Abstract
The case studies give the narratives of where the projects came from, how decisions were made, including, for example, how lack of financial safeguarding and corruption led to problems. The narratives “bring the statistical analysis to life” and give the reader an impression (relatively succinctly in about five pages per case) of what the project problems “feel” like. This chapter discusses the first matched project pair, the Abuja National Library and the Obasanjo Presidential Library.
The national library project suffered from design changes, budget cuts (because of unstable funding) and conflicts with the contractor, and it is an unfinished ruin today. The Obasanjo Presidential Library was privately funded, had a clear goal and ambition, and was completed close to schedule in spite of setbacks (although it was far over budget and has an uncertain financial future). The two case studies contrast project environments that can cause different project paths.
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We now analyse two major library construction projects: first, the National Library project, which was commenced in 2006 under President Obasanjo (whose term expired in 2007), using government funding; despite millions of dollars being spent, only a shell of a building was standing in 2020. Second, we look at the private Olusegun Obasanjo Presidential Library, which was begun in 2002 and completed in 2006–2007; it was funded through private donations.
6.1 The National Library of Nigeria in Abuja: An Abandoned Project
6.1.1 Project Initiation
A concept long discussed (UNESCO, 1954) and advised by the Ford Foundation in 1960 the idea of a national library was finally legislatively enacted in 1970 (National Library Act, 1970; Agidee, 1970; Ekpe, 1979). Over the years, through this Act, 37 libraries have been established around Nigeria as part of the National Library project. A library system was seen as significant to the national development goals of education and information-sharing, new skill acquisition, innovation and strategic thinking (Aguolu, 1989; Meraz, 2002).
However, the crowning achievement was seen as being the construction and implementation of a national library building. Prior to this building, the national library was housed in an office located in a rented apartment in Abuja, in a building in a poor state of repair, unfit for the importance of this institution. A shabby apartment was hardly the place for Nigeria to showcase its leadership in African education; nor was it capable of supporting an evolution of sophistication and services. The national library was to be “the reservoir of the intellectual memory of the Nigerian Nation”. It would represent a metric of successful state development plans and the stage of development. In the words of a minister of education of Nigeria, as “a giant of Africa” Nigeria wanted to build a national library of the very highest standard in Africa, showcasing Nigeria’s leadership in education. The building would house the “national reference library”, the centre where, according to the National Library Act, mandatory registration of all publications and issuance of the ISBN and ISSN numbers for the publication of books and journals took place (Akintude & Selbar, 1995; Gill et al., 2001).
In 2006 it was finally determined that the time had come, and a legislative group convinced President Obasanjo to sign the bill authorizing construction. In response to the wishes of the stakeholders (the educational establishment), a 13-storey building design was adopted because, according to the minister of education in 2019, its size represented a performance indicator used to measure a nation: other comparable countries had libraries on a similar scale, including Ethiopia, Kenya and South Africa, and Nigeria should be no different. After the president signed the act, this large project could proceed.
6.1.2 Contract Signature and Execution
A contract for a 13-storey national library was awarded to Messrs Reynolds Construction Company (RCC), for the sum of N8B (US$61M), with a completion schedule of 22 months. The choice of contractor followed a process, which was (in addition to the qualifications of the contractor) rated positively in our questionnaire by the respondent representing the high-level civil service that had “project ownership”. However, the questionnaire respondent who represented the part of the civil service responsible for project oversight rated both the contractor award process and the contractor’s qualifications poorly—this discrepancy does not prove that the award process was a failure, but it clearly reflects that the project supervisors had great difficulty managing the contractor’s behaviour and the project progress.
By the time President Obasanjo stepped down from office, little progress had been made, with only the construction of foundations complete. In interviews, we were given hints that corruption was partially to blame, forcing RCC to pay money at every stage in order to make progress. This meant that the contractor had insufficient funds to achieve completion within the contract without making a loss. However, this is not formally stated anywhere—it is, in effect, “hearsay”—because it has been impossible throughout the process to get anyone to make official statements about corruption.
In 2007 President Obasanjo left office. The president immediately succeeding him was known not to be in favour of this project. Moreover, this was a period characterized by austerity measures, “when we had to cut our coat according to our size”. Therefore, it was decided to reduce the number of floors from 13 to 5, so that “we could finish it quickly because we were not sure of the sustainable funding”. This decision was taken not by the Federal Executive Council but by the Ministry, and it echoed the fact that projects did not have dedicated funding (for their life cycle), so managers had to repeatedly approach the Budget Office and the National Assembly to approve a budget for the year. Funding could dry up on the basis of budget cuts and shortfalls driven by other (non-project-related) issues. (As an aside, the decision also seemed to generate points with the (new) president.)
Although the project was scaled down from 13 to 5 floors, ironically its budget was scaled up after protracted negotiations with the contractor, who claimed that they had run out of funds and could not achieve completion. By the time a new contract had been settled, another two years had passed, and the contract sum had increased by 120% to $137M; the completion period also changed to 21 months, beginning in July 2010.
After two years, construction work progressed to the fifth floor, with only the roofing left to be completed. However, just as the roofing engineers were about to move into the project site, another directive came from the (again new, as President Yar’Adua had died and President Jonathan had come in) presidency via a letter dated 11 October 2012, which was sent to the consultant to instruct RCC to revert to an amended design of eight floors. In February 2013 RCC requested another extension and again sought an upward review of the contract.
No major work has been done since then. The National Library Department continues to occupy a rented building with a leaky roof, cracked walls, and old toilets and water pipes. The building is an unfinished shell, as shown in Fig. 6.1. Since 2013 the contractor has allegedly been charging a daily fee for pieces of equipment left on the site for over seven years.
A letter by the Education Ministry, dated 9 July 2019, entitled “National Library of Nigeria Headquarters Project, Abuja: Submission of Revised Estimated Total Cost (RETC)”, indicated a disparity of $20M (between the government estimate for completion of the National Library Project and the contractor’s demand for project completion). The letter also detailed an argument between the contractor and the Nigerian government, which had offered the contractor the net sum of $120M to return to the site to complete the project. However, the contractor insisted on being paid $180M.
6.1.3 Conclusion
It was evident from our interviews that there was a desire to correct and revive the abandoned project, but doing so was made difficult by the lack of funding, the risk of litigation and a lack of planning. Developments in modern technology also reduce the need for a library of this nature—and thus the need for another $190M in the face of other urgent demands. Some stakeholders interviewed argued that rather than spending another $180M on the National Library, the fund should improve the Nigerian university libraries.
6.2 Olusegun Obasanjo Presidential Library: A Completed Project
6.2.1 Project Initiation
The concept of a presidential library was conceived by President Obasanjo in 1988, and the bulk of construction took place during his second term in office, between 2002 and 2007 (although it was not officially dedicated and opened until 2017, see BBC, 2017).
President Franklin D. Roosevelt oversaw the creation of the first presidential library in the USA in 1939—something that has now become standard practice in the USA. The idea behind these buildings is to keep presidential documents for the historical record and for the development of the national archive (Ginsberg, 2010). The Obasanjo library is the first of its kind in Nigeria, and, in the same spirit, it is not just a library. It is an extensive museum of Nigerian history (with an emphasis on Obasanjo’s role in that history), housing over 16 million documents and 3.5 million books, several historical pictures and over 4000 artefacts explaining the trajectory of Olusegun Obasanjo and his two-term stints in power, both as military and civilian president of Nigeria. The library sits on 32 hectares of land in the Abeokuta Ogun State of Nigeria, and it includes a 1000-seat auditorium and 153 rooms with recreational facilities, as well as an amusement park (Akinwande, 2019).
Private donors funded the presidential library project, and by way of acknowledgement, their names are engraved at the entrance of the library. However, critics have alleged that these donations were made when President Obasanjo was serving as the president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, when he had the power to “arm-twist” donors.
6.2.2 Project Execution and Outcome
The execution of the project took place closely overseen and supported by the project owner, the president himself, which conferred the ability to overcome obstacles. Not even the sudden death of the head of the leading project contractor, MD (a family firm), could stop the project. President Obasanjo convinced the contractor’s management team to keep all the workers in place, purchased the necessary materials and made a cash payment of 10% of the project cost to pay the staff salary, which enabled the project to continue.
In addition, the project suffered from cost overruns driven by increasing costs of procurement arising from inflation and the cost of foreign exchange (many material parts of the projects were imported). The final numbers reflected the fact that the project was certainly not problem-free—the budget overran by 100%, and the final project dedication happened eight years later than originally planned. However, it was completed and is now in operation (Fig. 6.2).
The library’s official brochure states its value to the community: “At a more local level the library will teach children and young adults the essential concepts of leadership and citizenship through the example of a former president. By upholding the critical worth of good governance, the exhibitions should inspire future leaders of Nigeria.” Furthermore, some stakeholders have commended the presidential library project as a good initiative that will assist knowledge and intellectual capabilities developed using the archive of presidential documents. Indeed, a subsequent president, President Jonathan, is also planning a presidential library (on a smaller scale).
However, other stakeholders have criticized President Obasanjo’s library on the basis that it is a colossal waste of money. They have argued that a private presidential library offers no insights into the national development of a developing country. Questions have also been raised about how to finance the library in the future, given that it is not self-sustaining. Stakeholders have argued that the library could be donated by President Obasanjo to the Nigerian government.
6.2.3 The Difference Between the Two Projects: In the Words of Former President Obasanjo
The case studies invite interpretations of the sources of the two libraries’ different fates. We had a chance to listen to President Obasanjo regarding his view of the differences, since he was in charge of both projects (at least at the outset). He suggested that there were three “differences” between the two projects, which resulted in their completion and abandonment, respectively (citations are taken from Jimoh 2021: 104):
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Clarity of purpose. “We knew exactly what we wanted with the Presidential Library, but the public sector did not (and does not) know what to pursue with the National Library.”
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Continuity of purpose and execution. This is illustrated by the determination to continue despite repeated specification changes. “We stuck with it in the Presidential Library. Even when the owner of the contractor company died, we decided we would continue … and so we did.” In contrast, “The National Library had its specifications changed twice, from thirteen floors to five floors to eight floors. The new government (after mine) felt it was too big and wanted a reduction, and the government after that decided this project was of international visibility and needed the National Library to be enlarged to meet international standards.”
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Continuity of funding. “I had collected sufficient funds for the entire project from my donors (many companies gave). The donors trusted that this project would be what they signed up to, [and] that’s why they gave.” (It is unknown but assumed that overruns on this project were funded by large personal reserves or additional “donor” rounds that were requested.) “And that’s what we did. In contrast, the National Library was starved and stalled (for funding) after I left office.” (This suggests that subsequent governments did not always support this project in annual budget reviews, which caused some of the delays.)
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Ibrahim, J., Loch, C., Sengupta, K. (2022). Two Library Projects. In: How Megaprojects Are Damaging Nigeria and How to Fix It. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-96474-0_6
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