Introduction

The quote by Ruh above draws on outcomes of thinking or thoughts behind every migrants’ mind, always of unknown journeys, whether in the precolonial past when Europeans actually invaded Africa and elsewhere for allegedly ‘missionary’ activities or the present-day sea movement of Africans ‘invading’ Europe through the same sea voyages. Migrations in general are shrouded in the unknown. When people make choices (out of fear of political oppression), to seek freedom or safety (due to wars or communal clashes or conflicts), or economic welfare (as a result of hunger, unemployment), to relocate, it is usually places that are unknown, places friends and families have probably talked about, read about or even seen in print or via social media. Migration itself is as old as the universe.

Migration within and out of Africa is not new. It has been an age-long tradition. According to Castles, de Haas, and Miller (2013), large-scale African migrations started around 200,000 years ago with technological innovations that allowed populations to increase in numbers and expand. In their write-up, the history of migration can be broken into three phases: pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods. In pre-colonial times, technological innovations (for example, among the Nubia/Red Sea region which is the present-day Egypt and Sudan), linguistic origins and patterns (for example, the spread of Semitic and Berber languages from Ethiopia to the Horn of Africa as well as the spread of Nilo-Saharan languages to present-day Cameroon and to parts of South Africa), climate and ecological changes (due to droughts in the Sahara deserts) were responsible for migrations and constituted part of normal life of Africans which according to Castles, de Haas, and Miller included “permanent movements to open new lands and/or to escape wars and repression as well as seasonal or circular migration concerned with hunting, trade agriculture and religion” (Chap. 4.2, p. 2). The Muslim conquests (‘Arabization’) of North Africa also linked the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) with the Middle East and down to the West African sub-region and slavery during the European (British, French, Portuguese, Dutch, Belgian, Germans, etc.) invasion of Africa brought about colonial occupation and some migration dynamics at the time. Post-colonial migrations followed patterns of confusions caused by the artificial border creations by colonial powers which brought about infightings and wars among nation states in Africa which again further brought about the creation of refugees and internally displaced persons on higher scope. According to Castles et al. (2013), the historical background is crucial to understanding the refugee movements and by implications migrations in general in Africa which grew in volume particularly in the last decades of the twentieth century. Their claim is summarized in the following statement:

Population movements have placed an important part in shaping Africa and the rest of the world for thousands of years. Environmental, economic, cultural and political changes led to large historical migrations which helped form African societies and ways of living. These patterns were disrupted and transformed by European colonialism which brought economic exploitation, political domination and cultural change. The Atlantic slave trade devastated much of western and central Africa, while playing a crucial part in the development of the Atlantic economies. The underdevelopment and impoverishment left behind when colonialism receded after 1945 provide the context for today’s migrations within and from Africa. (Chap. 4.2, p. 1).

According to Bilger and Kraler (2005), Africa has long been described as an immensely mobile continent and continues to be viewed as such. Flahaux and De Hass (2016) see these claims of Africa being described as a continent of mass displacement and migration caused by poverty and violent conflict with ‘boat migration’ as alarmist rhetoric of politicians based on prejudiced assumptions, selective observation, or journalistic impressions, which do not represent the facts and realities on the ground nor sound empirical evidence. According to Flahaux and De Hass (2016), there are three partially false assumptions for this fear of an ‘African invasion of Europe:’ (a) that African migration is extraordinarily high, (b) that it is predominantly if not solely directed at Europe, and (c) that the migration is driven almost exclusively by poverty and violence. Several studies, however, have shown that African migration is much more diverse (Lessault & Flahaux, 2013; Schielke & Graw, 2012) and that Africans migrate not only to Europe but everywhere (Schoumaker et al., 2015; Bakewell & De Hass, 2007).

In fact, the World Migration Report of the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2005) described Africa as the continent with the most mobile populations in the world, while the same report indicated a decline in international migrations among Africans from 12% of the total number of migrants globally in 1970 to 9% in the first decade of the new millennium. On African migration to Europe, Hamilton (1997) reported that Moroccans constitute the largest group while those from sub-Saharan countries are negligible in numbers. According to the IOM (2005) report, African migrants constituted 9.9 million of global of 81.5 million, and 16.3 million of global 174.9 million in the years 1970 and 2000, respectively. Recent data (Fig. 1.1) for 2013–2018 offered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c) show a global total of 71.4 million of a ‘population of concern’ which includes refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and asylum seekers. Of this number, (sub-Saharan) Africa constituted 34% followed by Middle East and North Africa (23.5%), then Europe (15.5%) and, finally, by the Americas (14%), and Asia and the Pacific (13.2%).

Fig. 1.1
figure 1

Source UNHCR (2019a, 2019b, 2019c)

Population trend chart.

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While African numbers may seem higher than those of other regions, Flahaux and De Hass (2016), measuring immigration and emigration intensities, showed that the bulk of African migration is contained within the African continent which they highlight as occurring specifically between neighboring countries as demonstrated by the UNHCR (2019a, 2019b, 2019c) (Fig. 1.2).

Fig. 1.2
figure 2

Source UNHCR 2019a, 2019b, 2019c)

Migration destinations.

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Flahaux and De Hass (2016) further note that African migration has also increased not only to Europe but to other regions such as North America, the Gulf, and Asia. Their viewpoint is also supported by the report of the African Regional Consultative Meeting on the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (2017), which underscores that portraying African migration as a ‘crisis’, a deluge, and a ‘maritime invasion’ is overstating Eurocentric data, based on media images, political narratives, and some uninformed academic writings. Rather, African migration is not different from global migration or other migrations from other regions in the world to any major extent.

Within the context of the above scientific analyses, it is important to also understand the global migrant and refugee situation in Africa. In general, statistics (UNHCR, 2017) have shown that there is a strong upsurge of migrants worldwide rising from 173 million in 2000 to 258 million in 2017 with 84% of the world refugee burden on developing countries. As of 2017, statistics showed that more than 70 million people have fled their homes to other countries and out of this population, only about 25 million were given refugee status (UNHCR, 2017).

According to the UNHCR (2017) there are 25.4 million refugees in the world inclusive of the 4.4 million people who were newly displaced in the year 2017. Turkey ranked as the country hosting the highest absolute number of refugees (3.5 million) followed by Pakistan (1.4 million), Uganda (1.4 million), Lebanon (998,900), Iran (979,400), Germany (970,400), Bangladesh (932,200), and Sudan (906,600). Jordan hosts the highest number of refugees in comparison to its national population by a ratio of 1:3 (one refugee per 3 autochthonous residents), followed by Lebanon (1:4) and Turkey (1:23). Out of the 1.7 million new asylum claims in 2017, United States of America received the highest absolute number of claims (331,700), followed by Germany with 198,300 applications, Italy (126,500) and Turkey (126,100). Children (i.e., those less than 18 years of age) constitute 52% of the refugees in 2017 with about 173,800 unaccompanied and separated from their families. Some two-thirds (68%) of the world’s refugees came from five countries, which include Syria (6.3 million), Afghanistan (2.6 million), South Sudan (2.4 million), Myanmar (1.2 million) and Somalia (986,400) with Syria contributing almost 48% of the total. Out of these 5 countries, only two are African, South Sudan and Somalia. About 125 countries have granted asylum to Syrian refugees with Turkey (55%), Lebanon (16% Jordan (11%) and Germany (8%) having the highest intakes. It is to be noted that developing regions still host about 85% of the world’s refugee population.

In Africa, the estimated population of refugees is 6,268,200 with East and Horn of Africa accounting for almost 70% (4,307,800). The origins of African refugees are primarily South Sudan (2.4 million), Somalia (986,400), Sudan (694,600), DR Congo (620,800), Central African Republic (545,500), Eritrea (486,200) and Burundi (439,300). Most of South Sudanese refugees are hosted in Uganda (43%), Sudan (32%), and Ethiopia (18%). Refugees from Somalia are mainly hosted by Kenya (29%), Yemen (27%), and Ethiopia (26%). Chad (47%) and South Sudan (38%) host the majority of refugees from Sudan. The bulk of refugees from Central African Republic moved to Cameroon (40%) and DR Congo (34%). Ethiopia (34%) and Sudan (23%) host the largest number of Eritrean refugees. The chief hosts of Burundian refugees are Tanzania (58%) and Rwanda (21%). Unfortunately, solutions to the refugee crises seem not to be in sight as the number of refugees is projected to increase through the next decades (IOM, 2018b). According to Adepoju (1995) and—earlier—to Heisel (1982), growing disparities in development between the haves and have-nots, have been the primary cause of voluntary movement of populations between and within national borders in recent years, which they claim to have political, social and demographic dimensions.

Reasons for the fear of ‘invasion’ and ‘shock’ in the European Union (EU) are well summed up by Parkes (2017):

In the past three years, the EU has been hit by another migration shock, not from the east this time, but the south. Between 2014 and 2016, more than half a million people crossed the central Mediterranean to Europe, moving from the Horn and West Africa through Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria. These flows are again fundamentally challenging European foreign policy and its setup. The foundations of this policy were laid in the 1990s, in the wake of the first migration crisis. This was the doctrine of ‘concentric circles’, or ‘arcs’, whereby the EU attempted to radiate a transformative kind of order abroad. The EU has encouraged deep structural reforms foremost in a nearby arc of Western Balkan countries, then in a longer and more varied arc stretching from Belarus to Morocco, and then across a broad swathe of Eurasian, Latin American and African countries where it has been carrying out classic development policies. If that setup is now being challenged, it is because today’s migrants and refugees come from sub-Saharan Africa – from the outer swathe of countries where EU engagement consists of little more than development cooperation and is least driven by Europe’s own narrow interests. In other words, they come from places where the EU has the fewest tools to stem the flows. The migrants are also ignoring the EU’s carefully-demarcated concentric arcs, moving from the outer arc in Africa, through Europe’s near abroad in North Africa, and into the EU itself. (p. 1)

There is no doubt that African migration has begun a new outward movement to Europe and elsewhere. Media images of dinghy boats and Mediterranean deaths have attested (despite the insignificance of the numbers in terms of global statistics) to this new mode of migration which is now described as an ‘irregular’ ‘unauthorized’ invasion.

Idemudia and Boehnke (2010) tried to explain that unauthorized migrations are common among youths who are usually between 18 and 39 years. They believe that to put an end to their problem is to travel to Europe or North America, thinking that it is all bed of roses, lands flowing with milk and honey. As a result, they travel in droves and in fact, many travel by unsafe means. Some trek through the valleys and shadows of death of the hot Sahara Desert, using unsafe means such as trolleys, dinghies and cargo ships to cross the Mediterranean Sea and, in the process, sometimes meet untimely deaths while trying to cross over sharp razor-blade borders. Those who succeed, on arrival, find that the land that was supposed to flow with ‘milk and honey’ actually flows with racism, hardships, imprisonment, police harassments, daily apprehension of deportation and other hosts of hostile life situations. Some are then pushed into what may be described as undesirable and unprofitable ways of life such as prostitution, domestic thefts and other vices, and as a result may find themselves in prisons, lockouts, asylums, and mental institutions. Some, on the other hand, engage in petty and menial jobs such as dishwashing in restaurants, corpse cleaning, etc. It is not uncommon to find university graduates washing dishes in restaurants, cleaning the streets, and engaging in jobs that are menial to ‘keep body and soul together.’ The consequences are psychological difficulties necessitated by settling in a new country, frustrations and loneliness induced by racism, police harassment, and clash of values which inevitably have implications for mental health and wellbeing. For some with strong resilience to stress the consequences may be in the long term while for those with weak resilience to stress, the consequences may be immediate. Understanding the statistics of migrations globally and regionally is important but understanding the psychological dynamics of these migrants and their motivations for migrations should be more important, the sole reason for this book.

In the past, migration research has traditionally been dominated by disciplines such as biology, anthropology, sociology and geography. Migration is a human behavior and part of human condition which can be influenced by many factors which according to Bade (2000) can be political, economic, cultural or ecological. According to Bilger and Kraler (2005), migration research is a field of research that has emerged as a multi-(and sometimes inter- and trans-)disciplinary) field of research in the 1960s. Only recently, are psychologists beginning to be involved in migration research from a cross-cultural perspective (see Ward, Bochner, & Furnham, 2003; Mahalingam, 2006).

The goal of psychology is to understand humanity both by discovering general principles and exploring specific cases (Fernald, 2008). While psychological knowledge is typically applied to the assessment and treatment of mental health problems, it is also applied to understanding and solving problems in many different spheres of human activity. Psychologists attempt to understand the role of mental functions in individuals and to understand social behavior, while exploring the physiological and neurobiological processes that underlie certain functions and behaviors. Migration research from the point of view of psychology is to understand the nature of stress migration actors go through, implication of these stressors for posttraumatic stress symptoms (PTSS) and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other mental health outcomes. The discipline also tries to understand their perceptions, attitude, acculturation and cross-cultural encounters. The focus of psychology in migration research complements the approach of other so called ‘traditionalist’ disciplines and according to Mahalingam (2006), human migration is complex and dynamic with huge implications which we as scientists are only beginning to understand.

Some authors have also argued that the intersect between migration and psychology includes mental health of migrants, community level trauma interventions, integration of migrants, and the impact of discrimination and alienation and transnational families while at the same time recognizing a dearth of studies between migration and actual psychology (Palmary, 2018). As indicated earlier, the approach to migration from a psychological perspective and within the framework of globalization, focuses on acculturation, racism/prejudice, intercultural contacts, and mental health. This approach is anchored on a multi- and transdisciplinary approach which is the anchor of this book.

However, a problematic area in migration research is categorizing or sticking a label to the actors of migration because it is difficult and also fluid in nature, which in the authors’ opinion greatly affects research sampling. According to Idemudia and Boehnke (2010), actors in migration include students, visitors, international tourists, refugees, diplomats, economic migrants, undocumented migrants, or ‘stateless’ migrants (irregular migrants). Which label actually fits and at what time is this label removed or another added? The fluid nature of this is such that a student or visitor so categorized can become an ‘asylum seeker’ or an ‘irregular migrant’ if the student or visitor chooses not to return home and overstays the duration of the visa or even chooses to apply as a ‘refugee’. Or in the worst scenario ‘shreds his or her identification such as passport and in this case becomes ‘stateless.’

Hence, in this book, participants in the study include migrants in a broad sense: Those who have come legally (i.e., the regular migrants) and have their permanent residence or become citizens by naturalization, and those who recently arrived through the desert and Mediterranean Sea whom we refer to as ‘unauthorized’ or ‘irregular’ migrants. Some of these irregulars have also become refugees at some stage and so are all grouped under ‘irregulars.’ The essence of this is to locate the study within psychology profiles for these groups, understand the dynamics of stress, psychopathology operational from sending countries and receiving countries within the contexts of six European countries. Several focus group discussions were held and will be used to support evidences of claims for the study.

However, there is no doubt that when people move from one country or society to another especially in the most irregular manner, emotional difficulties are experienced because migrants pass from one set of cultural values to another. Different migrating populations have diverse resources and different abilities to cope with the stresses encountered. Immigrant groups are subject to discrimination in housing, employment, in education services and in everyday interpersonal relations. Also, virtually in every EU country, housing of ethnic minorities indicates that they occupy the transitional zones of town areas, which are falling into disrepair and/or are scheduled for eventual demolition in accommodation, with rudimentary sanitation and cooking facilities (Littlewood & Lipsedge, 1989).

The burden of migration is enormous on the migrants, the sending and receiving countries, leading to problems of abuse, homelessness and many stressors before migration, through the journey and after arrival in the host countries. These stressors may gravely affect the mental health of migrants and refugees. These stressors may actually begin from the day the journey starts which can be broadly categorized as pre-migration, mid-migration and post-migration periods (Idemudia, 2011; Idemudia, 2014a, 2014b; Idemudia, 2017; Idemudia & Boehnke, 2010; Idemudia, Williams, Boehnke & Wyatt, 2013; Idemudia, Williams & Wyatt, 2013). There is also a viewpoint of this book whether these irregular migrants possess a different kind of personality, because crossing the desert, living on the road without time frame, crossing the sea and the hardships of unimaginable discomfort that come with these travels will after all require extraordinary health, endurance and resistance to pain. The pre-migration period would be dominated by stress encountered in migrants’ home countries before embarking on the journey. Mid-migration will be from the time they set off from their various countries, through the various routes and finally to Europe and elsewhere, and how they also cope when they arrive their destinations. We have accounts of durations from one year to ten years before reaching the goal. The post-migration period commences when migrants reach Europe and this includes periods during which migrants are processed as refugees or ‘undocumented’ if refused asylum and may flee detention centers. At this point, it is important to discuss briefly some of the plights inherent in the asylum process and obtaining refugee status.

The Plights Inherent in the Asylum Process and Obtaining Refugee Status

The first step to gaining refugee status is to seek asylum in any country of destination after fleeing one’s country of origin. According to the European Union 2003 Dublin II regulation, it is the responsibility of the first country of destination to process asylum claims filed within the first 12 months of getting into the EU. Thereby the receiving country is given legal recognition to process asylum claims. At that stage, it is the responsibility of the receiving state to provide internal protection and care for asylum seekers, and process their asylum claims as timely as possible. However, countries of first entry have limited incentives and capacities in implementing the Dublin II regulation, thereby necessitating asylum seekers to struggle on to other destinations (Bauböck, 2018). Based on the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention principle of non-refoulement, host countries are barred from forcing asylum seekers to go back to their country of origin unless in rare circumstances, where asylum seekers themselves pose a threat to the security of host communities.

Legally, for an asylum seeker to have refugee recognition, the asylum claim must undergo the administrative procedure referred to as Refugee Status Determination (RSD). This process enables the individual to obtain a refugee status document processed by UNHCR or the government of the host country. Refugee status is granted according to national, regional or international laws. RSD particularly involves hearings, an interview or series of interviews with the representative of the host country or UNHCR, and where there is a situation of mass displacements, RSD is based on a prima facie basis because of the potential pressure on interview resources (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program, RSTP 2017). Under the prima facie basis condition, refugee status is determined by the obvious objective conditions of the host country that led to fleeing (e.g., the Syrian crisis).

The territorial asylum system adopted by the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention, the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (demanding that refugees must apply for asylum at the border of host countries before the asylum claim can be processed) is described (Hansen, 2017) as inefficient and deadly, given that it forces refugees to embark on illegal and dangerous journeys and increases vulnerability to abuse by traffickers and smugglers. This is why preferential treatments are accorded to categories of individuals who claim that they were individually persecuted rather than to those who flee from wars and conflicts during the refugee status determination (RSD, Koopmans, 2016). The refugee policies of the 1969 OAU Convention have also been criticized for their inability to adequately meet the complexities of refugee protection demands in sub-Saharan African (d’Orsi, 2016).

The living conditions of asylum seekers vary from country to country. In the Global South (i.e., the developing world), asylum seekers are relocated to refugee camps until their applications are determined. While some countries in the EU house asylum seekers in immigration detention centers, others put them in community centers restraining them from gaining employment.Footnote 1 In Calais, France, asylum seekers are reported to have been restrained in a camp with hazardous spaces, signifying a kind of political indifference towards the refugee regime (Davies, Isakjee, & Dhesi, 2017). In Germany and the UK, asylum seekers are prohibited from working for durations of 3 months and 1 year, respectively, from the time of arrival, and in Germany, they are only permitted to work if no German or EU citizen applied for the job.Footnote 2 A country like Australia operates an extraterritorial policy where asylum seekers are put in an offshore detention in Nauru until their cases are determined (Orchard, 2016). According to the UNHCR, the Nauru regional processing center is marred with timeless refugee determination procedures and more of a “detention-like setting” in which the primary conditions of asylum seekers do not differ from those experienced when they were in their home countries (Andrew & Renata Kaldor Centre of International Refugee Law, 2018). In countries like Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, asylum seekers are permitted to live among the local populations, apply for informal work to earn daily living, have makeshift houses or live in uncompleted and abandoned building.Footnote 3 In Kenya, asylum seekers undergo the encampment policy which retrains their capacity to move around and seek informal employment, and must get a movement pass to enable them to travel outside the camp (Goitom, 2016). Although the Kenyan law allows for naturalization after gaining a refugee status, in practice refugees are not naturalized in Kenya (Goitom, 2016). In Egypt, there is absence of legal comprehensive instruments for the protection of refugees (Abdelaaty, 2016). Refugees are reportedly restricted, arrested, detained and harassed by the police, face unemployment problems, and are in danger of being attacked by human traffickers (Sadek, 2016). In places where asylum seekers, refugee and migrants tend to live in freedom, they are found to be in pitiable conditions below human dignity and honor (The Greek Ombudsman Independent Authority, 2017). These extremely unpalatable circumstances are detrimental to safety and protection of asylum seekers (Sandelind, 2017).

Although it is assumed that states have the moral justification to exercise discretion in control of the influx of migrants (Carens, 2014), the individual states’ policies underlying RSD have been criticized for turning some refugees to illegal immigrants and shielding EU countries from fulfilling their international legal responsibilities (Robila, 2018). In rhetoric, Global North countries show their commitments and dedication to the refugee regime while on the other hand, against humanitarian interests, implement stricter policies on border control and immigration (Orchard, 2016; Sandelind, 2017). In practice, it is observed that states jettison the legal framework for protection of asylum claimants by refusing admission and returning them to a country they used as passage, or the country of origin or another unsafe country without examining whether their claim is genuine or not (Dahlvik, 2018). Ziegler (2015) pointed out that Sudanese and Eritrean asylum seekers were adjudicated individually in their refugee claims but simultaneously adjudged as not qualified for refugee status by Israeli migration officials. The detestation of refugee protection has led to the general claim that “60%” of asylum seekers in Europe are mere economic migrants without adequate empirical evidence (Cluskey, 2016). Also, using the group-based refugee status determination rather than the individual-based status determination in evaluating asylum claims in developing countries has encouraged refugees’ dehumanization and poor treatment (Kagan, 2017).

It is further noted that increased backlogs of refugee determination have hindered and led to decline of processing individual RSD, meaning that asylum seekers must initially spend some of their vulnerable years waiting for their status to be determined (Kagan, 2017). For example, by the end of 2014, a total of 1603 asylum applications were determined in Thailand with 6806 pending cases because of lodgment of 5617 new applications (UNHCR, 2015). Processing of asylum claims is also fraught with delays in the United States by about 3 years. To qualify for an asylum interview in February 2017, the initial claim should have been filed before the middle of 2014 (United States Asylum Office, 2017). In South Africa, the Department of Home Affairs is criticized for its failure in finalizing asylum claims within 180 days (Kock, 2018). In some countries that adopt the “accelerated, prioritized and fast-track,” asylum processing procedures, such procedures are underpinned by higher rejection rates and lower protection to asylum seekers (European Council of Refugee and Exiles, 2017; Nicholson & Kumin, 2017).

Delay in RSD has been shown to have greater disadvantage ranging from inability of applicants to recollect all memories relating to persecution in their country of origin to doubts whether the persecutors are no more after them at the time the adjudication process begins (Kagan, 2017). This means asylum seekers may be unable to present accurate narratives of their persecutory experiences thereby leading to rejection of asylum applications or being granted provisional status. It is further reported that many countries put asylum seekers in detention pending the time their status is determined considering the determination of backlogs with the intention of deterring new arrivals of asylum seekers (Foster, 2017). The EU-Turkey agreement of 2016 with the European Agenda on Migration in 2015 has been described as a legalized process for prevention and deterrence of refugee movements in Europe (The Greek Ombudsman Independent Authority, 2017). According to the European Council of Refugee and Exiles (2016) country report, while some European states such as Malta (89.8%), Sweden (77.8%), Switzerland (75.5%) and Netherlands (71.8%) have high refugee recognition rates, others like Hungary (8.4%), Poland (16.5%), Ireland (23.1%), Germany (29.1%), UK (33.9%), Italy (38.7%) and France (39%) have relatively lower rates.