Reform and Revolution

Abstract

To overcome capitalism, the strategies of reform and revolution continue to play a prominent role. Historically, both strategies have led to state-dominated societies with a top-down structure of domination. This is no coincidence, as both strategies are fundamentally state-oriented and aim at gaining state power by “climbing the mountain” or “jumping over the gorge” and a subsequent reorganisation of society by the state. However, both strategies provide valuable insights into overcoming capitalism, with reformism strengthening the process element and revolution heralding the necessary break. Strengths and weaknesses of both strategies are discussed and variants critical of the state are evaluated. In the end, it is not the name that matters, but combining reformist and revolutionary insights with the development of a societal alternative as part of the struggle to overcome capitalism.

Transformation theory answers the question of how a free society can be reached from the starting point of capitalism. The answer rests on assumptions. On the one hand, it assumes that a free society lies within the reach of our human-societal possibilities of development. On the other hand, it assumes that there are qualitatively different forms of producing our living conditions, which means there must be qualitatively different forms of society and not just a continuum of differently decorated forms of capitalism.

Millions of people have wondered about such a liberating transformation. Our contribution rests on the shoulders of many theoretical reflections and practical experiments. In this chapter we want to reflect on the transformation theories which, until today, have been important for emancipatory movements. What were their strengths and weaknesses? What can they explain, where is their blind spot? When discussing the overcoming of capitalism today, two strategies still have a prominent role: reform and revolution. Historically, both theories of transformation have given birth to state-dominated societies with a top-down structure of domination. Did they go about it the wrong way? If we were to do everything right, could we not, nevertheless, build a free society with a revolution or a chain of reforms? We do not think so, and we will try to explain our view in this chapter. However, reform and revolution are not all “wrong”. Both theories yield important insights, worth harvesting by every theory of transformation. We want to overcome reform and revolution: there are aspects we want to keep, others we intend to develop and yet others we want to get rid of.

Now, criticism runs the risk of missing the subject. And, indeed, any criticism of reform and revolution can be contested with “that is not my understanding of reform/revolution. You’re barking up the wrong tree.” The danger of dismantling imagined trees is high, and it even increases the more variations a theory has. Theories and thoughts about reform and revolution are manifold, and a lot of movements refer to them in a positive manner. So, it is inevitable for our criticism to miss many ideas, at least in parts. We do not intend to disagree with every person who thinks reform or revolution is a good thing, or even to prove them wrong. No; our aim it is to criticise certain core elements, which we connect with theories of reform and revolution. We believe that these core elements prevent us from achieving a free society. Our criticism focuses on content, not on words.

Before diving into the concepts of reform and revolution, we would like to discuss two fundamental approaches: interpersonal transformation theory and transpersonal state-oriented transformation theory; we believe the second is of particular importance for reform and revolution.

1 Interpersonal Transformation Theory

The idea of interpersonal transformation theory can be illustrated by painting the following picture: in the meadow (of capitalist societies), mushrooms (interpersonal practices) occasionally sprout up, slightly changing society. When there are enough of these mushrooms, the meadow (capitalism) turns into a mushroom forest (free society).

Each transformation theory must include interpersonal practices. This is relevant for state-oriented political transformation theories—which traditionally include a party (organised on an interpersonal basis) preparing revolution or reforms—as well as transvolution theories (Chap. 3). An exclusively interpersonal transformation theory believes that the sum of individual decisions will ultimately bring about a qualitatively new society. As an inscription on the Berlin Wall goes, “Many little people doing many little things in many little places can change the face of the earth”. If many people—within the limits of their possibilities—behave differently from what is suggested by societal norms, this can bring about a radical change in society. Many people probably turn to these interpersonal practices to improve their lives and the present world but do not aim at creating a new form of society. In this chapter, we focus only on theories which seriously believe in overcoming capitalism by means of a multitude of interpersonal practices.

The number of interpersonal practices is unmanageable. They include humanist intents (“I am kinder to people I meet”) and antisexist activities (“I try to live feminist relationships”). These practices are often aimed at changing individual patterns of thinking and acting and can result in (big) social and individual changes in one’s immediate surroundings. Many types of exclusion—for example, racist or sexist—are tackled, and societal standards are overstepped. Even the →economy (p. 14) can be influenced. This is what the →critique of consumer culture (p. 44) and the fair-trade movement aspire to achieve with their emphasis on fair consumption. The general idea is to do what can be done in our own vicinity (and beyond) with regards to the satisfaction of our needs, our self-determination and how we relate to other people, ourselves, our employees, animals, strangers, the environment and so on. What is the scope of such interpersonal practices?

Interpersonal practices can indeed lead to societal shifts. Thus, the “sexual revolution” of the student movement of 1968 or the environmental movement, for example, can be attributed to changes in interpersonal forms of thinking and behaving. This is often referred to as a “shift in values” or “cultural change”. This shift in values, however, does not lead to a change in the form of society, because interpersonal practices do not bring about new societal conditions for living or acting, or new determining forms of societal mediation. As long as they do not aim at creating new societal conditions but only intend to act differently within the existing framework, they do not overcome capitalism, which is not only a “value system” but a powerful, objective and physical societal structure. Need-oriented actions, under the premise of accepting the present conditions, cannot change it. On the contrary, to conquer capitalism, new conditions must be established, new spaces opened beyond money, paid labour, patriarchy, valorisation, competition and so on. Only under new societal conditions do the courses of action and attitudes that we wish to cultivate in interpersonal spaces find societal support and encouragement. “Survival of the fittest”, the transpersonal logic of exclusion, will only be overcome by new conditions.

Critique of Consumerism

The critique of consumerism is a set value in today’s capitalism. We are often told that a shopping list equals a “ballot paper”. Next to their quality, many products advertise their method of production as being philanthropic and environmentally friendly. Consumption can be a way of improving things. We doubt, however, that capitalism as a whole—or the market economy, which is the positive term used in this context—can be overcome through a change in consumption. The point here is that the basic mechanisms of capitalism, such as exchange, exclusion and the realisation of value, are left untouched. Corporate group Nestlé does not destroy the environment out of enthusiasm; respecting the environment more than the competition does would simply raise the costs. Consumers can cushion this effect of externalisation by accepting higher prices for “fair products”, but they cannot cancel it, because the force of valorisation generally prevails. A critique of consumerism may even claim to overcome capitalism. It undoubtedly wants to overcome the effects of exchange, money and competition; but, at the same time, it wishes to maintain the form and the means which cause the destruction. Thus, the critique of consumerism can only address the symptoms, and its repair work merely chases its own tail.

A lot of people organising alternative interpersonal practices—for example, antiracist, antisexist, ecological—are well aware of their limits. Values do not suffice; general societal changes are required. Some then hope to shape the societal conditions with the help of the capitalist forms, via the state. In capitalism the state represents generality (cf. p. 28). An implemented political demand has a much bigger impact than individual changes in behaviour. Reallocation via wealth tax is much more effective than via donations. Looking at the state for help turns interpersonal transformation theory into a state-oriented transformation theory.

The interpersonal transformation theory acknowledges that the capitalist form of society cannot be overcome through a single sphere of responsibility, for example, politics. It must change our lives completely. In order to organise the structures of our life according to our →needs (p. 113), a transformation must also be effective in our everyday life. But a mere change of the values imbuing our activity does not suffice. It is not only our actions that must change but also the conditions of our actions. In order to overcome the capitalist shaping of our daily life, we must also overcome the capitalist form in our daily life—and this is only possible by way of a transformation that will bring about new societal conditions.

2 State-Oriented Transformation Theory

State-oriented transformation theory considers the state and its connected sphere of politics especially important in achieving a free society. According to this perspective, transformation must begin in the political and state-oriented sphere and, from there, seize the whole of society. The qualitative change in the form of society should be made possible through a state-oriented political change. Today, state-oriented transformation concepts—like reform and revolution—occupy almost the entire theoretical space of transformation theories. But what do we actually mean by “state-oriented”?

2.1 State-Oriented Transformation

The →concept of politics (p. 46) today is ambiguous. When we talk of state-oriented transformation we want to express that the transformation essentially takes place in the political sphere or rests on it; the political sphere we described above is characterised by features of generality, statehood and the interest form. Within the political sphere, the state is the self-legitimised (sovereign) and legitimising centre. We call it the door between politics and society.

A transformation organised in a state-oriented way tries to attain the free society mainly via a change in the state (cf. Fig. 2.1). This approach aims at changing the whole of society and, ultimately, the form of society through a political process of obtaining state power. Therefore, there is a difference between state-oriented and societal transformation. Firstly, a political process (reform or revolution) leads to the transformation of the state: the state either gains societal primacy and coordinates the whole of society (“socialist” mode) or is destroyed (“anarchist” mode). Secondly, state transformation leads to a transformation of society: through either top-down (democratic) central planning or self-organisation. Either way, the state-oriented transformation uses the capitalist forms and institutions and moves within this frame. Whether the state is intended to be used or destroyed is of course relevant, but many anarchists and state-critical communists give much more thought and energy to political processes and abolishment of the state than what supersedes state (and markets) and building political and re/productive alternatives. Thereby, they negatively reproduce a state-orientation.¹ State-oriented transformation theories consistently focus on the issue of how to gain state power.

Fig. 2.1

Concept of state-oriented political transformation

The Concept of Politics

Today’s concept of politics is dazzling and diverse (cf. Wikipedia: politics). In the nineteenth century the concept of politics was largely limited to statehood. The concept of politics has since been extended and, according to the motto “the private is political”, it has even reached the private sphere. Politics has become interpersonal. Whatever is designable and can “somehow” reach into society is now “political”. Every act—conversations, dress, food and so on—can now be political and change societal relations. We avoid the concept of politics, as most people—despite all the efforts to give it a broader meaning—still perceive politics as action aimed at changing the state, when it is a matter of changing general societal structures. In principle, our transvolution theory could also be seen as a political theory; however, we are afraid this could evoke wrong associations.

We postulate that a free society cannot be built with or within capitalist forms and institutions. We want to prove this thesis by looking at some points.

There are two main answers to the question of how state transformation can lead to a new form of society: either by a gradual process of restructuring (reform theory) or by a qualitative change within a relatively short period of time (revolution theory). We shall discuss these two theories in more detail below. A crucial question, however, one which affects both approaches equally, is that of the role of the state in the reforming transformation process or in the postrevolutionary process of reorganisation. Is it an instrument, a frame or an enemy?

2.1.1 Can the State Create a Free Society?

Transformation theories are fundamentally influenced by the theoretical concept of the state (Chap. 1, 3.3). The state-oriented transformation theory derives from traditional Marxism, which sees the state as an instrument of class domination.² An instrument can be used in many different ways. But can the state be used to build a free society? More recent state-critical transformation theories, as well as anarchism—past and present—have a definite answer to this question: No (cf. Chap. 2, 4.4).

A process of liberation creates new forms of producing living conditions and of overcoming capitalism and leaves old forms behind. If the state is to design this process of liberation, the latter can only take place within a certain form. This form is the legal form, the means are laws, passed and enforced by politics and the state. So, organising new societal conditions is done by way of legal procedure. The process of liberation takes a legal path. Thus, the new conditions are delivered from “above”. The state has to enforce the “Good New” by imprinting it on the members of the society it represents as a general demand. This constitutes a fundamental paradox for emancipatory movements that aspire to need-oriented new societal life conditions. It is a contradiction in terms: the other-directing state is expected to bring self-determination.

For the state to be able to enforce need-oriented forms of producing* life conditions, it would have to know what the needs of all people are. On the one hand this is impossible, as only we can know our own needs and, therefore, only we can create forms of relationships, living and activities that correspond to them. The notion of comprehensive knowledge and, thus, of the planning capability of the world is part of traditional Marxist theory. On the other hand, the needs of people have been shaped by capitalism. They can only change, develop and unfold in the process of liberation. For that purpose, people need space for self-reflection and self-development.

Only people themselves can create a free society according to their needs, as we shall see in detail below (Chap. 6, 1). Given that they are the only ones that know their needs, it is up to them to find the societal form for their fulfilment. No matter how democratic the legislative procedure might be, a new form of society enforced by the state will always be tainted by its political-governmental origins. It has not been created but drawn up, not learned but decreed, not self-organised but administered. A good cause is corrupted by repressive means. This tragedy is evident in many socialist attempts, both throughout history and today. This does not necessarily mean that the state has to be treated as an “enemy”. It could provide a space for the self-organised development of new life conditions—the state not as a designer but as someone helping into the saddle? What is important for us at this point is to stress that the state cannot create free societal conditions.

2.1.2 Separation of Path and Goal

State-oriented transformation theories aim at a free society, but the path is blocked by their state-oriented form. Revolution amounts to a sudden seizure of power, reformism³ is a long march. Both forms of state-oriented seizure of power require the use of means that are not in line with the end:⁴ manipulation, oppression or even violence. This follows from the fact that state-oriented transformation does not create new forms of action but has to dwell within its own realm. However, this framework of state-oriented action entails certain forms of operation: convincing the voters, founding and leading a party, gaining positive media coverage, seizing state power, defeating the counterrevolution and so on. A society without violence shall be fabricated by violence, a society without terror by terror (cf. Chap. 1, footnote 4). The political means aimed at gaining state power in political organisations often acquire a life of their own. The clearer the focus on state power within the framework of politics and the state, the more the movement has to concentrate on the means for gaining domination. This orientation defines the structure of the organisation, and often the external instruments for gaining domination hold inside the organisation. Within the framework of politics and the state, the aim pushes the organisation towards using forms corresponding to politics and the state. This can often be seen in the authoritarian structure of revolutionary movements or the dirty power struggles in reformist parties. Step by step, the external logic becomes internalised. Understanding the weak spots of previous approaches enables us to explain what went wrong in the path to implementation, or even the betrayal of ideals that followed their triumph and, ultimately led to the opposite of what was intended. We are bound to encounter this over and over again: it is linked to the interrelation of utopia and transformation. The goal should mould the form of the path, but it is often the other way around: the path (de)forms the goal. A good goal will be missed if the path is not adequate, if it is shaped by means and methods that contradict the goal. But the goal does not justify the means. A liberating victory over capitalism requires a fundamental clarification of the goal and a corresponding path; otherwise, it is bound to fail.

The Question of Domination

Almost all texts of state-oriented transformation theories deal with the “question of power”. In most cases, this refers to the issue of how to conquer state “power”. The question of “power”, however, is in fact a question of domination. →Power (p. 4) is quite different from domination. Collectively, people can have the power to develop new ideas or build a house. The power of agency does not necessarily include domination. Domination is clotted power; it is the ability to subjugate people. If power is meant to command people, it is domination. The state is not only an institution of power—such a definition would be a euphemism—but an institution of domination: it has power over people insofar as their conditions of life are at its disposal. State-oriented transformation theories aim at state power, at exercising it over people for the purpose of enforcing general objectives. That, however, is domination. State-oriented transformation theories want to utilise this option of domination for the purpose of abolishing domination—for example, by reorganising society or even eventually destroying the state they make use of at the beginning. Talking of the “question of power” disguises the actual claim, to seize power over an institution of domination. We expand on this in Chap. 5, 2.3 “Capacity and Domination” (p. 134).

The separation of path and goal explains the unattractiveness of politics in general and of reform and revolution in particular. Too close to religion, they promise paradise at the end of a long path of sacrifices. Revolution partly drives this self-instrumentalisation to the limit—death: “die for hope”. Its mass rejection is understandable.

This is also true in general: it is no surprise that hardly anybody wants to partake in the left project under the motto “fight, fight, fight”, demanding the sacrifice of the present for the sake of the future. How many comrades-in-arms became tired of that? How many returned, tired and relieved, to civil life when “the job was done”? “That’s something for young people”, they say. Therefore, the growing role of hedonism within emancipatory movements, the increasing inclination towards the immediate satisfaction of needs, should be supported. At the same time, however, it should be criticised as an unquestioned conformation to society. Hedonism must not be simply applied as a positive, need-oriented yardstick for emancipatory-transformative practice; it is separately celebrated in the capitalist pleasure and entertainment industry. In our view, the scale and foundation of transformation should be individual needs. For that purpose, transformation must exit the political sphere.

Nationalisation

Traditional Marxism did not have a uniform understanding of socialisation. A lot of people presumed the state could be a “representative of society” if governed by the workers, and socialisation could come about through nationalisation. Others imagined socialisation as the dissolution of property into the means of production and its transfer into the hands of the workers. But what that really meant and how it should be organised remained largely unclear. In addition, the focus was only on the means of production. The socialisation of the means of consumption in the broader sense, including the results of production, was not taken into consideration.

The socialisation of the means of consumption in the sense of the dissolution of →property (p. 130) was not among the goals of traditional Marxism. This becomes very obvious when looking at traditional Marxist culture, impregnated with its respective work and performance ethic: “The idlers push aside” (line from the German lyrics of the battle song “Die Internationale”). Or the criticism of “earning without working” or the demand of “equal liability of all to work” in the Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels 1848). In 1879 the Marxist August Bebel wrote: “Socialism agrees with the Bible in asserting that ‘he who will not work shall neither eat’”. Products shall not be freely available but only accessible via wages for work. Consequently, products will have to be produced as private property in separation from the needs of the people. This separation through property must be maintained by force and, finally, by violence, requiring a state. Without the socialisation of products, real socialism did not socialise the means of production and, therefore, did not put into practice the abolition of property. Property was simply managed in a different way. The hope of socialisation turned into the fact of nationalisation.

2.2 Traditional Marxism

Traditional Marxism has dominated the theories of emancipatory movements for more than 100 years. The state-oriented transformation theories—above all reform and revolution—have grown on its theoretical basis. In order to understand a subject, it is important to understand how it came about. True to this, we shall continue with a brief—thus, unfortunately, curtailing—presentation of traditional Marxist theory.

What is the utopia of traditional Marxism? The socialisation of the means of production and, thus, the end of class domination. Capitalism is basically understood as class domination, whereby the means of production are concentrated as property in the hands of capitalists, excluding all other people from their disposal. This gives capitalists the power to employ the broad mass of the population as wageworkers and exploit them. The socialisation of the means of production could abolish their unequal distribution and the exploitation resulting from it. Thereby socialisation is often equated with →nationalisation (p. 50), and it does turn into nationalisation if the principle of work and performance is not abolished as well. Lenin (and Marx before him) realised that the end of class domination does not mean the end of domination in general. Many theorists were aware of the fact that reform and revolution alone did not suffice to establish a society free from domination, and this led to the model of stages (cf. below).

Transitional Society

Transvolution can, sure enough, be combined with the traditional theory of conquest: an initial break—via reform or revolution—brings about a (socialist) society in transition. Then the process of transformation begins. The free society is created by generalising emancipatory early forms. A kind approach would be to attribute this view to the state-oriented theory of overcoming. However, one disturbing issue is apparent: the path from the society of transition to the freed society (communism) has hardly been thought through. Lenin leaves the “withering away of the state” to re-education and the development of the productive forces.

But just because the traditional state-oriented theory of overcoming cannot imagine this transition, it does not mean it is impossible. Indeed, the question arises, would it not be easier to put a constituting process into practice in a society dominated by political-statestructures? As attractive as this idea may seem, in our view there is one crucial flaw: until now, state-oriented attempts to overcome capitalism have often been unpredictable and chaotic. Counterrevolutionary movements add to this instability. It is hard to predict which dominant political-state structure will prevail after the break. Therefore, it remains doubtful whether state-oriented transformation can bring about societal conditions favourable to a process of constituting qualitatively new conditions. In addition, most transition societies are not characterised by a loose integration but by the dominance of a small group (party or similar) with a tight and authoritarian structure which hardly allows for other forms of societal organisation.

These spaces, however, are crucial for the beginning of a transformation process, as the latter often emerges in niches. Surely, there might also be transition societies dominated by political-state structures that are less tightly organised. However, we consider that a society built on plan mediation is inevitably characterised by an integrating-authoritarian logic (cf. Chap. 4, 3.2). That said, the contemplation of societal transformation on the basis of political-state dominance could be rather interesting in counties which (still) have a strong political and state organisation and perceive themselves (nominally) as transition societies (China, Cuba, Venezuela etc.).

In a scenario discussed in the movement of the →commons (p. 143), the transitional state could function as a “partner state” for movements. In that capacity, however, as a stirrup, it would have to strive for its own overcoming. This is conceivable, in principle. But we are afraid that the state has a certain “gravity” that reproduces the structures of the state and keeps new forms of societal organisation under control. This interest in control is understandable, given that production and mediation require a stronger state coordination in this context in order to maintain →societal coherence (p. 126). Also, the new forms have to fit into its coordination, resources and manpower have to be provided and so on. A liberating constitution process would have to defend itself against this “gravitational attraction”.

Another scenario could be a constitution process which does not occur in niches but in the transitional state itself. In this instance, thetransitional state must remodel itself according to needs. Again, we are critical of this path since the goal is not the democratisation of state decisions but an inclusive form of mediation. Therefore, decentralisation and the transfer of decisions to local authorities in Venezuela is a good thing; however, they still rest on central institutions of domination. Further on we will demonstrate that an institution with power of enforcement (→question of domination, p. 49) actually tends to prevent the emergence of inclusive conditions (Chap. 6, 1.2).

Bottom line: Liberating societal forms can only develop beyond the state.

How were the goals to be met? By the “capture of political power” (Marx and Engels 1848). The following sentences from the 1891 Erfurt Programme of the Social Democratic Party are fundamental: “The battle of the working class against capitalist exploitation necessarily is a political fight. […] It cannot effect the transfer of the means of production into the ownership of the collective without having gained political power.” Political power means the state. And the conclusion is correct: nationalisation can be achieved by taking political power—state power. Thus, the problem of transformation—how can we establish a free society?—becomes a problem of domination: how can we seize the state? We either follow the path of elections to political power (reform) or fight for it (revolution). That is the basis of state-oriented transformation theories.

2.2.1 Stage Model

Other thinkers within traditional Marxism also came to the conclusion that the “capture of power” is not the direct way to a free society. Their answer was as simple as it was unsatisfying: capitalism is not followed by the free society, communism, but by a →transitional society (p. 51), socialism (cf. Fig. 2.2, p. 54).

Fig. 2.2

The stage model of traditional Marxism

In the nineteenth century, there was no significant difference in the use of the terms socialism and communism, they were even exchangeable. However, the stage model turns socialism into a mere transitional society. This implies that a state-oriented transformation cannot lead to a free society. Karl Marx laid the foundation for the stage model with a few words in the text “Critique of the Gotha Programme” (1875)⁵ where he distinguishes a “first phase of communist society” from a “higher phase”. The first phase derives directly from capitalist society and, therefore, is “economically, morally, and intellectually still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society” (ibid., p. 20) Here, work certificates establish a relation between individual performance and consumption, and the work principle remains in place. Naturally, Marx recognises that this principle is a “right of inequality, […] like every right”, but “these defects are inevitable in the first phase” (ibid., p. 21). This “first phase” is later called socialism.

The model of the transition society was received with open arms by the workers’ movement. At long last, the claim of a consistent design of a postcapitalist society retreated into the background—socialism is allowed to incorporate inconsistencies and mistakes. Furthermore, the state does not have to be abolished but can be used in a sensible way, and eventually it simply withers away. Marxism-Leninism and other socialist theories explain inconsistencies with the socialist “temporary nature”. The promise of the communist paradise is postponed.

We would agree to the stage model in what refers to a state-oriented transformation—be it reform or revolution—building up a state-dominated society. The crucial question is: how does the state disappear? Because only then does a free society emerge, only then does the question of transformation find a satisfying answer. In fact, this theoretical challenge has been largely ignored by most theorists of the stage model, past and present. Marx did not say a word about the withering away of the state. Only Lenin tried to back it up in the text “The State and Revolution” (1917). But this theory too, in our view, remains incomplete.

2.2.2 Withering Away of the State

Traditional Marxism sees the state as necessary for the establishment of the “first phase of communist society” (Marx 1875) but considers that, when that is accomplished, it gradually loses its functions and, thus, its foundation. This was formulated by Engels and Marx; however, it was Lenin—essentially with recourse to Marx’ reflections on the Paris Commune (a socialist 1871 uprising)—who gave it a more consistent shape. He argued that the work principle and civil law are still in force: “Of course, bourgeois law in regard to the distribution of consumer goods inevitably presupposes the existence of the bourgeois state, for law is nothing without an apparatus capable of enforcing the observance of the rules of law”. But when is this “administrative state” going to die? Within “complete communism” it will happen “when people have become so accustomed to observing the fundamental rules of societal intercourse and when their labour has become so productive that they will voluntarily work according to their ability”. Complete communism would lead to “the breaking away from the division of labour, of doing away with the antithesis between mental and physical labour, of transforming labour into ‘life’s prime want’” (Lenin 1917).⁶ The adjustment includes that “people will gradually become accustomed to observing the elementary rules of societal intercourse that have been known for centuries and repeated for thousands of years in all copy-book maxims. They will become accustomed to observing them without force, without coercion, without subordination, without the special apparatus for coercion called the state.” Lenin’s text is not explicit about the rules, but it seems reasonable to assume something like “do as you expect others to do” and “don’t be egoistic, serve the community”—demanding individuals to freely subject to a collective whole.

Although Lenin speaks of “complete democracy” in socialism, the guidelines of development in socialism are set: development of the productive forces and familiarisation with moral rules; detractors, or honest people (and, later on, Lenin himself), also speak of re-education. And, even though he claims the socialist state is nothing but an “administrative state”⁷ or a “semi-state”, it clearly exists as a full state as it remains an institution enforcing its goals in society. His absolute belief in liberation via the development of the productive forces proves Lenin to be a worthy heir of capitalism. He thus replaces “production for the sake of production” with “production for the sake of communism”, the promise of a heavenly “higher phase”, and justifies all violence and subjugation that people have to suffer along the way. We, however, are of the opinion that a free society cannot emerge merely through the development of the productive forces. We will come back to this in Chap. 3, when dealing with transvolution. Also, the “inevitability of the withering away” seems doubtful to us. A free society is not built by way of familiarisation and subjection but by creating societal conditions according to our needs. The idea of re-education carries some truth for, in a transformation process, the subjectiveness of the people will also change. This, however, is not possible by learning rules, whether traditional and old or new and decreed. An individual and free unfolding requires a self-determined process of creating rules and conditions.

Other theories—neo-Gramscian, for example—put the question of the withering away of the state into practice and assume that an increased transfer of state decisions to local-neighbourhood self-organisation will disperse the state into the society. Nevertheless, a simple democratisation of the state, for example, by an increased participation of people in state decisions, will not achieve a free society. As long as there is a central administrative authority—no matter how democratic its decisions are—domination must prevail (c.f. Chap. 4, 3.2). And it is not enough to dispose of the state completely; it must be replaced by new forms of producing our life conditions and their societal mediation. We shall discuss below the possibility of developing such new forms within a state-planned society in transition.

2.3 The Question of Utopia Becomes the Question of Domination

The goal of emancipatory movements is to build a society free from domination. A transformation theory, to begin with, must determine the substantive provisions of the new society (question of utopia). Only if there is a clear understanding of the new form desired can one think about the way, about how this form can become dominant. The first question asks for the goal, the second for the path. Many new approaches to transformation (degrowth, solidarity economy, transition towns, radical reformism etc.) evade the first question and focus on the path.

State-oriented transformation theories follow the state-oriented path for the emergence of the new form. In traditional Marxist utopia, this is a logical assumption. It intends to build a new society on the basis of conscious state planning, which can be achieved and enforced via gaining political domination. The radical change of the form of society thus becomes a technology of domination: how can social movements or the political party become strong enough to enforce their own interests? The decisive question in traditional Marxist transformation is: “how can we conquer political domination?” It fits the utopia of a state-planned society. An emancipatory movement not aiming at a state-planned society has to start from scratch. It has to ask itself which transformation theory fits its utopia.

However, the problem is that many emancipatory movements have lost track of the question of utopia; at the same time, the old state-oriented answers to the question of transformation still linger. This is, certainly, due to the fact that the existing discourse on societal alternatives and utopias is rudimentary. The question of utopia is haunted by the ghosts of the past—and so is the question of transformation. The Interventionist Left (a network of many local groups in Germany), for example, claims: “The overcoming of capitalism, in the end, is a question of power” (IL 2014). This highly resembles traditional Marxism’s “conquest of political power”. Here too, the focus of attention is on state domination, even though the IL is state-critical. There are other cases where the connection between utopia and transformation has not been thought through in detail. In these cases, as it happens, a utopia free from domination and state is combined with a state-oriented transformation theory. But the goal of a utopia without a state requires going beyond the state-oriented transformation theory. Persistence on state-oriented transformation theories is the outcome of theoretical inconsequence.

Even though we do not share the state-oriented approach to transformation, the primacy of the question of utopia nevertheless applies in this case. If it turned out that this theoretically based utopia could be enforced in a state-oriented way, it could proceed to the question of domination. We have tried to elaborate on why we think this is not possible. Transformation requires a societal process, not just a state-oriented one. It needs power, but the question is which power should be gained, how, and whether this power turns into domination. This is the particular configuration we shall look into in our analysis of transvolution (Chap. 3).

3 Reform: Climbing the Mountain Step by Step

Reform usually refers to the “systematic reorganisation of existing conditions and systems” which can also include “drastic societal changes” (cf. German Wikipedia: Reform). For reformists, the transformation of capitalism is a mountain to be climbed. A mountain needs to be mastered step by step. Single steps are something distinct, sequential, calculable, plannable, designable. The next step can be discussed and specified once the previous has been taken. You can start with the first step right away, and should you be on the wrong track or be going adrift, the reform process can just take a few steps back. Moving step by step implies a soothing continuity, a reassuring security. And this lack of security is the reformist critique of revolution: revolutions abandon existing democratic decision-making institutions and are, therefore, less controllable and may be subject to antidemocratic and probably violent changes.

Thus, traditional, state-loyal reformism identifies possibilities within capitalist structures and the capitalist form. The idea is that gradual changes can slowly overcome capitalism. At a certain number of changes, reformed capitalism tips over into the free society. When the turning point has been reached, enough quantitative changes have accumulated to bring about a qualitative change of the form of society. For example: there can be a progressive rise in CO₂ taxes starting at 60$ and better health care during the first year; in the fourth year, unconditional basic income and a stricter democratic control of the economy; and in the tenth year all these reforms sum up to a profound societal change. Step by step, capitalism has been left behind. Not all reform theories are like this, some include breaks and levels.

Systematic, general redesign within capitalism links reform theories to the state, as it is the legitimate form of societal design in capitalism. The state stabilises changes through laws and enforces changes in society in a general, binding way. Without stabilisation and generalisation, any step-by-step process would always have to start from scratch and would be confined to niches.

Only in the political sphere and within the state can reformism systematically design society. The welfare state is an example of this. However, to reach a new form of society, it would have to break with existing structures. A new societal form must be created by a different form of producing the conditions of life. Traditional reformism cannot deliver that. It remodels the state and thereby society, but the state cannot create a free societal form. Therefore, traditional reformism’s positive reference to the state binds it to capitalism. Reaching the mountain peak, the mountaineers encounter what they have always been meeting during their hard ascent, only at a different level.

In the next section we shall show that state-loyal reformism in fact believed, and still believes, that the state is not a part of capitalism but a neutral instrument which can be used independently. Then we will deal with a variation of modern state-critical reformism which reveals tendencies to create a new social form, beyond the state, “from below”. Here the state is not the organiser of change but rather a mediator, an institution providing spaces for change.

3.1 Traditional Reformism

While traditional Marxist tendencies faithfully adhered to revolution, reformist worker tendencies took shape in the workers’ movement towards the end of the nineteenth century. They became established within the context of an improved position of the proletariat and the influence of extended suffrage. Thus, the proletariat increasingly began to consider that capitalist society could change within the framework of politics and the state. In the German-speaking world, reformism is connected to its most interesting representative, Eduard Bernstein (all quotes from 1899, transl. M.R.). Friedrich Engels’ former assistant declared democracy to be the forerunner of socialism: “With a […] backward working class, general franchise for a long time can appear as the right to choose one’s own ‘butcher’ however, with the workers’ number and knowledge it becomes an instrument to turn the elected representatives from masters into true servants of the masses”. He specified general franchise as “(only) a part of democracy, albeit a part that in the long run must entail the others, like a magnet attracts the scattered iron particles”.

For Bernstein, this enriched democracy was nothing less than socialism, since democracy is not only “a means for attaining socialism but a means and an end at the same time. It is the means for winning socialism and it is the form for fulfilling socialism”. For, without it, the “societal acquisition of the means of production (could) probably only” be enforced “in the form of dictatorial revolutionary central power, supported by the terrorist tyranny of revolutionary clubs”. Despite the bright ideas, the positive reference to a (democratic) state remains evident. The state is the instrument for the construction of the new society. The question of utopia becomes the question of domination. The task of societal restructuring is conferred on the state.

State-positive reformism, however, does not vanish with the disappearance of the traditional workers’ movement. It can be found in Eurocommunism (a European communist movement of the 1950s and the 1960s, in opposition to the Soviet Union) as well as (partly) in today’s reform theories—for example, in the theory of “Socialism of the 21^st century” (Dieterich 2006), which was decisive for Hugo Chavez’s politics in Venezuela.

3.2 State-Critical Reformism

Real socialism experiences lead to criticism of the traditional understanding of the state. Whether the state could be an instrument for emancipatory actions was already questioned to begin with. Recent state-critical reform approaches recognise the state as a sine qua non for reforms; however, their underlying attitude is critical or even hostile. As these theoretical orientations are relatively new, there is no general theory yet. Therefore, our presentation of state-critical reformism will be limited to Joachim Hirsch’s concept of “Radical Reformism”. This term includes “‘Reformism’, because it does not aim at the revolutionary capture of power, ‘radical’, because the focus is on those societal relations producing the dominant conditions of power and domination” (Hirsch 2007, transl. M.R.).

3.2.1 Radical Reformism

Hirsch fundamentally objects to the traditional understanding of revolution “because people (could) not be freed by domination and force” (Hirsch 1995, p. 194). He argues that “attempts to change the fundamental structures of society using state power” have failed, whether communist-revolutionary or social democratic-reformist. Moreover, “states have lost crucial policy spaces” (ibid.) because, he believes, nation-state-based politics is increasingly challenged by multinational companies. Thus, a nation-state-based centre of power has disappeared. He also dismisses ideas of a world-state. He favours a decentralised approach instead: “The point is not to have a new and even more perfect state but to create new, decentralised and cooperatively interconnected structures” (ibid.). After this rejection, however, he once again turns to the state.

“Although (the state could) not be an instrument of emancipatory social change, fights for the state influence the social balance of power and the conditions of political activities” (Hirsch 2002). Thus, “social rights and compromises won at the state level can attain general validity”. Historically, radical reformism developed “at first independently and in opposition to the state’s domination apparatus” (ibid.). Examples include the 1968 students’ protest, as well as the environmental and women’s movement of the 1970s and 1980s. They were independent and not state-based, and “their success led to a massive change in awareness and habits” (ibid.). They changed state politics.

Today, Hirsch claims, there are “neither plausible concepts nor sufficient support […] for the immediate implementation of a non-capitalist society” (Hirsch 1995, p. 194). Therefore, the next step would be to democratise political institutions, so that the “restrictions of the liberal-democratic nation state-based model (can be) overcome step by step” (ibid., p. 198). Hirsch links this to decentralisation and to a federalist, increasing independence of more locally-based institutions and, finally, to an “establishment of a completely new and more complex system of democratic rights of decision” (ibid., p. 202). This system is supposed to specify rules of procedure for the purpose of allowing various groups to participate in “public processes of discussing, negotiating and reaching compromise” (ibid., p. 201), in which “conflicts can be settled in an open and public manner” (ibid., p. 195), excluding majority opinion and including minority protection.

A fundamental requirement for the process of democratisation and the reform of state institutions would be a “politicisation of the economy” and a “re-politicisation of politics” (Narr and Schubert 1994). Hirsch wants to re-establish a primacy of politics (cf. p. 46). Politics must regain the ability to act if it is to exert real influence on entrepreneurial decisions. Hirsch postulates that the contradiction between politics and the economy “can only be resolved with the help of ‘Radical Reformism’, i.e., a political fight based on an internationally linked political self-organisation, independent of the ruling institutions and, nevertheless, aiming at successive institutional reforms” (Hirsch 1995, p. 204). It is only through such a fight and the experiences gained that “the concept of a new and freer society, beyond capitalism and socialism, can take a more concrete shape” (ibid.).

3.2.2 Utopia, Weak Spot of Traditional Reformism

With his radical reformism, Hirsch tries to conceptualise a transformation process which proceeds step by step and can still establish the basis of a new society—social agents as well as political and institutional forms. Many insights and ideas here have broken loose from state-positive reformism. A new society is supposed to develop free from state influence, via a broad process of democratisation, providing a frame which allows for the forms and agents of the new social system to crystallise. Now, one can doubt to what extent this extensive democratic “politicisation of the economy” can be achieved by a re-established primacy of politics; however, the main problem in this approach is the lack of identification of what is qualitatively new.

There is no theoretical answer to the question of the new societal form and, therefore, the target society. What social mediation will replace the market, the state and so on? Indeed, Hirsch talks about “alternative forms of life” and new “ways of living”, and with the adjective “radical” he claims that his transformation theory changes the fundamental societal relations. However, radicalism is but a negative definition, and the alternative—the quality of the new society—remains unclear. The main weak spot of traditional reformism was its inconsistent formulation of utopia, and Hirsch’s theory has the same problem.

The missing utopian theorisation also explains the prevailing inclination towards political-state transformation. The concrete part of his concept revolves mainly around economic democracy and the politicisation of the economy, a shift of the duality of market and state towards the state and the democratisation of the state. Nevertheless, his approach asks the right questions, even though it remains doubtful whether the new “forms” and “agents” constitute early forms of a free society.

3.3 Reformist Insights

Reformism stresses processuality, an important element of transformation. New societal forms cannot be simply enforced; they must be built and learnt step by step. We cannot leap out of capitalism; we must struggle our way out. The focus of reformism on transformation of the state, however, infringes on the orientation of the process. Reform theory must reassess the quality of the process by linking the necessary break with the social form to the equally necessary processuality. Transformation cannot simply be a state-based political process, for that would reduce it to modifications of a society based on property and work—be it a reformed capitalism or state socialism. For the process to really go beyond capitalism towards a free society, it must rest on new forms of the production* of living conditions.

4 Revolution: Jumping Over the Gorge

A revolution is a “structural change” which prevails “in a relatively short period of time […] outside the former legal forms”—therefore illegally—and, thus, “seldom in a peaceful way”. It differs from a coup or “palace coup” in that it has the “broad support of the population”. Therefore, it is considered a movement “from below” (German Wikipedia: revolution).

For revolutionaries, overcoming capitalism resembles jumping over a gorge. A gorge cannot be bridged step by step; it must be surmounted with one giant leap. It is not sufficient to leave the old behind step by step, hoping that a qualitative turnover will eventually take place. Only an abrupt, qualitative change can pave the way towards a new form of society. In order to achieve a sudden, fundamental change, the revolution has to deliver two things: end the Old and build the New. Putting an abrupt end to the Old, however, steers the revolution towards the state-centred political form. The New is built as a postrevolutionary reorganisation. Thereby, revolutionary theory—as well as reformism—separates state-oriented change from societal change. First a state-oriented break puts an end to the old society, and then a societal process starts, producing the new society. The order is crucial here: it is not a societal conversion which brings about political-state changes, but rather a state-related political conversion that leads to societal change.

4.1 Reactive and Active Revolutions

A revolution’s potential depends on its trigger. If the trigger of the revolution is social discontent, its potential is limited. The October Revolution of 1917 in Russia was triggered by hunger and war and led to the seizure of domination by a revolutionary minority, the Bolsheviks, who enforced a state-controlled economy. The French Revolution of 1789 bears certain similarities: triggered by hunger and tax pressure, the revolution served a bourgeois minority which replaced the absolutist regime with a modern civil state; thus, freed from feudal bonds, it lay the foundations for capitalist development. In these reactive revolutions, social revolt was used to enforce the domination project of a minority.

A revolution can only give birth to a free society if the old society “is pregnant with a new one” (Marx 1890, p. 779). Therefore, the possibilities for a free organisation of the society must be formed to such an extent that the people perceive them as a viable alternative. Then revolution will not be a reactive protest without visible alternatives but an active shift towards a new, tangible form of society. The state break will follow a societal change and not the other way around. This is the value a revolution theory can acquire in transvolution. It can be an active revolution. Whether it is necessary for transformation, we do not know; but it might possibly be so.

4.2 Revolution Is Bound to the State Form

Why does an abrupt ending of the old societal conditions have to take place in a state-based way? An abrupt shift necessarily leaves most of society unchanged, since a general change of all societal relations and human relationships requires a lot of time. If society is initially left largely unchanged, then abrupt, fundamental change must use the old societal forms. In other words, it is structurally conservative, hence moves in the old logic. The old societal form of changing society is politics, which wants to implement new conditions with the help of the state. Furthermore, revolution needs power to gain domination, which is necessary in order to enforce pervading societal changes. This power which aims at domination can be built piece by piece (e.g., by a movement headed by a party); however, domination must be won or conquered quickly, within the frame of the old logic. Only one form of public domination in capitalism is centrally organised and can thus be gained in a relatively short period of time: state domination. It is also a general form of domination, for its gravitational centre—the state—enforces and defends the societal structure.

Therefore, reference to the state can be found in all revolutionary theories. Marx already criticised the state focus of revolution: “Because it (the proletariat) thinks in political terms, it regards the will as the cause of all evils and force and the overthrow of a particular form of the state as the universal remedy […] and however universal a political revolt may be, its colossal form conceals a narrow split” (Marx 1844, p. 407 f.). The focus on the state finds different expressions: traditional Marxists want to seize political domination, which, in socialism, they wish to convert into the proletarian-democratic state. Modern communists and anarchists, however, do not regard the state as an instrument for emancipation (anymore). They seek to destroy the state through revolution. The consequences of putting a political end to the state become palpable in the uncertainties of postrevolutionary reorganisation.

4.3 Interest Form, Domination and Counterrevolution

The interest form of politics (cf. Chap. 2, 2.1) leads to the fact that a revolution supported by a majority of the population only represents partial interests. Therefore, it must prevail against other interests, other people; it must exert power over others, gain domination. An enforcement from the top requires domination. Existing conflicts of interest commonly produce various forms of counterrevolution. The sharpest form is an armed counter-power setting itself against the revolution. This puts revolution in a quandary; it either remains true to itself and desists or else it applies the very means it wants to abolish: suppression, violence, terror. Once the door to violence has been opened, it is difficult to close again; from that point on, it is only a question of definition, of who will be subjected to violence and when. This is also true if violence is “only (applied) for the defence” of the revolutionary achievements. Attack has always been the best defence (enjoy further reading: Adamczak 2007). Therefore, during and after the revolt, the revolution finds itself involved in a battle of domination which prevents many emancipatory processes.

4.4 Postrevolutionary Reorganisation

State power is either destroyed or conquered by the revolution. The day after has begun. Now the build-up of a new society commences. Let us create this postrevolutionary situation in our mind’s eye: production is full of capitalist machinery, the materialised force of the obligation to work, essentially built to submit people to tedious tasks. Capitalist technology is not neutral and thus not to be applied light-heartedly. With the exception of some creative areas and fields of knowledge, the dominant types of labour organisation represent forms of organised enforcement. The people themselves still carry the mental qualities of the old society: trust in domination, sexism, exclusion, performance fetish—internalised domination against oneself and others. And this without even considering the possible traumatic experiences and destructions of the revolutionary process itself. This is a problematic area that traditional Marxist theories, above all, with their purely external concept of domination, cannot grasp. For them, domination usually comes from the “outside”, and the disappearance of the latter solves the problem of the former. This is due to the reinterpretation of the question of domination as a mere question of power. Power sounds nicer. While the purpose of domination is clearly the suppression of unwanted impulses, power can be used for both positive and negative purposes. However, a free society cannot be enforced, for enforcement always requires domination.

The issue of what circumstances the previous state upheaval has left behind is crucial. Do these circumstances allow for the construction of a free society? The abrupt state conversion itself does not create a self-organised societal alternative. Revolution interrupts the “normal paths of societal reproduction” (Demirovič 2012, p. 36)—what replaces them, however, is not clear. The task is nothing less than the building of a new societal system. Quick solutions are required to guarantee societal reproduction; people must still eat and require all kinds of provisions. The process of reorganisation is quickly overstrained by many simultaneous requirements and abrupt changes. People with know-how in emancipatory projects are rare, the knowledge of different forms of socialisation is scarce and scattered (c.f. ibid.). The risk of conflict and violence is huge. Demirovič is correct in expressing: “The expectation that everything will be fixed by the situation itself, that in revolutionary processes the revolution provides appropriate people in sufficient numbers, that they, quasi spontaneously, develop the relevant abilities, is wrong” (ibid.). The combination of overwhelming problems and overwhelmed people who have grown up under capitalist conditions easily leads to familiar authoritarian and excluding solutions. The only societal power with sufficient resources for societal formation is the state. In postrevolutionary conditions, without the societal construction of an alternative mode of production*, one can expect, at best, a society organised by a democratic state.

Antiauthoritarian approaches and those critical of the state—collective or communist anarchism, council communism and so on—reject state planning but share a fundamental difficulty. The question of how to develop and implement a new societal form remains largely unanswered; either the question is not grasped properly or to reflect on the form of the new society is forbidden as authoritarian. Once state-based domination has been conquered, this reflection is suspended by the pressure to perform. The focus on destroying the old rather than understanding and creating the new has fatal consequences for postrevolutionary reorganisation. In this situation, what is to be done and what the result might be is largely unclear. In doubt, many antiauthoritarian movements pin their hope on spontaneous self-organisation. The obvious mode of organisation for subjects with a capitalist background—that is, subjects used to domination—is exclusion, precisely because they are so familiarised with it.

4.5 State-Critical Revolutionary Theory

Unfortunately, the substance of modern revolutionary theories is scarce, in spite of frequent verbal appeals. In many cases they simply prolong old ideas. At this point, we would like to discuss the decidedly antiauthoritarian revolutionary theory of the communist anarchists.⁸ As in state-critical reformism, many elements of transvolution can also be found in state-critical revolutionary theory. Revolutionary anarchists distinguish between a political revolution, which corresponds to a mere “change of ruler” (McKay 2012) and a social revolution, referring to a societal transformation of the way a society is organised. A social revolution is the “result of years of social fights, not the result of an overthrow of the state apparatus” (deu.anarchopedia.org/Soziale_Revolution, transl. M.R.). The fundamental change is carried out “directly by the mass of the people […] not by political means” (McKay 2012, own re-transl.). Traditional Marxists organise the masses in order to “conquer state power”, anarchists do so to “destroy” it (Bakunin 1975, p. 263). In this context, “evolution and revolution (are) not two different and separate things […] revolution is just the boiling point of an evolution” (Berkman 1928, p. 34, transl. M.R.). The social revolution starts today. The focus is not on “organising the power of the working class” but on the development of a “non-political or antipolitical social force” (Bakunin 1975, p. 262f, transl. M.R.). It is the daily fight which produces “free people and organisations” (McKay 2012, transl. M.R.). Bakunin regarded the First International as a promising organisation, as the “real power, which knows what to do, and, therefore, is able to take the revolution into its own hands” (Maximoff 1964, p. 323). In contrast to Bakunin, modern anarchists rather see this power in libertarian trade unions, cooperatives and so on. But Bakunin also agreed that cooperatives train “workers in the practices of economic organisation and plant the valuable seed for the organisation of the future” (Bakunin 1975, p. 173).

The mere construction of alternatives is not enough for anarchists. Capitalism cannot be “reformed away” or “outcompeted” (McKay 2012). No “ruling group” has ever given up its domination voluntarily. So, in the end, a revolution is necessary. However, the revolution should not incorporate elements of violence or coercion, except for the purpose of self-defence. It would be practised by a “voluntary militia” which, however, would not “interfere with the life of the communes”. It is only supposed “to defend the liberty of workers and farmers to self-organise their lives” (ibid.). The true revolution is carried out by the people themselves. During the Spanish Revolution—a focal point of hope for many anarchists—“freed farmers and workers” started to collectivise the land and the means of production. Attempts at enforcing authoritarian organisations would be quenched by “free individuals” refusing cooperation. An internal counterrevolution would be impossible, since the broad mass of the population could never be estranged from the revolution because, in an anarchist revolution, the power would be in their hands (ibid.).

4.5.1 Problems in Anarchist Revolution Theory

Anarchists validly criticise traditional Marxism for its fixation on the state and its orientation towards the state form. Also, they acknowledge the necessity of building alternatives in order to establish a free society. With its rejection of abruptness and the criticism of a revolution without “evolution”, this theory resembles transvolution. However, certain problems persist in a number of approaches, whereas other perspectives more or less overcome them.

The classical revolution becomes state-oriented not only by aiming at the “replacement of the rulers” but also by steering towards the abrupt seizure of societal power. Though many anarchists object abruptness, others, nevertheless, favour the idea of a state-oriented liberation and subsequent postrevolutionary self-organisation. The previous building of other societal forms presumably helps in tackling postrevolutionary problems, but the importance of spontaneous restructuring is also often strained. A free societal organisation is something to be figured out and learned. Emphasis on spontaneous postrevolutionary self-organisation tends to socially-romantically exaggerate human potential.

A further possible problem is the inconsistent understanding of prerevolutionary “evolution”. This “evolution” can only allow for a postrevolutionary restructuring if it creates evolving alternatives of a new societal form, as well as promotes its expansion to the extent that it represents a viable alternative to the current form of society. Unfortunately, in most cases the quality of the alternatives is not adequately specified. Often named “libertarian alternatives”—as in the case of “libertarian trade unions, cooperatives”—they do not have the quality of being governed by a different societal, that is, non-capitalist, form of mediation. Although they question the ownership of the means of production, the ownership of the resulting products is not part of the analysis. Usually, cooperatives still produce commodities for the market. At this point the big problem of many anarchist revolution theories becomes obvious: the utopia is not sufficiently specified and, therefore, potentially contaminated by old forms. The content of the new societal forms to be built before the revolution cannot be defined because the form of the free society—despite some tendencies—has not been sufficiently grasped. Mere trust in cooperatives and collective bodies and their “free association” is not enough.

Anarcho-communist revolution theory already displays numerous qualities of a transvolution theory. However, the content-related meaning of “libertarian alternatives” would have to be specified first via a utopia theory, to prove that it really carries a different societal logic. This, in turn, requires at least a basic understanding of the targeted form of society. Secondly, the issue of how far the prerevolutionary “evolution” has to develop and what a “sufficient generalisation” within the old society means should be resolved. This way the revolution will not only reflect social unrest, it will not be a mere reactive revolution; it will rather foreshadow the possibility of a different form of societal organisation, it will be an active revolution (cf. p. 64).

4.6 Revolutionary Insights

Revolution emphasises the societal break. It criticises reformism for simply extending capitalist tendencies. The transformation of capitalism requires a qualitative change of the societal form of re/production. This change, however, must not follow the societal break, or else it will be all too easily integrated into the Old in a situation full of turbulence and ample requirements.

New societal forms of producing* our living conditions must be the starting point of the transformation process; they must design it from the very beginning and grow with it. These ideas are also intrinsic to state-critical revolutionary theories; however, they must be specified in more detail. We will do that in our transvolution theory.

5 Summary

A free societal form cannot be the result of a state-oriented process. It needs a societal constituting process within which to pave the way for a liberation at the individual, collective and societal level:

• We ask state transformation theories: which form of society can they create?

• The approaches of reform and revolution both move in the sphere of politics.

• Reform as a “successive reorganisation” depends on the state as the institution of “generality”.

• Due to its abruptness, revolution must—for the time being—reside within old structures and, therefore, in the realm of the state, no matter whether it subsequently wants to destroy it or use it.

• A separation arises: first a state break takes place, achieved through reform or revolution; this should subsequently enable a qualitative transition to a different societal form.

• The state, however, cannot bring about a free society, as that can only be designed “from below”, by the people and on the basis of their needs.

• The traditional Marxist aim of the “nationalisation of the means of production” can be achieved on a state-oriented basis. State transformation theories can serve this purpose.

• Reform and revolution are manifested as children of traditional Marxism: they can conceptualise the seizure of power and redesign the state but cannot lead to the development of a free society.

• Focussing on the state alteration changes the question of transformation “How can we achieve a free society?” to one of domination “How can we gain state domination?”.

• State-critical revolution and reform theories question the state as an instrument; thus, the development of societal alternatives becomes essential.

• A transformation theory aiming at a free society would have to start by asking the utopia question: what characterises a free society? After reaching a conclusion, the transformation question can be asked: how can we achieve this aim?

• Only a self-organised constitution process can bring about a free society.