Abstract
A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable and fixed player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class.
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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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van den Brink, R., Funaki, Y. Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for TU-Games. Theory Decis 67, 303–340 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9083-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9083-x