Introduction

Abstract

In the twentieth century traditional alternative to capitalism—socialism—suffered a catastrophic defeat. However, although emancipatory movements developed many new practices to tackle domination, injustice and exploitation, they have not found a new societal alternative and therefore struggle to develop a consistent approach to make capitalism history. From a bird’s eye view, many movements try to reform capitalism, revive traditional socialist ideas or remain vague about an alternative. To investigate an alternative to capitalism and real socialism, this chapter begins with a critic of capitalism and state socialism. With Marx and other critical theorists, the authors develop capitalism as an exchange- and market-based society. Capitalism produces a logic of exploitation, destruction and exclusion that even left-wing, ecologically oriented governments can only marginally limit, because the state has only a relative autonomy vis-à-vis the dominant economy. But state socialism is no real alternative either, because—like the market economy—it is based on wage labour and money and thus acts much more like an inefficient, more egalitarian, authoritarian brother, subject to many similar logics and defects.

1 Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow, the Day After Tomorrow

We say goodbye to traditional Marxism. For a long time, its utopia of a free society was linked to a concrete practice of transformation. This age and its accompanying hopes have passed. However, emancipatory movements have not rested. They exist in abundance: interventions critical of racism, queer-feminist free spaces, ecological practices of daily life, antisexist struggles, political demonstrations, antifascist education, campaigns against transphobia and homophobia, reflections on ableism and ageism,¹ cooperatives, commune and housing projects, eco-villages, international solidarity, trade-union struggles and so on. Emancipatory movements detect and reflect on many new forms of domination and discrimination—and search for practices to overcome them. They disengage from statist (plan-) utopias and their hopes based on the “state as an instrument”. However, they have found neither a new utopia nor a new theory of transformation. Although some movements—above all that of 1968, as well as the environmental and women’s movements—have greatly influenced society as a whole, a new consistent idea on how to overcome capitalism has not been developed. Lip service has very often been paid to reform and revolution—the old concepts of transformation. However, their promise of emancipatory change under the conditions of party structure, of taking power and changing the state is no longer convincing. Therefore, emancipatory movements have often retreated to daily practices. Many forms of domination such as sexism and racism, ableism and ageism, transphobia and homophobia have been tackled at the interpersonal level. Changes of societal norms, of politics and culture have also been brought about. The environmental movement has raised awareness on transgenerational problems: we are destroying our conditions of life and those of future generations. Individual alternatives are practised—different eating habits, different consumer behaviour, energy efficiency, no-flight policy—thus achieving political change. Ever so often, applied societal alternatives raise the issue of whether criticism of underlying power relations can be elevated to an overall societal level in order to reach beyond minuscule changes within the framework of capitalism. Again and again, disillusionment prevails, the feeling that the structures of domination and exclusion within capitalist society cannot be overcome. An extended perspective of surmounting capitalism remains vague.

We intend to utilise the insights and concepts of emancipatory movements and re-establish a utopian goal. Thus, we try to create a connection between diverse practices of everyday life and making capitalism history. In the course of recent decades this connection has become shredded, it seems fickle and loose. Our emancipatory practice appears to have outgrown the old forms of party, state and seizure of power, without having found new forms for an overall societal transformation. Many of us are looking for new answers, and this book intends to contribute to this search. New answers to the problems of utopia and transformation contribute to the establishment of new criteria for practice. At the end of this book (Chap. 7, 4) we would like to suggest some ideas; however, we are convinced that each one is best qualified to find one’s own criteria in the context of a theory of transvolution. We are also convinced that emancipatory practice requires reflection on utopia and transformation. It must regain a theoretical framework exceeding capitalism if it is to develop its full potential.

1.1 Hopelessness

The point is to overcome capitalism; however, how should we do it? Today, this issue leads to hopelessness, and this hopelessness is due to three aspects: first, apart from the all-pervading power of capitalism, the main historical adversary of capitalism—communism—experienced a catastrophic defeat in the twentieth century. Any serious perspective of transition must learn from this defeat. Second, there is no well-founded and systematic theory of a societal alternative. Followers of Computer Socialism (Cockshott and Cottrell 2012), of Parecon² (Albert 2003), of the twenty-first-century Socialism (Dieterich 2006) and other concepts simply revive socialist ideas. Others see the freed society only as “the other”, indeterminable and completely different. Third, the concepts of transvolution are patchy, the question of how to develop the free society rarely finds an answer and most of the answers that are given remain bound to the political concepts of revolution or reform, which aim at the state.

Communism has lost its innocence. A hundred years ago this book would have been one of many filled with hope for a better world, with faith in an emancipatory future of the revolution, with trust in human possibilities. That perspective of trust and hope capsized in the storms of the twentieth century. Revolutionary faith cracked when the Russian Revolution opened fire on the Kroonstad sailors,³ their antiauthoritarian revolutionaries, in 1921. Faith disappeared when Stalin proclaimed the “Great Terror”⁴ in 1936, when German antifascists fleeing their country were extradited to the Nazi state by the Soviet Union, when Mao justified the consequences of the “Great Leap Forward”,⁵ when the Red Khmer drove the intellectuals to the countryside.⁶ Hope for a better world was deprived of its images, its paths were destroyed; confronted with reality, hope had gone crazy.

Hope became hollow and, as vain hope, it either stuck to the existing socialist alternative until 1989 or—in a reformist wait-and-see fashion—made itself comfortable within a lack of direction and path. The prospect of a bright future lingered on as a spark. However, it lacked the substance needed to ignite. Those who are still concerned with practically overcoming capitalism and establishing a free society must justify themselves to history, they must trace past atrocities to their source and analyse them; only then can they fill the void of hopelessness (cf. Adamczak 2007).

1.2 The Old and the Empty Utopia

It is impossible to consciously achieve a goal that is vague. Thus, the old communist movement also had a concept of utopia. It was essentially dominated by the idea of what to abolish: privatisation of the means of production, capitalist domination, war, alienation and so on. A positive specification of utopia was a hot potato due to the danger of extending the existing into the future. That is why Karl Marx avoided saying anything about it for a long time; until, in a short text, “Critique of the Gotha Programme” (1875), he finally got carried away. In this text, he laid the foundation for the later-stage model Capitalism → Socialism → Communism, and for the first stage (named “first phase of the communist society”) he suggested the distribution of commodities according to work performance. The few sentences of the text followed a sad career and still shape many of today’s utopias. For example, according to Cockshott and Cottrell (2012), computer socialism attributes the main problem of old socialism to the difficulties in quantifying, calculating and coordinating resources and workload, and sees the solution in modern computers. The principle of work, which only allows for the satisfaction of people’s needs according to their work performance, is perpetuated.

Power

Power is the capability to act individually or collectively. It is the ability to be in command of material conditions or other people (cf. p. 131). It can be determined in a positive or negative way. Power is a means to achieve individual or collective aims but also a means to enforce one set of interests against others (cf. p. 65) and a means to establish domination. Very often, power and domination are incorrectly viewed as the same (→question of domination, p. 49).

Those who want to evade the dangers of a positive clarification of their utopia forbid (themselves from) painting positive pictures and determine the free society as something “completely different”. This utopia is as arbitrary and as mystically unattainable as a religious imaginary of paradise. It becomes the open placeholder for all kinds of fantasy wishes. No wonder this religious communism does not take effect in society. The sad thing about the ban on images is that its originator, Theodor W. Adorno, never intended it to become a ban on thinking about utopia (cf. Chap. 4, 1). His texts opposed a detailed “ornamentation” of a future society but, nevertheless, did discuss quite a few utopian aspects. (cf. Adorno 1980).

Utopia cannot aim only at agitating the “masses”. It is, however, a necessary component of all transformation theories. Without a clear comprehension of the goal, neither criticism of the present system nor the path to the one desired can be understood.

1.3 On Revolutions and Reforms

History has taught most modern anticapitalist movements to distance themselves from centralised organisation. Criticism of the party logic is already the main difference compared to old socialist movements. The daily routine of politics still predominantly aims at gaining political →power (p. 4). This could render revolution feasible or lead to state reforms, which would at least make this world “a little bit better” and possibly prepare for the overcoming of capitalism.

The tragedy of reformism is that its practise has lost all connection to the fundamental changes in society (Chap. 2, 3). It has reached the point of chasing its own tail in political struggle. This destiny is unavoidable, as reformism lacks a true concept of surmounting capitalism. The only vision of the future which radically turns against this lack of concept is revolution. However, the current situation is not revolutionary and, therefore, one hopes, waits and organises. The revolutionary ethos is displayed with apparently radical pathos. Revolution itself—like utopia—is a gap that lacks theoretical processing (Chap. 2, 4). Revolutionaries have also drawn and suffered the consequences of socialist defeats. However, the central ideas of failed socialism—the conquest of state power and the subsequent postrevolutionary reorganisation—have remained largely unchallenged. In essence, many revolutionary theories still see societal change as a single qualitative break.

We prefer to draw different conclusions from the defeat of socialism: in order to conceptualise the overcoming of capitalism in an emancipatory way, reformism teaches us that societal change demands processes, and revolution tells us that these processes require a break. The concept of “transvolution” combines transformation and revolution and logically binds together insights of reform, revolution and constitution. It conceptualises the transformation process itself as a break with the capitalist form of society.

1.4 Transvolution and Commonism

This book challenges hopelessness. But neither indulging in past successes nor calling for a serious approach to revolution this time will give us hope. In this book, we intend to theoretically process—and practically surmise—the basis for an emancipatory overcoming of capitalism in all its complexity and contradictory nature. Our theory is not designed to point out how to achieve and secure political power but how to allow a free society to develop; how the new can be formed within the old and finally overcome the old. In other words: what must a freed society look like, how can it emerge and become generalised? That is what transvolution is about (Chap. 3), and it provides the framework for what we suggest, the seed-form theory (Chap. 7).

A transvolution, however, shall remain vague if its aim is not fully understood, because a transvolution demands that path and aim match. That is why we intend to contrast the futile duality of random “ornamentation” and heavenly “complete otherness” with a justified and possible utopia. The justified—or whatever we decide to call it—categorical utopia overcomes the opposition between a pipedream and the ban on images (cf. Chap. 1, 1.2 and Chap. 4, 1) by assessing human potential at the conceptual and rational level. In doing so, it sets itself apart from ethical and moral pipedreams such as: “This is what a freed society should look like”. The point, however, is to explore the objective possibilities of a better world. The categorical possibility utopia provides the frame for what we suggest, commonism (Chap. 6).

Figure 1.1 (p. 7) illustrates the content structure of the book. The introduction’s overview of the book themes is followed by a critique of traditional approaches to transformation which, however, acknowledges all their positive contributions. Next, we suggest a new theoretical framework for transformational thinking, which we furnish with our theoretical basis and the content of our utopia and transvolution.

Fig. 1.1

Content structure of the book

2 The Promise of Theory

2.1 Why Theory?

There are good books which reveal the impressive endeavours that individuals are already undertaking within the framework of our capitalist society by presenting motivating examples.⁷ Our book is different. Ours is a theoretical excursion, in which we try to explore and redefine the foundations of utopian and transformation theory. It will get theoretical, it will speak of many concepts, minute formations of terms, it will present definitions and delimitations bordering on pedantry. Sometimes our statements may seem remote and abstract. Theory often seems to be up in the clouds, detached from reality, while reality takes place here on earth. It appears aloof but, nevertheless, the theoretical clouds in the sky shape our activity on earth.

Theory shapes the frame into which we fit our daily life. It is the glasses that colour the world pink or brown or multi-coloured. Theories are ideas about reality. If our idea of reality is one of a fragile and unstable society, we are likely to detect many practices where individuals try to distance themselves from the capitalist logic and try alternatives. If our theory considers capitalism as a totality that fundamentally permeates and shapes us, even acts of resistance will appear as modifications or innovations within the framework of capitalism rather than transvoluting acts. If we are absolutely positive that women and men are fundamentally different, we will always find daily proof. On the contrary, if we tend to criticise those natural differences as part of a social design, we are likely to detect acts that deviate from this two-gender, man-woman scheme.

We all are perpetually involved in theoretical discussions. We discuss what holds the world together at its core, why people display racist behaviour, what brings out the colours of the rainbow, and whether a woman would make a better boss. In doing so, we reflect on the world—we do not just observe it, we try to understand it. Crystallised patterns of understanding and explaining turn into theories about reality. Now, such theoretical discussions are not limited to direct phenomena—why is the rainbow coloured—but can include other theories: how does Goethe’s theory of colour explain the rainbow? Our discussion turns abstract. We are thinking at a meta-level. We theorise about theories, we explain explanations, we try to comprehend comprehension. We ask: what is Goethe’s understanding of colour? How does Goethe imagine the connection between colour, light and rain? In this instance, we are dealing with the clarification of Goethe’s terms, concepts, ideas; this initially does not seem to be about reality but only about another theory. However, understanding Goethe’s theory of colour might enable us to improve or to criticise our own theory of colour, to expand it with his explanations or reject it as stupid. And, maybe, by theorising about theories we can better understand rainbows.

There is a second reason why theories seem abstract: we try to comprehend things we cannot perceive with our senses. We cannot perceive Ancient Rome, surely, but a Roman aqueduct we can imagine or even look at. We even explain invisible things that we find hard to imagine. Physics tries to understand the big bang and the structure of atoms. These explanations become tangible and imaginable with the help of illustrating figures. But some things are hard to display and difficult to imagine, and a prime example is the object of social sciences: society. Society emerges from the relationships between people. From the myriads of interrelations between people emerges a structure, which gives people’s activity a frame. It is a frame that establishes a certain religious ethic or rewards actions on the basis of profit. Therefore, in dealing with the object “society”, which is hardly perceivable or representable, our thinking will necessarily remain abstract; this is quite odd, considering we move within this context every day.

2.2 Concepts Between Play and Precision

Many parts of this book are about concepts and their content, because concepts are condensed theoretical ideas. For example, we will criticise the concepts of revolution (Chap. 2, 4) In this context, one consideration is important for us: concepts are open. Theoretical discussions are often triggered by words. However, they should not be about words but about their content. Certainly, some people’s understanding of socialism can be identical to our understanding of a free society, as their concept of revolution can be similar to our concept of transvolution (cf. Adamczak 2017; Holloway 2010). For all the seriousness with which approach theoretical dispute, we should not forget what the struggle is about: content and not words. Dealing with words, for us, lies between precise content and playful openness. Different words can mean the same thing; nevertheless, the content behind the words, the terms, should be sufficiently clear.

In this book we set out to clarify the content of some concepts and limit their semantic horizon. So, those who consider economy to mean the material re/production of society will be surprised to learn that, for us, the term →economy (p. 14) refers only to capitalist mediation via the market and exchange. Likewise, in contrast to its usual meaning, we will use the concept of work in a negative sense—with which we identify—in reference to the hardship and exertion linked to this word (cf. Wikipedia: work), to activities not self-determined. We tried to give words a definition that is not too narrow, but we often found that the demarcation of the content and the narrowing involved were necessary for a precise analysis. Therefore, we ask you, dear reader, to not “bother” too much about words and to try and focus on the content involved. Theoretical discussions become more productive, as far as content is concerned, by assuming an open-minded and understanding approach, one that views concepts as a game rather than a battlefield.

2.3 Important Concepts

In what follows, we shall outline some concepts we consider of fundamental importance, and crucial for the understanding of the book.

2.3.1 Form

The form of an object is its particular manner of existence. According to (German) Wikipedia, form is “the way in which something is or changes”. Societies, relationships or actions can exist in various forms. Accordingly, capitalism is a particular form of society whereby cooperation is constituted through the market and competition.

2.3.2 Decisive Element

Within a system there can be several elements (aspects, parts, subsystems) which account for its form and dynamics. In this case, the decisive element is the one that prevails over the rest and determines the form and dynamics of the whole system. In capitalism we find relations of inclusion in many places, but its overall functioning rests on a logic of exclusion (cf. Chap. 1, 3.2).

2.3.3 Inter- and Transpersonality

We distinguish between inter- and transpersonal relations. An interpersonal relationship exists between me and other specific people. It is determined by the characteristics of the other people. Interpersonal relationships exist, for instance, in a school class, in a political group or in a seminar at university. Transpersonal relationships, however, connect me with people in general. The important element in this case is not whether the person is special to me but the fact that we are somehow connected; it is not about who has a connection to me but what the connection is about. For example, we have a transpersonal connection with all people of the state we “belong to” or, via the market, with the workers who manufactured the t-shirt we are wearing. Somewhat more vaguely, Bini Adamczak specifies this difference as close and long-distance relationships (2017).

2.3.4 Production* of Living Conditions

Society is a transpersonal system of cooperation, characterised by a special form of production* of living conditions. As we mean this in the broadest sense, we must specify. We people produce the conditions we are subject to ourselves. The conditions, however, are not only produced but also maintained, preserved, cultivated. Moreover, a substantial part is not determined by manufacturing activity but by preservation and nursing: the field of care. These so-called reproductive activities are not just additions but a substantial part of the living conditions we produce and maintain. That is why we talk about production* with an asterisk or re/production to include the reproductive, preservation field. There is one additional aspect: production* is not restricted to the material production of living conditions (such as our food) but also involves our social relationships and infrastructure—clubs, honorary organisations, churches, circle of friends and so on—which are produced and constantly reproduced. These also include social forms like language, manners of speaking, ideologies, sex practices, table manners and so on. But our identities too—gender, skin colour, culture and so on—are symbolic-social conditions which are re/produced in society. In short: we produce* our living conditions in the broadest sense—in a material, symbolic and social way—and care for them.

2.3.5 Exchange

We regard exchange as cooperative activity under conditions: it takes place only if both sides fulfil the condition of parting with something to get something. If one side has nothing, no matter whether the item is urgently needed, it will not change sides—unless the exchange is cancelled and turns into a one-sided gift. Therefore, exchange is not neutral; it is a form of reciprocal exercise of power. The generalised form of exchange is the market.

2.3.6 Mediation

A society is formed by people connected through interpersonal or transpersonal relationships. The way in which they relate to each other is expressed by the term mediation. Thus, relationships can be established by force and violence or through contract and exchange in a market. The form of a society is determined by the form of its mediation.

2.3.7 Property

Property, in our view, is a social relationship between people whereby one person (or group of people) can exclude others from material, symbolic or social resources. If I am the proprietor (colloquially: owner) of a guitar I can largely do with it what I want, without anybody being allowed to limit my power of disposition. Property can give exclusive control to one person (individual property) as well as a group (common property) or a state (state property).⁸ We conceptualise →property (see p. 130) as a form of disposal, for example, resources or means at our disposal (cf. Chap. 5, 2.2).⁹

2.3.8 Categories

Apart from theories, we use categories as a broader type of theoretical term. Categories are meta or framing theories that allow for the development of individual theories. Categories are developed through an explicit scientific procedure. Therefore, scientific procedures as well as the results—the categories—are subject to discussion and criticism. For instance, “mass” is a category used in physics, and the category “exploitation” can be found in Karl Marx’s theory. We use this approach for our categorical theory of utopia (cf. Chap. 4). This theory is not a utopia itself, in the sense of a detailed presentation of a future society, but a framework for utopias.

2.3.9 Utopia

Utopia for us is not a “no-place”—as its literal translation would want it—and utopian does not mean unattainable. We believe utopia determines human possibilities, and it is a possible society that people collectively design according to their needs (cf. Chap. 4).

3 Categorical Criticism

To overcome capitalism we must understand what capitalism is in the first place. There are too many theories and practices of overcoming capitalism which, ultimately, only modify and thus prolong it. Too many utopias only perpetuate domination. Our critical analysis of current conditions shapes our ideas about utopia and transformation. Criticism can identify phenomena, for example, gender relations, as something cultivated, something that can be changed and, therefore, designed. For us, a theory of capitalism is identical to a criticism of capitalism, “criticism through presentation” as Marx called it (1858, p. 550). Now, there are two ideal-typical¹⁰ forms of criticism: implicit and categorical criticism. An implicit criticism addresses various aspects of capitalism, such as injustice, the destruction of the environment, war, but it does not capture the inherent dynamics that produce them. Therefore, implicit criticism only addresses the symptoms of the capitalist form of society but not its roots. Categorical criticism, in contrast, aims at the roots. Its disclosure reveals the dynamics creating the criticised symptoms which, therefore, must be overcome.

3.1 Basics: Capitalism as a Form of Society

Capitalism is not only a certain type of economy, but also a form of society. Society is a difficult concept—so difficult that even some sociologists dismiss it as an illusion (cf. Schelsky 1959; Urry 2000). We perceive society as a form of human cooperation in which individuals act together in an indirect way without necessarily knowing each other. An individual is linked to other people by a division of tasks but does not maintain a direct, interpersonal relationship with them. This societal connection between people who do not know each other is maintained by certain forms of mediation—such as exchange, plan, feudal relationships. A form of mediation is linked to a certain form of production* of living conditions (in detail cf. Chap. 5, 2.2). The different forms of society are distinguished by the forms of societal relationships, the mediation and their matching form of re/production. But beware: re/production is not only an “economic basis” which determines a societal “superstructure” detached thereof, as traditional Marxism believed. The reproduction of human life is not only an economic undertaking; it also takes place at a social, cultural, political and psychological level. It is only in capitalism that a “disembedded” (Polanyi 1944) economy commands the totality of societal re/production. This statement certainly depends on our concept of →economy (p. 14).

In capitalism, it is the economy—the sphere of production, exchange and value realisation—which, in fact, prevails. Its logic structures and dominates other spheres, such as reproduction, politics, culture and so on. Without these other spheres, however, the economy is not viable. In private reproduction, the strain of working life is cushioned. Politics secure and manage the frame in which exploitation takes place and so on. This splitting of spheres is a significant feature of capitalism (cf. p. 23). At this point, we would like to attempt a presentation of capitalist re/production in its substantial features. We have illustrated the structure of the following explanations in Fig. 1.2 (p. 15). Let us begin with the social relationship of (capitalist) producers.

Fig. 1.2

From separated production to independent self-replication of conditions

Economy

According to German Wikipedia, the economy is “the totality of facilities and activities which serve to cover the systematic satisfaction of needs” and involves “businesses”, “sale” and “exchange” (German Wikipedia “economy”). There are several inconsistencies in this statement. Firstly, a form of re/production that is generally based on exchange and businesses (separate producers) is not a general form of re/production but a special one, viz. the capitalist form of re/production. This form of “economy” can only be found in capitalism. Secondly, the capitalist form of production does not aim at the “systematic satisfaction of needs” but, unfortunately, at the valorisation of capital (cf. p. 18). Indeed, people strive to satisfy their needs, but that is not the aim of capitalism. Regrettably, to a large extent science—and above all economic sciences—does not accept this structural feature of capitalist economy.

We define the economy in a narrower sense: it is the capitalist form of production. We often come across people who enthusiastically speak of a “free economic system” or a “solidary economy” which still, however, includes exchange and the market. Hence our determined demarcation. Nevertheless, there are fellow theorists who grasp the concept of economy somewhat differently (cf. Habermann 2016). This is understandable given that, in the evolution of the concept through time, “economy” has for a long time meant something other than mediation by exchange (cf. Finley 1977).

3.1.1 Separated Production as Social Relationship

In capitalism, production takes place through separation. Each producer plans, produces and sells on her/his own, since the products are her/his property. As property, the products are subject to the exclusive command of the owner. Therefore, a major part of one’s needs can only be satisfied by acquiring the property of someone else.¹¹ This leads to the question of how the mediation of production and consumption can work on the basis of property. No one can offer one’s own products to other people unconditionally, as there is no way of unconditionally acquiring the means to cover one’s own needs. The form of mediation that can establish a coupled form of give and take between separate producers is exchange.

3.1.2 Exchange as a Form of Mediation

Exchange is a form of mediation that can link separate products to one another: the taking is subject to the strict condition of a giving, and nobody gives without taking. The insecurity of the anonymous and separated producer thus turns into a contractually secured performance on the basis of reciprocity. When I give away my property, I obtain the property of others. Therefore, in separated production the individual producers are not linked through political administration (e.g., plan) or direct social relationships (e.g., subsistence) but through the exchange of commodities. Commodities are goods produced for the mere purpose of exchange. This exchange connects people who are neither acquainted nor have to like each other. By its virtually spooky ability of coordination, market-based capitalism generates a societal →net (p. 163) which today spans across the entire globe.

3.1.3 Exchange of Equivalents

Capitalism knows a specific form of exchange, namely the exchange of commodities of the same value, the exchange of equivalents. Value here is not a subjective attribution but a measure for the average cost of production in society—exchange value.¹² When exchange becomes the decisive form of mediation in a society, it is bound to turn into an exchange of equivalents. Individual acts of exchange are not random but reflect the average effort. To reflect the average effort in society, acts of exchange must refer to a general equivalent.

3.1.4 The Necessity of Money

At the societal level, the many individual relationships of exchange must generate a whole. A coherent distribution of societal costs—human labour, in particular—must take place. It is necessary to ensure that there is enough food, energy or steel for car manufacturing. As people do not design this connection consciously, the correct signals must come from this exchange network—the market—itself.

The market is a stigmergic, hint-based system (cf. Chap. 6, 3.3); it signals and operates via prices. Prices express amounts of work and allow for the comparison of commodities. Amounts of work, however, can only be determined by comparing all commodities in a market. A general comparison is only possible when all commodities refer to an object embodying uniform likeness, a particular commodity which serves as a general equivalent: money. Money in capitalism is not only an instrument or a means, as it was in the premodern period, but a necessity. It refers all commodities to each other and thus creates a societal →coherence (p. 126), a functioning societal connection. Hence Marx’s consideration of money as the “real community” (1858, p. 152). Without a generalised equivalent, a society based on generalised exchange cannot function.

3.1.5 Competition

Competition is a social relationship in which one person can only gain advantage at the expense of others. Her/his gain is the loss of others.

Logic of Exclusion

A social logic is considered a “logic of exclusion” when it encourages people to cover their →needs (p. 113) at the expense of others. Here, logic means rationality or meaningfulness. Excluding actions are rational and make sense to me because they secure my livelihood. Exclusion, therefore, is not a sign of viciousness, greed or hunger for power, but a conduct objectively encouraged and subjectively functional. Such behaviour is not necessarily individual. I can join forces with others so as to prevail as one collective against another. This is called representation of interests (cf. p. 65). The logic of exclusion is not based on intention; it is a manifestation of a structural relationship. I do not want to do it, but I do it (often without noticing) because it is an integral part of the conditions governing our actions.

Competition is part of the →logic of exclusion (p. 17). Separated production turns individual producers into competitors. Individual people all produce in a concrete and particular way—as traditional artisan or modern factory owner, for example—but, when it comes to exchange, the only thing that matters is the production cost of the commodity. All people are equal before the money. Only the producers with the cheapest offer prevail—comparable quality provided. This competition (of prices) is the driving force of capitalism. It is an important drive for innovation and development. However, it also leads to the externalisation of those costs (cf. p. 22) which are not necessarily required for the production of the goods. Well-known consequences include the mistreating and exploitation of people and nature as well as operational saving through efficiency and atomisation, which robs people of paid labour and, thus, of the basis of life in capitalism. The most important consequence, however, is the compulsion to valorise.

3.1.6 Compulsion to Valorise

The general competition of producers leads to the notorious absurdity of capitalism: money must be invested as capital in order to multiply itself. The science of business administration also states that the major objective of business management is one: the multiplication of the money invested, the valorisation of capital. However, this is not the result of the greed of managers or shareholders; it derives from a structural compulsion to valorise that is built into the system. If producers display inferior valorisation, therefore less profit than their competitors, they will be at a disadvantage vis-à-vis advertising, the development or acquisition of new machines, the design of new products and so on. That is why, in the short- or long-term, they will be defeated in competition and vanish from the market. Nestlé, for example, could produce in an ecologically sounder, more social and humane manner, but increased costs would hamper valorisation and endanger its position in the world market. While the actual aim of production* should be the satisfaction of needs, this is not the purpose of production under capitalist conditions. It is the valorisation of capital.

Producers—usually businesses—must not prioritise satisfying the needs of their consumers or even of their workers (use value). To survive competition, they must first and foremost pay attention to valorisation and profitability (exchange value). In this context, the satisfaction of needs is only a means to an end; use value is only the carrier for exchange value.¹³

3.1.7 Independent Self-Replication of Conditions

The compulsion to valorise leads us to the centre of the capitalist logic. Marx and Engels call it “independent self-replication of the conditions towards the individuals” (Marx and Engels 1846, p. 400) or “fetishism” (Marx 1890, p. 87).¹⁴ Within capitalism, people produce and reproduce the societal conditions they are subject to like they used to do with nature. Capitalist conditions have the effect of a “second nature” that is separate from the people (cf. Adorno 1966, p. 347). They possess a logic of their own, an inherent necessity, which we cannot escape within the framework of these conditions. Marx calls this →independent self-replication (p. 155) or fetish, as people in capitalism have created—and are maintaining—something that has a hold on them (cf. Marx 1890, p. 86 f.). People do not act according to their needs but according to conditions. The conditions seem to utilise the people, as if people only serve the purpose of valorisation. This is also proven by the fact that people cannot decide on the aims of the system: while (almost) everyone agrees that it would be better to not destroy the environment, to ensure better working conditions and so on, for market actors it does not make sense to pursue these aims. Likewise, no nation-state can take the liberty of pursuing a truly environmentally friendly way of production as, in that case, businesses would emigrate. The phenomena shaping societal mediation—markets and prices—are not consciously produced by the people but unknowingly materialise “behind the back” (ibid., p. 59) of the people. That is why the “silent pressure of the economic conditions” (ibid., p. 765) in the form of general competition and the compulsion to valorise can only be overcome beyond capitalism and, accordingly, beyond exchange as the form of mediation.

3.2 Capitalism as a Society of Exclusion

Our presentation of the basic dynamics of capitalism will now be followed by an analysis of the central characteristic of capitalist society: the →logic of exclusion (p. 17). In capitalist society, people have good reasons to satisfy their needs at the expense of others. Thus, Hobbes’ statement that “Man is wolf to men” is well-founded in capitalism. This fact, however, is not a manifestation of a naturally exclusive relationship between people but one of a historically specific form of society. Nevertheless, to identify a society as an exclusion society does not mean that there is no logic of inclusion, that there are no conditions implying the inclusion of the needs of others; but it does mean that the logic of exclusion is the decisive social logic. For fashion chain H&M, for example, it is appropriate to include the needs of their customers by offering clothes as cheap and as nice as possible. However, this inclusion is only practised by H&M in order to prevail against other fashion chains and exclude them. Inclusion for the sake of exclusion. But in capitalism there are also social areas seeking inclusion without the metalogic of exclusion. In circles of friendship as well as in families, the inclusion of the needs of others is unquestionable; otherwise these relationships are bound to disintegrate.

Capitalism generates societal conditions that render the satisfaction of my needs at the expense of others subjectively functional (cf. p. 121). In an exchange, I try to give as little and take as much as possible. Thus, often unknowingly, I indirectly support and promote dangerous and precarious working conditions. Even when I am aware of this and feel ashamed because of it, it can serve me better (subjectively) to buy the cheaper computer or win the race for a job or an order against competitors. Although the logic of exclusion is a structural relation and not a personal defect, greed, bossiness, and egoism become functional, “rewarded” forms of action. And even without greed or egoistic excess, the mere unfolding of people’s daily life already limits the living conditions of others. Inversely, the freedom of others potentially limits my freedom. Societal togetherness is realised through individual confrontation. It is a cooperation in the mode of competition, in Hobbes’ words, “a war of all against all”.

Precapitalist Societies

Claiming that capitalism is the completed exchange society often raises some eyebrows: are exchange, trading, money, markets not to be found in many societies? What about Ancient Rome and the towns of the Middle Ages?

Indeed, these societies were acquainted with exchange, money and markets. However, exchange was not the dominant form of mediation. It had not yet “reached its full potential”. Highly collaborativepremodern societies saw extended trade and market networks, but they were not subject to the compulsion to valorise. Furthermore, the market was often limited. Thus, town guilds often dictated the prices of handcrafted products in the Middle Ages (Le Goff 2010), or specific traders got tax relief or custom privileges. In many societies self-production (subsistence) played a central role. Social communities such as village, family, clan or farmyard produced most of the food they required. Mediation within these communities was direct and governed by traditional domination. Polanyi (1944) claims that re/production was “embedded” in social relationships in all these societies.

Many historians, like Robert Brenner (1976), emphasise that trade, exchange and market should not be equated with capitalism. Whereas the market in premodern societies was an additional possibility of survival, in capitalism it became a necessity. Historian Ellen Meiksins Wood (2002) places the birth of capitalism in sixteenth-/seventeenth-century England. It was then and there that the exchange logic seized the most important means of re/production of the premodern society, the land, and turned the entire feudal system upside down. Until that moment, land was commonly provided on the basis of traditional and fixed relationships (serfdom, fixed lease etc.). The historian Heide Gerstenberger (2018) places the birth of capitalism in the eighteenth/nineteenth century, when the exchange logic seized the most important means of re/production such as land, factors and labour, and competition became the driving force of markets.

Bottom line: Although exchange, money and markets can be found in many societies, only in the form of society that is capitalism does exchange become the dominant form of mediation.

3.2.1 Privileges

In an exclusion society there are always lines of exclusion which condense, stiffen and structure exclusion. Along these lines, differences are built on a biological or ethnical basis, or merely as a social construction, and are stabilised as privileges. Consciously or unconsciously, exclusion and depreciation arise on the basis of gender, skin colour, cultural affiliation, family membership, age, disability, class, education, physical appearance and so on. These lines of exclusion pervade capitalism and steer, allow for, and stabilise the general logic of exclusion. In situations where the logic of exclusion is suggested, it tends to be applied quickly and specifically along these lines. All these structures operate by producing otherness, also called “othering”, and serve to safeguard the needs of certain groups of people and delegitimise those of others. Thus, a net of exclusion pervades our society, whereby each one of us has an allocated place, linked to the gain or loss of specific privileges.

3.2.2 Externalisation and Exploitation

Another dynamic which is a good indicator of exclusion is externalisation. In competition, it is suggested to get rid of costs, to externalise them. Thus, for example, costs attached to the physical or mental well-being of workers or the protection of the environment are often axed (cf. the example H&M, p. 20). The general public might be called upon to help via the state, or future generations might be burdened with the costs. This is accepted, albeit with a guilty conscience, as system failure; such is the case of climate change or the plundering of resources in the global South (cf. Lessenich 2016; I.L.A. Kollektiv 2017; Brand and Wissen 2017). Another element of exclusion is exploitation. The only thing many people can exchange is their labour; as a result, they are forced to offer and sell themselves. However, they receive neither the products they make nor a wage equivalent to the exchange value of these products; they are only paid part of it. The difference is collected by the company that hired them. That is, the companies appropriate the labour of their workers, they exploit them. In this case, exploitation is not a moral category but an analytic one. Of course, we criticise this exploitation, but it is an integral part of a universalised exchange society and can only be overcome as a whole.

3.2.3 Principle of Work

Capitalism is based on the principle of work or performance: I only get a share in society’s riches if I accomplish something. Thus, I am forced to contribute to society in the capitalist form: labour for wage. The satisfaction of my needs is not fundamentally guaranteed simply because I am human; it rather depends on my individual performance. The better I fulfil the capitalist demands of performance, the more I get. Therefore, capitalism encourages and rewards self-submission. In interpersonal relationships the work principle is cushioned (e.g., in families) and moderated by state-run coverage (e.g., unemployment benefit). The work principle unites capitalism with real socialism and other state-planned societies. Here too, people can expect a share in society’s riches only if they adhere to the plan. However, in capitalism as well as in real socialism, a big part of society’s wealth is created beyond the plan or the market. This is highlighted when discussing the problem of the division of spheres.

3.2.4 Division of Spheres

The capitalist form of re/production becomes visible first of all in the sphere of the economy. This sphere, however, cannot survive on its own. The logic of valorisation (“what makes a profit, wins”) would disintegrate, as many of its preconditions cannot be brought about through this logic. Children, household and care simply do not work this way. Capitalism is self-mediating by constantly differentiating itself. It creates spheres with independent forms of logic which protect the logic of exploitation from self-destruction. Spheres are divided along various dimensions: work/leisure, production/reproduction, privacy/public, economy/politics, functionality/culture and so on. Two important spheres that are separated from the economy and we would like to present in short are reproduction and the state (in Chap. 1, 3.3).

The sphere of reproduction is the world of family, privacy, children, household—and, according to the traditional allocation of roles, of woman. In this sphere, the damages originating in the sphere of production—such as exhaustion, anger, stress, lack of energy and so on—are mended, and deficits like unkindness, coldness, separateness and so on are compensated. “Humaneness” is reproduced and revitalised to meet the requirements of production: competition, cost efficiency, career and so on. For a long time, the epitome of reproduction was the male head of the household, burnt out from work, returning to the safety of his home and finding peace and quiet with the help of his wife’s loving attention and the soothing effect of television in the evening. The sphere of reproduction caters for many more tasks, such as looking after people in need of care, repairing the kitchen table, providing emotional support to friends and so on. In capitalism this is not paid for,¹⁵ and that is why it seems to not matter so much. To not consider these activities as a necessary part of the production and preservation of our living conditions and to fail to integrate them into our theory would be a huge blind spot.

3.3 State

The state is often considered the opposite of the market. It is frequently seen as the “institution protecting the public”, a deliberately designable alternative to the market. In this section, we want to analyse some aspects of the significance of the state in capitalism.

3.3.1 Secured Property and Monopoly on the Use of Force

The economy is based on separate production. Separate production is only possible if the ownership of the means of production and of products is guaranteed. Why should starving people accept being separated from food that is actually available? Why should people accept limited access rights to the means of production? Why should somebody honour exchange contracts and not simply take but not give? What prevents brute force from entering the economy?

Positive Qualities of Capitalism

Criticising capitalism can easily lead to a “litany of horrors”. A decent analysis, however, must also state the positive qualities of its object. Let us name some. Material mediation through exchange and money relieves people from being dependent on the goodwill of their social group or their ruler and, thus, makes them freer. That is the precondition for the development of individuality. Through cost efficiency, capitalist production leads to unprecedented productivity and, for many people, its material, sensuous wealth outshines the living standards of earlier human societies. Exchange-related mediation through goods encompasses the entire globe and manages to integrate almost all of humanity in one cooperative association. As a result, harvest failures and diseases could be tackled globally. The mediation of material exchange in an unconscious form takes place without deliberate design, thus hugely reducing complexity. This enables capitalism to deliver its ultra-performance of coordination. What is profitable will be integrated. At the same time, capitalism is extremely adaptable to the most variable cultural backgrounds and state forms. In today’s global society, we are part of a worldwide, highly complex and diverse net of division of labour. People pursue their self-interest and produce globally for each other via buying and selling.

The economy is a conflictual, excluding sphere. It only works if its basis—property and, vice versa, the exclusion of the dispossessed—is guaranteed. If this protection were to be organised privately and individually, there would always be a danger of the required means being used to rob the property of others. Consequently, this protection must be guaranteed publicly and generally. There must be an institution which monopolises all means of violence in order to guarantee the protection of property as much as possible. This public, general institution protecting the monopoly on the use of force is the state.

Freedom and Equality

Compared to →precapitalist societies (p. 20), completely penetrated by personal and direct domination, the state’s monopolisation of power constitutes an enormous change. Although, generally speaking, the economy is a relationship of force, its force is effective due to general structures and not through direct personal rule. On the surface of the economy, the subjects seem to meet on free and equal terms. They are free inasmuch as they have themselves and their property at their disposal. In the beginning, this liberty was provided only for white men, and social struggles were required to extend it. They are equal to the extent that the state protects everyone’s property regardless of the person. Thus, the state simultaneously guarantees the fundamental inequality in the distribution of assets. Therefore, the freedom and equality the bourgeois are so passionate about is real and, at the same time, historically determined and generally restricted.

3.3.2 Conflicts and the Functions of the State

Why does the state not limit its function to the protection of property? Protecting property guarantees the basis of the economy but not its existence. Therefore, →conflicts (p. 146) in society must be settled in a way that is more tailored to individual needs, as opposed to the economy, where conflict solution is based only on the logic of valorisation. Generally speaking, the economy destroys its own foundations. In the nineteenth century, for example, due to the unlimited exploitation of the 14- to 16-hour workday, many labourers were working themselves into the ground. The economy’s human capital was finally protected by the state’s restriction on working hours. Even some entrepreneurs demanded these laws (cf. Marx 1890, p. 262ff). Although they were forced by competition to exploit the workers as long and as hard as possible, they also realised the disastrous consequences. A lot of functions were taken away from the economy and socialised: education and training, regulations relating to health and safety at work, dismantlement of monopolies, infrastructure development, social security and so on.

A Short History of Marxist State Theory

Marx and Engels did not develop a consistent state theory. Therefore, their political reference to the state contains contradictions: they demand both its destruction and its use. Social democracy acknowledges the state as the “only natural foundation […] of the socialist association” (Kautsky 1892), it is the custodian of their utopia. →Nationalisation (p. 50), however, does not lead directly to socialism. Additionally, the proletariat would have to conquer the “state of the capitalists”. Only then “will the state stop being a capitalist enterprise, only then will it be possible to reshape it into a socialist association” (ibid.). Lenin’s state theory recognises the state as an “organ of class rule” (Lenin 1917). But, in socialism, it could be used to suppress the capitalists and to administer society. The utopia of a free society thus moved from socialism to communism, in which the state should die off (cf. p. 55).

These concepts of the state as a designable instrument are challenged by anarchist and modern theories. Anarchist theorists agree in that the state is an “instrument” of class suppression; however, they consider no liberation is possible within the framework of the state. So, Bakunin categorically demands: “property and the state must be destroyed” (1975, p. 84). Current materialist state theory sees the state as a necessary part of capitalism and not as an “instrument of the capitalists” that can be used in different ways. The capitalist form of production would need a political form, which the state, as an impersonal force, represents historically and theoretically.

3.3.3 Relative Autonomy

The state operates in a sphere of its own which, to a certain point, allows it to act against the imperative of valorisation. This relative autonomy derives from the fact that it acquires part of the produced capitalist wealth not by exchange but through taxes. Thus, the state enjoys the possibility of action beyond competition and valorisation. This autonomy, however, remains relative, as state taxes in turn depend on a functioning economy. The state has no separate power of disposition. Like every other capitalist entity, only with the help of money—that is, economic power of disposition—can it organise its political, legal, infrastructural, police and military actions, among others. Therefore, the economy is the dominant sphere encompassing the state.

But what about the state simply printing money? Although this is an option, the creation of money by the state increases inflation if the market does not need this money due to a lack of profitable investment. The state depends on a successful production of goods which will raise enough money to pay for the state’s activity. Therefore, it must have an interest in supporting the logic of valorisation: it is not an opponent of the market but, rather, a legislative regulator for successful market activities. This orientation towards valorisation is reinforced by the global location competition: nations try to lure investment capital into the country through a low tax burden, weak social and environment laws and so on. High revenues from low taxes are better than low revenues from high taxes. Offering the lowest taxes eliminates competition from other nations. This logic leads to an international “race to the bottom”.

3.3.4 Subjectless Violence

The capitalist state can assume different forms, ranging from democratic to dictatorial. The one thing that is not up for grabs is the protection of property to safeguard a working economy. If there is danger of the state appropriating property, producers do not see any reason to risk their money by investing in that country. Historically, state domination is separated from the individual will of the people which, for example, pervaded the power structure in feudalism. The state goes beyond personal domination and turns into juridified “subjectless violence” (Gerstenberger 1990). Personal despotic domination becomes the rule of law.

3.3.5 Generality

In capitalism, the dominant sphere for the production of means that satisfy needs is the economy. Although production is organised on a societal basis, needs are only satisfied on a private, individual basis. Everyone must look after her/his own needs within the frame of exchange, labour, realisation of value. If I cannot satisfy my needs privately or find it very hard to do so, I must try and step out of my private sphere and claim my needs collectively or commonly. Politics is the sphere trying to establish generality. Fascination with politics stems from this generality. If I detest factory farming, I can individually consume in a different way. Or I can try to win a general improvement, for example, through animal protection laws. If I condemn injustice, I can spend money privately or politically advocate wealth tax. This generality is established by an institution which can provide a framework for the economy.

The state, however, does not reside outside capitalism; it depends on a functioning valorisation in the economy and is a necessary integral part of it. It secures the basis of capitalism and deals with necessary tasks which are not profitable. Thus, the state fulfils a double role: on the one hand, it provides the capitalist society with the necessary framework by securing property; on the other, as it operates within the frame of the market and property, it is indirectly subjected to the logic of valorisation. Therefore, there is a fundamental limitation to the “sphere of generality”. This is the self-contradiction of politics and the state: they claim a generality that they do not objectively have in capitalism. We experience a priority, a primacy of the economy. Via the state, politics can create a regulatory framework for the economy, limit its power and indirectly change it, but politics cannot fundamentally reorganise the economy or put an end to it. If politics and the state want to overcome capitalism and establish the primacy of politics, the state will have to change its form. The state can do so because it guarantees the capitalist social relationships and can, therefore, end capitalism. The state abolishes the market, organises re/production itself and claims real generality. If the market’s function of coordinating society is abolished, it must be replaced by a structure the state can control and shape: central planning. When the economy is coordinated by central planning instead of markets, a new form of society arises.

Central planning may take different societal forms such as state capitalism, where the means of production remain in private hands, or state socialism, where the state owns the means of production.

3.4 State Socialism: The State-Coordinated Society

The relationship between emancipatory movements and the state is long and contradictory. Public opinion identifies the “left” with extending the influence of the state, to anarchists the state is the biggest foe, and the traditional workers’ movement considered it as an instrument of emancipation. The positive reference is understandable and logical, since the state conveys a feeling of controllability and formability as opposed to the independent and chaotic market. We believe that such a transgression of present societal structures by politics and the state only generates different structures of property and domination but not the abolition of →property (p. 130) and domination. This fact is not due to imperfect leaders or state representatives; it is an effect of the very form of the state itself: statehood.

3.4.1 Statehood

The institution of generality is the state. It is the self-legitimised (sovereign) and legitimising centre of the political sphere. Political demands are demands directed at generality. State laws are the form in which they are consolidated and generalised. Only the state can make political changes that are binding for society. It is, so to speak, the door between politics and society, between the private call for political generality and true generality. Indeed, societal changes can take place without the support of the state—an example being the growing acceptance of homosexuality—however, the state can secure such changes with its power, for example, in the form of ending the criminalisation of homosexuality. The state is the condensed centre of politics. As the economy finds its institutional form in the market, so does politics in the state.

But what is a state? A state is not so easily defined. Some scholars define it on the basis of its goals; for example, as an institution that mediates and regulates conflicting particular interests and, therefore, requires superior decision-making powers (cf. Wikipedia: state). Already in this definition we find the central moment of state domination: the power to impose its decisions through force. Therefore, we are in line with: “The most commonly used definition is Max Weber’s, which describes the state as a compulsory political organization with a centralized government that maintains a monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a certain territory” (Wikipedia: state). Charles Tilly’s definition of the state as a “coercion-wielding organisation” (Tilly 1990, p. 2) and Michael Mann’s “centre of binding rule-making authority” (Mann 1984, p. 195) are on the same page. The state usually does not enforce its decisions through physical force because its people acknowledge its legitimacy; however, if it comes to that, the state will do so and is defined by its power to do so.

3.4.2 State Economy: Labour, Exchange Value and Property

Like capitalism, state socialism is a form of society, but whereas in capitalism the market economy dominates societal re/production, in state socialism it is the state economy that does so. In state socialism the state coordinates large parts of re/production and does it like all other things: by enforcing decisions, by enforcing a central plan. The plan rests upon the re/producers (people and enterprises) fulfilling their designated tasks, and the best way to enforce this plan is wage labour and, therefore, extortion: only if factories fulfil their designated tasks do they receive the promised amount of resources, money, support. Only if people work do they gain access to consumption goods. Within a state economy the prices are fixed by the state not by the market; therefore the state economy lacks competition and economic coherent prices and hinders performance-related distribution.¹⁶ Socialist states became aware of these problems and tried to simulate many market effects, such as performance pressure. If enterprises exceed expectations, they receive extra grants. If their production falls short, their resources are cut. And socialist enterprises—at least in later years—used the same principle of performance against their workers. They must fulfil their task or suffer wage loss, extra workload, cutbacks on holidays. Although, all these sanctions were very modest compared to the market. For the state or enterprises to be able to threaten with wage loss, a reduction of the means of consumption and so on, societal wealth cannot be distributed by needs, it must be distributed according to work performance and power. Therefore, the power of disposal over the means of consumption is exclusive—they must be (state) property. The exclusive power of disposal over the means of consumption requires the exclusive disposal of the means of production; otherwise, people would just use the means of production to fulfil their needs, not the state plan. The socialist hope for socialisation becomes de facto nationalisation. Therefore, market and state-planned economies are both based on the principle of work. They are both societies of wage labour and, despite their differences, they are quite alike.

The work principle not only rewards self-submission but also leads to a contrast of needs. The individual worker is perfectly entitled to try to work less and gain more. He/she does not do what he/she wants to do but what he/she is paid for: therefore, it is quite reasonable to try and maximise output (consumption possibilities) and minimise the extorted input. Despite state-socialist anthems praising the workers of the regime, just like capitalist workers they, too, must be disciplined and exploited. The same holds true for the enterprises. They will try to receive as much money, goods, and grants as possible (for future stability, personal gain, or whatever reason) and produce minimally, even trade some goods on the black market. They will try to lower production cost and increase the output. And, again, it is perfectly reasonable for them to do so.

The exact same behaviour was observed in real socialism: the state tried to enforce productivity and high product standards, and enterprises tried to avoid these enforcements. Without market competition it was often easy to do so. In the German Democratic Republic this led to so-called “soft plans, i.e. plans whose fulfilment did not require top performance from the enterprises. This phenomenon was also known to the planning authorities, but there were no effective means of eliminating it” (Gutmann 1999, p. 35). Directors of enterprises and combinates “armed themselves against the excessive plan specifications ‘from above’ […] by concealing their true production possibilities and planning below maximum capacity utilization […]. This left only ‘plan poker’ as an elaborate regulatory instrument for annual production”, in which directors and planners haggled over the plan specifications, “whoever mastered it was considered a successful director” (Roesler 2002, p. 55). Thus, there is a “‘game of hide-and-seek’ between operations and headquarters […]. The results of the negotiations often served management more as a measure of success than the actual performance achieved” (Hilbert 1994, p. 39). And if they failed, enterprises and workers didn’t have much to fear. Sanctions for enterprises were modest and bankruptcy was impossible. Similarly, workers hold quite some power in this “dictatorship of proletariat”—state-socialist leaders feared nothing more than worker strikes—performance sanctions were modest too and unemployment didn’t exist. Politically, state socialism was authoritarian; economically, it was much softer than the dictatorship of the market. On the ground of a wage labour society state socialists traded equality against efficiency.

Therefore, in state socialism we can detect the same contrast between use value and exchange value as in capitalism: the production of enterprises and individuals is not need-oriented but exchange-oriented. They are mainly concerned with what they get and not with what they give. This explains planned obsolescence, environmental destruction and so on, in capitalism and poor quality, comparable environmental destruction, lack of productivity gains and so on, in state socialism. The dominance of exchange value “appears only in the form of external state-bureaucratic supervision, that is, no longer in the shape of the ‘coercive laws of competition’ (Marx). Therefore, it can be deceived, tricked, and perforated in a thousand different ways” (Kurz 1991, p. 104). The next state-coordinated society may be better in enforcing its standards, but the fundamental contrast will not disappear. Allow us to illustrate: a future eco-socialist state tries to enforce “green” production. Individual enterprises try to minimise inputs and maximise their revenues; green production is clearly on the cost side, needing a lot of resources and labour. Therefore, it is reasonable for enterprises or cooperatives to opt for green-washing and only superficially fulfil environmental standards—comparable to capitalist enterprises. The eco-socialist state may tighten regulations, but it fights against the very economic basis it rests upon.

The work principle leads to a contrast of needs: they stand against each other, and they exclude each other. All real socialist societies were structured by this contrast of use and exchange value, with enterprises producing slowly, not enough, in bad quality and so on, and the state trying to force them to perform in a productive, plan-orientated way and deliver reasonable quality. This contrast runs through all individuals: as consumers and human beings, they may prefer environmentally friendly, good-quality goods and services; as producers, they are required to minimise cost at the expense of quantity, quality and the environment. As workers, they prefer interesting, meaningful, not exhausting but well-organised workplaces; as (co-)managers they must subdue the workers, steadily raise pressure and exploitation. In capitalism, production is organised towards valorisation and not the satisfaction of needs, and state socialism faces a very similar obstacle.

3.4.3 Interest Form

The last critique does not focus on the state economy but on the state as a decision-making institution. State planning turns conflicts into contrasts, but even decision-making within the state pits needs against each other. In the political sphere, many needs compete for generality. But what needs acquire this status? The state is an institution that suggests which conflicts of needs will become contrasts of interests. Needs must refer to their societal options of realisation, and in capitalism and state socialism they structurally oppose each other. Needs can only prevail at the expense of others. In this way, needs take the form of interests. An example from capitalism: my need is to live well. In order to satisfy it, I pursue a certain strategy. My strategy must adjust to the prevailing circumstances and possibilities and stay within societal realities. Capitalist realities, however, only allow for the satisfaction of my needs at the expense of others (→logic of exclusion, p. 17). To prevail against others, the need must organise itself as a collective concern (cf. Meretz 2013). Thus, the need for a nice dwelling becomes an interest in more money for social housing, cheaper rents, higher wages and so on. Those interests are faced with conflicting interests: landlords want as much rent as possible, other interest groups want less money for housing and better financing of education and so on. Interests are the historically specific societal form to politically advance one’s own needs. Their implementation requires →power (p. 4). Thus, the mediation of needs becomes a question of power. The state is a very convenient form for interests and contrasts because it can take universal decisions. The state gathers information, listens to collective concerns and makes a decision. This may seem perfectly reasonable and democratic, but this way the state creates societal conflict. Needs become interests, and conflicts become contrasts.

Anthropologist David Graeber and archaeologist David Wengrow study consequences of hierarchical institutions with no power to enforce decisions. The American indigenous Wendat—and many other First Nations—had chiefs, but their people usually possessed the freedom to ignore their commands. A missionary therefore writes: “They have reproached me a hundred times because we fear our Captains, while they laugh at and make sport of theirs. All the authority of their chief is in his tongue’s end; for he is powerful in so far as he is eloquent; and, even if he kills himself talking and haranguing, he will not be obeyed unless he pleases the Savages” (cf. Graeber and Wengrow 2021, p. 41). Their power rests not on “state power, rooted in control over rule making and rule enforcing over territory”, but on what political scientist Erik Olin Wright calls “social power” which is “rooted in the capacity to mobilize people for cooperative, voluntary collective actions” (Wright 2010, p. 20). Unsurprisingly Europeans were “surprised and impressed” by their hosts’ eloquence and reasonable arguments, “skills honed by near-daily public discussions of communal affairs” (Graeber and Wengrow 2021, p. 39). In contrasts, their hosts often remarked the constant scrambling over each other by Europeans, cutting each other off in conversation, employing weak arguments and behaving not particularly bright. “People who tried to grab the stage, denying others the means to present their arguments, were acting in much the same way as those who grabbed the material means of subsistence and refused to share it” (ibid.).

For conflicting parties, it is neither reasonable nor recommended to reach a general solution; a partial solution where their interests are fulfilled is good enough. They do not have to cooperate for the sake of everybody because the state has opened up another way: enforcement at the expense of others via state power. Conflicting parties can and will try to gain power and influence. Not because they are bad people but because society encourages them to do so. People may still consciously refuse this suggestion, but you cannot escape the logic of the state. Within this exclusion-promoting environment, cooperation is recommended only if it strengthens one’s own position. Alliances of interests are formed to prevail over others. The fighting pit is inaugurated. If conflicts are mediated by the state, they turn into contrasts. Needs refer to each other in the form of interests and fight against each other instead of struggle for common ground. The state reproduces and fosters the logic of exclusion because it merges with the economy.

3.4.4 Beyond the Principle of Work

Our critique of the state-coordinated society is short and, therefore, condensed, but we hope some ideas have become clear. Many critics point out that state-socialist economies were part of a global market economy and, therefore, subject to its imperatives and dynamics. This is true, but it only partially explains the dynamics of a state economy and focuses on external mechanism, whereas we argue that a state economy produces many of its historical problems itself. Also, we did not refer to the benefits of state socialism in aspects such as a far (!) more equal distribution of property and labour and heightened possibilities for—if not democratic, at least elite—planning. State coordination is incompatible with criticism of (wage) labour and property. The state coordinates and regulates via enforcement and, ultimately, domination. The resulting principle of work produces a logic of cost minimisation at the expense of quantity, quality and the environment. Furthermore, historically state capitalism and state socialism have not been democratic. Putting the blame solely on individuals such as Lenin or Mao is too easy. State power increases enormously when markets are abolished. It wields power over production and coordination, career and economic downfall, allocation of resources and goods. Therefore, it is easier and even recommended for it to dominate the people, become authoritarian and concentrate decision-making powers within an elite. Finally, the state suggests the conflicts of needs that are to become contrasts of interests. It reproduces the logic of exclusion and domination instead of solidarity and inclusion.

Societal alternatives depend heavily on the critique of what has to be overcome. Utopias are—so to speak—the children of critique. That is why it is quite important what one criticises as capitalism. We could distinguish four elements:

• 1. Private property of the means of production: The largest part of the means of production and money—and thus of societal wealth—belongs to a social minority.

• 2. Market: Re/production is decisively coordinated by the market, which creates a compulsion to valorise.

• 3. Separation of care work and reproduction: Most care work is done privately and mainly by women. Care work for the environment is essentially not done.

• 4. Priority of exchange value over use value: Individuals and companies must focus primarily on exchange value rather than of use value, so that individual rationality leads to societal irrationality.

The emphasis on different aspects leads to three major social-ecological utopias: eco-social market economy, state socialism and care-commons and council utopias. Advocates of eco-social market economy do not want to abolish any of these elements. They want to minimise the dominance of the market (element 2), but believe that strong state regulation is possible and sufficient. The failure of state socialism in the twentieth century has convinced them that the market economy is more liberal, efficient and meritocratic. Left-wing advocates of eco-social market economy such as Naomi Klein propose green jobs, welfare state, strong regulation of the market through bans and subsidies, burdening “the rich and filthy”, global redistribution and a questioning of “consumerism” (cf. Klein 2019). Actually, the enemy is always neoliberalism and never the market economy itself. Market socialists like Erik Olin Wright or Vivek Chibber (2022) want to combine a highly regulated market economy with the abolition of private property (element 1) and transfer the means of production into the hands of the workers of the enterprise.¹⁷ State socialists such as Andreas Malm (2021) and Cockshott and Cottrell (2012) want to abolish class rule (element 1) and market (element 2). They argue that the market cannot be sufficiently regulated or that states are too weak to do so in a global market economy. They want to overcome failures of twentieth-century socialist rule computers, better mathematics, democracy and the internet. Cockshott and Cottrell even include market elements such as “clearing prices” and soft competition in their model. By capitalism they mean class relations and market domination.

The extremes of the liberal market economy and state socialism are not divided by a deep gap but belong to a continuum; they constitute two poles that are simply different blends of market and state. Within this continuum, many proposals of a “postcapitalist” world find their place—and many proposals of a “third way”, which are usually just a mix of the two. If we start from the free-market pole and progressively add state power, we come across the European social market economy, ideas such as the Green New Deal and eco-socially regulated market economies or market socialism, until the state becomes powerful enough to increasingly regulate prices and replace market competition by state planning; then we find ourselves within state socialism. This continuum is based on one binding element: wage labour and the splitting of care work and the domination of exchange value over use value. Goods and services are not distributed according to needs, but according to money, power and/or performance. In our opinion, a solidary society must overcome this binding principle of labour and all the other four elements. Many emancipatory movements—notably care, commons, indigenous, anarchist and council communist movements—strove for such a society, and our utopia of “commonism” is just a proposal on how to organise such a care-commons-council utopia.