Abstract
In this paper we propose and defend the Synonymy account, a novel account of metaphysical equivalence which draws on the idea (Rayo in The Construction of Logical Space, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) that part of what it is to formulate a theory is to lay down a theoretical hypothesis concerning logical space. Roughly, two theories are synonymous—and so, in our view, equivalent—just in case (i) they take the same propositions to stand in the same entailment relations, and (ii) they are committed to the truth of the same propositions. Furthermore, we put our proposal to work by showing that it affords a better and more nuanced understanding of the debate between Quineans and noneists. Finally we show how the Synonymy account fares better than some of its competitors, specifically, McSweeney’s (Philosophical Perspectives 30(1):270–293, 2016) epistemic account and Miller’s (Philosophical Quarterly 67(269):772–793, 2017) hyperintensional account.
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Open access funding provided by FCT|FCCN (b-on). The first author acknowledges the financial support of the FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., under the projects CEEC/IND/0467/2017, and the PHI-ASM Project - Philosophical Investigation of Applications of Science in Mathematics, with reference PeX.2022.06784.PTDC, https://doi.org/10.54499/2022.06784.PTDC. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the project PID2019-106078GB-I00 (2020-2024, MCI/AEI/FEDER,UE, 10.13039/501100011033) of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, the project IT1612-22 (2022-2025) of the Basque Government and the contract with UPV/EHU funded by the Postdoctoral Training Programme 2021–2022 (POS202110027) of the Department of Education of the Basque Government.”
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Jacinto, B., Belastegui, J. Quineanism, Noneism and Metaphysical Equivalence. Stud Logica (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-023-10085-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-023-10085-y