón’s (2006) position and Kaplan’s (1986)/Salmón’s (1995) position, the question arises as to which of the two is more plausible. In my opinion, there are good reasons to counter the former position and hence favor the latter. For, first, if (15) were the correct paraphrase of (16), then in (16) the second occurrence of the pronoun “he” would be anaphorically linked to its first occurrence, since in (15) the position of that second occurrence is occupied by the reflexive pronoun “himself”. But nothing in (16) compels us to interpret the second occurrence of “he” in that way: (16) only mandates the interpretation of both anaphoric occurrences of “he” as linked to the common antecedent “Ortcutt”, with no obligation to consider anaphora as a transitive relation, given that “Ortcutt” in (16) is placed outside the linguistic context “to be such that …”. We should also bear in mind that (16) is the de re sentence corresponding to the de dicto sentence (13), and no feature of (13) suggests that in (16) the second occurrence of “he” is anaphorically linked to the first; quite the opposite, the “Ortcutt” case supports the conclusion that no anaphoric link holds between those two occurrences, as a consequence of the fact that in such a case, Ralph fails to realize that the man in a brown hat is the man at the beach.Footnote 27
As regards the alternative (in my opinion, preferable) paraphrase (17) of (16), one could object that it is also unsuitable: (17) contains two occurrences of “Ortcutt”, whereas (16) contains one occurrence of this name. In reply, I should note that if we aim, using the lambda calculus, to render the idea that in (16) both occurrences of “he” are anaphorically linked to “Ortcutt” while keeping open the possibility that the second occurrence is not anaphorically linked to the first (a possibility that, as I have argued above, is a fact in the “Ortcutt” case), the only available option seems to be Kaplan’s (1986) proposal (17p); and proposition (17p) is inevitably expressed by something like (17), where two occurrences of “Ortcutt” appear.Footnote 28
I must then conclude that no (clear) counterexample to thesis (T1) stems from the “Ortcutt” case: a counterexample emerges if, following Salmón (2006, p. 371), (16) (undoubtedly an instance of (D)) is paraphrased as (15); on the other hand, the counterexample vanishes if, following Kaplan (1986) and Salmón (1995), (16) is paraphrased as (17); and, as I have argued in this sub-section, Sect. 4.4, there are good reasons to favor the Kaplanian paraphrase (17) over the Quinean paraphrase (15).
4.5 More on Salmón’s strategy and further objections to it
Let’s return to Salmón’s strategy for resolving the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case, which, as explained in Sect. 4.1, consists in the rejection of thesis (T1). It is worth noting that Salmón considers valid (rightly, from a Millian-Russellian viewpoint) the inference from the de dicto report (5) (Sect. 3.1) to the de re report (19) below, which is also an instance of the (rejected) thesis (T1). In light of this, he (2006, p. 371) finds it appropriate to replace (T1) with (T3) below. Thesis (T3), which is a variant of (T1), allows him to claim that in the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case, the first-order de dicto report (5) entails the corresponding de re report (19), since the predicate “was a man” is monadic; at the same time, (T3) is taken by Salmón to be compatible with his solution to Schiffer’s puzzle—namely, blocking the move (viz. denying the implication and thus the entailment) from the second-order de dicto report (7)/(8) to the corresponding de re report (9)/(10) (Sect. 3.1)—due to the fact that the predicate “believes” is not monadic.
- (19)
Ralph believes George Eliot to be such that she was a man.
- (T3)
Every instance of the de dicto schema (C), i.e. ⌜α believes that Φβ⌝, entails the corresponding instance of the de re schema (D), i.e. ⌜α believes β to be such that Φit⌝, if Φit has monadic-predicational form, “It”+VP, and under the threefold assumption that β is instantiated by a Millian singular term, VP is a monadic predicate, and “it” in (D) as well as in VP does not occur free.
I am not persuaded that the replacement of (T1) with (T3) allows Salmón to achieve his goals: the denial of the implication from (7)/(8) to (9)/(10) falsifies the former as well as the latter thesis. In fact, the exact instance of Φit in the report (9)/(10) (instantiating (D)) is not “believes” (as I conceded above) but is “Ralph believes that she was a man” or rather: “She” + “is believed by Ralph to have been a man” (concerning this harmless shift from de dicto to de re, see fn. 16). Now, since “is believed by Ralph to have been a man” is a complex monadic predicate, (T3) successfully applies to (7)/(8), licensing the move from (7)/(8) to (9)/(10), in contrast with Salmón’s intended solution to the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case.
In order to avoid this drawback, Salmón could replace thesis (T1)/(T3) with the even more sophisticated thesis (T4) below, where by simple-monadic predicate I mean a monadic predicate from which no polyadic predicate can be carved out (e.g. “was a man” is simple monadic, whereas “loved Evans” isn’t because from the latter a dyadic predicate, “loved”, can be carved out).
- (T4)
Every instance of the de dicto schema (C), i.e. ⌜α believes that Φβ⌝, entails the corresponding instance of the de re schema (D), i.e. ⌜α believes β to be such that Φit⌝, if Φit has simple-monadic predicational form, “It”+VP, and under the threefold assumption that β is instantiated by a Millian singular term, VP is a simple-monadic predicate, and “it” in (D) does not occur free.
Unfortunately, thesis (T4) does not provide justification for a case like the following, signaled by Schiffer (2008, §3), where an instance of (C), viz. (5*) below, seems to entail (from a Millian-Russellian viewpoint) the corresponding instance of (D), viz. (19*) below, despite the fact that the relevant instance of Φit, viz. “loved Evans”, has complex-monadic predicational form:
Consider … Dr. Fritz Lauben, an acquaintance of George Henry Lewes who knew Mary Ann Evans and knew about the love affair she and Lewes were having. I should think that if
- (19)
Ralph believes George Eliot to [be such that she was] a man
counts as true by virtue of its being the case that
- (5)
Ralph believes that George Eliot was a man,
then
- (19*)
Fritz believed Lewes to [be such that he] loved [Evans]
… should count as true by virtue of its being the case that
- (5*)
Fritz believed that Lewes loved Evans.
Finally, and more problematically, as we will see in the upcoming Sect. 5, the strategy of replacing thesis (T1) with thesis (T4), and a fortiori the strategy of replacing (T1) with (T3), does not resolve the new puzzle I am going to present in that section.
5 The “Superman”/“Clark Kent” puzzling case
5.1 The puzzle
The “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case aims to achieve results similar to Schiffer’s “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case, with the advantage that the overall strategy proposed in the second part of Sect. 4.5 for resolving the latter case, i.e. rejecting thesis (T1) and replacing it with thesis (T4), does not apply to the former case. The key difference between the two puzzles lies in the fact that the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case, unlike the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case, involves first-order (instead of second-order) belief reports where the instances of Φit have simple-monadic predicational form.
The new puzzling case originates in ideas, presented in Saul’s article “Substitution and Simple Sentences” (1997) and in Braun’s and Saul’s later article “Simple Sentences, Substitutions, and Mistaken Evaluations” (2002), about simple sentences that provoke anti-substitution intuitions.
Many competent speakers initially judge that [(20) below] is true and [(21)] is false, though they know that (22) is true.
… But perhaps you [do] not have these intuitions. No matter: it’s undeniable that many competent, rational, relevantly well-informed speakers who understand these sentences do have these intuitions, at least initially—the reactions of readers to Saul (1997) are sufficient to establish this. (Braun & Saul, 2002, pp. 1–2—underlining mine)
- (20)
Superman can fly, while Clark Kent cannot fly.
- (21)
Superman can fly, while Superman cannot fly.Footnote 29
- (22)
Superman is identical with Clark Kent.
The data provided in the quoted passage above are grounded on experience; as such, they can be taken at face value (unless stronger empirical data that disprove the former are put forward). Now, let Emily be one of the many rational English speakers, mentioned by Braun and Saul, who, although they know that (22) is true, have the intuition that (20) is true and (21) is false. In light of the provided data, we expect Emily to have the disposition to utter sentence (20) sincerely (due to her judgment that this sentence is true), on reflection (since she is “relevantly well informed”),Footnote 30 and competently; as confirmed in the quoted passage, she also understands such a sentence. Based on these considerations and by applying the Disquotational Principle (Sect. 3.1),Footnote 31 we conclude that Emily believes the proposition expressed by (20).
It is worth observing that such a conclusion can also be achieved without applying the Disquotational Principle but by employing Scott Soames’ characterization of belief as a disposition to judge:
To believe that B is red is … to be disposed to judge that it is. (Soames, 2015, p. 18)
In fact, starting from Braun’s and Saul’s (2002, p. 1) datum that Emily judges that (20) is true and using Soames’ characterization of belief, we derive that Emily believes that (20) is true. Since Emily understands sentence (20) (2002, p. 1) and therefore entertains the proposition it expresses, we conclude that Emily believes such a proposition.
Finally, note that this conclusion is also immediately derivable from the following further passages by Braun and Saul:
… the proposition that [(20)] … expresse[s is] false, but [Emily] c[o]me[s] to believe it [is] true. (2002, pp. 16–17—underlining mine)
[Emily] c[o]me[s] to believe that [(20)] is true and [(21)] is false. (2002, p. 20—underlining mine)
Now, having established—in three different ways, viz. (j) by applying the Disquotational Principle, (jj) by employing Soames’ (2015) characterization of belief, and (jjj) by simply exploiting some quotations by Braun and Saul (2002, pp. 16–17, 20)—that Emily believes the proposition expressed by (20), we can infer that she also believes (simultaneously) the propositions expressed by (23) and (24) below. Consequently, reports (25) and (26) below are true.Footnote 32
- (23)
Superman can fly.
- (24)
Clark Kent cannot fly.
- (25)
Emily believes that Superman can fly.
- (26)
Emily disbelieves that Clark Kent can fly.
Crucially for our discussion, since “can fly” is a simple monadic predicate, thesis (T4) (Sect. 4.5) applies to (25) and (26), licensing the moves from these de dicto reports to the de re reports (27) and (28) below respectively. At this point, the substitution in the de re report (27) of the name “Superman” with the coreferring—according to Saul (1997, pp. 103–105, 2007, Chap. 2) and Braun and Saul (2002, §3.1)—name “Clark Kent” yields (29) below.
- (27)
Emily believes Superman to be such that he can fly.
- (28)
Emily disbelieves Clark Kent to be such that he can fly.
- (29)
Emily believes Clark Kent to be such that he can fly.
Finally, from (28) and (29) the following falsification of Frege’s Constraint can be drawn: Emily rationally believes and disbelieves Clark to be such that he can fly (~ii) thinking of the property of being such that one can fly under only one mode of presentation and (~i) thinking of Clark without having different modes of presentation of him which Emily takes to present distinct individuals.Footnote 33
5.2 Two related objections to the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case and a reply
There is a couple of prima facie easy ways one could explore in order to dismiss the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case: arguing that the names “Superman” and “Clark Kent” refer to different entities or personae, say Clark-in-his-superhero-role and Clark-in-his-ordinary-life, to the effect that the substitution salva veritate of “Superman” with “Clark Kent” in (27) is not permitted (semantic objection); or arguing that in Emily’s statement (20), the token names “Superman” and “Clark Kent”, though (semantically) coreferential, are pragmatically/cognitively taken by Emily as referring to the aforementioned personae,Footnote 34 with the result that Emily ends up thinking of Clark under different modes of presentation which she mistakenly takes to present distinct entities, viz. the two personae in question, in accordance with Frege’s Constraint (pragmatic/cognitive objection).
In reply, it could be pointed out, first of all, that both objections do not match with Emily’s identity judgment that (22) is true (beginning of Sect. 5.1).Footnote 35 Secondly, I would like to present a variant of the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case—echoing analogous cases from Braun and Saul (2002, p. 11) and Saul (2007, §2.2.3.2, §2.2.3.3) but with a wider impact than them—where the token names “Superman” and “Clark Kent” in a particular utterance of (20) (semantically) corefer and are pragmatically/cognitively taken by Emily as coreferring, viz. as referring to Clark rather than to two distinct personae. Suppose that Emily sincerely, on reflection and competently assents to an utterance of (20) made by Lois Lane, who, unlike Emily, does not know that the identity sentence (22) is true. Assuming that Emily is aware of Lois’ ignorance, it seems intuitively correct to claim that Emily fully (i.e. semantically, pragmatically and cognitively) understands Lois’ utterance and thus grasps the proposition communicated (i.e. semantically expressed and/or pragmatically conveyed) by such an utterance. If ab absurdo two personae (instead of the individual Clark) were pragmatically/cognitively associated by Emily to Lois’ token names “Superman” and “Clark Kent”, then Emily, contrary to all evidence, would fail to understand Lois’ utterance pragmatically/cognitively: surely, by uttering (20), Lois does not intend to communicate a proposition about the entities Clark-in-his-superhero-role and Clark-in-his-ordinary-life; nor does Lois intend to cognitively take “Superman” and “Clark Kent” to refer to such entities, for the simple reason that she is unaware of Clark’s dual role in his life (in fact, she wrongly judges that Clark Kent and Superman are distinct individuals). Lois’ aforementioned intentions—both communicative and referential—combined with her competence in uttering (20) also rules out that her tokens of “Superman” and “Clark Kent” (semantically) refer to Clark-in-his-superhero-role and Clark-in-his-ordinary-life, and therefore that her utterance expresses a proposition about such entities: if ab absurdo those token names referred to the entities in question, then Lois, as a competent user of (20), would notice it, which instead does not happen. In sum, in order to account for the intuitive fact that Emily fully understands Lois’ utterance of (20) and for Lois’ communicative/referential intentions combined with her competence in uttering (20), we must conclude that at least in the present variant of the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case, the token names “Superman” and “Clark Kent” (semantically) corefer and Emily follows Lois in pragmatically/cognitively associating the individual Clark to them as their referent.Footnote 36
5.3 A third doubt about the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case and a couple of responses
Let’s return to the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case presented in Sect. 5.1. As we assumed in that sub-section, Emily, a rational speaker, has the disposition to utter sincerely, on reflection and competently conjunction (20). She is then expected to have the same sort of disposition towards its two conjuncts, (23) and (24). Let’s suppose that she in fact utters, under the aforementioned conditions, (23) and (24). One might wonder how, despite uttering (23) and judging that the identity sentence (22) is true, Emily refrains from drawing the conclusion (31) below, being instead disposed to utter sincerely and on reflection the negation of (31), namely (24).Footnote 37
(31) Clark Kent can fly.
Braun and Saul (2002, §4) and Saul (2007, Chap. 6, Appendix B.2.1) have offered various empirical/psychological explanations for such phenomenon, the most basic of which (basic explanation) relies on the hypothesis that when Emily utters (23) and (24), her identity judgment that (22) is true is somehow set aside—I would say, it is stored into a separate compartment of her mind.Footnote 38 As a result,
[Emily does] not consider [(22)] during [the] evaluation procedure; or if [she does], [she fails] to go through the sort of reasoning that would [allow her] to detect [her] mistake. (Braun & Saul, 2002, p. 17)
I am inclined to think that there is an even more basic explanation for the phenomenon in question, which does not presuppose the isolation of Emily’s identity judgment within her mind and which is written between the lines of Braun’s and Saul’s (2002) article:
[Emily] treat[s] “Superman” and “Clark[ Kent]” … as if they were about different people.
… Clark’s double life gives [Emily] good reason to [do so]. (Braun & Saul, 2002, p. 19−underlining mine)
On my own interpretation of these passages, treating as (which I also call “cognitive coordination”) is a non-semantic and non-pragmatic but cognitive relation between a subject and two token terms; such a relation is grounded (not in personae but) in the relations of taking as and doing as if, the latter being a sort of simulation of taking as (more details in fn. 12). Now, it happens that although Emily (unlike Lois Lane) correctly takes “Superman” in (23) and “Clark Kent” in (24) as coreferring, she does as if they were non-coreferring, in doing so simulating someone (like Lois) who wrongly takes them as non-coreferring. As a consequence of it, Emily (like Lois but for a different reason than her) does not treat “Superman” in (23) and “Clark Kent” in (24) as coreferring, i.e. she negatively coordinates them. This fact allows Emily to utter the quasi-contradictory sentences (23) and (24) sincerely, on reflection and rationally while knowing that (22) is true, and thus justifies her unwillingness to draw at least in some occasions, for instance the one under discussion, the conclusion (31) above (which plainly contradicts (24)) from the premises (22) and (23).
6 From Salmón and Schiffer to an alternative strategy for solving the two puzzles
6.1 Objections to Salmón: a summary
Let’s sum up the criticisms I have addressed to Salmón in the previous sections:
- (I)
Salmón’s solution to Schiffer’s “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case appears not entirely justified with respect to its endorsement of Frege’s Constraint, and artificial with respect to its appeal to sui generis (viz. unstructured or non-standardly structured) guises (Sect. 4.2);
- (II)
Salmón’s argument for the strategy underlying his own solution, i.e. rejecting thesis (T1), is disputable (Sect. 4.4);
- (III)
Salmón’s overall strategy of replacing the rejected thesis (T1) with thesis (T3) does not allow him to achieve the intended solution to the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case (Sect. 4.5);
- (IV)
Such a strategy and even the more sophisticated one that replaces thesis (T1) with thesis (T4) fail to solve the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case (Sect. 5.1).
Among (I)–(IV), the objections of greatest impact are, I think, (III) and (IV). In response to these two objections, Salmón could, in principle, maintain that it is possible to formulate a thesis, even more sophisticated than (T4), which resolves the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case by blocking the move from (7)/(8) to (9)/(10) (Sect. 3.1), and the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case by blocking the move from (25)/(26) to (27)/(28) (Sect. 5.1). On the other hand, the desired thesis is also expected to offer a justification for the valid (from a Millian-Russellian viewpoint) inferences from (5) to (19) and from (5*) to (19*) (Sect. 4.5). I wonder how all these desiderata could be fulfilled without sharpening the criticism (I), viz. without rendering Salmón’s solution to the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case and the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case more artificial.
6.2 Some objections to Schiffer
So, the strategy of resolving the two puzzles by replacing (T1) with some more sophisticated thesis does not seem very promising. In order to devise a better strategy, it is useful to reconsider the list of elements that, based on Schiffer (2006, pp. 363–364, 2008, §1–§2) and based on what we discovered in Sect. 3 and in the second part of Sect. 4.2, underpin his “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case, i.e.:
- (a)
Salmón’s claim (B) about the truth conditions of de dicto belief reports;
- (b)
thesis (T1);
- (c)
Salmón’s semantics of de re belief reports;
- (d)
Frege’s Constraint;
- (e)
Propositional guises are (standardly) structured entities.
As anticipated in Sect. 3.2, Schiffer’s (1987, 2006) strategy to solve his own puzzle consists in rejecting (a) and, ultimately, the Millian-Russellian semantics of belief reports.
Nevertheless, various criticisms may be raised against this strategy. First, as the reader can verify by going over my exposition of the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case in Sect. 3.1 (and considering the additional point made in the second part of Sect. 4.2), elements (a) (enriched with (e)) and (c) are not indispensable in order to generate this case: the move from Jane’s linguistic dispositions towards (5) and (6) to the de dicto reports (7) and (8) can be performed using the Disquotational Principle instead of (a); and the move from the de re report (10) to (11) is authorized by any semantics involving de re belief reports (fn. 9), not exclusively by (c). Given these ascertainments, it can be alternatively and perhaps more plausibly argued that the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case is generated by the following four elements: (a*), (b), (c*) and (d). If so, pace Schiffer, the import of his puzzle would not lie in the failure of the dispensable element (a).
- (a*)
Disquotational Principle.
- (c*)
any semantics involving de re belief reports.
Regarding Schiffer’s rejection of the Millian-Russellian semantics of belief reports in the light of his puzzle, it could be critically pointed out that none of the elements (a*), (b), (c*) and (d) is exclusive of this semantics, but they are also involved in other semantics. This is obvious for (a*). Concerning (b) and (c*), remember that, as famously shown by Kaplan (1968), Fregeanism can also encompass de re constructions and thus the de dicto/de re distinction. As for (d), Schiffer (1990, pp. 249–254) himself has maintained that most (Millian-Russellian as well as) non-Millian-Russellian theories of belief reports involving modes of presentation (more or less explicitly) commit to Frege’s Constraint. In addition, as argued in Sects. 3.2 and 4.2, it is a viable option for a Millian-Russellian theorist to dismiss modes of presentation, thus completely renouncing (d). Based on all these considerations, which can be extended mutatis mutandis to the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case, the following conclusion can be drawn:
- (V)
Pace Schiffer, the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case poses a problem not specifically to the Millian-Russellian semantics of belief reports, and so does the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case. Therefore, the import of both puzzles is not the failure of this semantics.
6.3 An alternative strategy
What is, then, a good strategy to solve the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case and the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case? Taking for granted that (a*) and (c*) should not be rejected,Footnote 39 two options remain: either rejecting (b); or rejecting (d). In Sect. 6.1, I turned down Salmón’s proposal of rejecting (b), in light of (I)–(IV). By exclusion, (d) should be rejected. So,
- (VI)
the import of the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case and the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case is the failure of Frege’s Constraint.
On my own view, Frege’s Constraint is replaced by the Relationist Constraint (end of Sect. 3.2), involving cognitive coordination (fn. 12); accordingly, the two puzzles are solved as indicated in footnotes 19 and 33.
6.4 A further doubt about Schiffer
In his book The Things We Mean (2003), Schiffer has proposed a very original semantics for simple sentences and belief reports, according to which:
type linguistic expressions lack semantic content but have character*, which serves to constrain the semantic content of their tokens (2003, pp. 132–133, 156);
statements (or token declarative sentences) express Schifferian propositions, i.e. propositions which are pleonastic (2003, p. 71), unstructured (2003, pp. 82, 84), and more or less fine-grained (2003, pp. 82, 84) depending on the conversational contexts where the statements are made (2003, pp. 80, 81);
token singular terms and token predicates in belief statements are semantically innocent, with the former retaining their customary referent (2003, p. 84) and the latter preserving their customary content (Schiffer’s Replies in Ostertag, 2016, pp. 387, 408);
believing is a two-place relation between a subject and a Schifferian proposition (2003, p. 84).
Nothing seems to prevent us from introducing a de dicto/de re distinction within Schiffer’s semantics: token sentences of de dicto form (C) could be said to express Schifferian propositions with a granularity comparable to that of propositions of the form <a, believing, that Fb> , where that Fb ranges over fine-grained Schifferian propositions; and token sentences of de re form (D) could be said to express Schifferian propositions with a granularity comparable to that of propositions of the form <a, believing*, b, being such that one has F> (second part of Sect. 1). If so, in the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case, from Jane’s rationally believing the fine-grained Schifferian propositions that Ralph believes that George Eliot was a man and that Ralph does not believe that Mary Ann Evans was a man we deduce, in accordance with Schiffer’s theory and using thesis (T1), Schifferian propositions having a granularity comparable to that of the propositions (9p) and (10p) in Sect. 4.2, despite the fact that Jane does not have different ways of thinking (Schiffer’s Replies in Ostertag, 2016, pp. 411, 433) of Eliot which she takes to present distinct individuals,Footnote 40 in contrast with Frege’s Constraint.Footnote 41 It is therefore evident that:
- (VII)
Schiffer’s “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case, and mutatis mutandis the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case, pose a problem to Schiffer’s theory of belief reports as well.
Given this outcome, which aligns with the previous conclusion (V) (Sect. 6.2), one may wonder how Schiffer would solve within his theory the two puzzles—generated by (a*), (b), (c*), (d) (Sect. 6.2)—and in particular his “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case: it is highly probable that Schiffer (1987, p. 465, 2006, p. 363) endorses some version of the (a*) Disquotational Principle; and he would certainly have no objection to incorporating (c*) de re belief reports into his theory, as proposed above; nor, in light of his (2006, pp. 365–367), would he abandon (d) Frege’s Constraint in favor of Frege’s Constraint*. Perhaps, in line with his (2016, p. 452), he is inclined to resolve his puzzle by (~b) rejecting thesis (T1) like Salmón; on the other hand, in this paper, I have extensively criticized such a strategy (see Sect. 6.1 for a summary of my criticisms) and I have also defended thesis (T1) (see fn. 7).
7 Conclusions
Although I (unlike Schiffer) endorse the Millian-Russellian semantics of belief reports (fn. 17), I (pace Salmón) think that the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case should not be solved by denying the implication from (7)/(8) to (9)/(10) (Sect. 3.1), nor should the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case be solved by denying the implication from (25)/(26) to (27)/(28) (Sect. 5.1), leading to the rejection of thesis (T1). Arguably, this thesis is true within a Millian-Russellian framework—considering that potential counterexamples to (T1) like the “Shorty” case can be discharged as proposed in fn. 7.
My solution (Sect. 4.2 and footnotes 19, 33) to the two puzzling cases consists in denying the implication from the conjunction of (9) and (10)/(11) to (12) (Sects. 3.1, 4.2) and the implication from the conjunction of (27)/(29) and (28) to (30) (Sect. 5.1 and fn. 33). The truth of (9)–(11) and (27)–(29) is ensured by the rejection of Frege’s Constraint (Sect. 6.3) and its replacement with the Rationalist Constraint (end of Sect. 3.2), the latter involving cognitive coordination (fn. 12) instead of modes of presentation.
As became evident in Sect. 6, the rejection of Frege’s Constraint poses a challenge not only to Salmón (1986a) but also to Schiffer (2003) and to all mode-of-presentation theorists of belief reports who (more or less explicitly) assume that modes of presentation fulfill this constraint.Footnote 42
Notes
Salmón (1986a, p. 120) has advanced various hypotheses regarding what guises are, without endorsing any of them explicitly: “Is [a guise] perhaps [a] proposition [more fine-grained than the BELed proposition,] or a sentence in the language of thought? Is it a ‘mental file’?”. The roles that guises play are, instead, clarified by Salmón (1986a, 1989) and can be summarized as follows:
-
Semantic role: guises contribute to the truth conditions of belief sentences/statements in the manner specified in claim (B), without contributing to the semantic content of any sentence/statement in accordance with claim (A);
-
Pragmatic role: guises routinely contribute to the pragmatic content of (i.e. to what is pragmatically conveyed or imparted by) belief statements;
-
Cognitive role: guises satisfy Frege’s Constraint;
-
Epistemic role: guises are ways of being de re connected with Russellian propositions and their constituents.
-
De re connection: The epistemic relation of singling out (or selecting) an object directly (i.e. not via a descriptive abstract entity determining the object), which has as sub-relations:
-
(j) acquaintance, e.g. introspection of one’s own mental tokens, perception of ordinary (material) objects, memory, and entertainment or grasp of universals (e.g. attributes, propositions, mathematical entities);
-
(jj) epistemic causal connections, e.g. causal sub-relations of acquaintance, testimony or communication paths, creation;
-
(jjj) compositions of multiple relations of the sort (j) and/or (jj).
-
-
An anonymous reviewer has maintained that Frege’s Constraint should be interpreted so as to provide both a necessary and sufficient condition for rationally believing and disbelieving b to be such that it has F; consequently, in the formulation above, “only if” should be replaced by “if and only if”. I don’t have, in principle, any objection to this interpretation of Frege’s Constraint. I wish to remark, on the other hand, that Salmón (1989, p. 258, 2006, p. 370) and Schiffer (1990, p. 252, 2006, p. 362, 2008, §1) formulate the constraint as a merely necessary condition. I would like to follow them on this for a couple of reasons: first, if they do so, I assume that for the purposes of their debate and hence of my paper, such a formulation suffices; second, my paper is largely devoted to criticize aspects of (viz. strategies employed within) Salmón’s theory, and in his theory Frege’s Constraint is formulated as a necessary condition. Incidentally, the considerations just made can be extended mutatis mutandis to the various cognates of Frege’s Constraint that will be presented in the next pages (Frege’s Constraint*, Ralationist Constraint, etc.).
One further observation: the particular formulation of Frege’s Constraint adopted above, which is well suited for the general purposes of my paper, is very close to Schiffer’s (2008). In fact, Salmón (1989, 2006) offers a slightly different formulation, where my/Schiffer’s phrase “a thinks of b/G under different modes of presentation which a takes to present distinct objects/properties” is replaced by the phrase “a takes/grasps b/G by means of different guises which a construes as guises of distinct objects/properties”; in the latter, “takes/grasps b/G by means of a guise” could be understood, coherently with what stated in fn. 1, as being de re connected with b/G in a certain way.
The pronoun “it” in (D) does not occur free in the sense that it “occurs anaphorically on the occurrence of β” (Schiffer 2008, §1). This characterization could be objected to on the grounds that, given the semantic content <a, believing*, b, λx[Fx]> assigned to (D), the pronoun “it” occurs in (D) not as an anaphor linked to its antecedent β, but as a variable bound to the lambda operator “λ” or “to be … such that”. In response, I wish to emphasize that the proposed characterization is considered standard both in philosophy of language and in linguistics; this leads me to accept it at face value.
I would like to make three remarks about the semantic content of (D). First, pay attention not to confuse believing* with BEL, the three-place relation, mentioned in claim (B), of a subject’s being disposed to inwardly or mentally assent to a Russellian proposition grasped by means of a guise. Second, a comment on λx[Fx]: this is a one-place function that takes single individuals, fills the open proposition <__, F> with them, and outputs Russellian propositions; more on propositional functions of this sort, which originate in Russell (1905), can be found in Salmón (1986a, pp. 155–157n4) and in my (2018, §7). The third remark concerns <a, believing*, b, λx[Fx]> : we will discover in fn. 27 that this propositional form is too simple to serve as the semantic content of the de re schema (D) on every occasion; however, at the current stage of the paper, such a form suffices.
In this paper, I will only consider definite descriptions used as non-Millian terms, viz. terms designating their denotation (i.e. the described object) and whose semantic content is or includes a descriptive entity (property or abstract kind) which determines the denotation.
As confirmed by Schiffer in (2008, §1, §2, 2016, p. 451), Salmón (1986a, p. 3, 1995, §I, §III, 2006, p. 371) even draws a distinction between the de re schema (D) and the mixed schema (E)/(E*) below, the latter containing the phrase “is (something/someone) such that α believes that”/“believes of/about”. Instances of (E)/(E*), where the pronoun “it” does not occur free, express Russellian propositions of the form <b, being (one) such that a believes that one has F> or identically <b, λx [a believes that Fx]>.
-
(E)
β is (something/someone) such that α believes that Φit.
-
(E*)
α believes of/about β that Φit.
Like the de re schema (D) and unlike the de dicto schema (C), the mixed schema (E)/(E*) allows the substitution salva veritate of the Millian singular term instantiating β not only with coreferring Millian singular terms but also with codesignative definite descriptions: e.g. in “Aristotle is such that Lucy believes that he is a philosopher”/“Lucy believes of/about Aristotle that he is a philosopher”, the name “Aristotle” is substitutable salva veritate with the description “the teacher of Alexander the Great”. Conversely, like the de dicto schema (C) and unlike the de re schema (D), the mixed schema (E)/(E*) irretrievably contains the phrase “believes that”/“believes … that”; hence, the semantic content of (E)/(E*) irretrievably includes a Russellian proposition as a constituent.
-
(E)
Thesis (T1) is challenged by cases like e.g. the “Shorty” case. Suppose that there is only one person on earth who exemplifies the property of being the shortest spy and with who we are not de re connected (fn. 1); call this person “Shorty”. Several theorists of belief reports, including some Millian Russellians—e.g. Jeshion (2010) and even Kaplan (1989a, p. 536), but possibly not Kaplan (1989b, pp. 606–607)—deem that although we have no de re beliefs concerning Shorty, we have de dicto beliefs concerning him or her, to the effect that while sentence (4) below (instantiating the de re schema (D)) is false, sentence (3) below (instantiating the de dicto schema (C)) is true, for example in a context where I am the utterer of (3) and (4); consequently, thesis (T1) (allowing the inference from (C) to (D)) is falsified.
-
(3)
I believe that Shorty is a spy.
-
(4)
I believe Shorty to be such that s/he is a spy.
This counterexample to (T1) is, nevertheless, rebutted by Salmón as follows. First, Salmón (1995, p. 215, 2004, pp. 246–247) endorses thesis (T2) below.
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(T2)
A subject has a cognitive attitude (entertainment or grasp, understanding, judgment, belief, etc.) towards a Russellian proposition only if s/he is de re connected with such a proposition and with all its constituents.
From thesis (T2) and Salmón’s Millian-Russellian semantics of belief reports, viz. claims (A) and (B) (beginning of Sect. 1), it follows that (3)—exactly as (4)—is false (Salmón 2010, p. 72): according to this semantics, the name “Shorty” in (3) (despite having its referent introduced via a definite description, “the shortest spy”) is a Millian term and hence contributes solely its referent, Shorty, to the Russellian proposition expressed by (3); now, since, by assumption, I am not de re connected with Shorty, it follows from (T2) that I do not believe the Russellian proposition <Shorty, being a spy>, with the result that the de dicto report (3) is false—exactly as the de re report (4). So, (3) and (4) have the same truth value (both are false); in this way, the correctness of (T1) is vindicated in the “Shorty” case (and mutatis mutandis in all similar cases involving Millian terms that refer to objects we are not de re connected with).
In my (2023), I have argued that despite certain prima facie counterintuitive consequences, Salmón’s solution to the “Shorty” case is preferable to its alternatives. Readers unconvinced by Salmón’s solution could amend thesis (T1) by restricting its scope of application to cases where subject a (i.e. the referent of the substituend for α) is de re connected with object b (i.e. the referent of the substituend for β), in this way excluding from such a scope potentially problematic cases like the “Shorty” case.
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(3)
The Disquotational Principle originates in Kripke (1979, pp. 248–249). The qualifications “normal speaker”, “on reflection” and “sincerely” are characterized by Kripke (1979, p. 249—underlining mine) as follows: “a normal speaker of English … uses all words in the sentence in a standard way, combines them according to the appropriate syntax, etc.: in short, he uses the sentence to mean what a normal speaker should mean by it. … The qualification ‘on reflection’ guards against the possibility that a speaker may, through careless inattention to the meaning of his words or other momentary conceptual or linguistic confusion, assert something he does not really mean, or assent to a sentence in linguistic error. ‘Sincerely’ is meant to exclude mendacity, acting, irony, and the like”. Based on these characterizations, in a case—signaled by an anonymous reviewer—where McEnroe shouts “You’re blind” at a line judge who called his ball out, McEnroe’s utterance does not count as sincere; therefore, the Disquotational Principle does not apply to this case.
Nonetheless, Kripke (1979, p. 249) fears that “even with all this it is possible that some … reader … may discover a[n overlooked] qualification …, without which the asserted principle is subject to counterexample”. The qualification “under normal circumstances” contained in the above formulation of the Disquotational Principle is an addition by Salmón (2011, p. 248) to Kripke’s original formulation, which aims to exclude “genuinely bizarre circumstances—as, for example, in which a normal speaker is under a hypnotic spell, or under the control of a Cartesian demon, and as a result signals assent when he/she intends to dissent” (2011, p. 237n4).
The qualification “which a understands” (or, more explicitly, “a understands the semantic content of, i.e. the proposition expressed by, S”) is a further addition aiming to avoid a counterexample generated by the “Shorty” case (fn. 7): assuming that I am not de re connected with Shorty, I do not believe that Shorty is a spy, even if I am disposed to utter sincerely, on reflection and competently “Shorty is a spy”. Thanks to this qualification, the counterexample is evaded as follows: since I am not de re connected with Shorty, I do not entertain and therefore I do not understand the Russellian proposition <Shorty, being a spy> ; consequently, the Disquotational Principle does not apply to the “Shorty” case.
Generally speaking, by de re belief report, I mean, in line with what established in the second part of Sect. 1, a report of the form (D), i.e. ⌜α believes β to be such that Φit⌝, which is true if and only if the three-place relation of believing* holds among the designatum of the singular term instantiating α, the designatum of the singular term instantiating β, and the property expressed by the predicate instantiating ⌜to be such that Φit⌝; given these truth conditions, in the report in question, the singular term instantiating β is substitutable salva veritate with any codesignative singular term, definite descriptions included. As a noteworthy consequence of this characterization, the fact that a belief sentence/statement of the form (C), i.e. ⌜α believes that Φβ⌝, contains a Millian term in the “that”-clause is not sufficient (nor is necessary) to conclude that such a sentence/statement is de re and, therefore, to render the Millian term at issue substitutable salva veritate with a codesignative singular term even if Millian in turn: the Hidden-Indexical theory of belief statements (Schiffer 1992) provides evidence for this.
In “The ‘Fido’-Fido Theory of Belief” (1987, pp. 464–465), Schiffer argued that in order to solve the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case, Salmón is compelled to deny—implausibly, on Schiffer’s opinion—(7) and (8), since Jane cannot rationally believe and disbelieve the Russellian proposition (5p) (Sect. 3.1) given her knowledge that “George Eliot” and “Mary Ann Evans” corefer; consequently, (~a) claim (B) and, the Disquotational Principle as well, should be rejected or somehow amended by Salmón. In the postscript of the same article, nevertheless, Schiffer (1987, pp. 474, 476) acknowledged Salmón’s (APA meeting, San Francisco, 1987, reiterated in his 1989, pp. 264–265, 267–268) reply that (7) and (8) are true, thanks to Jane’s mistake in taking the Russellian proposition (5p) for two distinct things.
In his later article “A Problem for a Direct-Reference Theory of Belief Reports” (2006, pp. 363–364), Schiffer strengthened his objection, pointing out that from (7) and (8), we are led, using thesis (T1), to the (allegedly) problematic de re reports (9) and (10). As a way out—which he judged inadmissible—Schiffer (2006, pp. 365–367) considered the possibility that Salmón (~d) rejects Frege’s Constraint. As we will see in Sect. 4.1, option (~d) is not Salmón’s (2006) solution to the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case.
A terminological note: in his works, e.g. in (2016, pp. ix, 11–12), Récanati calls Frege’s Constraint* “Frege’s Constraint”. No surprise: Schiffer’s formulation of Frege’s Constraint has changed over the years, shifting from what I call “Frege’s Constraint*” in (1978, p. 180) to what I call “Frege’s Constraint” in (1990, p. 252, 2006, p. 362, 2008, §1). While Récanati explicitly follows Schiffer (1978), I follow Schiffer (1990, 2006, 2008): my paper is about Salmón-Schiffer debate, occurred between 1987 and 2016; hence, the formulation of the constraint relevant for such a debate is the later one.
Taking cues from Fine (2007), Salmón (2012) and my (2012, Chap. 6), in (2019, §7.3, 2020, §7, 2021, §10) I have characterized cognitive coordination as follows:
Cognitive coordination: This is a three-place non-semantic and non-pragmatic but merely cognitive relation holding between a subject a and a pair of occurrences, b1 and b2, of the same or different objects, included in the same or different Russellian propositions entertained by a; correspondingly, cognitive coordination also holds between a and a pair of token Millian singular terms, β1 and β2, having b1 and b2 as semantic contents and being included in the same or different statements, made competently by a, which express(es) the aforementioned proposition(s). Occurrences b1 and b2, and thereby terms β1 and β2, are positively (i.e. not negatively) coordinated for a if and only if a treats b1 and b2 as occurrences of the same object, i.e. if and only if the following two conditions are jointly satisfied:
(j) a (correctly or incorrectly) takes b1 and b2 as occurrences of the same object;
(jj) it is not the case that a does as if b1 and b2 were not occurrences of the same object.
As it is evident from this characterization, cognitive coordination (or treating as) is grounded in the relations of taking as and doing as if: doing as if is a sort of simulation of taking as, whereas taking as and simulation can be understood as philosophically basic but neuroscientifically analyzable (e.g. along the lines sketched in my 2019, p. 495n27). Coordination is then not reducible to modes of presentation (following Fine, 2007, §A of Chap. 3 and opposing Salmón, 2012, p. 437n40), even though is subjective, non-semantic and merely cognitive (following Salmón, 2012, §3 and opposing Fine, 2007). Examples illustrating the relations of cognitive coordination, taking as and doing as if will be offered in footnotes 19 and 33 and in Sect. 5.3.
Incidentally, one may wonder what happens if Ralph, who fails to realize that “George Eliot” and “George Eliot” corefer, utters “Mary Ann Evans admires Mary Ann Evans” and “Mary Ann Evans admires George Eliot”: it would seem that he both positively and negatively (i.e. not positively) coordinates the two occurrences of Eliot in the Russellian proposition <Eliot, admiring, Eliot> expressed these two utterances, which is, of course, absurd. Taking cue from an idea by Fine (2010, p. 479), I (2019, §8–§9) have suggested that in a case like this, we should posit at the cognitive level two occurrences of the aforementioned Russellian proposition, which serve to individuate in Ralph’s mind two token thoughts that Eliot admires Eliot: one token thought contains two positively coordinated token concepts of Eliot, whereas the other contains two negatively coordinated token concepts of her. (At this point, the characterization of cognitive coordination would need to be amended, in a way that I omit to specify here since it is irrelevant for the purposes of this paper; the interested reader may have a look at my 2019, §9.5.).
The only difference between Frege’s Constraint and Frege’s Constraint* lies in the two phrases “which a takes to present distinct objects” and “which a takes to present distinct properties”, contained in the former constraint but absent in the latter. Interestingly and relevantly for what I will argue in Sect. 4.2, Frege’s Constraint*, unlike Frege’s Constraint, allows a rational subject a to simultaneously believe and disbelieve b to be such that it has F, even when (~i) a thinks of b under different modes of presentation which a realizes are modes of presentation of the same object and (~ii) a thinks of the property of being such that one has F under only one mode of presentation.
A more exhaustive formulation of the Relationist Constraint—able to solve, besides the classical puzzles from Frege, Russell, Kripke, Perry, etc. and the two puzzling cases discussed in this paper, further puzzles about belief involving divided-mind believers and dialetheist believers—can be developed based on my (2021).
More exactly, the accordance here is with the following version of Frege’s Constraint:
Frege’s Constraint**: A subject a rationally believes and disbelieves the same Russellian proposition p only if in believing and disbelieving p, a grasps p by means of different guises which a takes to present distinct things.
To be precise, what Salmón (1995, pp. 218–219, 226n19) deems incompatible with Jane’s rationality is the truth of (9*) and (10*) below: since (9*) and (10*) (unlike (9) and (10)) contain no “that”-clause referring to the Russellian proposition <Eliot, having been a man> , there is no room in (9*) and (10*) (as instead there is, in principle, in (9) and (10)) to account for Jane’s rationality by maintaining that Jane mistakes such a proposition for two Fregean propositions or the like. For the sake of simplicity and at cost of lower precision, I will nevertheless continue employing (9) and (10) instead of (9*) and (10*).
-
(9*)
Jane believes George Eliot to be such that Ralph believes her to have been a man.
-
(10*)
Jane disbelieves Mary Ann Evans to be such that Ralph believes her to have been a man.
-
(9*)
The Millian-Russellian theory of belief reports I am sympathetic to includes Salmón’s claim (A) (beginning of Sect. 1), but replaces modes of presentation with cognitive coordination (fn. 12), and Frege’s Constraint with the Relationist Constraint (end of Sect. 3.2).
For completeness, I should add that since—as I argued in (2019, §7.4)—cognitive coordination is a non-transitive relation, modes of presentation cannot be built up and individuated using alleged equivalence classes of it. However, I (2019, §8–§9) have also maintained that by exploiting cognitive coordination and Russellian propositions, it is possible to introduce and individuate (along the line sketched in fn. 12) token thoughts, namely mental particulars having a granularity comparable to that of Russellian-proposition occurrences (thus intuitively more fine grained than modes of presentation), which combined with attitudinal modes— etc. (Crane, 2013, §4.4; Récanati, 2007)—give rise to further token (propositional) attitudes (token beliefs, token desires, token hopes, etc.). At this point, truth conditions of belief reports similar to the ones proposed by Salmón in claim (B) (beginning of Sect. 1) but having token beliefs in the place of guises, and a constraint similar to Frege’s Constraint* but involving token beliefs instead of modes of presentation, can be put forward. In a sense, token beliefs, and more generally token attitudes, are the remnants of modes of presentation; however, they do not need to play any role in the resolution to the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case and the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case, for which (as we will see in footnotes 19 and 33) cognitive coordination suffices.
It is important to clarify the difference between my position and Salmón’s, in order to avoid any misunderstanding. Salmón and I agree that the inference from (9p)&(10p) to (12p) is invalid; incidentally, concerning the invalidity of inferences of this sort, see Quine (1956, p. 182). Salmón and I also agree that if the same guise were associated to the two occurrences of Eliot in (9p)&(10p), then the implication from (9p)&(10p) to (12p) would be true. Where Salmón and I, I think, disagree is on the truth value of the implication from (9p)&(10p) to (12p) and on the truth value of its antecedent, (9p)&(10p), specifically in the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case: for Salmón the implication in question is true and its antecedent is false in such a case, whereas for me the implication is false and its antecedent is true. More details on this divergence are provided in the main text of the present sub-section, Sect. 4.2.
Reconsider the characterization of cognitive coordination formulated in fn. 12. Based on it, “George Eliot” and “Mary Ann Evans” in (5) and (6) are negatively coordinated for Jane: although Jane takes these names as coreferring, she does as if they were non-coreferring. Jane has a good reason to do so: she is reporting Ralph’s beliefs about Eliot and she knows that Ralph does not know that “George Eliot” and “Mary Ann Evans” corefer; in a way, she simulates Ralph’s taking these names as non-coreferring. Now, the fact that Jane negatively coordinates “George Eliot” and “Mary Ann Evans” in (5) and (6) (allows her to rationally believe and disbelieve Eliot to be such that Ralph believes that she was a man, in accordance with the Relationist Constraint, end of Sect. 3.2, and) provides a good reason to a reporter of Jane’s second-order beliefs to do as if these names were non-coreferring in (7) and (8), as well as in (9) and (10). It follows that for this reporter the two occurrences of Eliot in the propositions (9p)&(10p) are negatively coordinated, with the result that the inference from (9p)&(10p) to (12p) is for him or her unjustified. More on this is in my (2019, §7).
In fact, Frege’s Constraint prevents a rational subject a from believing and disbelieving b to be such that it has F while (~i) thinking of b under different modes of presentation which a realizes are modes of presentation of the same object and (~ii) thinking of the property of being such that one has F under only one mode of presentation.
Instead, my strategy of denying the implication from (9p)&(10p) to (12p) could be subscribed to by Millian-Russellian theorists who conceive modes of presentation à la Crimmins and Perry (1989), Forbes (1990), Saul (2007) and Récanati (2012, 2016). For instance, by adopting Récanati’s account of mental files, the Millian-Russellian theorist could maintain that two distinct files about Eliot indexed to Ralph but borne by Jane are associated to the two occurrences of Eliot in (9p)&(10p); crucially, Jane realizes that these files are about the same person, Eliot, in accordance with Frege’s Constraint* but in contrast with Frege’s Constraint. Concerning indexed (or vicarious) files as opposed to regular files, see Récanati (2012, Chaps. 14, 15).
Not only does this outcome appear inevitable for the reason I have indicated; but if Salmón blocked the move from (9p)&(10p) to (12p), then blocking such a move would constitute his solution to the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case. And once the puzzle were solved in this manner, what would be the point for him in additionally blocking the move from (7)/(8) to (9)/(10), as he indeed does?
Against something like Frege’s Constraint*, Schiffer (who, regarding this issue, follows Salmón) affirms that it is “quite unclear” (2006, p. 366) how a subject a can rationally believe and disbelieve b to be such that it has F, if (~i) a thinks of b under different modes of presentation which a realizes are modes of presentation of the same object and (~ii) a thinks of the property of being such that one has F under only one mode of presentation. It would be interesting if Salmón and Schiffer provided further justifications for their skepticism towards Frege’s Constraint*.
In my opinion, Jane’s propositional guises could be unstructured yet fine-grained entities, like propositions à la Schiffer (Sect. 6.4). An anonymous reviewer has advanced an alternative hypothesis: the propositional guises in question are structured entities that “include an additional guise for the proposition as a whole”. Nevertheless, the nature of such an additional constituent appears somewhat mysterious: undoubtedly, it is in turn a propositional guise; but is it structured (and, if so, what are its constituents) or is it unstructured (similarly to a proposition à la Schiffer)? Regardless of the preference for either hypotheses, mine or the reviewer’s, the fact remains that Salmón’s propositional guises held by Jane in the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case appear to be quite exotic entities.
It should be additionally noted that while Salmón (2006, p. 370) retains Frege’s Constraint, he (2006, pp. 372–373) rejects its cognate below, Frege’s Constraint***, which involves instances of the mixed schema (E*), i.e. ⌜α believes of β that Φit⌝ (fn. 6), instead of instances of the de re schema (D), i.e. ⌜α believes β to be such that Φit⌝. A brief critical discussion of this asymmetry is in my (2012, Chap. 2).
Frege’s Constraint***: A subject a rationally believes and disbelieves of b that it has F only if in believing and disbelieving so, (i***) a thinks of the object b under different modes of presentation which a takes to present distinct objects or (ii***) a thinks of the property F under different modes of presentation which a takes to present distinct properties.
Although in “Relational Belief” (1995) Salmón ultimately criticized Kaplan’s procedure of articulation besides Quine’s method (Salmón 1995, pp. 219–220), he clearly seemed to endorse Kaplan’s (1986) analysis of the “Ortcutt” case (Salmón 1995, pp. 213–214). One could then hypothesize that during the decade 1995–2006, Salmón changed his mind regarding how to interpret (16). On the other hand, no explicit reference to such a change is made in “The Resilience of Illogical Belief”; quite the opposite, by presenting the “Ortcutt” case in the latter article, he (2006, p. 375n5) refers back to the former article for details as if he still endorsed the Kaplanian analysis presented there.
A remark about the de re schema (D): in light of the considerations just made, the instances of (D) should be taken to express Russellian propositions of the form <a, believing*, <b, … b> , λx1…λxn[Fx1…xn]>, where n is the number of the occurrences of β contained in the corresponding instances of (C) and, consequently, the number of the occurrences of the object b within the sequence <b,…b> comprised in the aforementioned propositional form. So, what I said in Sect. 1 about the semantic content of (D) on the basis of Salmón (2006), i.e. that instances of the de re schema (D) express Russellian propositions of the form <a, believing*, b, λx[Fx]> , must now be amended as follows: such instances express this propositional form only in the particular case that n = 1, namely only when the corresponding instances of (C) contain a single occurrences of β.
In light of interesting considerations made by Salmón in his article “Reflexivity” (1986b), one could object to my reply, arguing that in addition to (17p), there is another, potentially superior option to render the same idea using the lambda calculus: (18p) below. I would respond that based on fn. 6, for Salmón, proposition (18p) is not expressed by (16) but by (18)/(18*) below: whereas (16) is an instance of the de re schema (D), (18)/(18*) is an instance of the mixed schema (E).
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(18)
Ortcutt is such that Ralph believes that he is taller than he.
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(18*)
Ralph believes of/about Ortcutt that he is taller than he.
-
(18p)
<Ortcutt, λx[Ralph believing that x is taller than x]>
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(18)
Actually, the sentences mentioned in Braun and Saul (2002, p. 1) are not (20) and (21) but (20*) and (21*).
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(20*)
Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent.
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(21*)
Superman leaps more tall buildings than Superman.
My choice of replacing (20*)/(21*) with (20)/(21), driven by the objective of achieving a falsification of (T4), might perplex someone on the ground that (20)/(21), unlike (20*)/(21*), expresses a self-contradictory Russellian proposition. In reply, I wish to point out that, first, (20*) can be regarded as a consequence of (20): Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent, because Superman, unlike Clark Kent, can fly. So, a speaker who judges that (20*) is true presumably also judges that (20) is true. Second, Braun and Saul (2002) are actually committed to the claim that the abovementioned speakers judge that certain sentences expressing self-contradictory Russellian propositions are true: e.g. the sentence “Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent, but it is false that Superman leaps more tall buildings than Superman”, obtained by conjoining (20*) with the negation of (21*). Finally, Saul (1997, p. 103) explicitly mentions a sentence that, like (20), expresses a (quasi) self-contradictory Russellian proposition: “He hit Clark Kent once, but he never hit Superman”.
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(20*)
Despite Kripke’s (1979, p. 249) fear that “some … reader … may discover a[n overlooked] qualification …, without which the asserted principle is subject to counterexample”, the Disquotational Principle appears solid. For, first, the formulation of the principle in Sect. 3.1 is an improvement of Kripke’s original one, able to avoid the counterexamples to the latter illustrated in fn. 8. Second, Kripke (1979, p. 249) himself reassures: “Taken in its obvious intent, after all, the principle appears to be a self-evident truth”. As Salmón clarifies in Frege’s Puzzle (1986a, p. 130), “[w]hat makes the principle self-evident is that it is a corollary of the traditional conception of belief as inward assent to a proposition. Sincere, reflective, outward assent (qua speech act) to a fully understood sentence is an overt manifestation of sincere, reflective, inward assent (qua cognitive disposition or attitude) to a fully grasped proposition”. Incidentally, a similar point is also made by Salmón in (2011, p. 247) and by Sosa (1996, p. 383). In “A Note on Kripke’s Puzzle about Belief” (2011), Salmón even offers definitions of the notions of normal, sincere and reflexive speaker such that the replacement of the words “normal”, “sincere” and “on reflection” in the principle with those definitions transforms it in “a classical logical truth” (2011, p. 248). Further arguments for the Disquotational Principle are presented in my (2012, Chap. 1).
Readers who are not convinced by the move from Emily’s believing the proposition expressed by (20) to the belief reports (25) and (26) should bear in mind that this move instantiates the logical schema (T5).
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(T5)
α believes that S1 & S2 → α believes that S1 & α believes that S2.
Incidentally, one may also arrive to (25) and (26) without instantiating (T5), by replacing (20) and (21) with (23) and (24) in the passage from Braun and Saul (2002, pp. 1–2) quoted at the beginning of the present sub-section, Sect. 5.1. This replacement would simplify the reasoning and would be approved by Saul: in her “Substitution and Simple Sentences” (1997, p. 102), she makes the same point made in the article with Braun (2002, pp. 1–2) using (besides sentences comprising two name occurrences like (20) and (21)) a pair of sentences comprising only one name occurrence of Clark (like (23) and (24)): “Dan dresses like Clark Kent” and “Dan dresses like Superman”. On the other hand, moving from (20) and then instantiating (T5) has an advantage: the fact that Emily judges that (20), i.e. the conjunction of (22) and (23), is true provides evidence for her simultaneously judging that the two conjuncts, (22) and (23), are true, and consequently for her simultaneously believing that Superman can fly and that Clark Kent cannot fly, a condition required to generate the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case.
-
(T5)
I would like to point out that the strategy I proposed in Sect. 4.2 to solve the “George Eliot”/“Mary Ann Evans” case can be extended mutatis mutandis to the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case, yielding the following outcome: the de re reports (27)/(29) and (28) are true, but they (and thereby their conjunction) do not imply (30) below, whose truth would amount to ascribing (unacceptably, given our initial supposition) irrationality to Emily.
-
(30)
Emily believes Clark Kent both to be and not to be such that he can fly.
My Millian-Russellian explanation for the falsity of the implication from the conjunction of (27)/(29) and (28) to (30) in the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case invokes the relation of cognitive coordination. Based on the characterization of this relation provided in fn. 12, Emily negatively coordinates “Superman” and “Clark Kent” in (20): although condition (j) of that characterization is satisfied since Emily takes these names as coreferring, condition (jj) isn’t, since she does as if they were non-coreferring; in a way, Emily simulates someone (like Lois Lane) who takes “Superman” and “Clark Kent” as non-coreferring—as Récanati (2012, pp. 202–203) puts it, Emily “takes the perspective of the ‘unenlightened’ …, for whom Clark Kent and Superman are different” individuals. Now, the fact that Emily negatively coordinates “Superman” and “Clark Kent” in (20) (allows her to rationally believe and disbelieve Clark to be such that he can fly, in accordance with the Relationist Constraint, end of Sect. 3.2, and) provides a good reason for a reporter of Emily’s beliefs about Clark to do as if these names were non-coreferring in (25) and (26), as well as in (27) and (28). It follows that for such a reporter the two occurrences of Clark in the propositions (27p) and (28p) below, respectively expressed by the sentences (27)/(29) and (28), are negatively coordinated, and consequently the inference from the conjunction of the propositions (27p) and (28p) to the proposition (30p) (below) expressed by the sentence (30) is for him or her unjustified. More on this is in my (2019, §7).
-
(27p)
<Emily, believing*, Clark, λx[x can fly]>
-
(28p)
<Emily, believing*, Clark, λx[x cannot fly]>
-
(30p)
<Emily, believing*, Clark, λx[x can fly & x cannot fly]>
-
(30)
Concerning the distinction between semantic referent and speaker’s referent, see Kripke (1977).
More could be said about this variant of the “Superman”/“Clark Kent” case and in response to the semantic and pragmatic/cognitive objections; yet, for reasons of space, I will not go further into them. The interested reader may consult Braun and Saul (2002, §3.3, §3.4) and Saul (2007, §2.2.3.2, §2.2.3.3).
Of course, not in all occasions Emily refrains from making the valid inference from (22) and (23) to (31). An example where subjects in a similar epistemic status as Emily make an inference of this sort can be found in Braun and Saul (2002, p. 6).
Concerning these mental compartments, which—borrowing terminology from Fogelin (1995)—I have elsewhere called belief subsystems, see Lewis (1986, §1.4), Davidson (2004) and my own works (2012, Chapts. 2, 6) and (2021, §8). The key feature of belief subsystems is this: holding a belief that p and a belief that q from different subsystems hinders the subject from forming the corresponding belief that p&q.
Some arguments supporting (a*) the Disquotational Principle were mentioned in fn. 31. In favor of (c*) de re belief reports, it can be observed that renouncing them would be a costly move. For e.g. reconsider the Lucy case (presented in the second part of Sect. 1), where the name “Aristotle” is not substitutable salva veritate with the description “the teacher of Alexander the Great” in (1). Despite this fact, there is an intuitive, pre-theoretical sense in which Lucy can be said to believe that the teacher of Alexander the Great is a philosopher: this sense is technically captured by the de re construction “Lucy believes the teacher of Alexander the Great to be such that he is a philosopher”, which might be appropriate e.g. in a circumstance where we report Lucy’s belief to someone unfamiliar with the name of the teacher of Alexander the Great.
Ways of thinking of individuals can be understood as Schifferian concepts of individuals, i.e. type (sharable) concepts of individuals, expressed by token singular terms, which are pleonastic, unstructured, and more or less fine-grained depending on the conversational context.
In his article “The Mode-of-Presentation Problem” (1990), Schiffer argued that there is no suitable candidate for the role of mode of presentation. With respect to his theory, he took this conclusion to follow from the fact that Schifferian propositions are unstructured and therefore (by definition of unstructured proposition) lack constituents plus the fact that his semantics is innocent: “we deny … that the referen[t] of the ‘that’-clause is compositionally determined in the standard truth-theoretic way …. [This means] that we don’t have to see the referen[t] of, say, [‘that George Eliot was a man’] as determined by its syntax and [by the referent and content] independently assigned to [‘George Eliot’ and ‘was a man’ respectively]. In this way, we’re not required to find ‘modes of presentation’ to serve as the [referent of ‘George Eliot’ and the content of ‘was a man’] when they’re ensconced in ‘that’-clauses, although we can say that the proposition [that George Eliot was a man] isn’t identical to the proposition [that Mary Ann Evans was a man]” (Schiffer, 1990, p. 268—underlining mine). Contrary to Schiffer’s (1990) declarations, nevertheless, it appears that his (2003, in Ostertag, 2016) theory involves modes of presentation. For, first, the two different propositions that George Eliot was a man and that Mary Ann Evans was a man can be seen as modes of presentation of the state of affairs that Eliot was a man. Second, Schiffer (in Ostertag 2016, pp. 411, 433) explicitly says that we think of individuals and attributes in certain ways. Aren’t these ways modes of presentation? Third, fine-grained Schifferian concepts/propositions are subject to the following version of Frege’s Constraint; therefore, they are expected to be modes of presentation.
Frege’s Constraint****: A subject a rationally believes and disbelieves b to be such that it has F only if in believing and disbelieving so, (i****) a thinks of the object b in different ways which a takes to present distinct objects or (ii****) a thinks of the property of being such that one has F in different ways which a takes to present distinct properties. Arguably, within Schiffer’s (2003) theory, ways of thinking are fine-grained Schifferian concepts/propositions (fn. 40 and beginning of this sub-section, Sect. 6.4).
As pointed out in Sect. 4.2, the advocates of modes of presentation have a way out: replacing Frege’s Constraint with Frege’s Constraint* (end of Sect. 3.2). On the other hand, Frege’s Constraint* also encounters various obstacles, especially because of its involvement of modes of presentation, whose identity conditions are obscure. See my (2019, §5, 2020, §4.4, 2021, §9) concerning the problematic identity of modes of presentation.
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Acknowledgements
The core idea of this paper originated in my PhD dissertation (Université de Genève, 2012), supervised by Kevin Mulligan, co-supervised by Marco Santambrogio, with Kit Fine and François Récanati as members of the PhD committee. That idea was subsequently developed into a paper, which underwent constant improvements over the years. Different versions of it were presented/discussed at various venues: the 2018 Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in San Diego, with commentator Gary Ostertag; the Colloquium Recent Issues in Philosophy of Language at the University of Tokyo; the Workshop Logic and Engineering of Natural Language Semantics 15 at Keio University, Tokyo; the 2022 Prague-Valencia Workshop at the University of Prague, with commentator Petr Kotatko; and a meeting of the research group Phlox at the University of Vienna. I am very grateful to the people just mentioned, the audiences of my presentations and discussions, and to many others. I will limit myself to acknowledging those who remarkably contributed to improving the latest drafts of my paper: the reviewers of Synthese, Yannic Kappes, Youichi Matsusaka and Benjamin Schnieder. The funding for my research is currently provided by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) [10.55776/M3350].
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Bonardi, P. Salmón, Schiffer and Frege’s Constraint. Synthese 204, 13 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04502-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04502-5