A Description of the 38 Matched Projects

Abstract

This chapter gives a short description of all 38 projects with summary statistics (size, which years, completed/abandoned, which sectors) and the reason for inclusion in the investigation. This gives the reader an overview of the richness of the data set.

Table 3.1, in Chap. 3, lists the project sample. It consists of 38 projects divided into 19 pairs, with 1 completed and 1 abandoned project each, matched by size, sector and (when possible) contractor. This chapter gives more detailed descriptions of the projects, offering an impression of each one. Detailed case studies are provided for 11 projects in Chaps. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. The numbering of the projects corresponds to the numbering in Table 3.1.

4.1 Lagos-Ibadan Express Road

Sector: Road infrastructure	Project value: $500M+	Status: Completed
Owner: Federal Ministry of Works Abuja	Location: Lagos/Ibadan, Oyo State	Contractor: Julius Berger Nigeria and Reynolds Construction Company

The Lagos-Ibadan Express Road is a 127.6 km expressway from Lagos, Nigeria’s largest city, to Ibadan, the capital of Oyo State. The expressway is the oldest in Nigeria built at the end of the 1970s and, as a primary connection to the north, south and east of the country, the busiest in Nigeria (more than 250,000 cars daily). The reconstruction contract to widen the road and increase its capacity was awarded by President Goodluck Jonathan’s Administration in 2013 at a value of more than $500 million (Wikipedia, 2021a). Work is ongoing, with significant success in terms of completion achieved during the last visit to the project site (Fig. 4.1).

Fig. 4.1

Lagos-Ibadan Express Road

Rationale Behind Inclusion

The project was included for investigation because of its economic significance to the Federal Republic of Nigeria (particularly the two interchange sections of the Lagos-Sagamu Road of Ogun State and Sagamu to Ore and Benin of Edo State). Reconstruction of the expressway has helped to reduce the travel time of hundreds of thousands of commuters. An average of 250,000 vehicles use the road daily. The contract was awarded to Julius Berger Nigeria and Reynolds Construction Company Limited (a Nigerian company) for the sum of $800,986,290.

4.2 Lagos-Badagry Express Road

Sector: Road infrastructure	Project value: $500M+	Status: Stalled/abandoned
Owner: Federal Ministry of Works Abuja	Location: Lagos/Badagry, Lagos State	Contractor: China Civil Engineering and Construction Company (CCECC) Abuja

The Lagos-Badagry Express Road is a 60 km section of the Trans-West African Coastal Highway Expressway Road, and it provides connection across the Nigeria Boundary from Lagos through Benin to Dakar. Similar to the Lagos-Ibadan Express Road, this project is a reconstruction work to increase capacity. The reconstruction contract was awarded in 2010 to the China Civil Engineering and Construction Company (CCECC). The Lagos portion of the expressway should be widened from four lanes to ten lanes for road vehicles, and a light rail line should operate in the centre. Two of the expressway’s lanes are intended for exclusive use by the Lagos State Government Bus Rapid Transit System (Fig. 4.2).

Fig. 4.2

Lagos-Badagry Express Road

Rationale Behind Inclusion

The Lagos-Badagry Express Road was included in the list of projects to be considered for investigation based on its economic significance and because it is a transnational road.

Although the contract for rehabilitation of the Lagos-Badagry Express Road was awarded in 2009 by the Lagos State Government (LSG) to the contractor CCECC, the road had been in a dilapidated state for a long time, as the LSG failed to carry out complete work on the expressway after it promised to convert it to a ten-lane expressway. Residents and motorists lament the poor condition of the road, which results in accidents, damage to vehicles, a slowdown of economic activity and traffic congestion.

4.3 Third Mainland Bridge

Sector: Road/bridge	Project value: $1B+	Status: Completed
Owner: Federal Ministry of Works Abuja	Location: Lagos State	Contractor: Julius Berger Nigeria and Reynolds Construction Company

The Third Mainland Bridge with 11.8 km is the longest of three bridges connecting Lagos Island to the mainland. It was the longest bridge in Africa until 1996 (when a longer bridge was opened in Cairo). The bridge connects the mainland at Oworonshoki to the Adeniji Adele Interchange on Lagos Island. Its construction was restarted (after an earlier aborted attempt) and overseen by President Ibrahim Babangida’s Administration in 1990 (Fig. 4.3).

Fig. 4.3

Third Mainland Bridge Eobal End

Rationale Behind Inclusion

This iconic project made the list for investigation considering its peculiar circumstances. The Third Mainland Bridge is an essential part of Lagos’ daily commuting activity, and as such it requires continuous renovation. As a result of its high economic importance, and in order to reduce traffic congestion in the state, successive governments have continued to spend money on maintenance of the bridge.

4.4 Second Niger Bridge

Sector: Road/bridge	Project value: $1B+	Status: Stalled/abandoned
Owner: Federal Ministry of Works Abuja	Location: Rivers/Niger States	Contractor: Julius Berger Nigeria and Reynolds Construction Company

The Second Niger Bridge connects Delta State with Anambra State. It was conceived to ease the pressure on the River Niger Bridge (built over 50 years ago) which became structurally overloaded by traffic. The Second Niger Bridge project, itself 1.8 km long, is divided into three phases of construction—bypassing Onitsha and Asaba Roads, connecting the Owerri-Onitsha Express Way at Nkwerre-Ezunaka and then crossing Atani to the Asaba-Benin Expressway at Okpanam—with a total length of 44 km (Fig. 4.4).

Fig. 4.4

Second Niger Bridge

Rationale Behind Inclusion

One relevant feature of this all-important project is that it was constructed by the same company ( Julius Berger) that built the successful Third Mainland Bridge. We included both projects so that we could gain insights into the data collection on the phenomenon under investigation. Again, the project consists of four sections: the Asaba Road, the Toll Plaza, the Bridge and the Onitsha Road sections. Although designed over 30 years ago, the project should have been completed in 2017, but it is still not in use despite a large amount of funding.

4.5 Egbin Power Station

Sector: Power/electricity	Project value: $500M+	Status: Completed
Owner: Federal Ministry of Power Abuja	Location: Ikorodu	Contractor: Marubeni Consortium Hitachi Company/ Bouygues

Egbin Power Station was carried out under the Babangida administration beginning works in 1982; its start-up was commissioned in six subsequent units between May 1985 and 1988. It is the largest power-generating station in Nigeria, with an installed capacity of 1320 MW. The station is located at Ijede/Egbin, approximately 40 km north-east of Lagos. The contractor was the Marubeni Consortium, which used the Hitachi Company of Japan for the electric/mechanical works and Bouygues of France for the civil works (Fig. 4.5).

Fig. 4.5

Egbin Power Station

Rationale Behind Inclusion

The Egbin Power Station is a gas-fired plant with six 220 MW independent boiler turbine units. It can also run on high-power fuel oil (HPFO). The thermal plant represents one of the most significant projects in the power sector. Egbin Power Station is now privatized as a joint venture between Sahara Power Group and KEPCO, which acquired a 70% holding at a cost of $407.3 million.

4.6 Calabar Power Station

Sector: Power/electricity	Project value: $500M+	Status: Stalled/abandoned
Owner: Federal Ministry of Power Abuja	Location: Calabar, Cross River State	Contractor: Marubeni Corporation (Japan) and Gitto Group (Nigeria)

This power station was built as part of the National Integrated Power Project (NIPP), which was supposed to create 11 power stations across Nigeria. A simple cycle gas turbine built with the capacity to supply 561 MW of electricity to the national grid, it was completed in 2014 without delivering power as planned.

In September 2017 the Nigerian government signed an agreement with Seven Energy for the supply of gas to the power station to enable it to deliver 561 MW of power in order to bring the power plant to full functional capacity. These objectives have not been realized (Fig. 4.6).

Fig. 4.6

Calabar Power Station

Rationale Behind Inclusion

Naturally, it is important to investigate what went wrong with a power station that took over $500 million in spending from the Nigerian national income without supplying a single megawatt of electricity. The Calabar Power Station is currently non-operational after an investment of over a billion dollars. Nigeria is now one of ten countries in the world with an irregular supply of electricity.

4.7 Zungeru Hydropower Plant

Sector: Energy	Project value: $1B+	Status: Completed
Owner: Federal Ministry of Power Works and Housing	Location: Niger State	Contractor: EEC /Sino Hydro (China)

Zungeru Hydropower Plant is located on the Kaduna River in Niger State, 150 km from Abuja. It entails an engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contract consisting of a 700 MW hydropower station, a river dam, a 2400 m RCC roller concrete gravity dam and a clay core rock fill dam, a powerhouse behind the dam, and a tailrace channel, at an estimated cost of $1.3 billion. The duration of the work was planned to span 2013–2018 (57 months). The first phase was set to be released by December 2019. The project has not quite been released, but completion is imminent at the time of writing (Fig. 4.7).

Fig. 4.7

Zungeru Dam

Rationale Behind Inclusion

The host governor on the project recently remarked: “We are conscious of the importance of this project, not only as it affects our people, but for the nation too. That is why we put in place a committee to interface with the communities and the contractors. We don’t want anything to delay the delivery of this project. All hands must be on deck to ensure that we have a hitch-free operation on-site and for the project to be delivered on schedule.”

4.8 Delta State (Oghareki) Power Plant

Sector: Energy	Project value: $1B+	Status: Stalled/abandoned
Owner: Federal Ministry of Power Works and Housing	Location: Oghara, Delta State	Contractor: Delta State Government

The Delta State Government conceived the idea of an independent power plant (IPP) project in order to boost the electricity power supply in the state. The state hosts the majority of the oil production in Nigeria. Federal electric supply was 100 MW versus the 1000 MW of electricity needed. The project is under financial investigation by a different government agency (Fig. 4.8).

Fig. 4.8

Delta State Oghareki Power Plant

Rationale Behind Inclusion

The host governor said the following at the project’s foundation ceremony: “We are glad as a state that we will be a hub for generations because of the peaceful nature of our state and the contribution to power in Nigeria.” Despite having the right intentions, the project site experienced inactivity after spending over $1 billion, very likely due to corruption, although no one has been convicted. Investigating the project will assist our understanding of the dynamics of the phenomenon.

4.9 Shiroro Hydroelectric Power Station

Sector: Energy	Project value: $100M+	Status: Completed
Owner: Federal Ministry of Power Works and Housing	Location: Niger State	Contractor: Bureau of Public Enterprise (BPE) Concession/ Shiroro Hydro Electric

This is a power plant with a 600 MW capacity, with a rock-filled concrete-faced dam that is 115 m high and 700 m long. The dam site has a reservoir of 7Bm³. The project has residential quarters, a hospital and a school. Shiroro has an electrical distribution network comprising an 11/0.41 kV distribution network and 11/0.415 kV sub-stations (110–200kVA). Assets consist of civil structures, the primary electro-mechanical plant and non-core assets. There are four hydraulic turbines, four generators, gates and hoists and plant auxiliaries, including a powerhouse portable water treatment plant, sewage treatment plant, lubricating oil treatment plant, one chlorination plant, two flood control pumps and reservoir management equipment. The project was privatized by the federal government on a private concession of 30 years (Fig. 4.9).

Fig. 4.9

Shiroro Dam

Rationale Behind Inclusion

Shiroro Hydroelectric Power Station assists our investigation in explaining project success in the much-needed electricity sector of Nigeria.

4.10 Omoku Power Plant Station

Sector: Energy	Project value: $100M+	Status: Stalled/abandoned
Owner: Federal Ministry of Power Works and Housing	Location: Rivers State	Contractor: Rockson Engineering Nigeria

Similar to Calabar Power Station, this power plant was meant to be part of the National Integrated Power Project (NIPP ), via the Niger Delta Power Holding Company (NDPHC ). It was to be a 252 MW gas turbine power station with 2x126 MW GE 9EA gas turbines. The project was supposed to complement the capacity of a previous project commissioned in 2006 by President Olusegun Obasanjo.

The Omoku plant was inaugurated in 2006, but it did not improve the power situation in the state. The project was under the investigation of the crime agency (Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, EFCC) based on petitions by indigenes who alleged that the project was overpriced (Fig. 4.10).

Fig. 4.10

Omoku Power Plant

Rationale Behind Inclusion

This project offers insights into project failures and why it was challenging to replicate the success factors in comparable projects such as the Shiroro Hydroelectric Power Station.

4.11 Mambilla Hydroelectric Power

Sector: Power/electricity	Project value: $5B+	Status: Stalled and restarted
Owner: Federal Ministry of Power Abuja	Location: Donga, Taraba State	Contractor: Consortium led by Sinohydro Corporation (China)

Mambilla Hydroelectric Power aims to construct a dam and reservoir at 1300 metres above sea level in order to generate electrical capacity of 3050 MW. Three tunnels will lead into a 1000 m (3300 ft) drop shaft tunnelled down through the rock to an underground powerhouse. The cost of over $5 billion is to be 85% financed by the Nigerian government via a loan from the China Exim Bank. The project design was finalized in 2012 but on hold until 2016, when the contract was given to Sinohydro in 2017 (NS Energy, 2021). The project was again stalled due to payment defaults by the Nigerian government to a contractor who lost out in 2017. However, an agreement has been reached (CPR Newsroom, 2021), and the project is finally to take off with a goal to be operational in 2030 (Fig. 4.11).

Fig. 4.11

Mambilla Site

Rationale Behind Inclusion

The size of the project (over $5 billion) makes it one of the two most expensive projects in Nigeria. This is comparable with the Ajaokuta Steel Project. The two projects have been included on the list of our investigation given their value of $10 billion, which is 50% of Nigeria’s total external debt.

4.12 Ajaokuta Steel Project

Sector: Power/electricity	Project value: $5B+	Status: Stalled/abandoned
Owner: Federal Ministry of Power and Steel	Location: Kogi State	Contractor: Tyajz Prom Export (TPE) (USSR)

In 1979 a tender went out to develop the Nigerian Steel Industry, and a contract was signed with Tyajz Prom Export (TPE ). The 1986 delivery date was rescheduled to 1989. Although TPE had a track record of on-schedule, on-cost delivery of steel projects, the project, initially scoped at $650 million, absorbed over $5 billion before being abandoned in 1994. In 2000, the project was restarted based on a public–private partnership (PPP) scheme, but stopped again because of corruption charges related to the award of the commission. In 2016 the sole administrator of the Ajaokuta Steel Company Ltd requested N43B ($113M) from the Senate Committee on Privatization for a light mill section of the plant and N5B for the completion of a thermal generation plant. This request was made after 38 years had passed and $5 billion had been spent without any steel production being accomplished (Fig. 4.12).

Fig. 4.12

Ajaokuta Steel Plant

Rationale Behind Inclusion

The project (costing above $5B) is one of the two most expensive projects in Nigeria (with the Mambilla Hydroelectric Power project in Taraba State). The two projects made the list of our investigation given their value of $10 billion, which represents 50% of Nigeria’s total external debt.

4.13 Kanji Dam

Sector: Dam	Project value: >$100M	Status: Completed
Owner: Federal Ministry of Water Resources	Location: Niger State	Contractor: Balfour Beatty; Nedeco (Italy)

One of numerous water projects in Nigeria, this significant water project started in 1964 and was completed in 1968 at a cost of about $200M.

It is one of the longest dams in the world, extending over approximately 10 km. As only 8 of 12 planned turbines have been installed, capacity is only 760 MW instead of the planned 960 MW. The Kanji Dam generates electricity for all large cities in Nigeria, and some is sold to Niger. Electricity output has diminished on some occasions because of the unpredictable water flow of the River Niger during drought (Fig. 4.13).

Fig. 4.13

Kanji Dam

Rationale Behind Inclusion

This is one historic project that was completed on time and with benefit to the Nigerian community.

4.14 Otukpo Dam

Sector: Dam	Project value: $100M	Status: Stalled/abandoned
Owner: Federal Ministry of Water Resources	Location: Benue State	Contractor: SCC Nigeria

The Otukpo Dam is a multi-purpose dam, initially designed for a combination of hydroelectric power generation, potable water supply, irrigation and primary dam construction. Specifically, the dam was expected to provide a 130-million cubic metre reservoir and a 3.3 KV hydropower plant for efficient water supply upon completion.

The multi-purpose dam construction was awarded to SCC Nigeria Limited in 2010 and was expected to be completed by 2014. However, after receiving 100% payment of the contract sum, the work is barely 35% complete and has long been abandoned, according to the Fiscal Responsibility Commission (Fig. 4.14).

Fig. 4.14

Otukpo Dam Equipment Yard

Rationale Behind Inclusion

The dam was included as a matched opposite to the Kanji Dam, a project of similar size that was completed.

4.15 Nigeria Satellite 2

Sector: ITC	Project value: $250M	Status: Completed
Owner: Federal Ministry of Science and Technology	Location: Abuja	Contractor: Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd (SSTL) (UK)

The President Jonathan Administration decided to build the Nigeria Satellite 2 (NigeriaSat-2) through the Nigerian National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA ). Its mission was to enhance food security through monthly crop monitoring, to assist with burgeoning urban planning demands and, through the development of engineering skills, to advance the country’s technological capability. In August 2011 NigeriaSat-2 was successfully launched on a Dnepr-1 launch vehicle using the space head module (SHM) configuration from the Yasny/Dombarovsky site in Russia (Fig. 4.15/4.16).

Fig. 4.15/4.16

Nigeria Satellite Offices

Rationale Behind Inclusion

In 2008 Nigeria lost the Nigeria Satellite 1 as a result of what some have alleged to be shoddy work by the project engineers. It is interesting to compare a successfully launched satellite with a failed one.

4.16 Nigeria Satellite 1

Sector: ITC	Project value: $250M	Status: Crashed/abandoned
Owner: Federal Ministry of Science and Technology	Location: Abuja	Contractor: Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd (SSTL) (UK)

Nigeria Satellite 1 was the first of five satellites launched by the National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA). Nigeria Satellite 1 was the first Nigerian satellite, launched by the Kosmos-3M rocket from the Russian Plesetsk spaceport on 27 September 2003. It was part of the worldwide Disaster Monitoring Constellation System, having the mission of helping to detect and control desertification in the northern part of Nigeria, as well as identifying (with remote sensors) environmental conditions that breed malaria and meningitis. It was also meant to provide the technology needed to bring education to all parts of the country through distant learning and to aid in conflict resolution and border disputes by mapping out state and international borders. In 2008 Nigeria lost the satellite as a result of what some alleged to be shoddy work by the project engineers.

Rationale Behind Inclusion

It is interesting to compare a successfully launched satellite with a failed one (see project 4.15).

4.17 Airtel Nigeria

Sector: ITC	Project value: $1B+	Status: Completed
Owner: Airtel Nigeria (Airtel Networks Limited)	Location: Nationwide	Contractor: Plot L2, Banana Island, Foreshore Estate

Airtel Nigeria provides mobile services to Nigerians. In 2001 the company became the first telecoms operator to launch commercial GSM services in Nigeria and has scored a series of many “firsts” in the highly competitive Nigerian telecommunications market (Fig. 4.17).

Fig. 4.17

Airtel Nigeria

Rationale Behind Inclusion

In an environment with multiple IT projects, Airtel provided the opportunity for further investigation into the comparison of project success in the private/government sectors. Airtel also provided Nigeria’s network capacity and coverage on 3.75G platforms, offering high-speed mobile Internet across the 36 states of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory in Abuja. According to Q4 2018 industry statistics by the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC), the company ranked second in market share for GSM (25.64%) and Internet data (26.6%).

4.18 Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL)

Sector: ITC	Project value: $1B+	Status: Stalled/abandoned
Owner: BPE	Location: Nationwide	Contractor: BPE in Abuja

Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL), the result of a merger between the telecoms arm of the postal service and the telecoms arm of the Ministry of Communications, was a monopoly telephone service provider in Nigeria until 1992. Like other state-owned corporations, NITEL did not serve the market well, for example, provide only 450,000 subscriber lines to a population of over 120 million people.

After several failed attempts at privatization, in 2015 the government eventually finalized a transaction that saw NITEL’s and its mobile phone arm MTEL’s assets transferred to NATCOM (Wikipedia, 2021b). With the great advantage of reliable infrastructure across the country—something that other operators would have jumped at—NITEL/MTEL remained a sleeping giant until its eventual sale (Fig. 4.18).

Fig. 4.18

NITEL Nigeria

Rationale Behind Inclusion

Despite its privatization, NITEL did not succeed with the eventual sale of NITEL to NATCOM. NITEL had lost its market share in the Nigerian telecoms market, with new entrants taking a large portion of the market. Why should a project like NITEL have failed in the hands of the government despite its monopoly and then failed again in the palm of the private sector despite its efficiency and skill?

4.19 Godswill Akpabio International Stadium

Sector: Sport	Project value: $100M+	Status: Completed
Owner: Government of Akwa Ibom State, Uyo	Location: Uyo, Akwa Ibom State	Contractor: Julius Berger Nigeria

The Godswill Akpabio International Stadium in Uyo offers 30,000 seats. It serves as home to the Nigerian Super Eagles, as well as being a centre for social, cultural and religious events. The contract for construction was awarded in 2012 and the project was completed in 2014. The modern multi-purpose sports complex was modelled after the Allianz Arena in Munich. The stadium is currently ranked as the best stadium in the country and is frequently used for local and international matches (Fig. 4.19).

Fig. 4.19

Akpabio Stadium

Rationale Behind Inclusion

The project demonstrates that large project management principles can be applied to sports venues with success. The comparison with project 4.20 (the Ogbemudia stadium) tests whether the same differences between completed and abandoned projects can be observed in the sports venue sector as in the other infrastructure sectors.

4.20 (Samuel) Ogbemudia Stadium

Sector: Sport	Project value: $100M+	Status: Stalled/abandoned
Owner: Government of Edo State	Location: Benin City, Edo State	Contractor: Peculiar Ultimate Consult

Originally known as the Ogbemudia Stadium, this 20,000-seater stadium was mostly used for football matches and was the home stadium of Bendel Insurance FC. In 2009 the stadium was banned by the National League due to an unsafe playing surface. Though the state government has attempted to renovate the stadium by signing a contract for the renovations with Peculiar Ultimate Consult, who promised to deliver by 2019, the stadium is still below standard and unfit for matches (Fig. 4.20).

Fig. 4.20

Ogbemudia Stadium

Rationale Behind Inclusion

See project 4.19.

4.21 Abuja International Airport

Sector: Aviation	Project value: $250M+	Status: Completed
Owner: Federal Ministry of Works Abuja	Location: Abuja	Contractor: CCEC (China)

The Abuja International Airport was built 20 km West of Abuja between 2000 and 2002 and named after Nigeria’s first president, Nnamdi Azikiwe.

In 2006, a management contract was signed with a company for 25 years, which included additional facilities (Wikipedia, 2021c). But this contract was revoked by the next government in 2008. A second runway was approved in 2009, but an awarded contract was revoked because of excessive cost (Omoh, 2015). A total of $50M were approved for the second runway in 2020 (Fig. 4.21).

Fig. 4.21

Abuja International Airport

Rationale Behind Inclusion

The contrast between the two airports (4.21 and 4.22) seeks to verify whether the same principles between completed and abandoned projects apply as in the other sectors.

4.22 Lagos MMA2 Airport

Sector: Aviation	Project value: $250M+	Status: Stalled/abandoned
Owner: Bi-Courtney Aviation	Location: Ikeja, Lagos State	Contractor: Bi-Courtney Aviation

After the domestic terminal of the Lagos Airport burnt down, a new domestic terminal was commissioned by the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) in a public–private partnership (PPP) with Bi-Courtney Aviation Services (BASL) in 2003. BASL started managing the terminal in 2007. However, the government then questioned the duration of the agreement and refused partial payments, causing losses for the operator (Blueprint, 2014) (Fig. 4.22).

Fig. 4.22

Lagos MMA2 Airport

Rationale Behind Inclusion

See 4.21.

4.23 Yenagoa International Cargo Airport

Sector: Aviation	Project value: $200M	Status: Completed
Owner: Government of Bayelsa State	Location: Yenagoa, Bayelsa State	Contractor: Ministry of Works Bayelsa State

The Yenagoa International Cargo Airport project in Bayelsa State was initiated in 2012, inaugurated in September 2018 and opened in 2020. The airport covers 2250 hectares of land with a 3.5 km runway and terminals, accommodates B747 aircraft and is fitted with Category II landing facilities for bad weather. The airport is creating jobs and attracting investors to the state (SageTravels, 2019) (Fig. 4.23).

Fig. 4.23

Yenagoa Airport

Rationale Behind Inclusion

This project provides evidence that a state government can successfully construct an international cargo airport.

4.24 Jigawa Airport Project

Sector: Aviation	Project value: $200M	Status: Stalled/abandoned
Owner: Government of Niger State	Location: Dutse, Jigawa State	Contractor: Ministry of Works Jigawa State

Jigawa Airport was meant to become the perishable cargo hub in the region. One of the foreseen benefits of this project was significant enhancement of the income of farmers in the area, who would have access to international markets for their produce. It was also hoped to boost tourism in Jigawa State, as it was supposed to have the capacity to accommodate B747 aircraft with its 3.6 km runway.

The project started in February 2014. The Federal Civil Aviation Authority (FCAA) carried out an inspection of the warehousing, which found that the airport was poorly constructed, there were no passengers, the project was poorly conceived and airlines were not flying there since it was not commercially viable. The airport is largely inactive, which is attributed by an unnamed civil servant to “misplaced priorities” (Ajakaiye , 2020) (Fig. 4.24).

Fig. 4.24

Dutse Jigawa Airport

Rationale Behind Inclusion

This project, unlike its successful paired project, failed in the hands of another state government.

4.25 Tin Can Island Port

Sector: Transportation	Project value: $400M	Status: Completed
Owner: Federal Government of Nigeria	Location: Apapa, Lagos State	Contractor: Port and Terminal Multiservices Limited (PTML)

Tin Can Island Port is a part of Apapa, the port for the city of Lagos (across from Lagos Harbour). The Tin Can port terminal commenced construction in 1981 and was opened in 1997. In 1991 the Nigerian Port Authority became responsible for operating the port. In 2006, Tin Can Island merged with Roro Terminal when private terminal operators, Port and Terminal Multiservices Ltd (PTML), took over.

Tin Can Island Port is the second busiest port in Nigeria after Apapa Port. The storage capacity of the silos is 28,000 metric tonnes of grain. The terminal handles wheat, maize and malt, and it can take delivery of approximately 4000 metric tonnes of grain daily. The facilities can handle ships of around 30,000 tonnes. There is also a grain bagging facility on-site (Fig. 4.25).

Fig. 4.25

Tin Can Island Port

Rationale Behind Inclusion

The same differences are observed between completed and abandoned projects in the seaport sector as in the other sectors.

4.26 Calabar Seaport

Sector: Transportation	Project value: $250M	Status: Stalled/abandoned
Owner: Federal Government of Nigeria	Location: Calabar, Cross Rivers State	Contractor: Julius Berger Nigeria

Calabar Port was notable for being central to trade with white businessmen. The Old Port, as it is often called, was administered by different companies for many years until the Federal Government of Nigeria took over its operations in 1969.

In spite of its historical importance, the port has remained neglected. Calabar Port is faced with unique challenges.

The bad road access into the port is one disincentive for shippers and business people when considering calling at the port. However, the dominant barrier to growth of the harbour (just like other ports in the region) is the inability of the government to dredge the channel (Salau , 2019). The former Minister for Transport, Malam Idris Umar, once stated: “Dredging of the channel could transform the economy of the Niger Delta region. The synergy between the Calabar Port, the Calabar Free Trade Zone, and Tinapa is valid. With the channel dredged, the increase in the volume of economic activities could be substantial and, of course, would transform and grow the maritime economy” (Fig. 4.26).

Fig. 4.26

Calabar Sea Port Authority

4.27 Victoria Garden City (VGC) Housing Estate

Sector: Housing	Project value: $1B	Status: Completed
Owner: HFP Engineering Ltd Lagos	Location: Ajah, Lagos State	Contractor: HFP Engineering Ltd

Victoria Garden City (VGC) Housing Estate was developed in the 1990s as one of the first gated communities within the Lekki area. It is a high-end residential neighbourhood located along the Lekki-Epe Express Way. Its land area is 213 hectares and it sits beside the Lagos Lagoon. The estate has reserved commercial regions separate from the residential field, and the residential area is made up of serene boulevards. The estate has a secure gated entrance and exit.

Most of the buildings in VGC are duplexes, and the uniform houses within the estate are prototypes built by the developer. Security in the area is generally tight. Within the estate are parks and playgrounds (enough space for children to express themselves). It is the right place for those who want to live in comfort, serenity and safety.

VGC was developed by HFP Engineering and then managed by VGC Estate Management Co (in which HFP has a substantial interest). HFP changed management under a management buyout and went intobankruptcy in 2019. When the data for this study was collected, the mother company was in receivership, looking for new investors (Fig. 4.27).

Fig. 4.27

Victoria Garden City

Rationale Behind Inclusion

The same differences are observed between completed and abandoned projects in the housing sector as in the other sectors (projects 4.27 and 4.28).

4.28 Festac Town Federal Housing Estate

Sector: Housing	Project value: $920M	Status: Stalled/abandoned
Owner: Federal Government of Nigeria	Location: Festac, Lagos, Lagos State	Contractor: Federal Ministry of Housing

Festac Town Housing Estate (otherwise known as the Black Arts Festival Town) is situated along Badagry Express Way, Lagos, South West Nigeria. The entire town will occupy, in its ultimate phase, an area of 1770 hectares and include seven residential communities of 15–20,000 people. Thus, the development will ultimately be able to accommodate a total number of 24,000 apartments, or around 120,000 people.

The present development (Phase 1) commenced in 1974 and was completed by the end of 1976. The construction of houses and various services was awarded to around 40 contractors in approximately 70 different sites of the project, while the infrastructure work was assigned to 14 major contractors.

However, the subsequent phases were never started. And, as a result of the neglect of Phase 1, most of the physical infrastructure of the once beautifully planned Festac Town is in a bad condition, the crime rate is increasing and social amenities are deteriorating. This is a marked departure from the original purpose and design of the village during its establishment in 1977 (Fig. 4.28).

Fig. 4.28

Festac Town Estate

Rationale Behind Inclusion

The project is a contract to Victoria Garden City. Stakeholder interests were not as effectively considered, which ultimately went along with a deterioration of the project.

4.29 1004 Housing Estate

Sector: Housing	Project value: $200M+	Status: Completed
Owner: Federal Government of Nigeria	Location: Victoria Island, Lagos State	Contractor: Federal Ministry of Housing, Abuja

In preparation for handing over to the democratically elected civilian administration of President Shagari in 1979, the Military Government of General Obasanjo needed to address accommodation for federal legislators and their families, who were compelled by their election victory to relocate to Lagos (then the federal capital of Nigeria). Isaac Fola-Alade was contracted to design appropriate accommodation on the 11 hectares of land available (Fig. 4.29).

Fig. 4.29

1004 Housing Estate

Rationale Behind Inclusion

The project constructed six high-rise buildings, four clusters of residential multi-storey condominiums for families of senators and members of the House of Representatives, and four low-rise buildings with over a thousand apartments. The estate opened in 1979, demonstrating that the government was already able to deliver successful housing projects to the public at that time. In contrast, it failed in Fig. 4.30, the Abuja Mass Federal Housing Project.

Fig. 4.30

Abuja Mass Federal Housing

4.30 Abuja Mass Federal Housing Project

Sector: Housing	Project value: $200M+	Status: Stalled/abandoned
Owner: FCT Abuja	Location: Abuja districts Apo, Kubwa and Mpape	Contractors: Zvecan Consulting and Engg Ltd (Nigeria); Wengfu Ltd (China)

The Federal Government of Nigeria entered in the year 2000 into a partnership with Zvecan and Wengfu to build the Abuja Mass Federal Housing Project under the Federal Integrated Staff Housing (FISH) programme. The project was financed by the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria, or FMBN. Construction has since commenced on the site but is currently abandoned. A memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed by the contractors with the Office of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation (OHCSF) for the off-take of the apartments upon completion. The scheme seems to have failed its purpose of generally accessible housing (Abdullah & Aziz, 2013; Umoh, 2012) (Fig. 4.30).

Rationale Behind Inclusion

See Fig. 4.29.

4.31 Olusegun Obasanjo Presidential Library

Sector: Education	Project value: $500M+	Status: Completed
Owner: President Olusegun Obasanjo	Location: Abeokuta, Ogun State	Contractor: Gitto Construzioni

The Olusegun Obasanjo Presidential Library was conceived in 1988 to immortalize the president, and it was built after he started his second term as president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The library was inspired by the US presidential library system and is the first of its kind in Nigeria.

The Library is owned by the former president of Nigeria and operates as a historic tourist centre with the ambition to also serve as a national archive for the preservation of documents and materials used by the president during his tenure and thus as an academic centre (Fig. 4.31).

Fig. 4.31

Olusegun Obasanjo Presidential Library

Rationale Behind Inclusion

The comparison of the two library projects demonstrates clearly the importance of having a clear design and purpose from the beginning, which does not change over the course of the project.

4.32 Abuja National Library

Sector: Education	Project value: $500M+	Status: Stalled/abandoned
Owner: National Library of Nigeria	Location: Garki, Abuja	Contractor: Reynolds Construction Co. (RCC) (Nigeria)

The contract for the library was awarded in 2006 to Reynolds Construction, a subsidiary of SBI International Holdings of Switzerland, with a plan to be completed within 22 months.

After 22 months, the project was scaled down from eight to five floors (but its budget was scaled up with the approval of the Federal Executive Council), and the completion date moved back to July 2010. Just as the roofing engineers were about to move in October 2012, a directive from the presidency instructed RCC to revert to the original design of eight floors. In February 2013 RCC requested an extension and again sought an upward review of the budget. No major work has been done since then (Chris, 2021). Meanwhile, the National Library Department is continuing to serve the nation from a rented building with a leaky roof, cracked walls, and broken-down toilets and water pipes (Fig. 4.32).

Fig. 4.32

Abuja National Library

Rationale Behind Inclusion

See 4.31.

4.33 Nigerian Youth Empowerment Scheme (N-Power)

Sector: Social project	Project value: $500M	Status: Completed
Owner: Federal Government of Nigeria	Location: Nationwide	Contractor: Federal Government of Nigeria

The Nigerian Youth Empowerment Scheme (N-Power) was set up in 2016 as an exploratory project of the Federal Government of Nigeria to support youth unemployment reduction and education by teaching and developing relevant work skills, which should also stimulate the economy overall. Modular programmes allow participants to customize content. Fifty thousand trained volunteers are being developed to cover gaps in public education services (Vanguard, 2017) (Fig. 4.33).

Fig. 4.33

N-Power Offices

Rationale Behind Inclusion

Despite over a billion dollars being spent, unemployment increased from 10% to over 23%. Currently, N-Power is also a platform for diversifying the economy. N-Power’s objective is to prepare young Nigerians for a knowledge economy. The mission is to create a pool of software developers, hardware service professionals, animators, graphic artists, building services professionals, artisans and more.

4.34 Nigeria Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P)

Sector: Social project	Project value: $500M	Status: Stalled/abandoned
Owner: Federal Government of Nigeria	Location: Nationwide	Contractor: Federal Government of Nigeria

SURE-P is a scheme that was established during the Jonathan Administration in 2012, applying a part of the Federal Government’s savings from the fuel subsidy removal in 2012 into job training and employment for unemployed graduates.

The core of the programme was the provision of employment for unemployed graduates through internship programmes, creating a database of unemployed youth and reducing social vulnerability (Vanguard, 2014). SURE-P has been described as a project without a clear objective that did not disperse funds or did so in biased ways, and the leadership of the programme has also been criticized (CSJ, 2014) (Fig. 4.34).

Fig. 4.34

SURE-P Offices

Rationale Behind Inclusion

The programme was limited in its impact by implementation issues (across states) that provide a contrast to the N-Power scheme.

4.35 Lagos State Waste Management Authority (LAWMA)

Sector: Environment/waste	Project value: $200M	Status: Completed
Owner: Government of Lagos State	Location: Lagos State	Contractor: Lagos State Ministry of Works

LAWMA was established in 1991 (replacing its predecessor organization established in 1977) and is the first waste management agency in West Africa. Its mission is to provide a professional, efficient and sustainable waste management and disposal service to Lagosian corporate bodies and governments (local and state) in Lagos State.

Before its establishment, waste management in a large commercial city like Lagos was a severe challenge for residents and the government. Lagos was ranked as one of the dirtiest cities in the country. Using a collaborative approach with all stakeholders, and introducing value-added services such as waste collection, recycling, receptacles, billing and service, Lagos State has become one of the cleanest cities in Nigeria (Obienyi , 2021) (Fig. 4.35).

Fig. 4.35

LAWMA trucks

Rationale Behind Inclusion

The LAWMA agency has been installed successfully and has had impact, with ambition for more. This contrasts with project 4.36.

4.36 Cleaner Lagos Initiative (Visionscape)

Sector: Environment/waste	Project value: $200M	Status: Stalled/abandoned
Owner: Government of Lagos State	Location: Lagos State	Contractor: Lagos State Ministry of Works

Visionscape is a public–private partnership with the Lagos State Government to provide waste management services for the Cleaner Lagos Initiative (CLI).

Visionscape has invested several millions of dollars in the purchase of cutting-edge technology and tools in a “24-hour waste management facility”. However, the initiative suspended its operations after “a series of grave threats to the lives of its employees and destruction of its operational vehicles and equipment” in 2018 (Nairaland , 2018). No photo is available because the operation has become defunct (Fig. 4.36).

Fig. 4.36

Visionscape Offices after dismantling and being taken over by a company

Rationale Behind Inclusion

The Visionscape project also had an excellent rationale but became a victim of hostile actions against it, in contrast to LAWMA in 4.35.

4.37 University College Teaching Hospital (UCH) Ibadan

Sector: Health/hospital	Project value: $500M	Status: Completed
Owner: Federal Ministry of Health	Location: Ibadan, Oyo State	Contractor: Alexander Gray (UK)

UCH Ibadan was authorized in 1952, started construction in 1954 and was inaugurated in 1956, in order to fill the need for the training of medical personnel and other health-care professionals for the country and the West African sub-region in the Medical Department of University College Ibadan, the first university in Nigeria.

UCH started with 500 beds and 2 clinical departments, Medicine and Surgery. It has evolved to having more than 65 departments, among which is the first Department of Nuclear Medicine in Nigeria. In addition, more than 200 examination couches have been added, with occupancy rates ranging from 65% to 70%. UCH performed the first open-heart surgery in Nigeria, and its wide range of facilities, workforce and track documents have led to patronage by both national and international clientele (Oguntola , 2017) (Fig. 4.37).

Fig. 4.37

UCH Ibadan

Rationale Behind Inclusion

The two hospitals 4.37 and 4.38 provide again a contrast between a project outcome that works (with admitted limitations) and one with a performance that invites severe criticism.

4.38 University of Abuja Teaching Hospital (UATH)

Sector: Health/hospital	Project value: $500M	Status: Underperforming
Owner: Federal Ministry of Health	Location: Abuja	Contractor: Mssrs Cochair Technology

Formerly known as Gwagwalada Specialist Hospital (founded in 1992), the hospital changed its name and became a subsidiary of the University of Abuja in 2013. However, it never reached its planned capacity of 500 beds or anything close even to the officially claimed 450 beds. Moreover, UATH has deteriorated over the years, with symptoms ranging from unavailability of basic medical equipment to patient complaints over treatment quality and service. This has prompted angry press reports that accuse the hospital of being “the gold standard of disguised incapacity” (Ugwu , 2017) (Fig. 4.38).

Fig. 4.38

UATH Abuja

Rationale Behind Inclusion

See 4.37.