Arguments for the Causal Principle

Abstract

I develop an argument for the Causal Principle: If x begins uncaused, y would also begin uncaused, which is not the case; therefore, the antecedent is not the case, and reply to objections by Oppy, Almeida, Linford, and others. I refute the claim that x (the initial state of reality: ISOR) begins uncaused as brute fact, and I refute the claim that pre-existing abstract objects provide the required metaphysical grounding. I demonstrate that there isn’t any concrete object that can provide the required grounding because (i) there would not be any causally antecedent condition which would make it the case that x rather than y (e.g. electric fields increasing in strength; energy-conserving changes) begins uncaused, (ii) the properties of x and the properties of y which differentiate between them would be had by them only when they had already begun to exist, and (iii) the circumstance is compatible with the beginning of y. I also defended an alternative Modus Tollens argument which shows that if x (e.g. our spacetime block) begins uncaused, then some other possible spacetime blocks (e.g. y) would also begin uncaused initially and collide with ours, causing massive disruption, which is not the case; therefore, the antecedent is not the case.

3.1 Introduction

As noted in Chap. 2, a number of scientists and philosophers have expressed scepticism concerning the Causal Principle ‘whatever begins to exist has a cause’. In particular, they have objected that, even if the Causal Principle applies to things within the universe, it might not apply to the universe itself. A number of arguments have been offered in the literature in response to this objection. These include (1) an inductive argument, (2) an argument from the concept of non-being, (3) a Modus Tollens argument, (4) the rationality argument (if the universe began uncaused, an absurd universe is as likely to begin uncaused as a normal universe is; this generates serious scepticism about the reliability of our cognitive faculties, the truth of our sensory inputs, and our past knowledge, thus creating a reductio ad absurdum against the objection [Miksa 2020]), and (5) argument from fine-tuning and order. It should be noted that any one of these arguments would be sufficient for the purposes of the KCA. In other words, a proponent of the KCA does not have to rely on any single one of these arguments. Therefore, even if the objector of the KCA manage to find fallacies in one of these arguments, this does not imply that the KCA has been rebutted. Rather, the objector would need to rebut all five of these multiple independent arguments.

I have defended the first three arguments in my previous work (Loke 2012, 2017, chapter 5). In this book, I shall develop my defence of (3) the Modus Tollens argument against objections which have been raised more recently since the publication of my previous work (I shall also respond to other relevant objections in older literature). In addition, I shall defend (5) the fine-tuning argument at the end of this chapter.

The Modus Tollens argument can be traced to the American philosopher-theologian Jonathan Edwards, who argues that ‘if there be no absurdity or difficulty in supposing one thing to start out of non-existence into being, of itself without a Cause; then there is no absurdity or difficulty in supposing the same of millions of millions’ (Edwards 1830, p. 53). Likewise, Arthur Prior reasons that ‘if it is possible for objects to start existing without a cause, then it is incredible that they should all turn out to be objects of the same sort’ (Prior 1968, p. 65). Craig and Sinclair explain the argument as follows:

If things really could come into being uncaused out of nothing, then it becomes inexplicable why just anything or everything does not come into existence uncaused from nothing. Why do bicycles and Beethoven and root beer not pop into being from nothing? Why is it only universes that can come into being from nothing? What makes nothingness so discriminatory? There cannot be anything about nothingness that favors universes, for nothingness does not have any properties. Nothingness is the absence of anything whatsoever. As such, nothingness can have no properties, since there literally is not anything to have any properties. Nor can anything constrain nothingness, for there is not anything to be constrained. (Craig and Sinclair 2009, p. 186)

Craig and Sinclair’s defence of this argument has been subjected to criticisms (e.g. Oppy 2010, 2015). In response to these criticisms (see below), I shall develop a version of the argument which can be formulated as follows:

• 1. If x (e.g. physical reality) begins uncaused, then y which begins to exist would also begin uncaused. (Here, y refers to event(s) or type of events that occurs/occurred/would have occurred.)

• 2. It is not the case that y begins uncaused.

• 3. Therefore, it is not the case that x begins uncaused.

As a rough analogy, consider the following story which illustrates the general principle that what begins to exist is brought about (and constrained by) the cause, and what would happen if this principle were violated.

Think about why my newly built house is the way it is, rather than a pile of rocks. The answer is simple: the house builder makes it that way; what begins to exist is brought about and constrained by the cause; if the cause were a huge explosion rather than a house builder, what began to exist would be rubble rather than a house.

However, if my house begins to exist uncaused, then that means that there is no cause, which makes it the case that only a house rather than other things (e.g. a rubble) begins to exist uncaused. That is, there would be no constraint on whatever begins to exist in the present circumstances from beginning to exist uncaused, in which case we would expect to see many other things (e.g. a rubble) begin to exist uncaused, but we do not.

I shall now elaborate on the argument.

Very briefly, the justification for premise 1 is that, (I) if something xbegins to exist uncaused, then this means that there would not be any causally antecedent condition of x which would make it the case that x (rather than y) begins to exist uncaused, (II) the properties of x and the properties of y which differentiate between them would be had by them in the actual concrete world only when they had already begun to exist, and (III) the circumstance is compatible with the beginning of y. I shall argue in the following sections that (I), (II), and (III) jointly imply that there would be no difference between x and y where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned. To deny the consequent in premise 1, I only have to show that one event around me does not begin to exist uncaused. For example, I do not experience an event such as y = ‘a rapid increasing in strength of electric fields around me’ beginning to exist without causally antecedent conditions such as (say) having to switch on the electric field generator. Since the consequent in premise 1 is false, the antecedent is false; that is, it is not the case that something begins to exist uncaused.

It should be noted that the Causal Principle I am defending is not ‘whatever begins to exist must have a cause’; but rather ‘whatever begins to exist has a cause’. I shall not argue that there could be no exception, but there is no exception. In other words, I am defending a causal principle that is contingent, that is, true in the actual world, rather than in all possible worlds. The Modus Tollens argument I defend does not exclude possible worlds which are utterly chaotic and in which the initial state of reality (ISOR) begins uncaused, but such worlds are obviously not our actual world. As we shall see later, an objector to my argument might claim that ISOR begins uncaused and yet our world is not utterly chaotic because other things do not begin uncaused. In reply to this claim, I will not be arguing that it faces the problem of explaining how it could be the case that a thing of a certain kind (a kind to which ISOR belongs) begins to exist uncaused whereas things of other sorts do not. Rather, I will be arguing that the objector’s claim faces the problem of explaining why (ex hypothesi) ISOR does in fact begin to exist uncaused while other things do not.¹

The above clarifications address Almeida’s (2018, pp. 87–90) objections to the Causal Principle. Almeida appeals to the argument that lawless possible worlds exist—one can imagine chaotic worlds in which events such as a raging tiger suddenly come into existence in the room uncaused happen often and unpredictably. While such events do not happen often and unpredictably in our world, there is a small chance they can happen. For example,

there is some small chance, further, that the particles that compose the hand of the statue of David all move together upward and then downward and ‘wave’ at you … for any actual object whatsoever, there is a small chance that it spontaneously disappears and an intrinsic duplicate of the object appears on Mars. (Ibid.)

My Modus Tollens argument is not susceptible to the above objection because it does not deny that there are possible worlds which are chaotic, or that some things can begin to exist uncaused. Rather, what the argument would show is that, if something does begin to exist without any causally necessary condition whatsoever, our actual world would be very different because some uncaused events (e.g. electric fields increasing in strength under certain circumstances uncaused) would happen all the time in our world,² which is not the case.

Almeida (2018) also suggests that, for all we know, ‘our world is one in which what we believe are the causal laws are statistical generalizations whose probabilities oscillate imperceptibly every 100 million years’ (p. 38), and we happen to live in an epoch in which we do not perceive uncaused events, but this does not imply that the beginning of the universe is caused. However, given my argument, the statistical generalizations suggested by Almeida would not hold because, as I shall explain below, if something begins to exist uncaused, some uncaused events would happen all the time and such events would not have been preventable.

Finally, it is important to remind the reader of the definition of the key term ‘beginning’ which (as explained in Chap. 2) is understood as follows: something has a beginning if it has a temporal extension, the extension is finite, and it has temporal edges/boundaries (e.g. on the model of spacetime which exists for all t > 0 but not at t = 0, t = 0 is a boundary). The above definition for ‘beginning’ holds regardless of whether time is emergent property of our universe or whether there may not be any definite time order to events when the universe is so small that quantum gravity is important. The definition does not require ‘time earlier than the universe’; it also does not require the universe to begin to exist in time. As long as the universe has a temporal extension, the extension is finite, and it has temporal edges/boundaries, it has a beginning (regardless of whether the beginning is ‘in time’ or not), and therefore susceptible to my Modus Tollens argument. In other words, my Modus Tollens argument does not require the existence of time before the existence of the universe. One must also be careful not to confound two distinct models of the world: one with temporal boundary and one without temporal boundary. If one thinks that the universe is timeless and has no temporal boundary (as postulated by Hawking’s no boundary proposal), that would be a separate issue which I address separately using other arguments explained in Chap. 6.

In the following sections I shall explain the argument in greater detail as I respond to various objections. I shall show that my argument would work on a static theory of time as well. At this point it should be noted that, even if the static theory of time is true, there is still something unique about time which makes it different from spatial order. For example, within the spacetime block, the durations next to each human, including myself, are occupied by his/her parents such that, if they had not existed, him/her would not exist. In this sense there is still a certain dependence and ordering among things/events, which I shall call ‘causal dependence’ and ‘causal order’. Whereas this is not so with spatial order: if my parents do not stand on my left or right, I would still exist. This indicates that time is different from space even if the static theory of time is true, and that there is still causal order in any case. The argument of this chapter is that, if the causal principle is false, we would not observe the temporal/causal order which we do observe.

3.2 Objection: The Initial State of Reality (ISOR) is the Only Thing That Begins Uncaused

To begin, against premise 1, Oppy has suggested that the initial state of reality (ISOR) is the only thing that begins uncaused, while later things/events begins caused (Oppy 2010, 2015). Oppy claims that this view is supported by a branching view of modality according to which all possible worlds share the initial state (the First Cause) of the history of the actual world which is necessary (such an initial state exists given that [as I shall argue in Chap. 5] an infinite causal regress and a causal loop is not the case). Oppy explains:

My favourite theory of modality has the evident advantage of theoretical frugality. On the one hand, if there are objective chances, then any theory of modality is surely committed to the possibility of the outcomes that lie in the relevant objective chance distributions. On the other hand, it is not clear that we have good reason to commit ourselves to any possibilities beyond those that are required by whatever objective chances there might be; at the very least, any expansion of the range of possibilities clearly requires some kind of justification. (Oppy 2013b, p. 47)

Oppy would also argue that, in comparison with theism which likewise affirms an uncaused and necessarily existent First Cause, his view has the best trade-off between simplicity and explanatory power because he thinks that it is able to explain everything that theism explains without needing to posit an ‘extra’ entity, that is, God (Oppy 2013a).

In reply, it is trivially true that, if there is an initial state of reality and that this state is the First Cause, then such a First Cause would be uncaused. The key question is, what kind of thing is the initial state that is uncaused? There are two possible answers:

• 1. A First Cause with a beginning

• 2. A First Cause without a beginning (I shall argue in Chap. 6 that such a First Cause would also be transcendent, immaterial, has libertarian freedom, that is, a Creator.)

Now both Oppy and I affirm that the First Cause is factually necessary and also metaphysical necessary. A factually necessary being is one which is not causally dependent on other things; in this sense, it is not contingent (dependent on) anything else. A metaphysical necessary being is one which exists in all metaphysically possible worlds. The difference between our views is that on Oppy’s view the initial state (i.e. the First Cause) is metaphysical necessary and has a beginning (whereas on my view the First Cause is beginningless), and he thinks that this metaphysical necessity would entail factual necessity, which he also affirms.

In the rest of this chapter, I shall argue against (1) using the Modus Tollens argument; that is, I shall argue it is not the case that something that begins to exist is factually necessary; thus, this Modus Tollens argument refutes Oppy’s view, which entails the opposite. While ultimately there must be brute necessity where explanation stop, my Modus Tollens argument implies that this brute necessity is not something that has a beginning; therefore, a brute necessity is something that is beginningless. At this point, I would just like to note that Oppy should not reply to my Modus Tollens argument by claiming that the initial state begins to exist as a brute necessity given his theory of modality, since this would be begging the question by assuming (1) instead of (2) (his theory of modality by itself does not imply either (1) or (2)). Neither should Oppy reply by claiming that ISOR would be uncaused if it begins to exist. The reason is because it is trivially true that ISOR would be uncaused (since it is supposed to be the initial state); whether it begins uncaused is precisely the issue under dispute. Oppy might object by arguing that (1) is justified by his claim that it has the best trade-off between simplicity and explanatory power. He thinks that premises of arguments are evaluated based on theories which are evaluated based on certain virtues (e.g. simplicity, explanatory power), and he claims that his view has equal explanatory power and is simpler compared to theism (Oppy 2013b). However, a view that entails a contradiction cannot be true, even if it is simpler. Thus, simplicity cannot help his view since his view entails a contradiction as I shall explain using the Modus Tollens argument. Basically, the argument shows that, if ISOR begins uncaused, I should expect to see other things beginning uncaused around me, but I do not; hence, the antecedent is false. I shall elaborate on this argument and defend it against objections in the rest of this chapter.

Let us begin by considering another scenario. Suppose someone postulates that the circumstances are such that it is metaphysically possible for x and y to begin to exist, and that only xbegins to existcaused. If he/she were asked ‘what makes it the case that it is x rather than y that begins to existcaused’, the answer would be simple: in these circumstances, the causally antecedent condition(s) makes it the case that it is x rather than y that begins to exist.

Now suppose someone postulates that the circumstances are such that it is metaphysically possible for x and y to begin to exist, and that only x begins to exist uncaused. The important question to ask is, ‘What makes it the case that it is x rather than y that begins to exist uncaused?’ (By ‘makes it the case’, I mean ‘provides metaphysical grounding’.)

Note that the term ‘metaphysical ground’ is standardly used in the philosophical literature to mean something distinct from a cause [although it can also be a cause]. ‘For instance, we might say that the members of a set are prior to the set itself; the existence of the set is grounded in its members. Or to take a more concrete example, the existence of any given composite object is grounded in the existence of its parts’ [Tahko and Lowe 2020, section 5].) Using the laws of logic (the law of excluded middle), the following are the only possible answers:

• 1.1. If x rather than ybegins to exist uncaused, then either

• 1.1.1. nothing makes this the case (brute fact) or

• 1.1.2. something abstract makes this the case, or

• 1.1.3. something concrete with property³ S makes this the case, in which case either

• 1.1.3.1. S is a property of x which makes it different from y (i.e. S is a property which x has but y does not have), or

• 1.1.3.2. S is a property of something other than x: either

• 1.1.3.2.1. S is a property of the circumstances of x, or

• 1.1.3.2.2. S is a property of y, or

• 1.1.3.2.3. S is a property of the circumstances of y.

(Note: circumstance is defined as ‘a fact or condition connected with or relevant to an event’ [Oxford English Dictionary, OED]. Thus, anything other than x, y, or their circumstance would be irrelevant).

In the rest of this chapter, I shall argue:

• 1.2. It is not the case that 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.3.1, 1.1.3.2.1, 1.1.3.2.2, or 1.1.3.2.3.

• 1.3. Therefore, it is not the case that x rather than ybegins to exist uncaused.

In particular, it should be noted that, given (as I shall show later) that the objector to my argument cannot appeal to ‘brute fact’ (1.1.1) or ‘abstract entities’ (1.1.2), it turns out that the objector has to affirm (1.1.3) something concrete with property S makes it the case that x rather than y begins to exist uncaused, in which case either 1.1.3.1, 1.1.3.2.1, 1.1.3.2.2, or 1.1.3.2.3.

As I shall explain later in this chapter,

• the falsity of 1.1.3.2.1 ‘S is a property of the circumstances of x’ is entailed by (I) there would not be any causally antecedent condition which would make it the case that x rather than y begins to exist uncaused;

• the falsity of 1.1.3.1. ‘S is a property of x which makes it different from y’ and 1.1.3.2.2. ‘S is a property of y’ is entailed by (II) the properties of x and the properties of y which differentiate between them would be had by them only when they had already begun to exist; and

• the falsity of 1.1.3.2.3 ‘S is a property of the circumstances of y’ is entailed by (III) the circumstance is compatible with the beginning of y.

Therefore, (I), (II), and (III) jointly imply that there would be no essential difference between x and y where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned, and this implies that Oppy’s theory that ‘x (ISOR) begins uncaused but y begins caused’ is false. Oppy should not respond by claiming that theories determine whether arguments are sound and that given his theory, (I), (II), and/or (III) is false.⁴ The reason is because (I), (II), and (III) are implied by Oppy’s own theory. To elaborate, (I) Oppy’s theory that x (ISOR) begins uncaused but y begins caused implies that no cause making it the case that x (rather than y) begins uncaused. Moreover, (II) x and y having a beginning implies that the properties of x and the properties of y which differentiate between them would be had by them only when they had already begun to exist, and (III) y begins caused implies that the circumstances are compatible with the beginning of y. In other words, Oppy’s theory implies (I), (II), and (III), which imply that his theory is false; that is, Oppy’s theory entails a contradiction.⁵

I shall now discuss 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.3.1, 1.1.3.2.1, 1.1.3.2.2, and 1.1.3.2.3 in detail.

3.3 Against 1.1.1. Brute Fact

Concerning 1.1.1, the objector to my argument might suggest it is a brute fact that only ISOR (suppose x = ISOR) but not y begins to exist uncaused (Rasmussen 2018). While there is a difference between x and y (viz. that x begins uncaused but y begins caused), there is no difference between x and y that explains why x begins uncaused but y begins caused. In this case, x and y have a difference that has no further metaphysical ground. The objector might argue that this is analogous to the situation in which two carbon-14 atoms which are qualitatively identical with respect to beta-decay and as a result have the same objective chance of decay, and purely as a matter of chance, one but not the other decays in the next moment as a brute fact (i.e. without a metaphysical ground that differentiates between them with respect to decay). In this scenario, it is stipulated that no relevant (hidden) variable is left out, such that the chances in question are irreducible; that is, the event happened as a brute fact without any further explanation. In this case of genuine indeterminism, there is no difference between the atoms that explains why beta-decay happens to one but not the other.⁶

Now the following two brute fact claims should be distinguished:

• 1. ‘x begins uncaused’ is a brute fact.

• 2. ‘x begins uncaused but y begins caused’ is a brute fact.

The possibility of (1) (see Sect. 3.1) does not imply the possibility or actuality of (2). (2) is refuted by the following three independent arguments (while (1) is refuted by the arguments in this chapter):

• Argument 1

It is ad hoc and special pleading to claim that ‘unlike other things which begins caused, x begins uncaused’ without any ground or justification for claiming that. (For why the special pleading objection does not apply to God, see Chap. 6.)

• Argument 2

There is a difference between radioactive decay scenario and the uncaused beginning (‘x begins uncaused but y begins caused’) scenario. In the former there are two atoms which pre-exist before one of them decays. Whereas in the latter nothing pre-exists the uncaused beginning of x. This difference is significant in light of the following argument:

• 1. ‘The possession of the property of “beginning uncaused” by x’ requires the existence of x, and ‘the possession of the property of “beginning caused” by y’ requires the existence of y.

• 2. Therefore, the existence of x and y (with their numerical distinction) is required for ‘x has the property of beginning uncaused and y has the property of beginning caused’ (From 1).

Since ‘x begins uncaused but y begins caused’ requires (i.e. depends on) the numerically distinct existence of x and y, it cannot just be a brute fact. Therefore, 1.1.1 is false.

The difference between the radioactive decay scenario and the uncaused beginning scenario is significant because, in the radioactive decay scenario, the numerically distinct carbon-14 atoms x and y already exist before the decay. Now the objector might claim that there is no metaphysical ground for ‘why x but not y decays’. I argue against this under the third argument below; but the point here is that, in any case, there is still a metaphysical ground for ‘x but not y decays’; namely, x and y are not numerically identical, even though they are supposed to be qualitatively identical with respect to beta-decay.⁷ Thus, it is the case that the numerical distinction between x and y is possessed by x and y, which concretely pre-exist ‘the radioactive decay of x but not y’. On the other hand, I shall argue in Sects. 3.4 and 3.5 that the numerical distinction between x and y (call this property S) cannot be a metaphysical ground for ‘x begins uncaused but y begins caused’. The reason is because it is not the case that S is possessed by x and y, which concretely pre-exist ‘the uncaused beginning of x but not y’, and I shall argue in the rest of this chapter that nothing else provides the required metaphysical ground. Hence, this argument refutes uncaused beginning, but it is compatible with indeterministic radioactive decay.

• Argument 3

If ‘x begins uncaused but y begins caused’ is a brute fact, this implies that there is no metaphysical ground which restricts uncaused beginnings to only x or makes x different from other things/events such as y with regard to uncaused beginnings; thus (contrary to the supposition), y would also begin uncaused unrestricted. The argument can be formulated as follows:

• 1. If ‘x begins uncaused but y begins caused’ is a brute fact, then there is no metaphysical ground which makes it the case that only x (and not y) begins uncaused.

• 2. If there is no metaphysical ground which makes it the case that only x (and not y) begins uncaused, then there is no restriction of uncaused beginnings to only x (and not y).

• 3. If there is no restriction of uncaused beginnings to only x (and not y), then y would begin uncaused.

• 4. It is not the case that y begins uncaused. (From 1)

• 5. Therefore, it is not the case that ‘x begins uncaused but y begins caused’ is a brute fact.

Against premise 3, it might be objected that ‘just because y could begin uncaused does not imply that it would begin uncaused’.⁸ However, this objection is based on a misunderstanding. I agree that ‘could’ does not imply ‘would’. But I didn’t argue or assume otherwise. ‘Could’ concerns possibility, but premise 3 is not referring to possible events. Rather, premise 3 is referring to (supposed) actual events. In other words, premise 3 is not referring to what could happen but what does happen. It states that the absence of restriction of ‘what does happen uncaused’ to only x implies that other events (e.g. y) which do happen also happen uncaused. For example, consider the scenario in which something (say) the universe began to exist and there was also a rapid increasing in strength of electric fields under certain circumstances around me. In this scenario these are not just possible events (i.e. it is not merely the case that the universe could begin to exist and electric field could increase in strength), but actual events; that is, the universe did begin to exist and electric field did increase in strength. Now suppose the former is x and the latter is y. Since premises 1 and 2 refer to what actually happens rather than merely what could happen, what follows from premises 1 and 2 is ‘there is no restriction that uncaused beginning would only occur for x and not for y’. This provides the justification for concluding that y would begin uncaused.

It might be objected that ‘just because there is no restriction to prevent a thing from behaving in a certain way does not entail that the thing would behave in that way’. For example, there was no restriction to prevent Peter from going for a walk today, but in fact Peter chose not to go.

In reply, there is a distinction between (A) ‘no restriction to prevent a thing from behaving in a certain way’ and (B) ‘no restriction of a kind of event (uncaused happening) to only one thing’. Concerning (A), I am not claiming that ‘there is no restriction to prevent a thing from behaving in a certain way’ entails that ‘the thing would behave in that way’. For in this case the thing can have the capacity to behave otherwise; for example, Peter has a capacity to choose not to go for a walk. Thus, the antecedent condition does not entail that the thing will behave in that way.

The case is different concerning (B) ‘no restriction of a kind of event to only one thing’. For example, if there is no restriction of ‘falling to the ground’ to a particular thing, then falling would happen to other things because of the nature of reality as described by the law of gravity. (The hot air above a fire rises because its density is lower than the surrounding air; in this case, its lower density serves as a restriction to prevent it from falling.) Likewise, the absence of metaphysical restriction in premise 3 implies that the nature of reality would be such that there is no limitation of uncaused beginnings to only one particular thing x, which implies that uncaused beginnings would be unlimited and would also happen to other things such as y, which implies that y would also begin uncaused.

The third argument is different from the second argument because it is arguably incompatible with indeterministic radioactive decay. To see this, one can simply substitute ‘undergoes radioactive decay’ for ‘begins uncaused’ and ‘does not undergo radioactive decay’ for ‘begins caused’ into the above argument, and one gets the conclusion ‘Therefore, it is not the case that x undergoes radioactive decay but y does not undergo radioactive decay is a brute fact’. This conclusion is compatible with scientific evidence, for as noted in Chap. 2 that there is insufficient scientific evidence for thinking that quantum events are genuinely indeterministic. Concerning probabilistic causation, there is strong justification for maintaining that the phenomena (the decay and statistics they exhibit) themselves have underlying proportionate causal explanations, for they exhibit regularities that strongly indicate the existence of more fundamental ordered causes (Stoeger 2001, p. 87).

The argument is compatible with indeterministic libertarian free choice, according to which ‘A is chosen by person P but not-A is not-chosen by P’ is a brute fact. It does not follow from this that there is no metaphysical ground for only A (and not not-A) is chosen, because person P is the metaphysical ground which makes it the case that only A is chosen.⁹ The argument is also compatible with the uncaused existence of God as a brute fact. It does not follow from this that ‘God exists uncaused beginninglessly but y begins to exist caused’ is a brute fact, because God’s existence having no beginning whereas y’s existence having a beginning is the metaphysical ground in this case (see Sect. 3.5). Neither does it follow from this that ‘God exists uncaused beginninglessly but an eternal Quadrinity does not exist uncaused beginninglessly’ is a brute fact, because there could be preventive conditions in the beginningless state which makes such a state incompatible with a Quadrinity existing (see Sect. 3.8.4).

Finally, even if the above three argument fail, one may offer a probabilistic version as follows: If there is no metaphysical grounding which restricts uncaused beginnings to only x, then some other event would occur uncaused at some point with an overwhelmingly high probability. Consider the decay example again as an analogy. The chances being the same entails that the other, yet undecayed atom would decay at some point (during a sufficiently long time) with an overwhelmingly high probability (or some other atom in a sufficiently big ensemble would also decay in the next moment with an overwhelmingly high probability.) Therefore, if only one carbon atom decayed after a sufficiently long time (or in a sufficiently big ensemble), that would be overwhelming evidence that the chance of that carbon atom decaying is after all different from the chance for other carbon atoms, which would then require a special or differentiating metaphysical ground with respect to decay. Likewise, if only x began uncaused after a sufficiently long time (or in a sufficiently big ensemble), that would be overwhelming evidence that the chance of x beginning uncaused is after all different from the chance for other events, which would then require a special or differentiating metaphysical ground with respect to uncaused beginnings.¹⁰

In summary, the restriction to ‘only x’ (but not other things) begins uncaused must be grounded in something such that there is a relevant difference between x and other things—one should not simply say that it is brute fact. For if there is no relevant difference between x and other things (say) y, this would imply that x and y are the same where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned. The argument can be formulated in this way:

• 1.1.1.1. If it is not the case that there is a metaphysical ground which differentiates between x and y with respect to uncaused beginning, then x and y would be the same with respect to uncaused beginning.

• 1.1.1.2. (According to the objector) x and y are not the same with respect to uncaused beginning (given that the objector claims that x begins uncaused but not y).

• 1.1.1.3. Therefore, (the objector would require the claim that) there is a metaphysical ground which differentiates between x and y with respect to uncaused beginning.

It should be noted that premise 1.1.1.1 is based on arguments 1, 2, and 3 (either one of which is sufficient) and none of the premises of these arguments assumes the truth of the Causal Principle, while premise 1.1.1.2 is what the objector claims. Thus, there is no circularity in my argument; that is, my argument does not beg the question against the objector by assuming the truth of the Causal Principle. What follows from premises 1.1.1.1 and 1.1.1.2 is that the objector would require the claim that there is a relevant difference between x and y. Since ‘x begins uncaused but y begins caused’ requires a metaphysical ground which differentiates between x and y in order for it to be possible that only x begins uncaused (but y begins caused), it cannot just be a brute fact (a brute fact by definition has no further metaphysical ground). Therefore, 1.1.1 is false. The objector to my Modus Tollens argument would need to appeal to metaphysical grounding in some form or another, and this will be discussed below.

3.4 Against 1.1.2. Abstract Entities

A Platonist objector might modify Oppy’s objection by claiming that the initial state of reality (ISOR) refers to the initial state of concrete reality. The objector might then claim that this leaves open the possibility that there could be beginningless abstract objects which exist timelessly. An abstract object, by definition, cannot cause something. Nevertheless, a Platonist objector to my argument by claim that abstract objects might provide metaphysical grounding for why only ISOR begins to exist uncaused. For example, the objector might say that the relevant difference between x (ISOR) and y is that ISOR and y are different logical possibilities (call this Difference D), and that Difference D exists in the abstract world. Alternatively, the objector might suggest that objects x and y subsist in the abstract world before they begin to exist, the subsisting objects already have haecceities before they begin to exist, and these haecceities differentiate between x and y. Another alternative is:

A Platonist might suppose that there are brute necessary truths about uninstantiated properties, including truths about which properties can begin to be instantiated uncaused. On this theory, perhaps (contra Loke) there are things—abstract things—prior to an uncaused beginning that could explain why that beginning has its particular properties. (Rasmussen 2018)

There are a number of problems with the Platonist objection.

First, the objector’s claim is that ‘x (ISOR) begins uncaused and y begins caused’. This claim refers to concrete entities x and y, and requires something concrete (whether qualitative or non-qualitative) to differentiate between two different things x and y in the concrete world. Hence, merely appealing to the haecceities of subsisting objects which exist in the abstract world is inadequate. (Contrast with Scenario 1 in Sect. 3.3 in which H is possessed by p, which concretely pre-exists the decay of p.)

Second, abstract objects (if they exist) merely describe relations (e.g. mathematical relations such as 2 + 2 = 4; logical relations such as ‘if, then’, relations between events) or possibilities/necessities (e.g. shapeless square cannot exist but shaped square can exist), or are merely exemplifiable by things (e.g. the property of redness are exemplified by red things). Abstract objects by themselves (i.e. apart from concrete objects) do not make it the case that things/events happen in one way rather than the other in the concrete world. Indeed, there are disputes concerning whether abstract objects even exist (Gould 2014). But even if they do, they do not make a difference to the concrete world.¹¹ Thus, Difference D in the abstract world would not make a difference concerning ISOR beginning uncaused in the concrete world but y does not, and therefore Difference D is not a relevant difference. It is a difference that makes no difference, which means it is not a relevant difference.

Third, to claim that an abstract object X would make a difference in the concrete world such that ‘only ISOR begins uncaused but y does not’ would be to think of X as something similar to a concrete entity which exists prior to ISOR. In that case ‘ISOR’ would not be the initial state (of reality) anymore; rather, X would be the initial state. In any case, even if one insists that X is still an abstract entity, X would have to be beginningless, because if it has a beginning it would (like ‘ISOR’) require something to make it the case that only X begins uncaused but y does not. In that case, one needs to ask how could a beginninglessly existing X make a difference that has a beginning of existence (viz. the beginning of ‘ISOR’) rather than a difference that coexist beginninglessly with X. As argued in Chap. 6, the answer to this question indicates that X has libertarian freedom, which means that X is a Creator, which is the conclusion of the Cosmological Argument! Hence, this objection to the Cosmological Argument would fail.

Against my view that abstract entities do not make a difference to the concrete world, an objector might insist that difference in possibilities can make a difference in whether possibility x rather than possibility y is realized in the concrete world without causing its realization, and that instantiation of possibility does not have to be seen as an effect of some cause.¹² To illustrate, consider possibility x: It is possible that Peter exists, and possibility y: it is possible that Peter does not exist. Given that Peter’s parents chose to conceive, possibility x is realized but not possibility y. Peter’s parents cause the realization of x. One might say that the difference in possibility x and possibility y makes a difference in whether possibility x rather than possibility y is realized in the sense that it explains why Peter’s parents causing the realization of possibility x does not also cause the realization of possibility y (answer: because possibility x and possibility y are different and y is not realizable given that x is realized).

However, such an explanation is not really making a difference in the concrete world, but merely explaining the difference made. In other words, it is not the difference in possibilities that makes a difference in the concrete world, but Peter’s parents (concrete entities) who make a difference in the concrete world. This illustrates that differences in possibilities in the abstract world do not really make a difference in whether possibility x rather than possibility y is realized in the concrete world; on the contrary, the instantiation of possibility in the concrete world is made by concrete entities.

Recall premise 1.1.1.1, which states:

1.1.1.1: If it is not the case that there is a metaphysical ground which differentiates between x and y with respect to uncaused beginning, then x and y would be the same with respect to uncaused beginning.

Premise 1.1.1.1 can be rephrased as:

1.1.1.1′: If there is no relevant difference between the possibility A that x begins to exist uncaused and the possibility B that y begins to exist uncaused, then both possibility A and possibility B would be instantiated if possibility A or possibility B was instantiated.

This belongs to a more general principle:

If there is no relevant difference between a possibility A and a possibility B, then both possibility A and possibility B would be instantiated if possibility A or possibility B is instantiated.

Premise 1.1.1.1 involves uncaused beginning and the general principle may not involve that, and that is a difference between them. One might object that this difference between them seems to contradict my earlier conclusion that a difference in abstracta cannot be a relevant difference.¹³

It is true that there is a difference between premise 1.1.1.1 and the general principle, but that difference is not relevant to making a difference in the concrete world and hence does not contradict my earlier conclusion. Rather, the difference is relevant in the sense that it merely describes the different consequences that would follow if a difference is made in the concrete world. By my reasoning, the difference between my premise 1.1.1.1 and the general principle is a difference in abstracta and can be a difference that is relevant for describing the different consequences that would follow if a difference is made in the concrete world. However, this difference is not relevant for making a difference in the concrete world in the first place; in particular, it is not relevant for making a difference such that ISOR begins uncaused in the concrete world but y does not.

To be a relevant difference, the difference has to make a difference in the concrete world, because making a difference in the concrete world such that ISOR begins to exist uncaused in the concrete world but y does not is what my sceptical opponent (not me!) is claiming here for the abstract realm to do, but that is nonsensical since abstract realm does not do this kind of thing. By saying this I am not assuming that concrete instantiation of a possibility has to be causal (hence, I am not begging the question); rather, I am merely explaining what my opponent is claiming in order for his/her objection to work and why he/she has failed to meet this claim; therefore, the objection fails.

The Platonist might attempt to support the objection by citing the argument that at least some dispositions have ceteris paribus (CP) clauses incorporating uninstantiated abstract universals, and that these CP clauses help to delimit the range of manifestations of those dispositions (Dumsday 2019, p. 22). To elaborate, Dumsday argues:

Take some value of mass, and a second value of mass, specify the distance relation, and a physicist could tell us what the resulting attractive force would be, ceteris paribus. We can then specify that the two masses belong to two objects which have a particular value of positive charge actually instantiated in our world, and a physicist could again calculate what the attraction would be, or whether instead it would be trumped by the repulsive force between the two like charges. Now do so for a value of positive charge that is not and has never been instantiated in our world. Once again, a physicist could calculate the results. The uninstantiated value is just as legitimate a part of the set of CP clauses of mass as are the instantiated values. (p. 13)

Dumsday concludes that with the CP clauses

we have abstracta determining that certain events can or cannot take place under particular circumstances. If an uninstantiated value of positive charge were instantiated in entities possessing mass, then where those entities would normally undergo a gravitational attraction of a certain force, they might instead be repelled … Even in their uninstantiated state, these universals serve as truthmakers for counterfactuals involving actual, instantiated dispositions. This counts as playing a governing role in the physical universe. (p. 14)

Nevertheless, the above argument cannot be used to support the Platonist’s objection to my argument¹⁴ because the uninstantiated abstracta Dumsday mentions merely describes what would be the case if certain things were to exist concretely alongside other pre-existing concrete things, as well as whether certain events can or cannot take place under particular pre-existing concrete circumstances. For example, if a positive charge of a certain value were to exist concretely, its repulsive force would trump the attraction of the pre-existing concrete masses. The uninstantiated abstracta do not make a difference as to which metaphysically possible set of properties are actually instantiated in the concrete world. In the case of Mass₁ attracting Mass₂ with a force F (‘if no positive charge P …’), the force F in the concrete world is determined by the concrete entities (the masses and the distances between their centres). The CP clause ‘if no positive charge P’ does not determine the force in the concrete world but merely indicates that if P were to exist concretely, F would be different in the concrete world.

In conclusion, abstract objects by themselves would not be able to provide metaphysical grounding for x (ISOR) rather than y begins uncaused. Hence, Oppy cannot simply claim that there are metaphysical principles ‘initial thing begins uncaused’ and ‘everything non-initial things have causes’ which explain why x begins uncaused but not y.¹⁵ The reason is because metaphysical principles/laws of nature are not concrete entities like tables or chairs; rather, they are supposed to be abstract entities. Thus, no abstract metaphysical principle/law of nature could (by itself) make it the case that only ISOR rather than other things begins uncaused. What makes things happen one way or the other are concrete entities and their properties, and I shall argue in the rest of this chapter that no such concrete entities and their properties can make it the case that only ISOR rather than other things begins uncaused.

Against my view that abstract entities by themselves do not make a difference to the concrete world, Malpass cites the Archimedes principle ‘any object, totally or partially immersed in a fluid, is buoyed up by a force equal to the weight of the fluid displaced by the object’. Given some actual facts about a concrete entity and the Archimedes principle, it follows that the body would float.¹⁶

In reply, the Archimedes principle is abstract and it merely describes the relation between the object and the fluid. What makes the body float are the properties of the fluid and the body, and the Archimedes principle merely describes the relation. As Feser (2013, p. 254) observes, the laws of nature are ‘mere abstractions and thus cannot by themselves explain anything. What exist in the natural order are concrete material substances with certain essences, and talk of “laws of nature” is merely shorthand for the patterns of behaviour they tend to exhibit given those essences.’ When we use the Archimedes principle as part of an explanation we are only using it as a shorthand. In other words, a principle/law of nature is part of the explanation only because of the essential properties of the concrete entities. Likewise, in order to metaphysically ground ‘x (ISOR) rather than y begins uncaused’, the properties of concrete entities are required, but as I shall show in the rest of this chapter, there are no such properties. Hence, Oppy’s theory fails.

It might be asked how would I answer the question ‘Why uncaused events do not begin around us?’ Do I not appeal to the abstract causal principle ‘whatever begins to exist has a cause?¹⁷

In response, I do affirm the Causal Principle, but this principle is just the consequence of my view that, in our actual world, things happen one way rather than the other as a result of concrete entities and their properties, which implies that without concrete causes doing the work nothing would begin to exist. That is why uncaused events do not happen.

It might be objected that ‘in our actual world, things happen one way rather than the other as a result of concrete entities and their properties’ is also an abstract principle.¹⁸ This is true. My view is that abstract principle by themselves do not make a difference in the concrete world. In this case, the abstract principle is not ‘by itself’; rather, it involves concrete entities. Moreover, in this case, ‘no event begins uncaused’ is merely descriptive of the absence of a difference in the concrete world concerning x and y where beginning uncaused is concerned; hence, it is consistent with my claim that abstract principle by themselves do not make a difference in the concrete world.

In summary, the objector who affirms 1.1.2 is claiming that abstract objects provide metaphysical grounding which differentiates between concrete events x and y with respect to uncaused beginnings. I argue that abstract objects by themselves do not ground a difference concerning concrete events. Moreover, if abstract objects by themselves do ground a difference with respect to concrete events such as x (but not y) begins uncaused, given that abstract objects are beginningless (more specifically, timeless) the uncaused event they ground should be timeless as well, but that is not the case.

In the following sections, we shall consider 1.1.3 something concrete with property S makes it the case that x (but not y) begins uncaused.

3.5 Against 1.1.3.1 S is a Property of x

Let us now consider 1.1.3.1. S is a property of x which makes it different from y (i.e. S is a property which x has but y does not have). 1.1.3.1 implies that x (ISOR) has some special and unique property S which makes it different from other things/events, and the possession of S by ISOR would be required to do the work of providing the metaphysically grounding which differentiates between ISOR and other things/events in order for it to be possible that only ISOR (but not other things/events) begins to exist uncaused.

However, the first time S is possessed by ISOR is at time t_isor, where t_isor is the first time at which ISOR exists. Given that S is stipulated to be an essential property of ISOR and possessed by ISOR only, and given that ISOR only begins to exist at t_isor, S would only begin to exist at t_isor. It follows that ‘the possession of S by ISOR’ can make it the case that ‘it is only ISOR that begins to exist uncaused’ only when ISOR has already begun to exist at t_isor. But what this means is that ‘the possession of S by ISOR’ cannot metaphysically ground the uncaused beginning of ISOR (but not other things/events) in the first place, since it is required that ISOR has already begun to exist in order that ‘the possession of S by ISOR’ can metaphysically ground the uncaused beginning of ISOR (but not other things/events).

Now there are causal account and non-causal account of something existing (Bliss and Trogdon 2014), and the objector is referring to a non-causal account here given that ISOR is supposed to be uncaused. But the point here is that, regardless of whether the account referred to here is causal or non-causal, any account/explanation/grounding in the form of S’s possession by ISOR would only begin to exist when ISOR already exists. Any such account/explanation/grounding would not exist without ISOR having already begun its existence; thus, there is nothing for accounting/explaining/grounding the uncaused beginning of ISOR (but not other things/events). For a thing has to exist in order to have any properties at all. And a thing that begins to exist must have begun to exist in order to have any properties. Thus, no matter what S is, ISOR having S cannot make it the case that ISOR begins to exist, make it the case that ISOR begins to existuncaused, and make it the case that nothing lacking S begins to exist uncaused.¹⁹

Hence, ‘the property S is possessed by x only when x has already begun’ challenges ‘S grounds why only x begins uncaused’, not on account of a temporal order, but on account of what needs to be grounded, namely, the uncaused beginning of x (but not y). While non-causal ontological dependence between simultaneous events is widely regarded as commonplace, in no case of such examples of non-causal metaphysical grounding is there a case of making it the case why only something having some properties begins to exist. (As I explained previously using the analogy of a house and house builder, we know that the work of making it the case that x rather than ybegins to exist is usually done by causes, that is, causal grounding.) On the other hand, any such property S of x would not be able to metaphysically ground the uncaused beginning of x (but not y), because the uncaused beginning of x (but not y) which supposedly needs to be grounded by S needs to happen in order that S can ground its happening—this violates the irreflexivity of metaphysical grounding. The uncaused beginning of existence of x is supposed to be explanatorily prior to x’s possession of the property; something must exist in order to possess a property.²⁰ Thus, the conjunction of x’s uncaused beginning and x’s possession of the property cannot provide metaphysical grounding for the first conjunct (rather than the beginning of y).

Now I do not deny that there are some other unique (perhaps unknown) properties possessed by ISOR—of course there must be such properties, since ISOR is different from (say) a tiger, a dinosaur, and so on! Rather, my argument is that there cannot be any unique property (regardless of whether this unique property is known or unknown) which can do the work of making it the case that only ISOR but not other things begins to exist uncaused if ISOR began uncaused. As Oderberg (2002, p. 330) notes,

it is no use saying that the nature or essence of some things (such as the universe itself) is to begin to exist uncaused, and of others not to, since before anything begins to exist how can the essence of a thing regulate the conditions under which it begins to exist? But since we know some things begin to exist only if caused, the Causal Principle cannot be false since its falsity would not allow of such a distinction.

More seriously, any attempt to provide such an account/grounding/explanation would entail a contradiction. For:

• 1. the uncaused (or ‘uncorrelated’; likewise, below) beginning of ISOR (instead of other entities) is supposed to require the possession of S by ISOR in order to account/ground/explain only ISOR begins to exist uncaused: this implies that the possession of S by ISOR is explanatory prior to (i.e. metaphysically grounds) the uncaused beginning of ISOR.

However,

• 2. the possession of S by ISOR is supposed to require the uncaused beginning of ISOR (instead of other entities), for S would not be possessed by ISOR if ISOR does not already (begun to) exist: this implies that the uncaused beginning of ISOR is explanatory prior to (i.e. metaphysically grounds) the possession of S by ISOR.

(1) and (2) entail a contradiction and violate the irreflexivity of metaphysical grounding.

The following points should be noted.

First, when philosophers talk about metaphysical ground, they are not talking about their subjective mental states or their use of language. Rather, they are talking about objective properties of the world. Just as when we talk about the foundation of a house grounding the roof (at a particular position instead of another), we are talking about grounding as an objective property of the world.

Second, by ‘explanatorily prior’, I am not referring to ‘how humans choose to explain things’. Rather, I am referring to the relationship between things/properties in the actual world. Just as ‘x (e.g. foundation) grounds y (e.g. the roof)’ implies that it is not the case that ‘the roof grounds the foundation’ (this illustrates the irreflexivity of metaphysical grounding), likewise ‘p is explanatory prior to q’ implies that it is not the case that ‘q is explanatory prior to p’. To illustrate the notion of ‘priority’ and to explain the distinction between ‘require’ and ‘imply’: I require the possession of money in order to pay for the house. The possession of money is prior. To say that q requires p is to convey that p is prior to q. However, to say that q implies p does not convey that p is prior to q.

Third, the above argument against 1.1.3.1 remains valid on a static theory of time. On static theory of time, it remains the case that there are also other events (e.g. y = increasing in strength of electric field) which have the beginning of existence in the same sense as the supposed beginning of ISOR, that is, being finite in temporal extent in whatever dimensions and having ‘edges’ (i.e. does not have a static closed loop or a changeless phase that avoids an edge). According to 1.1.3.1, S is supposed to metaphysically ground why ISOR begins uncaused but y (which lacks S) does not begin to exist uncaused. However, S is possessed when ISOR already begins, which makes S unable to do this work of grounding, as argued previously.

An objector might ask, ‘why couldn’t the property of necessary existence or being the initial state be the special property S that metaphysically ground the uncaused beginning of ISOR?’

In response, on the one hand, as noted previously in Sect. 3.2, whether initial state begins necessarily (rather than existing beginninglessly necessarily) is precisely the issue under dispute, and the objector should not beg the question by assuming that this is the case. On the other hand, there is an independent reason for thinking that there cannot be any special property S which metaphysically grounds such an uncaused beginning, namely, the demonstration (explained above) that any such property would be unable to do the necessary work of metaphysical grounding. As Malpass puts it, ‘the conjunction of x existing and x having a special property cannot explain the conjunct that x exists. Conjunctions don’t explain their own conjuncts.’²¹

The objector would ask how could a theist explain God’s uncaused existence without falling into similar problems. After all, whatever special property S that is used to explain why God is uncaused will already have to be had by God.²²

In reply, it should be noted that I am not claiming that anything that exists requires a special property to explain why it exists. Such a principle is obviously false. For example, my existence does not require a special property to explain why I exist. Rather, my existence is (at least partly) explained by my already-existing (i.e. pre-existing) parents who brought me into existence and I am not required to have a special property S. However, if instead of my already-existing parents I have already existed and always-already existed at all earlier durations and that my existence has no temporal boundary (i.e. beginningless) and supposing that I am not being sustained in existence, then no already-existing parents would be required and I am not required to have a special property. In this case, my beginninglessness is not a special property that explains why I exist; rather, my beginninglessness is merely a way of describing my always-already existence that has no temporal boundary, which also implies that no parents are required; that is, I would be uncaused (supposing that I am also not being sustained in existence).

The same reasoning applies to God. God is supposed to have always-already existed at all earlier durations and has no temporal boundary (i.e. beginningless), and He is not being sustained in existence; hence (unlike things with beginnings), no already-existing pre-existing causes are required and He is not required to have a special property S. In this case, His beginninglessness is not a special property that explains why He exists. Rather, His beginninglessness is merely a way of describing His always-already existence that has no temporal boundary (i.e. beginningless), which (together with the fact that He is not being sustained in existence) also implies that no causes are required; that is, He would be uncaused.

There are two distinct senses of explanation which need to be clarified: (1) a statement or account that makes something clear (OED); (2) to provide a metaphysical grounding for. In the case of ISOR beginning uncaused, I was arguing that there needs to be a special property S that not only makes something clear but also provides a metaphysical grounding for why ISOR begins uncaused but B begins caused (but there cannot be such an S). In the case of God existing beginninglessly, God’s beginninglessness merely makes clear why is it the case that no cause or special property is needed (it doesn’t provide any metaphysical grounding which S is supposed to provide). In particular, by explicating the meaning of beginninglessness, we can see why it implies that God would be uncaused (assuming for the sake of parity that both God and Oppy’s ISOR are unsustained). Thus, ‘beginningless’ itself is not a special property S.

Hence, God existing uncaused doesn’t need to be explained by S. Whereas according to 1.1.3.1, Oppy’s view that ‘x (ISOR) but not y begins uncaused’ needs to be explained by special property S, because (1) ISOR does not always-already exist in the same sense as God, but is finite in temporal extent and has a temporal edge, just like y (2) S is not supposed to be merely a way of describing ISOR’s beginning of existence (since y also begins to exist); rather, S is also supposed to ‘make a difference’ by explaining why ISOR begins uncaused but y does not begin uncaused. But as argued previously, there cannot be any property S that can do the required work of explaining why ISOR begins uncaused but y begins caused. Therefore, 1.1.3.1 is false.

3.6 Concerning 1.1.3.2.1

Concerning 1.1.3.2.1, one cannot appeal to the concrete circumstance of x making it the case that only x begins uncaused, since this would amount to saying that the circumstances causes x and yet x is supposed to have begun uncaused, that is, without causally antecedent conditions. Indeed, on Oppy’s theory there isn’t any concrete circumstances in which x (ISOR) begins uncaused, since ISOR is supposed to be the very initial state which begins to exist.

3.7 Concerning 1.1.3.2.2. S is a Property of y

Oppy might suggest the possibility that, once ISOR begins uncaused, ISOR brings about caused entities (e.g. y) with properties which would make it the case that they would begin caused (rather than uncaused). Thus, even though ISOR begins uncaused, this does not imply that later entities would also begin uncaused, since later entities would be causally dependent on earlier entities for their beginning.

The problem with this view is that the property of y which (according to 1.1.3.2.2) is supposed to make it the case that ‘y would begin to exist caused’ would be had by y when y has already begun to exist (caused). This implies that (contrary to 1.1.3.2.2) this property is unable to ground the caused beginning of y.

Therefore, the reason why y does not begin uncaused is not because of the property of y. Rather, as explained previously in Sect. 3.4, it is just the consequence of my view that what makes things happen are concrete entities and their properties, which implies that without concrete causes nothing would begin to exist. That is why uncaused events do not happen.

3.8 Concerning 1.1.3.2.3. S is a Property of the Circumstances of y

3.8.1 Objection: Current Spatial Considerations Prevent Things from Beginning to Exist Uncaused Now

Oppy has offered another argument for why (say) a tiger does not begin to exist uncaused now if the initial state of reality began to exist uncaused. Focusing on the well-established features of the part of reality that we now inhabit, Oppy argues that causally prior to some concrete object occupying the space currently occupied by another concrete object, the current occupant must vacate the space to make room for the new object. Thus, the former occupant’s ceasing to occupy the space is a cause (but not the sole cause) of the new object’s coming into being. Generalizing this line of thought, Oppy writes,

Pick any tiger shaped space in the room. In order for a tiger to occupy that space, that space must have appropriate internal and boundary properties: there are after all, lots of ways that the boundary and interior of that space could be that are simply inconsistent with the occupation of that space by a tiger. But, if that’s right, then it seems to me that we should allow that … the coming about of the consistency of the boundary and interior of the space with occupation by a tiger—is a cause of the coming into existence of the tiger. And as before, if this is a cause of the coming into existence of the tiger, then it … isn’t true that the tiger ‘comes into existence uncaused out of nothing. (p. 67)

Oppy then goes on to make a few remarks concerning possible objections to his argument, claiming, among other things, that even if there is no cause of (say) a table ceasing to occupy the location that it currently occupies, it will still be the case that the table’s ceasing to occupy the location is a cause of the coming to existence of the tiger in that location. Additionally, even if most of the universe consists of tiger-shaped spaces the interior and boundary conditions of which are consistent with occupation by a tiger, it would still be the case that the coming about of such spaces would be a cause of the popping into existence of a tiger in that space (pp. 66–67).

In summary, Oppy’s suggestion that, since in the reality that we now inhabit, the spaces the interior and boundary conditions of which are consistent with occupation by any entity y would be a causally necessary condition for the beginning of y in that space, y could not begin uncaused now. In a more recent paper, Oppy suggests the reason why it is impossible for a raging tiger to ‘suddenly come into existence uncaused out of nothing’ in the room in which you are reading this is that there is no place in that room for a tiger to come to occupy uncaused. He writes:

In the causal order, the displacing activity of the displacing object—the object ‘popping into existence’—would have to be both (causally) prior to the displacement of the displaced object (in order to cause the displacement) and (causally) posterior to the displacement of the displaced object (in order that the displacing object exists and hence is able to bring about the displacement). But that’s impossible. (Oppy 2015, p. 4)

He also argues that,

if—per impossible—something did ‘pop into existence’ at a particular location, we would properly regard the vacation of the space now occupied by the thing that comes into existence by the thing(s) that previously occupied that space as a cause—i.e., a necessary causal condition—of the existence of the new occupant of that space. Thus, even in this case, we would not have something popping into existence uncaused. (Ibid.)

An argument against Oppy’s objection based on spatial considerations has been offered by Erasmus. Erasmus notes that spatial substantivalism (the view that space is a substance that is able to exist by itself independently of material objects) is a metaphysically possible view, and indeed many scientists and philosophers hold to this view. Erasmus concludes that, if the Causal Principle is false, then ‘a space is a thing that can itself come into existence uncaused. Accordingly, we should observe empty spaces, and objects of the related shape, constantly coming into being all around us’ (Erasmus 2018, p. 166).

Even if the possibility of spatial substantivalism and Erasmus argument is rejected, Oppy’s objection can be replied to in various other ways. For example, one can think of ‘uncaused beginnings’ which do not involve displacement of objects or vacation of spaces, and hence are compatible with the fact that the spaces of our universe are occupied. An example would be ‘a pre-existing electric field increasing in strength uncaused under certain circumstances’, where ‘field’ is understood as a region of space in which there is a force. It is observed that the space that is occupied by the electric field is compatible with their existing and increasing. Furthermore, it is observed that different strengths of electric fields (as well as other fields) can occupy the same amount of space, unlike Oppy’s example of tigers where an increased number of tigers would require more space.

Moreover, our experiences indicate that in the reality that we inhabit, pre-existent fields (e.g. electric and magnetic fields) and ‘spaces the interior and boundary conditions of which are consistent with an increasing in strength of a pre-existent electric field’ are found around us. This can be seen from the fact that, when we switch on an electric or magnetic field generator around us, there will be an increase in strength in the relevant field around it. Indeed, in our experiences we have observed many instances of such events beginning to exist. This shows that our circumstances are compatible with such events beginning to exist around us, and that such events do begin to exist (call one such event y).

Concerning y: an increase in strength of a pre-existent electric field, Oppy would object that, since an increase in strength of a pre-existent electric field requires spaces the interior and boundary conditions of which are consistent with this increase, this event cannot begin uncaused. In reply, in the reality that we now inhabit, what is causally necessary for an increase in strength of a pre-existent electric field is not merely the presence of such spaces. Rather, it would also include (for example) the switching on of an electric field generator under certain circumstances. In this situation, the switching on of the electric field generator would be a cause. Recall that (I) x (ISOR) begins uncaused but y begins caused implies that no cause making it the case that x (rather than y) begins uncaused, (II) x and y having a beginning implies that the properties of x and the properties of y which differentiate between them would be had by them only when they had already begun to exist, and (III) the circumstances are compatible with the beginning of y. Now it has been explained in Section 4 that (I), (II), and (III) jointly imply that there would be no difference between x and y where beginning uncaused is concerned. Hence, if x (ISOR) begins uncaused, there would be no difference between ‘beginning of ISOR without cause’ and ‘beginning of increase in strength of electric field without [having to switch on the generator as a] cause’ (see the definition of ‘uncaused’ in Chap. 2). This implies y would begin without having to switch on the generator. The consequent is not the case; therefore, it is not the case that ISOR begins uncaused.

An objector might suggest reinforcing Oppy’s argument by developing further hypotheses about how existing things might place causal conditions with respect to any new state of affairs, such that only the first state of reality could begin without a causal condition (Rasmussen 2018). However, I have explained above that saying that ‘ybegins to exist uncaused’ would mean ‘ybegins to exist without having to switch on the electric field generator under certain circumstances’. The point is that there can be no further hypotheses about how existing things would place causal conditions with respect to increasing in strength in electric field in this case, given that I define uncaused in this case as ‘without having to switch on the electric field generator under certain circumstances’.

3.8.2 Objection Based on the Distinction between Different Senses of Beginning to Exist

Against my argument using the case of electric field increasing in strength under certain circumstances, it might be objected that there is a distinction between ‘there was no entity E and then there was an entity E with property p’ (i.e. an entity beginning to exist)—such as the beginning of existence of ISOR—and ‘an entity F which already exists coming to possess property q it did not previously have’ (i.e. an event beginning to exist)—such as an electric field increasing in strength. One might then claim that this distinction would be the relevant difference that explains why ISOR begins uncaused but an electric field increasing in strength under certain circumstances does not.

In response, both cases are compatible with the definition of beginning of existence which I used for my argument; namely, x has a beginning of existence if x has a temporal extension, the extension is finite, and it has temporal edges. Here, the beginning of x can refer to ‘then there was an entity E with property p’ (such as the beginning of existence of ISOR), and the beginning of x can also refer to ‘an entity F which already exists coming to possess property q it did not previously have’ (such as an electric field increasing in strength under certain circumstances). In both cases there is a beginning of possession of a property, and my argument would still apply. That is, if the event ‘then there was E with p’ begins to exist uncaused, then

• I. this event would not have any causally antecedent condition which would make it the case that only this event rather than ‘F coming to possess q’ begins to exist uncaused;

• II. the properties of the events ‘then there was E with p’ and ‘F coming to possess q’ would be had by them only when they had already begun to exist; and

• III. the circumstances are compatible with the beginning of existence of these events.

As explained above, (I), (II), and (III) imply that there would be no essential difference between these events where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned. Thus, the distinction between different senses of ‘beginning to exist uncaused’ would not be a relevant difference that accounts for why only ISOR begins to exist uncaused but an electric field increasing in strength under certain circumstances does not begin to exist uncaused.

Likewise, there is no relevant difference between ‘beginning to exist within time’ and ‘beginning to exist with time’ simpliciter where my Modus Tollens argument is concerned. The reason is because both cases involve being finite in temporal extension and having temporal edges, which is the definition of beginning of existence used in my argument, and my argument would still apply to both cases, since they both fit the definition. None of the premises nor the justification for the premises requires the assumption that there is earlier time or no earlier time before something begins to exist. Therefore, whether there is time or no time before something begins to exist does not affect my Modus Tollens argument.

In summary, the Modus Tollens argument applies equally well to objects and events. For even though there is a distinction between events beginning and objects beginning, yet both of them are finite in temporal extension and have temporal edges; hence, my Modus Tollens argument applies to both cases. To rebut my argument, the objector would have to rebut the premises of my argument rather than merely redefining the problem by saying that he/she is merely referring to objects, which is merely dodging the problem facing his/her view.

3.8.3 Objection: Pre-existing Things Such as a Pre-existent Law of Nature Might Prevent Things from Beginning to Exist Uncaused Now

The objector might suggest that the relevant difference between x and y is that there is nothing prior to x whereas there is something prior to y, and that once x begins uncaused, x causes ‘the circumstances of y’ which causes y. That is why (x begins uncaused but) y begins caused, that is, because of the causal powers of ‘the circumstances of y’ which brought about y.

In reply, the above answer is inadequate, because it does not answer why doesn’t y begin without a cause. If y begins caused, y is caused by its circumstances (circumstance is defined as ‘a fact or condition connected with or relevant to an event or action’, OED). To claim that ‘y begins caused because the circumstances of y causes y’ does not answer ‘why does the beginning of y (but not the beginning of x) needs a cause’ but merely restates the fact that ‘y begins caused (by the circumstances)’. It also fails to answer why doesn’t y-type events begin uncaused but are observed to be correlated in an orderly manner with (say) the switching on of the electric field generator. While such circumstances as the switching on of the electric field generator may causally explain those y-type events brought about by them, these circumstances do not explain why y-type events (but not x) do not also begin without such circumstances resulting in a lack of orderly correlation.

The objector might suggest an alternative explanation that, once the universe existed, the universe would be the antecedent condition which makes it the case that other things do not begin to exist uncaused. For example, once the universe began to exist uncaused, there would be laws of nature which prevent other things from beginning to exist uncaused and therefore we do not observe things beginning to exist uncaused now. As Oppy (1991, p. 196) argues, perhaps just any and everything can come into existence uncaused, but our universe is governed by certain conservation laws which ensure that such events do not actually happen. Perhaps there is a true subjunctive conditional to the effect that, were y to come into existence uncaused, then y would possess some property P*, and it is the truth of this subjunctive conditional which accounts for the fact that y does not come into existence uncaused.²³ One might say that y would possess the property of violating the law of conservation of energy if y begins uncaused, and y does not possess this property if y begins caused, and that the consequence of violating the law of conservation of energy would prevent y from beginning uncaused. With regard to my example of increasing in strength of electric field under certain circumstances, one might object that, since an uncaused change in electric charge would create an unbalanced surplus of charge, the so-called uncaused beginning of increase in strength of electric field has the property of being susceptible to prevention by conservation laws.²⁴ Alternatively, one might suggest that perhaps the Causal Principle only began to exist with the beginning of existence of our universe.

Oderberg (2002, p. 331) replies that Oppy’s appeal to the laws of nature begs the question. He writes:

On a regularity view of laws it is just a general description of what happens, not an explanation. On a necessitarian view of laws, it still does not explain why things require a cause of their existence, since the necessity inherent in the law derives from the powers of existing things, and so appeal to the law merely invokes their existence rather than explains it. Why should the laws be as they are? Because of the powers of existing things. But why can’t those things come into existence uncaused? Because that’s how the laws are.

Against Oderberg, some might object by claiming it has not been shown that all the laws of nature derive from the powers of existing things. Others have cited the law of conservation of energy as a counterexample to dispositionalism, arguing that the law indicates that interactions are constrained by the requirement of preserving the mass-energy, but that constraint does not seem to be the manifestation of a disposition (Chalmers 1999, pp. 12–13). It has been suggested that the law of conservation may derive from symmetries. For example, Lange (2016, p. 64) proposes that

A conservation law … may have an explanation. In fact, one way for a conservation law to be a constraint is for it to arise from a symmetry principle … As is well known, various classical conservation laws follow from various spacetime symmetries within a Hamiltonian dynamical framework: energy conservation follows from the laws’ invariance under arbitrary temporal displacement, linear momentum conservation from their invariance under arbitrary spatial displacement, and angular momentum conservation from their invariance under arbitrary rotations. If these derivations explain why the conservation laws hold (as they are often said to do), then the conservation laws are constraints, not coincidences.

However, one should ask why the symmetries hold. Lange (2016, p. 82) claims that a symmetry principle is ‘a ‘metalaw’: a law that governs the laws that are expressed by subnomic claims (the ‘first-order’ laws). But why should the metalaw hold? Bird (2007, pp. 213–214) states that it is a mystery why symmetries and conservation laws hold, and suggests that ‘the dispositional essentialist ought to regard symmetry principles as pseudo-laws … it may be that symmetry principles and conservation laws will be eliminated as being features of our form of representation rather than features of the world requiring to be accommodated within our metaphysics’. Lange (2016, p. 94) acknowledges that Bird may be proved right, but objects that ‘in any event, a metaphysics that cannot do justice to explanations by constraint is at a serious disadvantage’.

In reply, one can do justice to explanations by constraint by arguing that the representation mentioned by Bird holds because of the Causal Principle, such that if the Causal Principle is violated, the law of conservation would be violated as well. It is interesting to note Chalmers’ (1999, pp. 12–13) observation that ‘a characteristic feature, and a major strength, of thermodynamics is that it applies at the phenomenological level whatever the details of the causal process. It is precisely this feature of the laws of thermodynamics that makes it difficult to portray them as causal laws.’ Similar to the law of conservation of energy, the Causal Principle ‘whatever begins to exist has a cause’ also does not depend on the details of the causal process. The hypothesis that the law of conservation of energy is based on the Causal Principle would explain this observation.

More importantly, one should ask how would the existing universe, law of nature, and so on be able to prevent other things from beginning to exist uncaused if ISOR began to exist uncaused. Now Bigelow et al. (1992) had postulated that

the world has an essence, and that essence requires that mass-energy, charge, lepton number, etc. are conserved in all interactions … perhaps there is a property corresponding to the kind, the property of being a world, and this property has as its essence the disposition to conserve energy, etc. in response to any event.

On the other hand, Fine argues that, while the proposition that electrons have negative charge is metaphysically necessary in virtue of the identity/definition of electrons, ‘energy is conserved’ is at most naturally necessary but not metaphysically necessary, because it is hard to see how it could be partly definitive of energy that it should be conserved (Fine 2002, p. 261).²⁵ Wolff (2013) objects that a certain conservation law closely tied to symmetry principles via Noether’s second theorem is an instance of a metaphysically necessary physical law, because it supposedly follows from the interdependence of matter and gauge fields, and this interdependence can seem to look like the result of a mere mathematical identity (p. 904). Against Wolff, Linnemann (2020, p. 7) argues that, even in the derivation of the conserved current via Noether’s second theorem, some particular equations of motion (which on Wolff’s view would count as examples of physical laws that are naturally but not metaphysically necessary) were used. Linnemann claims instead that the conservation of topological currents holds in virtue of the identity of the fields, and thus, on Fine’s account of necessity, with metaphysical necessity (p. 10). On the other hand, Wilson (2020) claims that the conservation laws are metaphysically necessary because it occurs in every branch of the wavefunction.

However, given that multiple interpretations of the basic mathematical formulation of quantum mechanics are possible, any metaphysical claim of the form ‘quantum mechanics entails x’ is likely to be false (Lewis 2016, p. xi). Whether Linnemann’s or Wilson’s account can withstand further scientific scrutiny remains to be seen. I shall now argue below that, in any case, our world would have been very different if ISOR began to exist uncaused, and that the subjunctive condition concerning y mentioned above would be false because the uncaused beginning of y would not have been preventable if something begins to exist uncaused.

To begin, the problem with the view that once ISOR began it imposed a metaphysical principle or natural law that ensures subsequent entities begin caused is that (as argued previously) metaphysical principle or natural law is not concrete but abstract. Abstract objects do not make things happen in one way rather than the other. Thus, no such principle or law by itself could make it the case that only ISOR rather than other things begins uncaused. What makes things happen one way or the other are concrete entities and their properties. Thus, the objector should not simply suggest a principle or law of nature and say that suffices to explain why things do not begin uncaused now if ISOR began uncaused. Neither should the objector simply suggest that the Causal Principle only begins to exist with the beginning of existence of our universe. These suggestions would not work in the absence of concrete entities and their properties doing the metaphysical work of grounding why x (ISOR) rather than y begins uncaused. (As explained in previous sections, the abstract Causal Principle is just the consequence of my view that what makes things happen are concrete entities and their properties, which implies that without concrete causes doing the work nothing would begin to exist. For the objector’s hypothesis that ‘the Causal Principle only begins to exist with the beginning of existence of our universe’, there would need to be concrete entities and their properties doing the metaphysical work of grounding the restriction of the Causal Principle to y but not x.)

Hence, one should ask how would the conservation law (or any other law of nature) be able to prevent (say) the uncaused beginning of an unbalanced surplus of charge if ISOR begins uncaused. Now in order for x (e.g. law of conservation of energy) to prevent y from beginning to exist, x would have to either remove the causally necessary conditions or act on the circumstances to make them incompatible with y beginning to exist. (For example, in order to prevent a moving battery-operated toy car from entering a room, I would have to either remove the causally necessary conditions, such as by removing the batteries, or act on the circumstance to make it incompatible with the event occurring, such as by filling the room with hard objects such that there is no space for the car to enter into; see Sect. 3.8.1.) However, if ISOR began to exist uncaused, what this implies is that

• I. there is no causally necessary condition which makes it the case that only ISOR rather than other things begins to exist. In particular, any time t and any location l would not be such a causally necessary condition.

• II. Additionally, as explained previously, any difference between ISOR and other things would be had by them only when they had already begun to exist. (I) and (II) imply that there would be no difference between them where the requirement for causally necessary condition is concerned. Moreover,

• III. it has been explained previously that the circumstances around us have been shown to be such that they are compatible with the beginning of existence of an increase in strength of electric field under certain circumstances.

(In addition to (I), (II), and (III), the three problems noted below are relevant as well.)

Against the above, an objector might argue that once x (ISOR) begins uncaused, x causes the concrete circumstance of y to have properties which ground certain laws of nature and make it incompatible for events to begin uncaused within it. As Carrier (2018) argues, ‘the very reason we do not observe a violation of ex nihilo nihil is that those extant properties and laws now prevent “just anything” from happening. The only nihil we observe is actually a thing: propertied spacetime. And that thing, being existent, now limits what can happen.’ For example, one might suggest the possibility that some concrete substance (say, spacetime [this assumes a substantival view of space and time])²⁶ began to exist uncaused with the beginning of the universe, and the properties of this concrete substance determine (causes) the total mass-energy of the universe to remain constant throughout time by making the circumstances incompatible with increase in total mass-energy. Therefore, even if our present circumstances are compatible with the beginning of increase in strength of electric field under certain circumstances, we would not observe such events beginning to exist uncaused, and the law of conservation of mass-energy would hold. In this sense, y beginning in spacetime but x does not would be a differentiator between y and x (ISOR), which explains why the former requires a cause and the latter does not.²⁷

However, there are at least three arguments against the above objection; these arguments are independent and any one of them would suffice (I shall discuss the first two in this section and the third in the next section).

First, consider the above-mentioned example of a moving battery-operated toy car entering the room. One can make the circumstances incompatible with this event by filling the room with hard objects, because the car necessarily occupies space. However, an increase in strength of electric field does not necessarily occupy more space; in fact, the spaces around us are compatible with different levels of strengths of electric fields. This indicates that there is in fact no existing thing which makes it the case that the circumstances of our universe are such that it is incompatible with increase in total level of strength of electric field and hence increase in total mass-energy if something can begin uncaused. Rather, as I have argued, the reason why the law of conservation holds is because the causal principle (something does not begin to exist uncaused) holds. My argument is that, if this principle is false, as the sceptic suggests, then the law of conservation would not hold, but the consequent is not the case.

Second, the law of conservation of energy would not prevent energy-conserving events from beginning uncaused (e.g. without causal interaction) if ISOR begins to exist uncaused. It should be noted that there is no law or spatial considerations that now prevent energy-conserving changes from beginning. Indeed, such events happen frequently in the present, which indicates that the present circumstances are compatible with such changes happening. For example, hydrogen is currently being fused into helium in the sun, and in the process of the causal interaction some of the mass of the hydrogen atoms is converted directly to energy according to E = mc². Now if ISOR begun to exist uncaused, then given (I) the beginning of ISOR does not have causally necessary condition which makes it the case that only the beginning of ISOR rather than certain other events y begins uncaused, (II) any difference between the beginning of ISOR and the beginning of y would be had by them only when they had already begun to exist, and (III) the compatibility of the circumstances with the beginning of y, we can likewise expect these energy-conserving events (let these = y) to begin to exist uncaused now. These events would not be preventable by the law of conservation of energy given that they are compatible with it. But we do not observe these energy-conserving events/changes beginning uncaused now; on the contrary, scientists have described the causal interactions that brought about events such as the fusion of hydrogen into helium. Thus, the antecedent is false.

3.8.4 A Second Form of Modus Tollens Argument

Third, there is a second form of Modus Tollens argument which is immune to the objection that after the initial state has begun uncaused, some concrete substance would prevent things/events from beginning uncaused. It is immune to the objection because it implies that these would be other spacetime blocks which would begin uncaused initially (not after the initial state has begun) and massively disrupt our universe in an unconstrained manner, in which case our universe would have been very different. The argument can be formulated as follows:

• 1. If x (ISOR) begins uncaused, then some other possible spacetime blocks y and z would also begin uncaused.

• 2. It is not the case that y and z begin uncaused.

• 3. Therefore, it is not the case that x begins uncaused.

The justification for premise 1 is that,

• I. if x (ISOR) begins uncaused, this implies that the beginning of x would not have causally necessary condition which makes it the case that only x (rather than other possible spacetime blocks y and z) begins to exist.

• II. Additionally, any difference between the possibilities x, y, and z would be had by them in the concrete only when they had already begun to exist. Moreover,

• III. there would be no pre-existing entity that makes it incompatible for y and z from beginning to exist initially.

(I), (II), and (III) jointly imply that there would be no difference between the possibilities x, y, and z where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned. Hence, if x begins uncaused, y and z—as well as other things with other possible physical laws or metaphysical principles—would all begin uncaused initially.

This consequence has surprisingly been accepted by atheist Richard Carrier (2018) as a way to account for the fine-tuning of our universe. His reasoning is that, since ‘nothing (other than what is logically necessary) prevents anything from happening to that Nothing’ (ibid.), anything that is logically possible—including an actual infinite multiverse ensemble which includes our ‘fine-tuned’ universe—would begin to exist uncaused from nothing. Carrier concludes:

This entails that the assertion ex nihilo nihil, ‘from nothing, comes [only] nothing,’ is false. Because that is a rule, and Nothing contains no rules. No such rule can therefore exist when there is Nothing, so as to govern that Nothing. Therefore it cannot be the case that only nothing comes from Nothing. In fact we cannot even establish that it is likely that only nothing will come from Nothing. (Ibid.)

Nevertheless, there are several problems which Carrier fails to note.

First, Carrier’s hypothesis faces Mawson’s objection (2011) that on such a hypothesis in which every possibility is actualized, the probability of any universe in which we can more or less continually and consistently understand through induction would have been infinitesimally small, but that is not the case (see the discussion on multiverse in Chap. 4).

Second, for any spacetime block x, it is possible that there are y, z, … and so on which expand and collide with x and leave behind detectable effects. Cosmologists have been discussing the possibility of collision of multiple universes. Some have claimed that there are ‘scars’ of the collision detected on the Cosmic Microwave Background Radiation (CMB) as ‘cold spots’, while others have disputed the existence of the these ‘scars’ or argued that these ‘scars’ could have alternative explanations such as inhomogeneous reheating associated with non-standard inflation (Mackenzie et al. 2017). In any case, it is possible (though perhaps not yet proven) that there had been collision of universes leaving behind scars on the CMB. It has been objected that multiverses are brought about by an early inflationary phase and the process of inflation would have prevented the collision (Siegel 2018). However, if (instead of being caused by inflation) our universe began to exist uncaused alongside an actual infinite number of universes which also begun uncaused as Carrier suggests, a huge number of universes would collide with one another and with our universe in an unconstrained manner, and the huge number of collisions would generate huge amounts of radiations and would leave behind much more obvious traces rather than a few disputed ‘scars’ on the CMB. (The fact that there could also be other possible spacetime blocks that begin uncaused but do not affect our universe does not deny this consequence.) It would not help to say that the universes could have merged together, leading to the formation of our present universe, since given the lack of a cause, the beginnings would be unconstrained. In this case, not only ‘a small universe’ would begin uncaused, rather all kinds of possible universes (including those as big as ours!) with opposing properties would begin uncaused, since there would be no difference between them where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned, which implies that there would be no constraint whatsoever and the CMB would be totally disrupted. The opposing effects of the opposing properties would also cancel one another and no order would emerge from it. In short, the result would be totally disruptive rather than resulting in the fine-tuned and highly mathematically ordered universe which we see. It would also massively disrupt the spacetime substance of our universe, and our universe would have been very different such that the law of conservation of energy would not hold and would therefore not prevent events such as the uncausedbeginning of increase in strength of electric field under certain circumstances.

Against this second form of Modus Tollens argument, the objector might utilize the branching view of modality affirmed by Oppy which claims that all possible worlds share the initial state of the history of the actual world (Oppy 2013b holds this view because he thinks it is more parsimonious). Given this theory, the initial state of our spacetime block is necessary and there is no other possible spacetime block at the initial state. In other words, based on this branching theory of modality, there is no other metaphysically possible alternatives concerning the initial state, even though there are other logically possible alternatives such that we are able to tell alternative logically consistent stories about the initial state. Thus, when one asks, ‘Why is the initial state A rather than B (e.g. one who is totally disrupted by other spacetime blocks)?’ Oppy could answer, ‘Because A is necessary, and it follows from my branching view on modality.’²⁸ (It should be noted that the first form of Modus Tollens is not affected by this theory of modality because it is not referring to possible things or events, but to actual events such as increasing of electric field strength under certain conditions. As argued previously, there would be no difference between the beginning of ISOR and later actual events such as increasing in strength of electric fields [which we know happens frequently!] where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned, if it were actually the case that ISOR begins uncaused. However, this theory of modality is relevant to the second form of Modus Tollens which concerns possible initial states.)

In reply, I shall argue below that the branching theory of modality is unproblematic if the initial state is a beginningless First Cause. However, it is problematic if the initial state is a First Cause with beginning. In other words, my argument below is perfectly consistent with the branching theory of modality and does not require a rejection of that theory of modality; it only requires the rejection of the view that the First Cause has a beginning which is contradicted by the Modus Tollens argument and result in the unscientific denial of the fine-tuning problem.

To elaborate, empirical evidences show that it is metaphysically possible for physical entities with beginnings to have different arrangements. For example, we know that the tables and chairs in this room can be arranged differently; likewise, we know that atoms can be arranged differently. That is the reason why it is problematic to think (as Oppy claims) that the physical things of Oppy’s ISOR could not be arranged differently, that the arrangement of physical entities at the beginning of the initial state of our physical spacetime block is the only metaphysically possible arrangement, and that there are no other metaphysically possible arrangements or metaphysically possible spacetime blocks. Moreover, we know that, even though physical entities with beginnings can have different arrangements, the actual arrangement is usually dependent on the cause. For example, in the newly built house analogy mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the house is the way it is (rather than a pile of rocks) because the cause (i.e. the house builder) makes it that way; what begins to exist is brought about and constrained by the cause. However, if ISOR begins uncaused as Oppy suggests, then there would be no cause and no pre-existing preventing conditions which constrain what begins to exist. That is the reason for thinking that other spacetime blocks would also begin uncaused initially, since any property which differentiate between them and our spacetime block would be had by them only when they had already begun to exist.

Oppy might raise a tu quoque style objection by claiming that the theory that there is an immaterial, beginningless First Cause (call this ‘God’) would face the same problem. For example, if God exists uncaused beginninglessly and initially timelessly (see Chap. 6), why wouldn’t other timeless concrete entities exist uncaused alongside God? Alternatively, why is God three persons (as Christians claim) rather than four persons (a Quadrinity)?

In reply, since the objector raised the tu quoque objection by claiming that an immaterial, beginningless First Cause suffer the same problem as a First Cause with beginning, the burden of proof would be on the objector to justify his/her claim by showing that (say) multiple timeless concrete entities or a Quadrinity is metaphysically possible. The objector might reply that it is possible because it is conceivable. However, what is conceivable is not always metaphysically possible. To elaborate, I have explained above that, on my view, what exists is constrained by pre-existing conditions (e.g. the arrangement of the house is constrained by the pre-existing material and house builder). If God exists uncaused beginninglessly, then there would be a beginningless pre-existing condition which constrains what exists. This beginningless condition might make the beginningless state incompatible with other timeless concrete entities or a Quadrinity existing. In other words, it might be the case that those circumstances are such that it is not metaphysically possible for those entities to exist timelessly. In order for the objector’s objection to work, the objector would have to bear the burden of proof to rule out this possibility, but they have not done so; hence, their objection fails.

The objector might ask why cannot Oppy also appeal to preventive conditions to explain why other spacetime blocks do not begin uncaused. For if the static theory of time is true and the initial state of our spacetime block is tenselessly existing at time t₁, it might have some property located at t₁ which prevented any other blocks existing alongside it.

In reply, while a concrete entity existing at t₁ might have properties that are incompatible with some other things existing at t₁ and hence prevent their existence at t₁, the problem is that on Oppy’s view there is no entity or condition pre-existing t₁ which can prevent or constrain what begins to exist uncaused at t₁ in the first place. For in order to constrain what begins at t₁, condition C must act prior (in some sense of prior, see below) to t₁, for otherwise if (say) z has begun at t₁ it would be too late to constrain or prevent z’s beginning. However, on Oppy’s view, there is no such condition. In particular, on his view, there is nothing concrete that exist timelessly sans the initial state of the universe, since on his view that initial state is supposed to be initial state of all reality and has a beginning. If there were a timeless state, then that timeless state would be beginningless and would be the initial state of reality in terms of order of being (not temporal order) and hence would be prior to the beginning of the spacetime block in that sense. Thus, on Oppy’s theory there simply isn’t a state prior to the beginning of universe for any constraining or preventing condition to do the required work, not even a timeless state of existence which exists sans ISOR (this contrasts with Craig’s view according to which God exists timelessly sans the universe; see Chap. 6).

Moreover, many physicists do think that the initial conditions at the beginning of the universe could have been different. So why did our universe begin in such a ‘fine-tuned’ way which allowed life to exist? This is related to fine-tuning problem which I shall elaborate in Chap. 4. At this point it suffice to note that it is unreasonable to say, ‘Hey, there’s no fine-tuning problem, the initial state begins necessarily!’ Most scientists would rightly find this response implausible. For given the observation of our universe with its highly ordered systems (quantum systems, biological systems, solar systems, galactic systems, etc.) and highly ordered laws of physics as well as ‘fine-tuning’, what is the best explanation for its beginning? Something or nothing? It is unreasonable to think that our universe with its billions of stars and highly ordered laws of physics ultimately begun uncaused; that it just happened to be like that without anything determining it to be like that. For why should the initial conditions of the universe begin in such a way that the universe can allow for existence of life if there was nothing that determines the conditions to begin that way rather than other way and having other properties? As I shall explain further in Chap. 4, the fundamental principles or laws of nature do not uniquely determine a fine-tuned universe (and avoid the Boltzmann Brain problem, etc.). ‘Physics is blind to what life needs. And yet, here we are’ (Lewis and Barnes 2016, p. 181). That is one reason why many scientists recognize that there is a ‘fine-tuning problem’ which cannot be resolved simply by claiming that the initial state begins uncaused necessarily and therefore there is no fine-tuning problem. To reply this way is unscientific and irrational, that is, appealing to a magical event without a magician.

Because many scientists recognize the implausibility of simply saying that the universe began ‘fine-tuned’ and uncaused, they have proposed the multiverse hypothesis in an attempt to address this implausibility. However, as I shall explain in greater detail in Chap. 4, one problem with the multiverse hypothesis is that, even if there are many universes, whatever led to their formation would itself require fine-tuning (i.e. must be highly ordered) in order to generate so many different kinds of universes (whether deterministically or indeterministically) such that eventually one that is ‘fine-tuned’ is generated by chance. As Collins (2018, p. 90) notes, ‘anything that produces such a multiverse itself appears to require significant fine-tuning’. Thus, Oppy’s initial state would still need to be fine-tuned—but to say that such a fine-tuned state begins uncaused is precisely the problem that we started with!

Oppy objects that if the fine-tuning of the initial state is required for naturalism, it would be required for theism as well (Oppy 2013b, p. 59). He might therefore be motivated to raise a tu quoque style objection by arguing that both theories (Oppy and mine) suffer the same problem in the sense that, on both theories, there is no state prior to the initial state at which it is possible for some property or condition to do the constraining or preventive work concerning the initial state.²⁹

In response, my argument against uncaused beginning is not special pleading because it is based on evidence. As explained earlier, we have evidence based on observation and science that it is metaphysically possible for physical entities with beginnings to have different arrangements. Given this, we should ask why the initial arrangement of the universe began in such a way (rather than other ways) that allows for existence of life (fine-tuning problem). On the other hand, the objector has not provided evidence that it is metaphysically possible for timeless things without beginning to have different arrangements (e.g. a Quadrinity) in order to substantiate the tu quoque objection that theism suffers from the fine-tuning problem. Additionally, as explained earlier, we have evidence based on observation and science that constraining/preventive work is needed for things/events with beginning (e.g. so as to explain why is it not the case that a rubble rather than a house begins to exist). On the other hand, the objector has not provided evidence to substantiate the tu quoque objection that a similar constraining/preventive work is also needed for timeless things without beginning. Given the lack of evidence that a beginningless state would suffer from the same problem, the tu-quoque style objection fails.

Moreover, consider another analogy: Suppose that fire begins uncaused. In that case the beginning of fire would be unconstrained; in particular, the lack of oxygen would not constrain the beginning of fire. However, suppose that oxygen is causally necessary for fire. If there is an eternal lack of oxygen, then no fire can ever exist in that eternal state; such a state would be incompatible with the existence of fire. This scenario is analogous to my view according to which there is a beginningless state which can do the work of prevention. In order to (say) prevent other timeless entities/Quadrinity from existing uncaused beginninglessly alongside God, the preventive conditions do not need to act in any sense prior, but can be part of the beginningless state which makes such a state incompatible with those other timeless entities/Quadrinity existing. Such a beginningless state is not limited by a temporal edge, whereas ‘our spacetime block begins at t₁’ is limited by a temporal edge and hence comes too late to constrain what begins to exist at the same edge, as explained above.

It might be objected that, on Oppy’s theory of modality, the lack of a previous state to the beginning of the universe is precisely why it is metaphysically necessary. For according to his theory, in order for something to have been otherwise, it would have to be caused to be otherwise by a previous state, yet there is no previous state to the beginning of the universe according to his view.

In reply, the point that ‘in order for it to have been otherwise, it would have to be caused to be otherwise’ may be applicable to later events, but the fact that on Oppy’s theory there is nothing prior to the initial state of our spacetime block which has a beginning to constrain what begins to exist is precisely the problem. For the lack of a previous state to the beginning of universe on Oppy’s theory—which implies the lack of constraining and preventive conditions—is precisely one reason why he cannot say what makes it metaphysically impossible from beginning in a different way, and thus undermines his claim that the initial state of our universe has a metaphysically necessary beginning. It would be fallacious to reply to my argument that ‘without a prior state, other uncaused events cannot be prevented’ by saying that this is not applicable to the initial part of universe which is just necessary. For a theory of modality is merely abstract, which merely describes what is necessary and possible. What does the required metaphysical work are concrete things and their properties. However, the lack of a previous state to the beginning of the universe implies that there is no concrete previous state which can do the required metaphysical work of constraining or prevention, that is precisely why it cannot be metaphysically necessary.

On the other hand, I have explained above that, while the branching theory of modality is problematic for an initial state with a beginning, it is unproblematic for initial state that is beginningless. Being beginningless implies that the initial state would not face the problem posed by my Modus Tollens argument, which only works against the view of uncaused beginnings (such as that held by Oppy). Moreover, something that is beginningless and unsustained will be initial, since there cannot be another thing existing prior (whether temporally prior or causally prior) to an entity that is beginningless and unsustained, and given the branching theory of modality, such an initial entity would be necessary. Therefore, his properties could not have been different. Additionally, given the branching theory of modality which implies that First Cause is metaphysically necessary, it isn’t the case that multiple beginningless timeless concrete entities could have existed initially if there is only one such entity initially, and it isn’t the case that the beginningless First Cause could have been a Quadrinity if it is a Trinity. There just isn’t any possible alternative initial state, since all possibilities share that initial state. This conclusion provides another response to the tu-quoque style objection.

3.9 Objection Concerning the Distinction between Could and Would

Back to the first form of the Modus Tollens argument, sceptics might object by claiming that my argument only shows that, if ISOR began to exist uncaused, other entities could also begin to exist uncaused; it does not show that they would also begin to exist uncaused.

In reply, ‘could’ concerns possibility, but I am not referring to possible events here. Rather, I am referring to actual events, and arguing that there would be no difference between them where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned if one of them begins uncaused. For example, consider the scenario in which something (say) the universe began to exist and there was also a rapid increasing in strength of electric fields under certain circumstances around me. In this scenario these are not just possible events (i.e. it is not merely the case that the universe could begin to exist and electric field could increase in strength), but actual events; that is, the universe did begin to exist and electric field did increase in strength. Since (as explained above) there would be no difference between these events where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned if the universe did begin to exist uncaused, the increasing in strength of the electric field under certain circumstances around me would also begin to exist uncaused (e.g. without requiring the switching on of an electric field generator).

An objector might appeal to Oppy’s branching theory of modality according to which what is possible for these later events will be set by the causal powers of the previous event, and then argue that according to this theory it is not possible for later events to begin uncaused.³⁰

However, this objection misses the point of my argument which refers to actual later events (and not possible events). That is, we know that electric fields actually increase in strength from time to time, and given what I have argued above concerning I, II, and III, there would be no difference between the beginning of these actual events and the actual beginning of our universe where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned if (as Oppy says) our universe actually began uncaused, and that these actual later events would have been uncaused rather than caused as Oppy thinks.

Another objector might appeal to a different theory of modality according to which it is conceivable and possible that many different possible strengths could begin to exist uncaused. He/she might then argue that, since none of these possibilities is privileged over the other, none of them would begin uncaused even if ISOR begins uncaused.³¹

There are two steps to my response.

First, in our actual world, increasing in strength of electric field happens often. For example, I just observed an event y: ‘an increased in strength E under certain circumstances’ begins to exist at time ty after I switched on a generator. My argument is that, if ISOR begins uncaused, then given I, II, and III (explained above), there would be no difference between beginning of ISOR and beginning of y where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned. The fact that y could have been of different strengths (e.g. 2E, 3E) does not deny either of I, II, and III, which jointly imply my conclusion. That is, the fact that there is no privilege over which strength begins does not imply that none would begin. On the contrary, given I, II, and III, y would have begun uncaused, since there would have been no difference between the beginning of ISOR and the beginning of y where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned. Therefore, the beginning of y at ty should have been uncaused, that is, without having to switched on a generator. But that consequent was not the case. Thus, it is not the case that ISOR began uncaused.

Second, what about the fact that y could have been of different strengths and that there is no privilege over which strength begins? What does this fact imply? One can argue that this fact implies that, not only would the increasing in strength of the electric field under certain circumstances around me began to exist uncaused, the increasing in strength would be of very different values as well. The reason is because,

• I. since increasing in strength E would have begun to exist uncaused, as shown under the first step, what this implies is that the beginning of E would not have causally necessary condition which makes it the case that only E (rather than other possible strengths, for example, 2E, 3E) begins to exist.

• II. Additionally, as explained previously, any difference between the possibilities E, 2E, 3E, and so on would be had by them only when they had already begun to exist. Moreover,

• III. the circumstances around us are compatible with different levels of increasing in strengths of electric fields up to a certain physical limit.

Given (I), (II), and (III), there would be no relevant difference between these different increasing in strengths where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned. Hence, if increasing in strength E began uncaused, the other possible strengths would all begin uncaused up to the physical limit (e.g. suppose 6E is the limit; increasing in strengths of E, 2E, and 3E would all begin to exist and they add up to 6E), and our universe would have been very different.

With regard to the second step, one may argue more directly from the uncaused beginning of our spacetime block (if that happens) to the uncaused beginning of other possible strengths of electric field, as follows:

• 1. If possibility x (e.g. our spacetime block) is actualized and begins uncaused, then some other possibilities (e.g. y: increasing in electric field strength of E, 2E, and 3E) would also be actualized and begins uncaused.

• 2. It is not the case that y is actualized and begins uncaused.

• 3. Therefore, it is not the case that x is actualized and begins uncaused.

The justification for premise 1 is that,

• I. if possibility x is actualized and begins uncaused, this implies that the beginning of x would not have causally necessary condition which makes it the case that only possibility x (rather than some other possibilities, for example, y) begins to exist.

• II. Additionally, any difference between the possibilities x and y would be had by them in the concrete only when they had already begun to exist. Moreover,

• III. the circumstances are compatible with the beginning of y (as explained under step two above).

I, II, and III jointly imply that there would be no difference between possibility x and possibility y where being actualized and beginning uncaused in the concrete world is concerned, which implies premise 1.

3.10 Objection: The Causal Principle is Inconsistent with Libertarian Freedom

Almeida (2018, pp. 38–39) objects that the Causal Principle is inconsistent with libertarian freedom, which he understood as implying that, in the case whereby agent S freely chooses to do A, ‘the cause of A is S, and there is nothing that causes S to cause A. S’s causing A is an event that comes into existence uncaused. So according to source libertarianism it is perfectly possible that some things come into existence uncaused.’

In reply, an agent causing some effect is not itself an event, but just a way of describing an agent causing an event (Craig and Sinclair 2009 p. 194n. 101). My argument does not rule out libertarian free choice, since one can understand libertarian free choices as indeterministic but not uncaused (see further, Chap. 6).

3.11 Objection Based on Lack of Directionality

Don Page has raised the concern that

We have learned that the laws of physics are CPT invariant (essentially the same in each direction of time), so in a fundamental sense the future determines the past just as much as the past determines the future … the effective unidirectional causation we commonly experience is something just within the universe and need not be extrapolated to a putative cause for the universe as a whole.³²

Page’s worry is related to Linford’s objection to the KCA that ‘the explanatorily prior and physically necessary conditions for the universe’s “beginning” can fall in the temporal direction away from the beginning’ (2020, p. 11).

In reply, it should first be noted that the above objection by Page and Linford assumes the static theory of time according to which later events already exist and hence (according to them) might be able to cause earlier events. According to the static theory, our ordinary experience of time flow and the present is regarded as illusory, and in the absence of these one might have difficulty defining ‘earlier than’, ‘beginning’, and ‘first moment’.³³ The static theory of time is controversial (for objections to the static theory and a defence of the dynamic theory of time, see, for example, Craig 2000a, b). In any case, I shall explain below that my Modus Tollens argument would work even if the static theory of time is true and that the KCA can still be defended, even though time as it is used in mathematical physics is a quantity without direction.

To begin, it should be noted that the static theory does not exclude earlier than/later than relations; on the contrary, it is the presence of those relations which makes the B-series a temporal series, rather than a McTaggart C-series.³⁴ It is true that on a B-theory there is difficulty providing an explanation for why one direction is earlier rather than later. Nevertheless, even if Page’s speculation that earlier events actually depends on later events is true, then what we call earlier (and beginning) would in fact be later in my argument. Therefore, if an infinite causal regress and a causal loop is impossible (see Chap. 5), there would still be a First Cause.

Second, it has been explained previously in Chap. 2 that the laws of nature and equations of physics merely provide an incomplete description of physical reality without ruling out causation and causal properties (and causal direction) which operate at a more fundamental level as the ground of the regularities described by these laws and equations. Moreover, it has also been noted in Sect. 3.1 that, even if the static theory of time is true, there is still something unique about time which makes it different from space. For example, within the spacetime block, the durations next to the duration I exists is occupied by my parents and that, if they had not existed, I would not exist. (Whereas this is not so with spatial order: if my parents do not stand on my left or right, I would still exist.) Likewise, we know that hydrogen is causally necessary for the formation of water, but water is not causally necessary for formation of hydrogen. In short, there is still a certain dependence and an ordering of things/events which indicate the dependence, and I shall call these ‘causal dependence’ and ‘causal order’. (A causal sceptic would acknowledge that we observe correlations between things/events, but doubt that there is causation. In reply, the assumption of causation is justified in light of the critique of the causal sceptic’s position which others [e.g. Weaver 2019] have offered [e.g. ‘it is improbable that correlations exist without causation’] and which are summarized in Chap. 2. In any case, my argument can easily be translated in terms of correlation, by substituting the term ‘causal order/cause’ with ‘correlations’, ‘causally ordered’ with ‘correlated’, and ‘uncaused’ with ‘uncorrelated’: (1) If x begins uncorrelated, then y would also begin uncorrelated. (2) It is not the case that y begins uncorrelated. (3) Therefore, it is not the case that x begins uncorrelated.³⁵)

Third, as explained in Chap. 2, if something X has a temporal extension, the extension is finite, and it has temporal edges (that is, it does not have a static closed loop or a changeless phase that avoids an edge), then it has a beginning. The upshot is that a relevant defence of my argument for the Causal Principle ‘whatever begins to exist has a cause’ (in the context of defending the KCA) is independent of the temporal direction of causality. If physical reality as a whole is finite in temporal extent in whatever dimensions and having temporal edges (i.e. without a static closed loop or a changeless phase that avoids an edge), it would imply that physical reality has a beginning of existence.

Now the argument in Sect. 5.6 of this book refutes a static closed loop by demonstrating that it is viciously circular, while the argument in Chap. 6 demonstrates that if there is a changeless phase that avoids an edge, this (initially) changeless phase of reality must have libertarian freedom and thus would be a Creator rather than an impersonal physical reality which is constantly changing. Given that physical reality does not have a changeless phase that avoids an edge, and given that a ‘change’ is an event that has ‘edges’ at the state of having gained or having lost a property within a finite duration of time, physical reality as a whole would be finite in temporal extent if there is no infinite number of changes, and the latter is demonstrated by the arguments in Chap. 5. Given these arguments, physical reality as a whole would be finite in temporal extent in whatever dimensions. We then ask whether such a physical reality with temporal ‘edges’ (i.e. with a beginning) exists without causally necessary conditions.

Now if the number of earlier and later events in the scenario described by Linford and Page are finite and the series exists without a beginningless First Cause as a causally necessary condition, then the series of events would violate reflexivity; that is, the earlier events would be dependent on later events, which are dependent on earlier events.

Moreover, the two forms of Modus Tollens argument which I have defended above would still apply. That is,

• I. If our spacetime block is finite in temporal extent in whatever dimensions and having ‘edges’ and uncaused, then there would not be any cause which would make it the case that only our spacetime block rather than other possible finite spacetime blocks as well as many other actual things/events with finite temporal extension within our block and having ‘edges’ exists without cause.

• II. The properties of our spacetime block and the properties of those other possible/actual spacetime blocks/things/events which differentiate between them would be had by them in the concrete world only when they had already existed in the concrete world.

• III. The circumstances are compatible with those other spacetime blocks/things/events existing.

As argued previously, (I), (II), and (III) jointly imply that there would be no essential difference between them where existing uncaused is concerned, and therefore those other spacetime blocks/things/events would also be uncaused. But this is contrary to fact given the causal order we observe. Therefore, it is not the case that our spacetime block is finite in temporal extent in whatever dimensions and having ‘edges’ and uncaused.

It might be objected that, given that x (‘our spacetime block within which events are causally ordered/correlated’) is logically possible, if y (increasing in strength of electric field) is part of a causally ordered/correlated x and x begins uncaused, y would naturally have causal relations/correlations with other parts of x.³⁶

In reply, this objection begs the question by assuming that the events within x (our spacetime block) would still be causally ordered/correlated if x begins uncaused/uncorrelated. Whereas I am not begging the question by arguing that the events within x would not be causally ordered/correlated if x begins uncaused/uncorrelated, because the premises of my argument (i.e. I, II, and III) do not assume this conclusion, but jointly imply this conclusion. To elaborate, the following four claims should be distinguished:

• 1. It is possible that x (‘a spacetime block within which events are causally ordered/correlated’).

• 2. It is possible that x (‘a chaotic spacetime block in which y begins uncaused/uncorrelated’).

• 3. It is possible that x (a chaotic spacetime block in which y is uncaused/uncorrelated) begins uncaused.

• 4. It is the case that x (‘a spacetime block within which events are causally ordered/correlated’) begins uncaused.

While 1 is true and I grant that 2 and 3 are true for the sake of the argument, (I), (II), and (III) jointly imply that 4 is false, since (I), (II), and (III) jointly imply that there would be no difference between ‘x’ and ‘events within x’ (such as ‘y’) where beginning uncaused is concerned. In other words, our spacetime block would have been very different (i.e. the events within our spacetime block would have been causally disordered/uncorrelated) if our spacetime block begins uncaused. Hence, it is not the case that our spacetime blocks begins uncaused.

3.12 Epistemological Objections

It might be objected that, perhaps unknown to us, something did begin to exist uncaused faraway a long time ago in another universe with very different metaphysical principles/laws of nature.

However, ‘beginning long ago in a place far away’ by itself would not be relevant consideration, because ‘begins to exist uncaused’ implies that the time and location at which it begins (whether long ago or far away) would not be a cause for its beginning rather than other things/events (say, a rapid increasing in strength of electric fields under certain circumstances) around us where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned. The metaphysical principles/laws of nature of that unknown universe cannot be a cause for why things begin to exist uncaused in that world but not in our universe, since beginning to exist uncaused implies that the laws or principles are not the cause.

One might object that to argue that because we do not see things beginning to exist uncaused around us therefore it didn’t happen long ago is to commit the black swan fallacy. In reply, the black swan fallacy is a fallacy concerning inductive reasoning (‘because a person X has observed many white swans and no black swans, therefore X does not think that black swans exist’—this is fallacious because X has not observed all swans). Whereas my argument for the Causal Principle is deductive, not inductive. My argument is not simply saying ‘because we do not see things beginning to exist uncaused around us therefore it didn’t happen long ago’. Rather, my argument is saying, ‘if something (say, the universe) begins to exist uncaused long ago, then (because of I, II, and III) other things would begin to exist uncaused around us, but they don’t; therefore, it is not the case that something begins to exist uncaused long ago’.

It has been objected that we cannot know whether the Causal Principle applies to the universe itself because we cannot observe the universe as a whole and confirm that the universe has a cause.³⁷ One might also raise the concern that the word cause gets its meaning from our use of language involving our experiences, but it’s not clear whether it applies to the situation at the beginning of the universe, which is far beyond our experiences. As Nagel (2004) notes in his review of Rundle’s (2004) book Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing, ‘the most difficult philosophical question posed by Rundle’s critique is whether such efforts to use words to indicate something that transcends the conditions of their ordinary application make sense.’ Drees (2016, p. 199) raises the concern that ‘at the boundaries of physical cosmology our notions of time and causality break down’. It therefore is doubtful whether a ‘Big Bang’ as the limiting event of standard cosmology provides a stable model for ‘the first event’. He concludes that when the conceptuality of space and time changes, possible answers to the question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ need not to be thought of in temporal or causal terms.

The assumption of the first objection is that we can only know by direct observation, but this assumption is false. There are many events which we have not directly observed, but which we can know did happened by inferring from what we observe. Moreover, there are ways of knowing which are not dependent on observation. For example, I know that the statement ‘there cannot be shapeless squares’ is true, and I can know this without having to observe the entire universe to make sure that there are no shapeless squares anywhere. I just need to understand that the existence of a shape (e.g. square) implies that it is not shapeless. As explained in Chap. 1, the laws of logic are necessarily true because a violation of the laws of logic would be non-existent. The laws of logic would hold even in conditions far beyond our experiences, such as at the origin of universes and of time, in the microphysical world and in Kant’s ‘noumenal world’—there cannot be shapeless squares in such conditions too.

The fact that the laws of logic are necessarily true implies that the conclusion of a deductively valid argument from true premises must be true, and I have already explained that the Modus Tollens argument for the Causal Principle is deductively valid, and that its premises are true. The argument implies that the Causal Principle not only applies within the universe, but to everything without restriction, including the universe itself, the microphysical world, and the ‘noumenal world’.

Hence, with regard to Nagel’s and Drees’ concern, if ‘beginning’ does not apply to the universe at its earlier stages, then following the laws of logic (which as explained above cannot be violated even in conditions far beyond our experiences) what that implies is that the universe would be ‘beginningless’. I discuss this possibility in Chaps. 5 and 6. If ‘beginning’ does apply but ‘cause’ does not apply to the beginning of the universe, then following the laws of logic (which as explained above cannot be violated even in conditions far beyond our experiences) what that implies is that the beginning of the universe would be ‘uncaused’. If that is the case, (1.1) there would not be any cause which would make it the case that only universe rather than some other things (e.g. the beginning of a rapid increasing in strength of electric fields under certain circumstances around me) begins to exist uncaused. Moreover, (1.2) the properties of the universe and the properties of those other things which differentiate between them would be had by them only when they had already begun to exist. Additionally, (1.3) the circumstances around us are compatible with the beginning of existence of those other events. As explained previously, (1.1), (1.2), and (1.3) imply that there would be no essential difference between them where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned. Thus, if the universe begins to exist uncaused, it cannot be the case that only the universe begins to exist uncaused. In that case, the beginning of those other things would also be uncaused. But this is contrary to my experience. I (thankfully!) do not experience such events happening without causes such as (say) having to switch on the electric field generator. Therefore, it is not the case that the universe begins to exist uncaused.

3.13 Conclusion

In Chaps. 2 and 3, I have defended the Causal Principle ‘whatever begins to exist has a cause’ against objections and developed an argument which demonstrates that the principle is true. Contrary to the claims of some scientists and philosophers, fundamental physics does not exclude efficient causation, and quantum physics has not shown that the Causal Principle is violated given that (1) quantum events do not begin to exist without causal antecedents, (2) our current understanding of physics is limited, and (3) there are viable deterministic interpretations of quantum phenomena. On the other hand, (1) an inductive argument, (2) an argument from the concept of non-being, and (3) a Modus Tollens argument have been offered in the literature in support of the Causal Principle. I developed the Modus Tollens argument in response to objections. The argument states that, if x begins uncaused, then y which begins to exist would also begin uncaused, which is not the case; therefore, the antecedent is not the case. Against Oppy’s claim that only x (the initial state of reality: ISOR) begins uncaused, I have shown that one cannot simply claim that this is a brute fact, for if there is no relevant difference between (say) ISOR and y, this would imply that they are the same where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned. One also cannot appeal to abstract objects to provide the necessary metaphysical grounding for Oppy’s claim, because any such grounding would have to be concrete in order to ground the difference between x and y in the concrete world. I go on and demonstrate that there isn’t any concrete grounding because (I) there would not be any causally antecedent condition which would make it the case that x rather than y begins uncaused, (II) the properties of x and the properties of y which differentiate between them would be had by them only when they had already begun to exist, and (III) the circumstance is compatible with the beginning of y. In particular, against the appeal to current spatial considerations, pre-existent things or laws of nature preventing things/events from beginning uncaused around us, I have shown that such considerations would not prevent events such as electric fields increasing in strength and energy-conserving changes from beginning uncaused, in which case our experiences would have been very different from what they are. I have also defended a second form of Modus Tollens argument which shows that, if our spacetime block begins uncaused, then some other possible spacetime blocks would also begin uncaused initially and collide with ours, causing massive disruption, which is not the case; therefore, the antecedent is not the case. Although I have defended two forms of Modus Tollens argument in this chapter, it should be noted that any one of the two forms of Modus Tollens argument would be sufficient to refute Oppy’s claim. Against the objection that the first form of argument only shows that things could begin to exist uncaused now, not that they would, I reply that I am referring to actual events, and arguing that there would be no difference between them where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned if one of them begins uncaused. I also explained that my argument is consistent with libertarian freedom. I conclude that the Causal Principle would hold even in conditions that are far beyond our experiences, such as at the origin of the universe, the microphysical world, and in Kant’s ‘noumenal world’, for if it does not, our experiences would be very different from what they are.³⁸

In conclusion, the Modus Tollens argument demonstrates the absurd consequences which would follow if something x begins without any causally antecedent condition which makes it the case that x (rather than other things) begins to exist. The conclusion of this argument implies that whatever xbegins to existdepends on the cause which makes it the case that x (rather than other things) begins to exist.

Finally, in addition to the Modus Tollens argument defended above, which is already sufficient for establishing the conclusion ‘if our universe has a beginning, it has a cause’, another independent argument can be offered for this conclusion (as explained in Sect. 3.1, any one of these arguments is sufficient; thus, my case for the KCA does not depend on the Modus Tollens argument or the following argument). I have explained previously in Sect. 3.8.4 that it is unreasonable to think that our universe with its billions of stars and highly ordered laws of physics (which indicates that our universe is a huge, interconnected, highly ordered structure; see Chap. 4) fundamentally began uncaused; that it just happened to be like that without anything determining it to be like that. Such a conclusion is worse than magic—which at least has a magician—and it is worse than chance, which is highly unlikely (see Chap. 4) but at least has prior conditions which ground the probabilities. Most scientists recognize the implausibility of simply saying that the universe is ‘fine-tuned’ by chance; thus, they have proposed the multiverse hypothesis in an attempt to address this implausibility. In Chap. 4, I shall show that this attempt fails, but the point here is that saying that the universe began uncaused and was ‘fine-tuned’ is even more implausible than saying that the universe began by chance and was ‘fine-tuned’. Thus, it is more reasonable to conclude that, if our universe had a beginning, the highly ordered systems of our fine-tuned universe, together with the highly ordered laws of physics, fundamentally came from something—a Cause, which is arguably highly powerful and intelligent. I shall present the arguments for this conclusion in detail in the following chapters. In particular, I shall first discuss the evidences for the fine-tuning and order of the universe in Chap. 4, and I shall demonstrate that the universe has an ultimate beginning in Chaps. 5 and 6.