Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic became another arena of the escalating geopolitical rivalry between the U.S. and China. In the first months of 2021 with its mask diplomacy and early vaccine delivery, China appeared to be gaining an edge over the U.S. in Latin America. According to a report published in April 2021 by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EUI 2021) the Western powers had lost the global vaccine diplomacy battle against China and Russia, as the first donation of a U.S.-produced vaccine did not arrive in Latin America until June 2021. A month later, in May 2021, NBC News headlined a report “China is using vaccines to push its agenda in Latin America, and the U.S. is behind the curve” (De Luce 2021). Press coverage (Financial Times 2021a; The Guardian 2021; Wallstreet Journal 2021; Washington Post 2021) solidified the perception that China's policy of supplying medical masks and vaccines to Latin America has been a diplomatic success, and that the U.S. and Europe have failed (Stuenkel 2021; von der Burchard 2021; von der Burchard and Furlong 2021).

The article attempts to contribute to a more differentiated and comprehensive assessment regarding China's successes and failures in mask and vaccine diplomacy as part of a broader strategy to advance its interests in Latin America. The article builds on the existing literature on China's mask and vaccine diplomacy but with a focus on Latin America. Most Latin America-related studies address only partial aspects of the impact of mask and vaccine diplomacy, and data on vaccine sales and donations do not cover the whole of 2021 (see for example Malacalza and Fagaburu 2022; Parthenay 2022). However, there have been major changes in the third and fourth quarters of 2021. The article includes, systematizes, and evaluates data (Tables 1, 2 and 3) that has not been used at all or not for the whole period so far such as statistics on vaccine donations assembled from different sources (see Table 3), data collected by the Americas Society and Council of the Americas (AS / COA) on COVID-19 vaccine doses contracted (both secured and optioned) through government purchase deals, and vaccine-related trade statistics from the WTO. The article thus contains the most comprehensive compilation of statistics on deliveries and donations of COVID-19 vaccines to Latin America up to the end of 2021.

Table 1 Covid-19 vaccine supply to South America by producing economy (as of 31 December 2021) Source: WTO (2022a)
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Table 2 Total number (millions) of Covid-19 vaccine doses contracted—both secured and optioned—through government purchase deals (as of December 31, 2021). Source: https://www.as-coa.org/articles/timeline-tracking-latin-americas-road-vaccination (accessed January 5, 2022)
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Table 3 Donations of vaccines to LAC (delivered) by donor countries (as of December 31, 2021). Source: AS/COHA (2022a); Bridge (2022); Duke Global Health Innovation Center (2022); Government of Canada (2023); Government of India (2023); Griffith (2021); House of Lords Library (2021); PAHO (2022; 2021. UNICEF (2022); US Department of State (2022); U.S. Embassies in Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados, the Eastern Caribbean and the OECS. Local and international newspapers and other media outlets
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The period covered by the article ends in December 2021 when vaccine supplies in Latin America had improved significantly. Moreover, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the escalation of tensions around Taiwan, other issues in world politics became more important, and the topic “vaccine diplomacy” lost relevance (at least in Latin America). In this respect, this episode of vaccine diplomacy in Latin America can be considered closed, and it is time to take stock and evaluate the results based on the accumulated knowledge so far.

According to Flint (2022, 208) vaccine diplomacy has become a new term in the “lexicon of geopolitics” as China used its vaccines against COVID-19 as an instrument to increase its influence in different world regions and among important states. “Vaccine diplomacy” can be defined as “leveraging an ability to produce and distribute vaccines to populations other than a government’s own national population in order to achieve political purposes” (McDonagh 2022, 114). Several studies have examined how China has tried to use the supply of medical equipment and vaccines to consolidate and expand its influence in different regions of the world (see for example Gauttam et al. 2020; Kobierecka 2022; Kobierecka and Kobierecki 2021; Müller, Brazys and Dukalskis 2021). But opinions are divided on how successful China has been with its vaccine diplomacy on a global scale (Lee 2021; Zhang and Jamali 2022).

China pursued different goals with its mask and vaccine diplomacy, starting with damage control after the pandemic broke out in China and the Chinese government delayed critical information and pursued an opaque communication policy. Subsequently, the Chinese government wanted to propagate the narrative, first with its mask diplomacy and later with its vaccine diplomacy, that China as responsible and cooperative global power, unlike the U.S, was willing to provide other countries with important medical supplies after successfully combating the pandemic at home. The delivery of the COVID-19 vaccines was part of a soft power strategy to create or consolidate sympathy in recipient countries, deflect criticism of Chinese policies during the pandemic, and act as a door opener for Chinese companies.

Latin America is of particular geopolitical interest for China as it has traditionally been in the U.S. sphere of influence. Over the past decade, China has become the most important trading partner for many Latin American countries and has also expanded its presence in the region as an investor and lender (Ray and Batista Barbosa 2020; Roy 2023). In addition, Latin America and the Caribbean is the region where at the beginning of the year 2020 a particularly large number of countries (9 out of a total of 15 remaining countries) still maintained full-fledged diplomatic relations with Taiwan (including Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay). In the years before the outbreak of the pandemic, the People's Republic of China had managed to persuade several Latin American countries (Dominican Republic in 2018, El Salvador in 2018, and Panama in 2017) to break off diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The pandemic and vaccine diplomacy opened an opportunity to further advance the one-China principle in Latin America.

Even before the pandemic, the U.S. saw China’s advances in Latin America as a threat to its geopolitical interests in the region. The U.S. government responded, albeit with some delay, to the Chinese vaccine diplomacy with its own vaccine diplomacy. Against the background of the geopolitical rivalry between the U.S. and China in Latin America, the article retrospectively analyzes the Chinese government’s vaccine diplomacy as part of a broader strategy to increase and consolidate China’s presence and influence in the Western Hemisphere.

The goals of China's mask and vaccine diplomacy in various regions of the world, including Latin America, have already been analyzed and discussed by other authors. The article builds on the existing literature and examines both China's activities and the results (outcome) of China's mask and vaccine diplomacy in Latin America. Vaccine supplies, cited by many commentators as evidence of China's growing influence in Latin America, can be interpreted as an outcome of Chinese mask and vaccine diplomacy. By comparing Chinese deliveries (both sales and donations) to Latin America with the vaccine supply by the U.S. and Europe, we can evaluate China’s relative success in outperforming and displacing these traditional Latin American partners.

However, Chinese vaccines can also be seen as a tool to achieve other goals, such as improving China's image in Latin America, gaining better access to Latin American markets, or influencing the foreign policy of Latin American governments. In view of these goals, it is more difficult to assess the outcome of Chinese mask and vaccine diplomacy. The assessment in this article depends and is limited by the available data from existing studies (based on survey data or social media analysis). Moreover, this data only captures popular sentiment and not the impact of Chinese mask and vaccine diplomacy on Latin American government policies toward China. In the absence of major policy changes, this outcome of China's mask-and-vaccine diplomacy is much harder to capture, especially for a short period of time, and requires more in-depth case studies (for some examples of positive responses to China's diplomatic offensive in Latin America, see Carman and Carl 2021). In the Taiwan question and the one-China policy, political changes can be more clearly identified and attributed to Chinese strategy and policy.

The article describes China’s assertive information policy to counter critic of its pandemic management and to project a positive image, and it compares the supply (sales and donations) of protective clothing and medical equipment (including medical masks, hence the term “mask diplomacy”) to Latin America by the U.S. and China. Subsequently, the study takes stock of vaccine deliveries (both sales and donations) from China, the U.S., Russia, and Europe until December 31, 2021. It shows that over time, the U.S. has donated significantly more vaccines to Latin America than China, and that by the end of 2021 Europe, more precisely European production sites, narrowed the gap with China in supplying vaccines to South America and thereafter overtook China in the first months of 2022.

In the subsequent section, based on published survey data and social media analysis (Twitter and Instagram) the article explores the extent to which the delivery of vaccines or vaccine diplomacy has had a positive effect on China's perception in Latin America (or has mitigated the loss of reputation after the outbreak of the pandemic). According to the data, this was not the case.

As the pandemic created an opportunity for China to reduce Taiwan's influence in Latin America, the article also asks whether China has used the vaccine diplomacy to persuade states to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan, and whether China has been successful in doing so. There were proven initiatives toward Honduras and Paraguay, but they were unsuccessful.

Finally, the article briefly examines the effects of the pandemic and vaccine diplomacy on China's economic relations (trade and investment flows) with Latin America. The economic data available so far reveals that the pandemic was not an economic game changer in Latin America regarding the rivalry between the U.S. and China. At best, it reinforced pre-existing tendencies.

All in all, the article shows that the Chinese government has been relatively successful in preventing reputational damage due to its deficient crisis management and (mis)information policy early in the pandemic. China has also succeeded to blur the difference between the sale and donation of medical equipment and vaccines in the public perception. However, China only managed to a limited extent to consolidate sympathy gains in Latin America, and it has failed to capitalize on its mask and vaccine diplomacy to further push back Taiwan's influence in the region. China's advances in Latin America have been facilitated by the Trump administration's erratic and nationalistic policies during the pandemic. The article shows how Chinese advantages in vaccine diplomacy evaporated in the second half of 2021, as the U.S. in turn bet on vaccine diplomacy with massive vaccine donations that far exceeded China's contribution. By the end of 2021, most vaccines administered in Latin America had been manufactured in China, but vaccines produced in the EU (by European and U.S. companies) were a close second with clear advantages for U.S. and European companies in terms of future delivery contracts.

Geopolitical rivalry and default of U.S. leadership

Most authors who dealt with the pandemic's possible influence on international politics right at the beginning did not see it as a game changer (Drezner 2020: E19; Haass 2020). But there was also a consensus that the rivalry between China and the U.S. would complicate the international response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and that the pandemic fueled great-power competition. The mutual blame game to shirk responsibilities resulted in a vacuum of global leadership and made global cooperation in response to the pandemic more difficult (Zhao 2021). For example, China has only been participating in the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) initiative since October 2020, and the U.S. signed up even later, in February 2021.

The COVID-19 pandemic confronted both great powers with major challenges that put their economic and political systems to the test. Kahl and Wright (2021, 328) argue that the Trump administration “failed so spectacularly and shambolically” to contain the pandemic at home “that it left an indelible stain” on the U.S.’ global standing. On the global stage, China played its role much better than the U.S. Whereas the U.S. did not act congruent to its global power status China took advantage of the geopolitical opportunity of the pandemic emergency to expand its influence in global politics (Gauttam et al. 2020). In the competition with the U.S., China portrayed itself as successful model for coping with the pandemic and as responsible and benevolent great power by providing assistance to other countries and delivering public goods.

The Chinese government benefited from the leadership vacuum created by the U.S. and launched a successful campaign to divert attention from its own mistakes, and to build an alternative narrative. But the U.S. did not fail in all areas in addressing the fallout of the pandemic. The Federal Reserve played an import role to stabilize the international financial system and to keep the global economy afloat during the COVID-19 pandemic which provided the U.S. with an opportunity to reassert its financial leadership (Brands, Feaver and Inboden 2020, 302; Ferguson 2020, 426). It might be interesting to analyze in more detail in future studies the extent to which the U.S. administration's successes in financial stabilization (and the associated confirmation of U.S. leadership) have limited the diplomatic gains of China's mask and vaccine strategy in Latin America.

Discourse wars and mask diplomacy

It makes sense to divide China’s engagement with Latin America during the pandemic in two periods. The pandemic began in China, and the Chinese government reacted too late and initially pursued an opaque information policy. This gave the U.S. government an opportunity to accuse China of covering up. President Trump liked to use the term “China virus.” The association of China with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the non-transparent information policy had a negative effect on the country’s reputation. In the first phase, the aim of the Chinese government was to limit the damage to its reputation. China launched an assertive information policy through its embassies in Latin America including “wolf warrior-type messaging” to reject the blame and possible accusations (Myers 2021). Unfolding “discursive power” China entered in a “battle of narratives” (Rolland 2020) by advancing quite successfully a state sponsored media campaign of whitewashing and building a positive narrative (Farah and Richardson 2021) by showcasing its success in fighting the pandemic and presenting China as responsible global power that can be counted on (Kobierecka and Kobierecki 2021). Chinese ambassadors flooded social media with messages about Chinese cooperation, beneficence, and solidarity. At the same time, China delivered masks and protective clothing to Latin America. In contrast, the Trump administration largely eluded international cooperation in containing the pandemic.

The United States wasn't completely inactive. But the delivery of medical equipment to Latin America was hampered by export restrictions for pandemic-related materials in short domestic supply, ordered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in April 2020. Nonetheless, in 2020 the U.S. government committed nearly USD 112 million COVID-19-related relief to Latin America (U.S. Department of State 2021), and until November 2020, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) delivered 3,486 ventilators to 13 Latin American and Caribbean countries (Pforzheimer 2021, 3). But U.S. COVID-19-related relief measures were overshadowed by other activities of the U.S. government such as the withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO), the refusal to join the COVAX initiative, and the withholding of funding from the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), which reinforced the perception of a lack of interest of the U.S. government to help Latin America during the pandemic. In the 2020 Gallup World Poll the U.S. leadership approval rate in the Americas (including Canada but not the U.S.) was only 34% compared to a disapproval rate of 52% (Gallup 2021).

China started to deliver (sales and donations) medical equipment to Latin America, the so called “mask diplomacy,” a few days after the first case of COVID-19 was detected in São Paulo (February 26, 2020). At the beginning China’s “mask diplomacy” worked quite decentralized and semi-coordinated which provided more flexibility and visibility for Chinese activities. The Chinese government was able to engage a broad spectrum of actors as donors and suppliers of medical equipment such as local governments, state owned enterprises, private corporations, Chambers of Commerce, and the Chinese diaspora communities (Myers 2021; Telias and Urdinez 2021; Urdinez 2021a).

Until the end of 2020, China donated nearly USD 215 million in medical supplies to the region, most during the first semester and centered particularly in Venezuela (over USD 100 million) and Cuba (Ray et al. 2021, 5). As the preferential treatment of both countries demonstrates, China’s donations of health equipment and materials to countries affected by COVID-19 in Latin America had a clear political purpose. From February to June 2020 China donated more to its strategic partners in Latin America and punished countries that still recognized Taiwan (reflecting Beijing’s One-China policy) (Telias and Urdinez 2021).

In 2020, China was quite successful with its mask diplomacy not only in Latin America but also on the global stage. In October, Sanborn (2020, 2) argued “China’s response to date has been timely, strategic, and significant. … China was able to harness its advantage as the world’s leading producer of medical supplies, to donate large quantities to nearly all countries in the region with which it has diplomatic relations.” An analysis of statements from online newspapers worldwide corroborates that China’s mask diplomacy helped to offset the reputational damage of its handling of the pandemic at the outset (Müller, Brazys and Dukalskis 2021). As a result, Ferguson (2020, 420) succinctly comments: “Liberally exporting testing kits, face masks, and ventilators, the Chinese government has sought to snatch victory from the jaws of a defeat it inflicted.” And one can add the inadequate and nationalistic foreign policy of the U.S. as a facilitating factor. Hence, the first round in the competition between the U.S. and China to deal with the pandemic clearly went to China. The next round was about which country would develop and approve vaccines first, and which country would make these vaccines available to countries in Latin America first. Later the competition would be about how efficient and reliable the vaccines were in practice and which pharmaceutical companies could provide enough doses in the long term.

Vaccine diplomacy: who won the competition?

Latin America was hit hard by the pandemic and surpassed 1.5 million COVID-19 deaths in October 2021. Hence, Latin America was a fertile ground for vaccine diplomacy to reward old friends and make new friends (Nugent and Campbell 2021). In April 2021, not many analysts would have contradicted the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EUI 2021) verdict that China had gained a clear advantage in vaccine diplomacy over the U.S. in Latin America. In this month Chinese vaccines had an accumulated share (of the applied vaccines) of 21% in Argentina, 61% in Brazil, 79% in Chile, 58% in Colombia, 44% in Ecuador, 28% in Mexico, and 71% in Uruguay (Urdinez and Winters 2021, 6). Until mid-May, China had exported more than 250 million doses (42 percent of its total production), of which about 165 million were vaccinated in Latin America (Stuenkel 2021).

Moreover, the Chinese government has been very adept in marketing and branding its vaccine deliveries (Lee 2021). Small donations were used as an incentive for subsequent much larger purchases of vaccines by the recipient countries (Karásková and Blablová 2021). Moreover, Chinese vaccine producing pharmaceutical companies included several Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru) in their medical efficacy trials (Cohen 2020) which later facilitated market access and cooperation agreements with local producers. As Myers (2021, 8) points out, the pandemic “also amounted to something of an international debut for China’s pharmaceutical companies” in Latin America. Although only a small portion of Chinese vaccines were donations and most were sold, this was often blurred in the perception of the public (Lee 2021). In some cases, deliveries included both vaccine doses sold and (to a lesser extent) donations. Frequently Chinese embassy staff was at the airport or even on the runway during vaccine deliveries, even if these were purely commercial in nature. The recurring photos in the media could give the impression that the vaccine delivered was a donation from the Chinese government.

At the time, the U.S. wasn't a major player in vaccine diplomacy. Few doses of vaccine (3 million or 1% of the production) had been exported abroad because of President Trump's America First approach and the cautious reorientation of the U.S. policy under President Biden. It was only when the national vaccination campaign had made great strides that the U.S. began to export and even donate vaccines from its accumulated surplus (the AstraZeneca stocks were not vaccinated at all in the U.S.).

The situation changed in the second half of 2021 when the U.S. began to donate vaccines on a massive scale, and vaccines from the U.S. and Europe became more widely available in Latin America. Moreover, the U.S. government reacted to the demand of a more pro-active vaccine diplomacy (Locke, Iancu and Kappos 2021) in response to the Chinese “COVID-19 diplomatic blitz” (Farah and Richardson 2021). In November 2021, the U.S. Senate held a Hearing on “Vaccine Diplomacy in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Importance of U.S. Engagement” (U.S. Senate 2022), documenting the U.S. interest in countering Chinese advances.

Even before the roll out of vaccines in Latin America began, there was a preference for Western-produced vaccines from the U.S. or Europe in Latin America, as a survey from January 2021 in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, México, and Perú shows (Argote, Barham and Daly 2021). Moreover, Chinese and Russian vaccines appeared to be less effective than AstraZeneca, Pfizer-BionTech and Moderna, and in the case of the Russian vaccine Sputnik there were also delivery problems (Harrison 2021a; Hill 2021; Lee 2021). Already in August 2021 the TIME magazine concluded “Chinese and Russian vaccines won’t win those countries the geopolitical victories they hoped for. A huge missed opportunity for Moscow and Beijing” (Bremmer 2021).

In May 2021, on a global scale, China was clearly in the lead with exporting 252 million doses, with the EU second (111 million doses), India (69 million doses) third. Russia (13 million doses) and the U.S. (3 million doses) were clearly tracking behind (Malacalza and Fagaburu 2022, 11). But over the year, the EU was catching up with China as exporter of COVID-19 vaccines. Based on WTO data as of December 31, 2021, China had exported 1,578.5 million doses (35.9% of world exports), compared to 1,676.0 million doses from the EU (38.1% of world exports), 571.8 million doses from the U.S. (13%) and 92.5 million doses from Russia (2.1%) (WTO 2022a). In May 2022, the European share of COVID-19 vaccine exports worldwide was 39.6%, compared to China’s share of 32.2% and an U.S. share of 15.7% (WTO 2022b).

The published WTO statistics contain regionally aggregated figures only for South America and North America (including the U.S. and Canada), but not for Latin America. In the case of South America (sales and donations) as of December 31, 2021, China had supplied 293,994,177 doses (36.4%), the EU 240,659,813 doses (29.8%), the U.S. 45,545,410 doses (5.6%), and Russia 35,456,745 doses (4.4%) (Table 1).

The WTO data relate to the country where the facilities are located where the final vaccines are made (“fill and finish”). In contrast, the data of the Wilson Center (2021) relate to the headquarters of the company that manufactures the vaccine. According to this calculation, by the end November 2021 231 million doses of the vaccine used in Latin America and the Caribbean had come from China, and 223 million came from the United States.

From a Chinese perspective, the playing field for vaccine diplomacy in Latin America had changed significantly at the end of 2021. Western-produced vaccines had gained the upper hand in Latin America. According to the Americas Society/Council of the Americas (AS/COA) vaccination tracker (Table 2), as of December 31, 2021, Latin American governments had contracted through purchase deals—both secured and optioned—1,172 million doses from AstraZeneca, J & J, Pfizer-BioNTech, Novavax, Vaxxinty, and Moderna, 433 million doses of Chinese vaccines (CanSino, Sinopharm, Sinovac) and 82.4 million doses of Russian vaccines (Sputnik). It must be assumed that the AS/COA tracker did not record the Chinese vaccine deliveries to Venezuela. However, taking these deliveries into account would not fundamentally change the overall picture. The Venezuelan government did not pursue a transparent information policy. According to official communications, China is said to have supplied 22.3 million doses of vaccine to Venezuela in 2021 (Transparencia Venezuela 2022: 18).

No data are available on how these purchase deals and options were ultimately implemented. According to the export statistics of the WTO for South America, in May 2022, total deliveries from Europe (482,013,817 doses; 40.2%) were significantly higher than Chinese (333,740,983 doses; 27.8%) and U.S. (83,668,704 doses; 7.0%) vaccine deliveries (WTO 2022b).

Although China liked to portray itself as a great benefactor, it should be noted that considering the whole year 2021 the U.S. was worldwide by far the single largest donor of COVID-19 vaccines (41%) well ahead of China (12%), which was also surpassed by the EU countries (30%; UK 3%) (de Bengy Puyvallée and Storeng 2022, 7).

There are several problems in accurately mapping vaccine donations. Detailed and comprehensive reports on donations are not available for all donor countries. Often, data is highly aggregated, making it difficult to determine cumulative donations at a given point in time (in this study, 31 December 2021). Donations could be made bilaterally, but they could also be made as part of the COVAX (COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access) initiative. Although not initially envisaged in the initiative, donations to COVAX could be earmarked for specific countries (an estimated 42% of the total COVAX vaccine supply was earmarked; de Bengy Puyvallée and Storeng 2022, 7). In 2021, donated or shared doses accounted for 60% of vaccine doses provided through COVAX (de Bengy Puyvallée and Storeng 2022, 7). In addition to donated doses, there were financial contributions to COVAX that could be used to purchase and subsequently distribute vaccines from various manufacturers (through the Advanced Market Commitment AMC mechanism for low- and middle-income countries). In 2021, private and government donors had pledged a total of USD 10.8 billion, with the U.S. (USD 4000.0 million), Germany (USD 1218.8 million), Japan (USD 1000.0 million), and the UK (USD 735.2 million) making the largest commitments. China had only pledged USD 100.0 million (Gavi 2022).

In 2021, 30% of the 776 million doses donated worldwide were provided through bilateral agreements, and 70% were distributed through COVAX. Some countries, such as Russia, India, and China did not share any doses through COVAX. In contrast, most European countries (such as Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, and Sweden) have distributed over 90% of their donated doses through COVAX) (de Bengy Puyvallée and Storeng 2022, 4).

The aggregated WTO statistics (Table 1) differentiate between contracted supply via COVAX, direct donations, donations via COVAX, and supply via bilateral deals. According to these data China donated only 5.3 million doses (1.8% of the vaccine doses supplied) to South American countries. 90.7% of Chinese vaccines delivered to South American countries were sold via bilateral deals. In contrast the U.S. donated 22 million doses (48.8% of all vaccine doses supplied) to South America directly or through COVAX, and the EU donated 16 million doses (6.6% of supply). However, the aggregated figures conceal considerable variations. If we combine the figures from Table 2, which include both secured and optioned purchase deals, with the figures in Table 3, the proportion of vaccine doses donated out of the total vaccine doses supplied by China is 36.6% in the case of Bolivia, 8% in the case of Ecuador, and 1.4% in the case of Peru (including data from Central America and the Caribbean: El Salvador 20%; Dominican Republic 0.5%). In contrast, China did not donate any vaccine doses at all to South American countries with high delivery volumes, such as Brazil and Chile.

The United States clearly outperformed China in vaccine donations not only in South America but also in all Latin America and the Caribbean. The calculations in Table 3 are based on various data sources (AS/COHA, PAHO, UNICEF, U.S. Department of State, U.S. and Chinese embassies in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Duke Global Health Innovation Center) and cross-checked by newspaper and other media reports. If a direct link to a donor country could be established in the case of a COVAX vaccine delivery, this has been counted as a donation by this country. Vaccines purchased via COVAX in Europe, the U.S., or China and shipped to Latin America were not counted as donations in Table 3. For example, according to WTO statistics (Table 1) 22 million doses supplied by China to South American countries (7.5% of Chinese deliveries to South America) had been contracted and purchased via the COVAX initiative.

Despite the difficulties in accurately and comprehensively determining donations of vaccine by donor and recipient, Table 3 should capture the volume and distribution of bilateral donations (direct or through COVAX) to Latin America and the Caribbean quite well. According to the data considered, by the end of 2021, the United States had donated almost 57 million doses of vaccine to Latin America, EU countries had donated 11.5 million—Spain alone had contributed nine 9.4 million doses—and China had donated 8.4 million doses.

Nevertheless, the donation figures should be interpreted with caution. For most countries, donations represented only a small fraction of the vaccine doses delivered and consumed. For smaller countries, especially in the Caribbean, the importance of donations was likely to be greater (Griffith 2021; Hoffmann 2021). It also makes a difference when the vaccine doses were donated. The impact was greater in the early stages of the pandemic when vaccine was in short supply. Not only U.S. and European donations, but also some Chinese donations (for example in the case of Nicaragua) were not made until the second half of 2021 (or even in 2022). When vaccines were scarce, it was probably not so important from the perspective of the affected countries whether vaccines were donated or sold. In addition, there are different types of vaccine sharing: donations diverted from existing vaccine stocks needed to supply the population at home, and surplus vaccine (for example, doses from AstraZeneca that have not been vaccinated in many countries) which is no longer needed and is therefore being given away. This explains why some Latin American governments also donated vaccines in the second half of 2021. Additionally, as noted, only 42% of vaccines donated through COVAX were earmarked for specific countries. Vaccines purchased from financial donations to COVAX are therefore only recorded to a small extent in Table 3.

Notwithstanding the described limitations of the available data, it can be noted that China was only the third largest donor of vaccines to Latin America in 2021, behind the EU countries (and even behind Spain as a single donor) and well behind the United States. The U.S. also donated vaccine to a larger number of Latin American countries than China. This is true for Mexico and Central America, the Caribbean, but also for South America. If China's goal was to compete with the US as a generous donor of a public good (COVID-19 vaccine), then China's overall success in Latin America has been limited. But China may have used the donations in a more targeted and strategic way.

Did China win the hearts and minds?

With its reputation in decline after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, China’s mask and vaccine diplomacy was part of its soft power strategy to rally public opinion in Latin America in its favor. How successful has China been in its endeavors? Did the pandemic affect the perception of China in Latin America? The answer is difficult because the available studies show contradictory results and, due to the different methods used (opinion polls, survey experiments, and social media analysis), are only comparable to a limited extent.

China had a lot to lose in terms of sympathy in Latin America. The Latinobarómetro surveys consistently showed a positive image of China in Latin America in the period 2001–2017. Negative opinion toward China has remained low between 10 and 15% (Urdinez 2021b, 5). This is also confirmed by the Americas Barometer data from 2012 to 2018/19 (Salles Kobilanski 2021).

When assessing the extent to which China was successful with its mask and vaccine diplomacy, it is important to distinguish to what extent, on the one hand, a loss of reputation has been prevented and, on the other hand, a gain in reputation has taken place. It seems that China managed to avoide an image crisis at the onset of the pandemic. According to a comparative analysis of the language used in China-related Twitter posts by Latin American (and Caribbean) users in the period from October 2018 to January 2020 (14 months before the pandemic), and in the period from February 2020 to April 2021 (14 months since the start of the pandemic) the overall views of China did not measurably worsen because of the pandemic, nor did the views noticeably improve during the pandemic (Myers 2021).

Another study (Barham et al. 2021) based on a panel survey conducted in January and May 2021 in six Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) found that the trust in the government of the country where the vaccine that an individual received was developed increased (a moderate statistical effect of 0.2 standard deviations), especially in the case of Chinese vaccines (a quarter of a standard deviation). However, a similar study (Urdinez and Winters 2021) based on panel survey data collected in May 2020 and April 2021 in six Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) found only limited support for the assumption that respondents who received a Chinese vaccine have a more positive view of China. Overall, the study did not find evidence that China’s mask and vaccine diplomacy was successful to improve the perception of China substantially.

The 2021 Americas Barometer data from LAPOP suggest that China has failed to take advantage of the pandemic in Latin America. In contrast, trust in the U.S. government rebounded under President Biden and was almost back to the level during Obama's presidency (Salles Kobilanski 2021). The Americas Barometer data were collected between January and August 2021, when China still had a clear advantage in supplying vaccines to Latin America. While in the Latin American average in 2018/19 only 39% of the respondents had trust in the U.S. government, the share increased to 57% in the first semester of 2021. In contrast, trust in the Chinese government fell from 47 to 38%. In most Latin American countries (except for Haiti and Peru), citizens had more trust in the U.S. than in the Chinese government.

As already mentioned, the results of the available studies are difficult to compare. However, there is little evidence that China has managed to garner much sympathy through its mask and vaccine diplomacy as an instrument of soft power. At best, a major loss of reputation and trust could be prevented. Moreover, the surveys do not capture the developments in the second half of 2021 when the U.S. implemented its vaccine diplomacy, with more vaccines produced in Europa and the U.S. accessible, and raising concerns about the efficacy of Chinese and Russian vaccines in combating new variants of the COVID-19 virus.

Pushing Taiwan’s influence back in Latin America

The pandemic created a great opportunity for China to reduce Taiwan's influence in Latin America. Before the pandemic broke out in Latin America (in 2020) nine of 15 sovereign states that maintained full diplomatic relations with Taiwan were in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Chinese government had two rare goods to offer, medical protective equipment, and later vaccines against the COVID-19 virus. Taiwan did not have the same resources, and the Western powers were not a competitor to China at this stage. At best Russia and for a short moment India could compete in exporting vaccines. China tried to take the chance to get countries to change their Taiwan policy in return for deliveries of vaccines (Harrison 2021b). In the case of Paraguay and Honduras, China applied a policy of carrots and sticks (Aspinwall 2021; De Luce 2021; Infobae 2021; Knecht 2021; Myers 2021; Pantano 2021), but in the end the strategy did not work as the U.S. government (and Taiwan) countered the Chinese move (Financial Times 2021b).

COVID-19 was not a game changer in China's offensive to push back Taiwan in Latin America. In the years leading up to the pandemic, the People’s Republic of China made several forays into Central America and the Caribbean. In 2017 and 2018 three countries broke off their relations with Taiwan: Panama (2017), the Dominican Republic (2018), and El Salvador (2018). In this respect, it is rather surprising that Beijing was not more successful in convincing Central American governments to switch sides during the pandemic.

The only country that flipped from Taiwan to the People Republic of China during the pandemic was Nicaragua, which announced its decision on December 9, 2021. Although symbolically a Chinese airplane with a donation of 200,000 doses of Sinopharm vaccine landed at Managua airport on December 12 (another 800,000 vaccine doses arrived on December 24; Swissinfo 2021), the decision of the Nicaraguan government was not brought about by the Chinese vaccine diplomacy but by the increasing international isolation of the Ortega regime and increasing pressure and new sanctions from the U.S. Furthermore, the number of vaccine doses donated by China was lower compared to donations from Spain and France (2.6 million doses) in 2021 (see Table 3).

The donation of Chinese vaccines to Nicaragua is in line with findings of Telias and Urdinez (2021, 23) that China has boosted donations among the countries in Latin America hardest hit by U.S. sanctions. What needs to be explained is why the Nicaraguan government took the step of switching to China so late (as early as 1985, after the of the Sandinista revolution, Nicaragua broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan, which were resumed in 1990 during the presidency of Violetta Chamorro). It is very likely that the Nicaraguan government and the Ortega clan have received generous financial support from Taiwan for their continued support (Ellis 2021). At the beginning of the pandemic, Nicaragua received more donations from Taiwan than Guatemala and Honduras combined (Telias and Urdinez 2021, 13).

The pandemic did not change the status quo in the conflict between China and Taiwan in Latin America. Nicaragua's switch to China was not caused by the pandemic. This also applies to Honduras, which severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in March 2023. President Xiomora Castro’s party had promised a change in the China policy before the November 2022 elections. However, this was already the case in the 2017 elections (in which the parties’ candidate lost), long before the pandemic. As a reward for changing sides, the Honduran government seems to have negotiated economic benefits (Ellis 2023; Hioe 2023; Lazarus and Berg 2023).

Economic collateral effects

The pandemic has not significantly changed the geopolitical and geo-economic parameters for the U.S. and China in Latin America. In the years leading up to the pandemic, China had expanded its economic presence in Latin America as a trading partner, investor, and lender. For many Latin American countries, China had become the most important trading partner surpassing the U.S.

The pandemic hit the Latin American and Caribbean economies hard as the regional GDP shrank by − 6.8 in 2020, but almost recovered (6.2%) in 2021 to the level before the crisis (ECLAC 2022, 128). The economic slump in Latin America affected trade flows and foreign investment. With the Chinese economy recovering faster than other Latin American trading partners in 2020, trade with China was also far less affected by the economic fallout from the pandemic. In contrast to other trading partners, exports from Latin America to China did not decline in 2020 and even increased slightly (+ 1%; U.S. − 11%); imports decreased ( − 9%) but less than from other partners (U.S. − 19%) (ECLAC 2021, 78).

As Latin America’s GDP contracted in 2020, trade with China as a share of regional GDP rose to record levels (3.8 percent of GDP for imports, and 3.2 percent of GDP for exports; Ray et al. 2021). When Latin American economies recovered in 2021, exports to China (+ 35%) and imports from China (+ 33%) grew faster than trade with the U.S. (exports 19%; imports 29%) (ECLAC 2021, 78). However, China also reacted to the economic crisis in Latin America. In 2020 and 2021 Chinese development banks did not make new financial commitments with LAC governments, and instead renegotiated existing debts (with Ecuador). New Chinese greenfield FDI decreased significantly in 2020 and 2021, when for the first time since 2005 greenfield FDI announcements were below USD 1 billion falling behind the U.S., Spain, Germany, and Canada. In contrast Chinese participation in mergers and acquisitions rebounded in 2020 and 2021 from a very low level in 2019. While Western firms left Latin America during the COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese companies continued to buy up assets (Albright et al. 2022). Moreover, China offered Latin American governments loans worth USD 1 billion for vaccine purchases (Ray et al. 2021). According to Boston University`s China–Latin America Economic Bulletin the market share of Chinese vaccine contracts was roughly in line with the overall share of merchandise imports from China (Albright et al. 2022).

During the pandemic Brazil, Uruguay (both in 2020), Argentina, Chile, and Peru (in 2021) joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) launched by China in 2014. The accession would have taken place even without the pandemic to secure an additional source of funding. Finally, in January and February 2022, Nicaragua and Argentina became part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) but that was more due to the governments’ ideological orientation than Chinese vaccine diplomacy.

The pandemic and vaccine diplomacy were not economic game changers in Latin America regarding the rivalry between the U.S. and China. The pandemic had only limited impact on the geo-economic position of China and the U.S. in Latin America. At best, it reinforced pre-existing tendencies, such as the greater weight of China in Latin America’s foreign trade.

Conclusions

U.S.-China geopolitical rivalry in Latin America started long before the pandemic. But the COVID-19 pandemic became another arena of the escalating conflict between these great powers. Both governments made mistakes during the pandemic and showed weaknesses that they tried to exploit through mutual blaming and shaming.

China started with several advantages, at least in the first year and early months of the second year of the pandemic. The Chinese government was able to control the flow of information and to launch a coordinated (dis)information campaign to improve its image. With radical measures, the Chinese government managed to get the pandemic under control. Before the pandemic, China was the top producer of textile face masks (with a global market share of 50% in 2019; Gereffi 2020, 291) and other protective equipment, and was able to use this advantage strategically during the pandemic. Later, China was able to export vaccines to Latin America on a large scale due to the control of the infection process in the country. The United States, at first banned the export of vaccines. Moreover, the U.S. government under President Trump refused to coordinate international cooperation in confronting the pandemic. So, one characteristic of the pandemic was a lack of U.S. leadership (Haass 2020). But China also did not play a leading role in strengthening multilateral cooperation. However, China took advantage of the U.S.’ renunciation of leadership to expand its global influence and challenge the U.S. in Latin America.

By the end of 2020 and the first months of 2021, China seemed to have managed to expand its influence in Latin America and make new friends. Chinese pharmaceutical companies had gained new markets in Latin America for exporting vaccines. However, China had been less successful in reducing Taiwan’s influence in Latin America.

China also succeeded because the United States provided only limited support to Latin American countries during the pandemic. The situation changed when the U.S., under President Biden, itself conducted an active vaccine diplomacy in Latin America. In addition, more vaccine doses became available for distribution in Latin America, and vaccines developed in Europe and the U.S. appeared to be more effective than Chinese or Russian vaccines. As a result, China’s triumphs in vaccine diplomacy were short-lived. Chinese vaccines dominated the Latin American market only for a short time, then vaccines produced in Europe and the USA overtook Chinese competitors. In terms of vaccine donations, the balance is even clearer, with China falling far behind the U.S. and Europe. But China may have used the donations in a more targeted and strategic way. This issue should be further explored in case studies.

The Chinese government has been relatively successful in preventing reputational damage due to crisis management early in the pandemic. However, China only managed to a limited extent to consolidate sympathy gains in Latin America, insofar as they existed. China may have reaped some economic benefits from its mask and vaccine diplomacy and rapid economic recovery. But the question arises as to whether the pandemic was really a game changer in this respect.