Keywords

Security and protection of Israelis has officially been the largest priority for Israel and its leadership. However, to what extent do Israeli national security strategies and practices protect the civilian population under its authority? Who is deemed worthy of national protection and who doesn’t fall under the umbrella of state protection? This chapter will examine the principles, the practices, and the perceptions of Israeli protection. Who are the protectors and how effective is the protection of civilians? Unpacking strategies of the protectors, the realities of the unprotected and the perceptions and legitimization of non-protection, this chapter examines and analyses the current strategies and gaps in the Israeli protection regime and the justifications of their absence.

It is worth noting that some of the principles behind Israel’s security strategies were already established when the state was founded. Zeev Jabotinsky’s “Iron Wall,” written in 1923, provides some of the underlying guiding principles still valid today. According to Jabotinsky, it is ‘utterly impossible to obtain the voluntary consent of the Palestine Arabs for converting “Palestine” from an Arab country into a country with a Jewish majority’ (Jabotinsky 1923). Since Palestinians will not accept Jewish colonialism, ‘the only way to reach an agreement in the future is to abandon all idea of seeking an agreement at present’ (Jabotinsky 1923). As noted by Jabotinsky, Zionist colonialism can proceed and develop only under the protection of a strong power behind an iron wall, which the native population cannot breach.

The founder of the state of Israel and the first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion outlined two fundamental principles for Israel’s security; first, shifting combat onto enemy soil and, second; achieving military decision in the shortest possible time (Eisenkot and Siboni 2019, p. 30). Both principles have also remained in place—the first through Israel maintaining an impenetrable border with fierce retributions on attempts at breach; The second, achieving as much as possible in the least amount of time. As noted by Eisenkot and Siboni, rapidly shifting the fighting onto enemy soil and achieving victory as quickly as possible, applies today as much as ever (Washington Institute 2019). The so-called Gaza wars are a good example of this. The time element is crucial because of the social and economic difficulty of a reserve force in extended combat and the difficulty of preserving legitimacy within the international community for the use of force over time.

According to Washington Institute, Israel’s security strategy has officially focused on the four D’s—Deterrence, Detection, Defence and (Military) Decision-making (Washington Institute 2019, p. 34). Israel considers itself to be an anomaly in a predominantly hostile region. The country’s security narrative is commonly focused on regional threats, stemming from challenges from Iran’s nuclear military capability and its regional engagement with neighbouring Syria, Lebanon, and Iran. With Israel’s vast military superiority over its neighbours and unconditional support from the world’s military superpower the US, the threat has been exaggerated. One can differentiate between real threats, perceived threats and hyped-up existential threats. Existential threat, or a perceived fear of the potential annihilation of existence of Israel and its people, is frequently publicly elicited and is intended to heighten fear and rally support for a policy or a national leader. Several members of the Israeli military establishment noted that it’s often money and politics, rather than security, that push the fear of an imminent attack or hyped-up existential threat against Israel. Although much of the narrative is focused on regional threats, the daily tasks of the Israeli military establishment are focused on management of the Palestinian civilian population living under its military occupation.

Fearmongering, or relying on hyped-up threats that impact the civilian population hasve in recent years been a common way for Israeli national leadership to remain in power. Former Defence Minister Moshe Yaalon referred to Benjamin Netanyahu as a fearmonger. As noted by Yaalon, Netanyahu and his top ministers stoked ethnic and religious hatreds, exaggerated the security threats to cling to office and distract people from real challenges (Booth 2016). The former Director-General of Israel’s Atomic Energy Commission also noted that the defence establishment commonly sent out false alarms in order to grab a bigger budget (Halpern 2010). Critical scholars have pointed to common Israeli policies of promotion of fear and insecurity among Israeli and Palestinian civilians (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015). Although some of the fearmongering rhetoric had been slightly toned down when Netanyahu was out of power, the 2022 Israeli elections brought to the forefront even more radical and conflictual elements. In order to come back to power and prevent being persecuted for corruption, Netanyahu aligned himself with the what has been described as ‘the most extreme right-wing, racist, homophobic and theocratic coalition in Israel's history’ (Haaretz 2022). With an increase in hard-line rhetoric, rise of incitement and severe security measures against Palestinian demonstrators and insurgents, and little chance of a political solution, the realities subsequent to the 2022 elections are predicted to become even more violent and volatile.

Israeli emphasis on security has been studied and discussed extensively (Freilich 2018; Peters and Pinfold 2018; Cohen and Klieman 2018). Known globally as a security specialist, Israel’s sale of military knowledge, expertise, cyber and military equipment provides the country with a significant proportion of its income (Freilich 2018). There are over 150 active defence companies based in Israel with combined annual revenues of more than 3.5 billion USD (AICE 2021). During 2020, Israel’s military exports hit $8.3 billion USD, the second highest-ever total (Times of Israel 2021). European military imports from Israel, focused on terrorism, borders and cyber security, have also been on an all-time high (Times of Israel 2021). In recent years, Israeli military expertise has shifted from hardware required in fighting wars against armies, to tools utilized to monitor opposition and civilian populations. Particularly sought after though increasingly controversial has been the software Pegasus, spyware developed by the Israeli cyber-arms firm NSO Group. Pegasus has been used with increased frequency around the world to monitor government officials, opposition, critical NGOs and activists.

Although Israel’s military industry and its security expertise haves been a source of ample revenue, its security measures, especially the treatment of the Palestinian population under military occupation, haves been a source of much condemnation. Human Rights Watch noted that security has been abused to justify ethnic cleansing and a system of apartheid. Many policies, such as: ‘the denial of building permits in Area C, East Jerusalem, and the Negev in Israel, residency revocations for Jerusalemites, or expropriation of privately owned land and discriminatory allocation of state lands, have no legitimate security justification. Others, including the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law and freeze of the OPT population registry, use security as a pretext to advance demographic objectives’ (Human Rights Watch 2021). Israeli protection strategies have been designed to partially shield Israeli society from the effects of the occupation while maintaining control over the Palestinian population and hindering change. As will be discussed, political change has been viewed with hostility within Israel, as the potential cost of political change or a peace agreement is perceived as an unnecessary risk and a greater threat than the status quo (Sheizaf 2014).

Scholars, observers, diplomats and practitioners have been increasingly critical of Israel’s harsh security measures related to its military occupation and increasing numbers of injuries and fatalities of Palestinian civilians (Thrall 2017). Even ardent supporters of Israel have become critical of draconian security and anti democratic measures put in place by Netanyahu’s coalition government elected in 2022 (Bloomberg, 2023). Recent studies examining fatalities within the Israeli/Palestinian conflict have pointed to evidence of risk transfer, where Israel transferred risk from its soldiers to Palestinian civilians (Levy 2017). Although Israel blames the Palestinian Authority and terrorist organizations for placing Palestinian non-combatants in harm’s way, what are Israeli principles and practices regarding the protection of non-combatants? To what extent do Israeli security institutions distinguish between combatants and non-combatants? Are the growing number of civilian casualties linked to shifting principles and policies? This chapter will outline the role of protectors, the protected and those in need of protection, examining the principles, practice and perception of protection under Israeli authority. The final section will examine the justifications for the lack of protection.

The Protected

The population under varying degrees of the Israeli protection regime can be differentiated most significantly between those living within current Israeli borders and Palestinians living under Israeli military occupation beyond the green line. The green line is the demarcation line or the pre-1967 line separating Israeli territory from its neighbours and the territory occupied by Israel (see Map 2.1). The civilians living under Israeli protection within the green line comprise of: Jewish Israelis including Ethiopians and Russians, Muslim Palestinian Israelis (Israeli-Arabs), Christian Palestinians, Drews, Bedouins and other minority groups. Refugees and others who are living within Israel temporarily or permanently but without citizenship, also fall under Israeli civil authority including the civilian police. Outside of the green line are included Christian and Muslim Palestinians living under Israeli military authority and Jewish Israelis living in guarded settlements under Israeli civil authority. East Jerusalem residents, who for the most part do not hold Israeli citizenship but have access to Israel’s social services including healthcare, fall in a distinct category. The degree of protection offered and the perception of the protection varyies widely between the different ethno-religious groups, and particularly between the populations living inside or outside of the green line.

Map 2.1
A map of Israel. It has Jericho, Bethlehem, East Jerusalem, Hebron, the Dead Sea, and more. A demarcation line is all along its border. An inset map of the Mediterranean Sea has Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. The legend has the border lines, barrier, Oslo Agreement, and Oslo interim agreements.

(Source UNISPAL—The United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine [2022] UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, https://www.un.org/unispal/data-collection/)

Israel & occupied Palestinian territory

Full size image

The most dramatic differentiation in protection can be made between the protection of Jewish civilians living under Israeli authority within Israel, and Palestinian civilians living under Israel’s military occupation outside of the green line. Although the distinctions have been fundamental to how the Israeli government and security establishment perceive and justify their policing tools, the distinction in the perception of many Palestinians is are not as significant. In the eyes of many Palestinians, whether living within or outside of the green line, Israeli protection is perceived as a contradiction of terms.

Distinctions in protection can also be made among specific vulnerable populations including visible minorities, persons with disability and youth. The vulnerability of youth and children, particularly Palestinian children, will be discussed in Chapter 4. In recent years, vulnerability has also been exacerbated for vocal state critics of the Israeli regime, including human rights activists, who have been publicly declared to be enemies of the state (Gordon 2014). Human Rrights organizations have been increasingly monitored and targeted with offices ransacked, the heads of critical organizations threatened, arrested and/or deported. Members of the newly elected 2022 Israeli government made a vow to target those who do not support the state. Religious Zionism head Bezalel Smotrich said that human rights organizations are “an existential threat to Israel” and the incoming government must deal with them by “seizing their funds” and acting against them with all legal and security measures (Shpigel 2022).

However, the least protected population are Palestinian civilians living beyond the green line under the Israeli military occupation who are a target of aggression and in some areas do not fall under the umbrella of any protection. The following sections will outline those in need of protection under Israel’s de facto authority including East Jerusalem and beyond the green line in areas B and C in Occupied West Bank and within Gaza.

East Jerusalem

Jerusalem is the disputed capital of Israel and Palestine and remains largely divided between West Jerusalem, integrated within the Israeli protection sphere, and East Jerusalem, the home to mostly Palestinian residents, the majority of whom are stateless and do not fall under any protection regime. Israel’s unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem (and the surrounding West Bank territory) in 1967 has not been recognized by the international community (IC) but is a de-facto reality. UN and other international and regional bodies consider East Jerusalem an integral part of the occupied Palestinian territory and its Palestinian residents as persons protected by international humanitarian law (OCHA 2014). Israel considers East Jerusalem under its own authority but its treatment of East Jerusalem is far from equal and protection for East Jerusalem residents runs from poor to non-existent. The majority of Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem lack Israeli citizenship and do not trust or rely on Israeli authority and protectors including the police. There are no Palestinian police forces operating in East Jerusalem and, in most neighbourhoods, the residents prefer to approach traditional Muslim elders for disputes on issues. Border police are sent into East Jerusalem to deal with security concerns for Israel but not as protectors for the local population.

The degree of animosity between East Jerusalem residents and Israeli police varies between the different Palestinian neighbourhoods. Wealthier neighbourhoods such as Beit Hanina have fewer security issues and some residents have limited trust in Israeli police. Poorer neighbourhoods, particularly those with ongoing evictions of Palestinian residents and growing presence of extreme Jewish settlers such as in Sheikh Jarrah, have daily or weekly skirmishes and a very troubled relationship with Israeli security. Moves to evict Palestinian families in Sheikh Jarrah had been one of the key issues in the 2021 escalation of violence culminating in 2021 May’s Gaza war. Since 2019, Issawiah has also been a focal point of ongoing demonstrations and violent clashes between its Palestinian residents and the Israeli police.

Occupied West Bank

Beyond the green line, the territories of the West Bank are under Israeli military control and, with the exception of the Jewish settlements, have not been incorporated into Israel’s political and civilian administrative system. Since the 1990s Oslo Peace Accords, the West Bank has been divided into Areas A, B and C (see Map 2.1). Contested spaces notably Area C (and East Jerusalem) offer the least protection for civilians. Area A, constituting 18% of the West Bank, is the most populated region and includes the main cities of Ramallah, Jericho, Bethlehem, Tulkarem, Nablus, Qalqilya and Jenin. Area A is under Palestinian administrative control with Palestinian military and police forces and thus will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapter. Israeli citizens are officially forbidden from entering Area A, however, Israeli forces conduct regular incursions. Although incursions into Area A have been officially coordinated with the Palestinian aAuthority, cooperation in security has been suspended since 2020, and is generally ignored in times of tension.

Area B, composing of 21 percent of the West Bank, is under Israeli military control, while the PA retains some control in education, health and the economy. Area C comprises of about 60 percent of the Palestinian territory and is completely under Israeli military control. Thus, all protection in Area C, including policing and judiciary, is under Israeli military authority, which leaves the Palestinian residents living in Area C completely devoid of protection. Israel controls and monitors all movement between the different areas including economic trade. Area C also contains the highest number of forced evictions of Palestinian residents. During 2020, the demolition of homes resulted in the displacement of 570 people (OCHA 2021).

Gaza

Cycles of violence, including Israeli bombardment campaigns and incursions into Gaza, have directly affected the majority of the Gaza population that has nowhere to flee. Rockets fired into Israel have been the justifications for the incursions and bombardment campaigns. Hamas has also adopted new tools such as use of kites and balloons to deliver incendiary and explosive devices. Economic blockades, severe fuel and water shortages, and Israeli restrictions on many items including basic construction materials have left much of the population vulnerable to not only violence but also natural elements. Controlled and governed by Hamas with Israel controlling land and sea borders, Gaza is the home of the least protected population in the world. This is especially the case since the 2006 election of Hamas, a terrorist organization that maintains belligerent control of the population. Israeli security, in turn, has been focused on creating an impenetrable border, containment of the population within Gaza, firing at demonstrations who approach the border and bombardments from above, subjecting all Gaza residents to collective punishment for electing Hamas. Since Israel treats the civilian population as an enemy or collateral damage, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants in Gaza is negligible. In Gaza, Palestinian and international NGO’s efforts have also been hindered by Hamas, especially assisting women and LGBTQ given their limited rights and protection under Sharia law.

The Protectors

To begin with, who are the protectors, who is and who is not being protected under the umbrella of the various Israeli protectors and why? Including the areas under Israel’s military occupation, the official protectors can be said to consist of: the state leadership, Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), the police, the courts, border guards, and private security companies, Israeli intelligence agencies including the Shin Bet and Mossad and non-government organizations (NGO’s). Each of these entities perceive protection and who is to be included and excluded under the umbrella of Israeli protection differently. Israeli security forces and police are officially charged with protection all civilians; however, security becomes progressively more militaristic in Palestinian/Arab-dominated areas within Israel and takes on a malignant rather than a protective role in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Lethal force without just cause is utilized almost exclusively against Israeli minorities and Palestinians and a majority of the cases of abuse by the police are never investigated (Halbfinger and Rasgon 2020). While Israeli police are focused on security problems within Israel, border guards and private security companies have in recent years gained increased importance operating within Palestinian Occupied Territories.

The Government: Although Israel’s leadership has the responsibility for the protection of all civilians under its territory, this protection generally does not apply to the Palestinian population. Standards on protection of civilians are widely different depending on the identity of the civilian and their location. The Palestinian population living within the green line inside of Israel is commonly considered the fifth wheel, an undesired population that is commonly publicly threatened with eviction. Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu noted that Israel is “the national state, not of all its citizens, but only of the Jewish people” (NPR 2019). For the Palestinian population living under the Israeli occupation, particularly in Gaza, there is little to no distinction between a civilian and terrorist. Lack of protection of Palestinians, within or outside of the green line, is generally blamed on the Palestinian leadership. All violence is blamed on incitement of the Palestinian leaders.

In general, incidents involving security guards, the IDF or border guards where Palestinian civilians are killed are commonly not investigated and politically justified. As an example, when discussing heightened violence within Israel, listing all attacks against Israelis while ignoring attacks against Palestinians, the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs noted that ‘the series of attacks against Israelis is the direct result of incitement by radical Islamist and terrorist elements, calling on Palestinian youth to murder Jews’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021). In 2015, the Mayor of on Palestinian youth to murder Jews’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021). In 2015, the Mayor of Jerusalem asked those with guns to wear them and—“shoot to kill anyone carrying knife or screwdriver” (Hasson 2015). More recently, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett also asked those who have a licencse to carry a weapon 'should do it now’ (Breiner and Kubovich 2022).

Intelligence

The Israeli intelligence is made up of Mossad (overseas operations) AMAN (military intelligence and Shabak (internal intelligence). Although Israeli intelligence is challenging to pin down because documents are seldomly declassified, it plays a significant role in protection. Israeli leadership have used intelligence for targeted assassinations regionally and within Gaza. The 2004 assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, was one among many Hamas leaders to be targeted and killed in Israeli operations. Avraham Shalom, the Head of Shin Bet between 1980 and—1986, noted: “In a war against terror, forget about morality, find morals in terrorists first” (Gatekeepers 2013). The majority of intelligence today is gathered remotely, mainly by hacking computers and cellphones. The shift from Humint to Sigint intelligence has affected both the ability of spy agencies to gather information as well as protection of individuals. Humit—human intelligence—is the collection of information from human sources such as clandestine operations. Sigint intelligence refers to intelligence that is gathered by interception of signals. The multiplicity of security cameras backed by facial recognition technology and biometric passports has made it harder for intelligence agents to move around, infiltrate or travel undercover (Harrel 2022c).

Traditionally, Israeli intelligence units have been highly valued for providing exact intel on potential local and regional terrorists. Part of the strength of relatively effective Israeli intelligence has been the successful recruitment of Israel’s Palestinian Arab population including the Drews. The recent death of Mahmoud Kheir el-Din, who was killed in friendly fire in an intelligence gathering Gaza operation, spelled another step towards the end of risky secret operations (Harrel 2022a, 2022b, 2022c). Intelligence has also been used to monitor and expose vulnerable populations, such as LGBTQ, women and men engaged in socially unacceptable behaviours. Homosexuality in Gaza remains illegal and is punishable by death. The gathering of details on civilians' sex lives for use in blackmail operations has heightened vulnerability that has been exploited by Israel. In 2014, forty-three former members of the elite IDF intelligence Unit 8200, including officers, wrote an open letter to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu saying they would refuse to do reserve service because of Israel's ‘`political persecution' of the Palestinians. The unit noted that the information that is gathered and stored in the army’s systems “harms innocent people. It is used for political persecution and to create divisions within Palestinian society by recruiting collaborators and driving parts of Palestinian society against itself” (Cohen 2014).

Israeli Police Force The Israeli police force operates throughout Israel, Occupied East Jerusalem, Area C of the West Bank and the Golan Heights. Within Israel, the police are commonly criticized for mistreatment and discrimination against visible minorities. Waves of demonstrations by young Ethiopian Israelis during 2015 and 2019 that followed racialized incidents haves led to a push for internal investigations and police reforms. For Israelis of Ethiopian descent, institutional racism and troublesome policing are a major impediment to their sense of equality and full citizenship (Abu and Ben Porat 2021). Israeli police have also come under fire from women’s rights groups for failing to address the rising number of cases of violence against women. Minority women face the double bind of “gendered racism” and “racialized sexism” from the communities and police. For example, according to studies, Israeli police have been noted to more readily accept Arab men’s excuses for violent outbursts or turned a blind eye to battering incidents (Adelman et al. 2003).

Israeli police also operate in East Jerusalem and beyond the green line within Palestinian areas under Israel’s military occupation;, however, they usually deal with security breaches and not protection of Palestinian civilians and the police generally used are special militaristic units such as the border police.

Border Police: Border police, whose main tasks are maintaining public order and fighting terrorism, currently constitute about 22% of the operational forces in the Israel Police. The border police are made up of special police forces from the IDF and recruited volunteers. According to the Ministry of Public Security, there are 68 diverse units including operational battalions, units responsible for maintaining routine security, the YAMAM special counter-terrorism unit, the undercover YAMAS unit, units for the security of essential facilities, the 101 units, an anti-riot unit and a k-9 unit (Ministry of Public Security 2014). They do not necessarily wear a uniform and operate mostly in Occupied Palestinian territories as well as along the border areas. They receive counter terrorism and combat training and tend to have a very poor reputation for protection of civilians or accountability. The border police operate more as soldiers and are known for being quick to use lethal force against suspected terrorists including youth and unarmed civilians. Incidents between the police and Palestinian civilians outside the green line are commonly not reported or investigated. Palestinian civilians, including minors, are also commonly arrested and held without being charged.

The border police are the most prominent public security actor in East Jerusalem, however, generally their role is not to protect the local Palestinian population. According to police reports, there have been many incidents where Israeli Border policemen initiated “friction” with residents of East Jerusalem to provoke a violent response (Hasson 2016). Israeli border police operating in East Jerusalem have also been known to instigate rather than prevent violence. In an infamous incident in Issawiah, an Israeli police officer planted a M16 rifle in an East Jerusalem resident’s house for a Docudrama. The discovery was staged by policemen in the Jerusalem District, with the purpose of promoting themselves and presenting Isawiyah residents as a security risk (Hasson 2019). Although the police issued an apology, this incident and others like it did not result in any disciplinary actions.

International and national NGO’s have reported widespread violence and abuse against Palestinian civilians by border police units. Despite having a track record of abusive policing, border police have been strongly supported by the government. In 2021, Netanyahu exclaimed that the Israeli border police should not be afraid of investigations. “We hear talk of apprehension over [future] commissions of inquiry, investigations, inspections – we will give you all the tools to protect yourself and the citizens of Israel,” adding, “You have our full backing, do not be afraid” (Human Rights Watch 2021). As noted by NGO observers, the lack of accountability has contributed to their behaviour to act with impunity.

Israeli Defence Force—(IDF): It has been said that rather than a state with a military, Israel is military that has a state, attributing to the power of the military. All Jewish, Christian and Drew male and female Israelis are drafted into the IDF at the age of 18. For Jewish Israelis, the IDF is the most respected and trusted institution within Israel (Democracy Index 2019). Ninety percent of Israeli Jews and 41% of Israeli-Arabs (which includes Drews and Christians) trust the army. In comparison, trust in the Israeli parliament—the Knesset—is 30% among Jews and 24% among Israeli-Arabs. For the Palestinians living under the military occupation, the IDF is the key tool of the occupation controlling daily movement and life. While all armed forces value the lives of their soldiers, Israel considers its soldier’s lives to be more valuable than the lives of enemy civilians (Erakat 2019). Israel’s aversion to soldier casualties leads it to liberally apply force such as airstrikes and massive indiscriminate fire in order to guarantee force protection (Erakat 2019, p. 198).

There are hundreds of different units within the IDF including paratroopers, engineering, infantry, intelligence, miliarymilitary police and special forces, many utilizing different tools and rules of engagement. Some units, such as the Duvdevan, often wear civilian clothing to disguise themselves among the local Arab populace. They operate independently and engage in special operations including targeted killings. Targeted killings have commonly been under the auspices of Mossad and Shin Beit;, however, the IDF has increasingly been tasked or given the green light for targeted assignations (Bergman 2018). The 2022 killing of prominent Palestinian Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh by the Duvdevnan unit has drawn international condemnation and investigation by the international criminal court.

Security Guards

Armed security guards work at all entrances of buildings whether malls, transportations, businesses, education or entertainment facilities within Israel. According to estimates, there are about 135,000 security guards in Israel, approximately 50,000 of whom bear arms (Who Profits Research Centre 2016, p. 27). Considered a very basic job requiring little or no training, half of all security guards are new or old immigrants from the former USSR, who are paid minimum wage. Checkpoints along the green lines, however, are generally run by selected private security companies.

Private Security Companies (PSC) Private security companies have become increasingly important particularly in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, controlling the Palestinian population, manning checkpoints and protecting Jewish settlers on Occupied Palestinian land. Critics have noted that Israel has employed non-state actors to do the ‘dirty work’ required to ethnically cleanse the Palestinian population and build and maintain the settlements (Volinz 2019). The privatization of checkpoints along the seamlines between Israel and the military occupied territory and withing the territories began in 2006. Every year, additional checkpoints have been transferred to PSC (Who Profits Research Centre 2016). At least 14 checkpoints have been privatized and transferred to PSC including: 12 checkpoints in the West Bank and 2 checkpoints between Gaza and Israel (Erez and Kerem Shalom) (Who Profits Research Centre 2016). More are being privatized.

The outsourcing of security to private companies has made the Israeli state less accountable towards the protection of civilians. As noted by a local Jerusalem politician: ‘to recruit private security companies instead of relying on the police force can save us a lot of headaches. It means that the authorities don’t take full responsibility […] it means that accountability is scattered into so many different bodies so that in the end no one takes charge. […] it allows us to be bold in our projects, in our ambitions. I can see it growing’ (Volinz 2019).

Judiciary Within Israel

Traditionally Israeli civilians, including Palestinians, had turned to Israeli courts for protection. Israeli courts including the Supreme Court haves had significant rulings on evictions, location of the separation wall, human rights and shootings of unarmed demonstrators. Increasingly, due to political appointments under the Netanyahu administration, the Supreme Court has been less inclined to rule in favour of Palestinians. In 2002, Israeli Supreme Court justices rejected an appeal filed by 104 residents of the East Jerusalem area of Silwan to overturn a decision by the Custodian of Absentee Property to “free” the land on which they have lived for decades (B’Tselem 2018). The land was taken from Palestinian residents by a group affiliated with Ateret Cohanim, a settler association that works to Judaize East Jerusalem. In 2006, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that targeted killing is a legitimate form of self-defence against terrorists, and outlined several conditions for its use. The Court of Justice adjudicated on the issue of targeted killing deciding that ‘a civilian who has joined a terrorist organization …commits a chain of hostilities, with short periods of rest between them, loses his immunity from attacks “for such time” as he is committing the chain of acts’” (Erakat 2019, p. 201). Shooting live ammunition at unarmed demonstrators was another court case which was filed by human rights groups. However, in May 2018, the Israeli Supreme Court rejected two petitions filed by human rights groups and fully adopted the Israeli military’s position, giving a green light to its continued use of snipers and live fire against Palestinian protesters in the Gaza Strip.

Israeli Military Courts (Occupied Territories)

Palestinians living in any of the areas within the Occupied Territories and accused of security incidents are tried in Israeli military courts. The military courts have jurisdiction over two types of offences; security offences and threat to public order such as traffic violations and criminal offencses. Thousands of Palestinians, including minors as young as 12, are brought before military courts on various charges including: entering Israel without a permit, stone-throwing and membership in an illegal association. While the courts offer an illusion of proper judicial conduct, they mask one of the most injurious apparatuses of the occupation (B’Tselem 2017). In the military courts, the judges and prosecutors are Israeli soldiers and Palestinians do not have legal representation. The Palestinian defendants are convicted in 99 percent of the cases thus defendants commonly enter a guilty plea to avoid a lengthy trial during which time they are forced to remain in custody. As such, the military courts are neither impartial nor neutral.

Militias and New National Guard

There are several Jewish militias linked to far-right settlement groups that operate inside Israel and the West Bank. The escalating violence and terrorist attacks have served as a justification for the rising number of militias. The militias commonly cooperate with Israeli police or IDF units, gain funding from private organizations, local councils or the government and operate with little supervision or consequences. During the unrest in May 2021, Israeli authorities made use of Jewish militias to target Palestinian citizens in coastal cities, including Lod, Jaffa, Ramla, Haifa and Akka (Wated 2022). Armed militia called “the Guardians of Lod” have been supporting extremist Jewish settlements and ethnically cleansing Palestinians from the city of Lod (Wated 2022). Made up of volunteers and right-wing activists linked to extremist leadership, the militias have been able to take violent actions against Palestinian civilians living within Israel without legal consequences. International and Israeli observers have voiced concerns that Israel is losing control of the private militias (Wated 2022).

In May 2022, subsequent to a string of terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians, Prime Minister Naftali Bennett announced the creation of a new “civilian national guard” to fight terrorism (Breiner and Kubovich 2022). The national guard, according to the currently discussed plans, would be the body that would have a key role in dealing with disturbances in mixed cities. According to Bennett; “The urgent need to strengthen the personal security of the citizens of Israel was born a year ago during the events of Operation Guardian of the Walls, mainly in the mixed cities, and it is more urgent than ever in the current wave of terrorism” (Keinon 2022). The use of militias, as with private security, can also absolve the state from responsibility for its actions.

Principles of Security and Protection

The new way of waging war in recent years has been commonly characterized by transfer of risk from soldiers to enemy civilians with limited discrimination between combatants and civilians (Levy 2017). This is a consequence of the type of conflict, the challenge of recruitment of soldiers and militants hiding among civilians. Indeed, in recent years, the Israeli state has adopted new measures and tools to minimize risk to Israeli soldiers. Some of these have included increasing use of heavy aerial bombardments, unmanned drones and vehicles and moving through Palestinian homes, conducting violent operations in Gaza and the West Bank which do not risk the safety of soldiers. Security measures have tended to prioritize protection of Israeli settlements and Israeli soldiers, with little emphasis on the protection of vulnerable civilians. The distinction between civilian and combatant is to be established on the basis of whether the person is directly engaged in hostilities. The Geneva Convention expressly prohibits inhumane treatment of protected persons including: individual or mass forcible transfers or deportations of civilians, the destruction of property unless as an absolute military necessity (Darcy 2003).

The ongoing military occupation of Palestinian areas is focused on intimidation, control and severe military measures that made little distinction between combatants and civilians. The protection of lives of soldiers not only comes at the cost of Palestinian civilians but also ahead of lives of Israeli civilians. Rating the death hierarchy, Levy notes that due to lack of choice and political consequences of exposure to death, the reservist soldiers are the most protected segment of the population. This is because the Israeli army is dependent on the reservists during escalations such as Gaza wars. According to Levy, order of hierarchy for protection is: (1) Reservists; (2) Citizens from privileged groups; (3) Middle-class conscripts; (4) Conscripts from peripheral groups; (5) Peripheral citizens; and (6) Enemy civilians (Levy 2010, p. 352).

Since Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) rely on recruitment of 18-year old’s straight out of high school and reservists, willing to leave their families to serve, their safety is of primary concern. According to Levy, the declining motivation among privileged groups to serve in the military is the key to how soldiers’ lives have become more valued than civilians (Levy 2010, p. 346). The 2003 IDF ethical code of conduct noted that ‘where the state does not have effective control of the vicinity, it does not have to shoulder responsibility … that persons who are involved in terror operate in the vicinity of persons who are not…jeopardizing combatants rather than bystanders during a military act against a terrorist would mean shouldering responsibility for the mixed nature of the vicinity for no reason at all’ (Kasher and Yadlin 2005, p. 18). In other words, protecting the lives of IDF soldiers is more important than the lives of innocent bystanders.

On the lowest scale of value of a civilian life, the hierarchy can be broken down further into territory where the person is residing. As noted by the 2022 UN Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, there are stark differences between the legal systems in Israel and the West Bank, in particular with regard to criminal law, with significant implications for the rights of Palestinians (UN Commission Report 2022). For example, if a Palestinian living under the military occupation is shot and killed by Israeli security forces, there is little chance of investigation or repercussions, even if the victim is a child. Daily military incursions, house demolitions, targeting of civilians and even shooting of unarmed civilians can all be justified in the name of security. As an example, “Under military law, holding and waving Palestinian flags during demonstrations and assemblies of Palestinians is regarded as a security threat, so that Palestinians’ freedom of expression and freedoms of peaceful assembly and association are severely restricted” (UN Report 2014). Forcible removal of Palestinian flags has recently resulted in a pushback by Israeli police who have publicly taken a stance noting that it’s not good use of police time, and the removal of Palestinian flags usually results in escalation and not de-escalation (Police 2022). Shortly after taking office, Israel’s new National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir has ordered Israeli police to ban Palestine flags from public places in the latest crackdown by the country’s new hard-line government, calling the Palestinian national symbol an act of “terrorism” (Aljazeera 2023).

Israel considers the territories of the West Bank and Gaza under belligerent occupation where the state exercises military and legal control, but fails to take the responsibility to protect the civilian population. As noted in a 2005 Israeli Supreme Court ruling, “This court has ruled in a long list of judgments that Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip are under belligerent occupation of the state [of Israel]. They are not part of the State of Israel” (Adalah 2020). Considered the most dangerous and hostile territory under Israeli occupation, civilians living in Gaza are offered no protection by Israel. Israeli case law declared Gaza to be an ‘enemy entity’, and designated its population as ‘enemy aliens’ (Adalah 2020). In 2007, Israel's security cabinet voted to declare the Gaza Strip an enemy entity, a move that gave Israel the power to cut off all vital supplies including water and electricity (Jerusalem Post 2007). Collective punishment of the population of Gaza has become an accepted national strategy.

The guiding principle of minimum risk to the soldiers at the cost of harming innocent civilians has been integrated into IDF practice (Levy 2017). Hannibal Directive is one example in which if an Israeli soldier(s) is under threat of kidnapping, IDF have a policy of indiscriminate firing to prevent an abduction. The directive was used most recently during the 2014 war in Gaza as soldiers were given leeway in Rafah, Shujaija to shoot at any target to prevent a potential kidnapping of a soldier. In Rafah, where two Israeli soldiers were killed and one was suspected of being kidnapped, every person and moving vehicle became a potential target (Human Rights Council 2015). The directive was officially cancelled by the military in 2016 following heavy criticism. The criticism was not because of the deaths of Palestinian civilians, which numbered in the hundreds, but due to the criticism of a policy of shooting one’s own soldier, preferring a dead rather than an abducted soldier.

The shooting and killing of Palestinian protestors along the Gaza border has been the subject of investigations and much debate on the rules of engagement. According to the IDF, ‘Hamas has used the violent riots as another means for carrying out military attacks against Israel using the cover of the Gazan population’ (IDF Document 2019). The United Nations Commission of Inquiry into the protests found that the use of live ammunition by IDF against demonstrators was unlawful, as the protestors did not pose any threat to the lives of Israeli soldiers or civilians (UN Inquiry 2019). In its 2019 investigation, the commission found reasonable grounds to believe that Israeli forces intentionally used lethal force against civilians, including children, medical personnel, journalists, and persons with disabilities (UN Inquiry 2019). However, Israeli politicians, IDF and the Supreme Court all justified the actions. A February 2019 IDF document reiterated that soldiers may open fire with live ammunition on “key instigators” or “key rioters” even when they are at no longer participating in the protest or are resting (Adalah 2019). This policy is applicable in Gaza and the West Bank.

The rise of violence in 2022 has also resulted in acceptance of more lethal tools. Subsequent to the 2022 killing of an IDF soldier in Jenin, the Israeli military proposed to revamp the West Bank defensive strategy by using helicopters and drones to secure ground troops through the use of ‘deterrent fire’ (Kubovich 2022a). In September, the chief of staff gave officers of IDF Central Command “a green light to carry out targeted assassinations” in the West Bank (Harrel, September 22, 2022c). For the first time, in case of operational need, IDF is also allowing the use of drones to kill wanted Palestinians by long-range fire (Harrel 2022a, 2022b, 2022c). In 2022, Israel’s army also introduced artificial intelligence-powered robotic guns on top of a guard tower overlooking the crowded al-Aroub refugee camp in the occupied West Bank (Min 2022). The robotic guns are faster than humans once they lock on a target and currently can fire tear gas, stun grenades and sponge-tipped bullets. All of these new measures have been sharply criticizsed by international organizations and human right groups and will likely result in more deaths of civilians.

Practice of Protection

For Palestinians living under the occupation, there are few boundaries between the conflict and people’s lives which can be shattered at a moment’s notice. “Imagine it - you're sitting in your living room, which you know so well; this is the room where the family watches television together after the evening meal . . . . And, suddenly, that wall disappears with a deafening roar, the room fills with dust and debris, and through the wall pours one soldier after the other, screaming orders. You have no idea if they're after you, if they've come to take over your home, or if your house just lies on their route to somewhere else. The children are screaming, panicking. . . Is it possible to even begin to imagine the horror experienced by a five-year-old child as four, six, eight, twelve soldiers, their faces painted black, submachine guns pointed everywhere, antennas protruding from their backpacks, making them look like giant alien bugs, blast their way through that wall” (Weizman, 2006). The story is not a unique one describing the realities of the movement of soldiers through people’s homes even when those individuals are not the target. The soldiers blasted their way into the residence above and continued through the family’s home to blast into the neighbour’s house. Officially referred to as a military strategy of “swarming” or “infestation”, moving through walls was designed to protect the lives of soldiers. Described by a commanding officer as: I ordered my troops: …If until now you were used to moving along roads and sidewalks, forget it! From now on we all walk through walls! …We were thus moving from the interior of homes to their exterior in a surprising manner and in places we were not expected, arriving from behind and hitting the enemy that awaited us behind a corner’ (Weizman, 2007). Eyal Weizman ‘Lethal Theory’ Anyone No. 7 (Winter/Spring 2006), pp. 53–77.

This section will examine the practices of civilian protection outlining instances of effective, selective, ineffective, belligerent and exploitative protection. Within Israel, the protection can be categorized as selective as it is very dependent of the national group and their location. Vulnerability extends to women, visible minorities, youth and people with disabilities. Beyond the green line in the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli protection of the Palestinian population is belligerent. Israeli security forces are responsible for the majority of injuries and fatalities. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has noted that since 2008 there have been more than 6036 Palestinian fatalities, the majority of which have been killed by air-launched explosives (Gaza) or live ammunition (OCHA 2023). During the same period, there have been more than 138,040 injuries among Palestinians, mostly from tear gas inhalation, rubber bullets and live ammunition. Among Israelis within the same time period, there have been 124 fatalities and 5913 injuries (OCHA 2023).

Despite billions of dollars of expenses on security including police and military, there are few instances of effective security for even the Jewish population within Israel. Most vulnerable are visible minorities, persons with disabilities, gender minorities and youth. Persons with disabilities are killed by Israeli forces, mostly because they do not hear or understand instructions, including those with hearing and sight impairment or are individuals with mental disabilities. Palestinian women with head scarfs express the deepest security concerns within Israel, doubtless because the militaristic society has not given many a sense of security. The Israeli industry of fear targets not only Palestinian anti-occupation and anti-violence protesters, but also Israeli dissidents, anti-war protesters, human rights activists and other political activists (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015, p. 8).

Israeli occupation measures have also included targeted assassinations, collective punishment, administrative detentions, house demolitions, deportations, checkpoints, closures and the construction of a security wall. Within the West Bank and East Jerusalem, children and youth participating in actions, such as demonstrations, throwing stones or attempted assaults, have been subject to maiming, arrests, detention and extrajudicial killings. Subsequent to the 2014 Gaza war, angry Palestinian youth within Israel incited by social media sought to take vengeance on Israeli civilians by attacking them with household objects including knives, scissors and screw drivers. The so-called ‘knife’ or ‘children’s’ intifada led to approximately 166 stabbing attacks and 89 attempted stabbings and resulted in 38 Israelis and 235 Palestinians being killed and 7,955 detained (Shabak 2015). A majority of the attacks (60%) took place in Area C and from those that took place inside Israel, 72% took place in Jerusalem (Weissbrod 2018, p. 33). Some of the attacks were conducted by Palestinian youth as young as 12 years old. A political directive to kill the perpetrator on the spot led to outrage by human rights groups. Israeli NGO Adalah noted that ‘Politicians and senior police officers have not only failed to act to calm the public climate of incitement, but on the contrary have openly called for the extrajudicial killing of suspects’ (Adalah 2015).

In the West Bank and East Jerusalem, key protection concerns have been linked to settler violence. Israeli settler violence refers to acts of violence committed by illegal Jewish settlers against Palestinian civilians with the intention to threaten and intimidate. Condemned widely by the international community, settlement violence has been on the rise. Settlements are illegal under international humanitarian law as they violate Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits the transfer of the occupying power’s civilian population into occupied territory. Settler violence includes harassment, intimidation, physical violence and property damage to homes, religious buildings, commerce and agriculture. The number of yearly incidents ranges in the thousands with between 30 to over one hundred Palestinians dying each year. At times, Jewish settler violence as well as Palestinian violence against settlers is part of a cycle of violence where one incident sparks retribution or a ‘price tag’.

Beyond the cycle of violence, the most significant issue is the immunity and lack of accountability for the Jewish settlers, protected by Israeli state institutions including the IDF. OCHA noted that between 2005 and 2016, over 90% of the investigation files on settler attacks against Palestinians and their property filed with the Israeli Police were closed without an indictment of a suspect (OCHA 2017). Civilian security forces are appointed by the settlements’ regional and local councils and they represent their interests. The civilian security coordinators (CSCs) and the civilian guards that operate in the Israeli settlements on the West Bank are among the most problematic. The CSCs are agents of the army, in that they are subject to the Military Justice Law and hold policing powers, but they are appointed by the settlements and see themselves as representing the settlements’ interests (Hareuveni 2014). They are permitted to conduct searches, detain suspects and to use force. Although the military order grants the settlement guards substantial policing powers, it does not require them to wear a name tag, as required of Israel Police personnel (including Border Police) and other Israeli officials who hold policing rights (Hareuveni 2014). Thus, not only is there illegal confiscation of Palestinian land by Jewish settlers, there is ‘the transfer of law enforcement and policing powers in the settlements to a quasi-military civilian force, including the possibility to use injurious means, exercise force, deprive liberty, restrict movement, and search and seize property’ (Hareuveni 2014, p. 48).

The intimate connections between the illegal Jewish settlements, the police, the army and the government are very clear. Brig. Gen Roi Zweieg, commander of the Israeli army’s Samaria brigade, noted: “It has often been said that the army and the settlements work together. I disagree with that, I think the army and the settlement enterprise are one and the same” (Shezaf 2022). The cooperation takes place not only in the occupied territories but also within Israel. For example, in Israel’s mixed city of Lod, the mayor Yair Revivo is leading the fight against the Palestinian presence in Lod through harassment and intimidation. The actions include the policy of encirclement of Palestinians in all public spaces, with the aim of forcing them to leave under duress (Wated 2022). Proliferation of militias, such as Sayeret Barel, in the Negev, known to Palestinians as Naqab, has increased fears that the Israeli authorities and police are losing control over the rise of the fascist right (Wated 2022). One of the Palestinian members of the Lod municipality, Fida Shehadeh, noted that the far-right has become a kind of “state within a state” (Wated 2022). With the 2022 election of right-wing leadership coming from Israeli settlements, the strength of the militias and the special relationship between the army, settlers and the government are likely to only grow stronger.

Targeting of human rights activists and journalists has been another area of concern. Palestinian journalists have been accidently or purposefully targeted by Israeli soldiers. According to the Committee to Protect (CPJ), at least 19 Palestinian journalists have been killed since 2000 (CPJ 2022). On 11 May 11th, 2022, a veteran Palestinian-American journalist Shereen Abu Aqleh who was working for Al Jazeera was shot in the neck and killed while reporting on an IDF incursion into Jenin. Every indication seems to be that she and other journalists, who were all wearing well-marked press bullet proof wvests and helmets, were directly targeted by Israeli soldiers, who repeatedly fired at them and prevented their escape or medical attention. IDF commando unit Duvdevan (unit 217) was conducting a ‘sweep and arrest’ operation in close to Jenin refugee camp. The initial investigation into the shooting led by Col. Meni Liberty, the head of the Commando Brigade (to which Duvdevan is subordinate), found six instances of IDF gunfire near Abu Akleh and additional journalists. In one of them, a Duvdevan fighter returned fire from inside an armoured jeep while the jeep was about 190 meters from the reporter. It is during this incident that the army fears Abu Akleh may have been shot (Harel, May 18, 2022a). Duvdevan is responsible for undercover operations in urban areas, during which the operators commonly wear civilian clothing and disguise themselves among the local Arab populace (Duvdevan Unit 2021). The unit can operate independently and performs high-risk and complicated operations, including targeted killings.

Israeli army police stated, however, that they are not going to investigate the killing because it would become a criminal investigation, which would be unpopular with the Israeli public (Harel, May 18, 2022a). Ammar Himazi, Assistant Foreign Affairs for the Palestinian Authority (PA), noted that the refusal to investigate is no surprise. Palestinians do not trust the system which is meant to subjugate and punish them. Palestinians have decided to conduct their own investigation which they intend to forward to the International Criminal Court. A member of the Israeli ruling coalition resigned which, at the time of writing, resulted in the collapse of the current government. Israel refuses to cooperate with any independent mission. The NGO Yesh Din (There is Law) said the decision not to authorize the military police to investigate the incident showed that “the army law enforcement mechanisms no longer even bother to give the appearance of investigating. Eighty percent of the complaints that are submitted are dismissed without a criminal investigation” (Harrel 2022a, 2022b, 2022c).

The protection of civilian population under Israeli authority in Gaza is essentially belligerent. The most recent Gaza wars of 2008/2009, 2014 and 2021 have resulted in heavy loss of civilian Palestinian residents. Israeli justification for the military campaign in Gaza was the ongoing rocket fire launched by armed groups from Gaza. Between July and August 2014, Palestinian militants indiscriminately fired 4,881 rockets and 1,753 mortars towards Israel, killing 6 civilians (UN News 2015). Aggressive fire policy allowed for a ground operation by reducing the exposure of IDF soldiers to risk. However, the severe bombardment came at the expense of heavy losses to Gazan civilians. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) claimed that measures such as leaflets recommending evacuation and a small blast on the roof served as warnings for people to evacuate buildings targeted for destruction. The warnings were confusing, while Hamas recommended to civilians to ignore IDF warnings and Israeli security considered anyone who remained a voluntary shield. Also, many civilians had nowhere to flee; no location in Gaza was considered safe, and those areas that were designated as ‘safe’ such as UN schools were targeted. According to interviews with IDF soldiers who took part in the operation, the rules of engagement in 2014 were quite lax. The Hannibal Directive, which gives leeway to Israeli soldiers for shooting at all targets in order to prevent the abduction of soldiers, was reportedly activated in Rafah and Shujaija (Breaking the Silence 2018). In Rafah, where two Israeli soldiers were killed and one was suspected of being kidnapped, every person and moving vehicle became a potential target.

Beyond the periodic bombardments that cause significant deaths, injuries and destruction, borderline areas between Israel and Gaza have also become an area of ongoing demonstrations. The widespread Palestinian demonstrations began in March 2018 have resulted in more than 200 deaths and 3000 injuries from shots fired by IDF snipers. The vast majority of the persons killed or injured were unarmed and posed no threat to the soldiers on the other side of the fence. A UN Commission of Inquiry, which examined the shooting of the Gaza demonstrators, concluded in 2019 that in the tens of cases it had examined, none of the protestors were armed or posed an imminent threat to life or limb, and thus the use of force was unjustified (UN Inquiry 2019). The UN Commission also found ‘reasonable grounds to believe that Israeli snipers shot at journalists, health workers, children and persons with disabilities, knowing they were clearly recognizable as such’, (UN Inquiry 2019). However, Israel justified and whitewashed the investigation. Israeli officials noted that the open-fire regulations would allow the use of lethal fire against instigators or anyone who tried to damage the fence or even approach it (B’Tselem 2018). As noted by B’Tselem, ‘Israel conducted “investigations” into certain specific cases of shooting by snipers. But no one investigated – and no one in Israel will – the rules of engagement themselves’ (El-Ad 2022).

The practice of protection is also affected by the politics of the day. The months just prior to Israeli elections tend to be more volatile as the government commonly flexes its muscles. Intensive military confrontation in the West Bank, with a rising Palestinian death toll, is also liable to bring down the voting rate among the Arabs in Israel, increasing the proportion of voters from the Israeli right. As noted by Harrel, ‘That’s a fact known to everyone who follows the developments in Israel and the territories – from Hamas and the PA to Likud, Yesh Atid and the National Unity Party’ (Harrel 2022a, 2022b, 2022c). Israeli police have also noted that recent election campaigns have been accompanied by unprecedented radicalizsation in social media discourse (Harrel 2022a, 2022b, 2022c). Thus, violence in the Occupied Territories tends to benefit the right-wing parties both because Israeli votes shift to the right and fewer than 48 percent of Palestinians or Palestinian Israelis bother to vote in the elections.

Perceptions of Security and Justifications of Lack of Protection

There is a wide differentiation between the realities of protection for civilians and the sentiment of safety. Safety and perception of safety are directly related to national identities. Minorities also perceive their status within Israel and beyond the green line based on their own safety. As noted by Guy Ben Porat, minorities evaluate their status in the state’s citizenship regime through their interactions with the police, thereby emphasizing the ‘heavy symbolic load’ policing carries in shaping communal and collective identities (Abu and Ben Porat 2021). In East Jerusalem and Palestinian or mixed areas within Israel and in occupied territories, this would be also based on their interaction with border police, private militias and the IDF. Anger and threat tend to increase hawkish predispositions, such as ethnocentrism, intergroup animosity and militarism and are is more likely among those that experienced violence first-hand (Yakter 2022).

In the escalation of violence subsequent to 2014 Gaza War, most Israeli civilians expressed fear of personal security at the hands of state institutions. In a 2016 survey conducted by the Israeli Knesset, more than 59 percent of women and 54 percent of men polled were concerned about being harmed by state institutions. Most concerned were Palestinian/Arab women of whom 74 percent worried about damaging behaviour by state agencies that would negatively affect their personal security (Survey, Knesset, 2016).

In a 2018 survey of Jerusalem residents, safety and protection was the primary concern for Palestinian respondents while only a minor concern for Jewish respondents (Jerusalem Survey 2018). In the survey, 73 percent of the Palestinian residents living in East Jerusalem said that they witnessed violence between security forces and local residents in the past 6 months. On the other hand, 15% of Jewish residents of West Jerusalem had heard of or witnessed violence between security forces and local residents in the past 6 months (Jerusalem Survey 2018). After the 2022 string of terror attacks, a poll found a bleak security outlook with 83% of Arab Israelis and 64% of Jewish Israelis feeling no personal security (Democracy Institute 2022). Only 16% of Arab Israelis and 33% of Jewish Israelis said they felt a very large or fairly large degree of personal security (Democracy Institute 2022).

As noted in Chapter 1, Jonathan Leader Maynard identified six different recurring justifications of atrocities: dehumanization, guilt attribution, threat construction, deagentification, virtue talk and future bias. Dehumanization, guilt attribution and threat construction are very common within the conflict as well as within leadership. The Israeli public tends to be very supportive of harsh security measures against terrorism. During the children’s intifada, the public directive to kill the perpetrator on the spot had wide public support among the Jewish population. In a poll done by the Israel Democracy Institute, the majority of Jewish Israelis (53%) said they agreed with the statement that “any Palestinian who has perpetrated a terror attack against Jews should be killed on the spot, even if he has been apprehended and no longer poses a threat” (Ynet 2015). For the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), a key focus of justification for killing Palestinians is terrorism and radical Islam. The MFA refers to the timeframe between 13 Palestinians is terrorism and radical Islam. The MFA refers to the timeframe between 13 September 2015 to the present as the ‘60 months of terror’, placing 100 percent blame of all incidents on Palestinian youth. The MFA website notes: “the recent series of attacks against Israelis is the direct result of incitement by radical Islamist and terrorist elements, calling on Palestinian youth to murder Jews” (MFA 2015).

Whether for the IDF, border police or private security, rules of engagement have served to justify shooting of Palestinian civilians. Israeli politicians have been forceful in defending Israeli security and preventing investigations that may shed light on wrongdoing. Netanyahu publicly supported soldiers who assassinated captured Palestinians and emphasized that the border police or soldiers should not be afraid of any investigation. As noted by Eric Goldstein, acting Middle East director at Human Rights Watch; “Netanyahu’s statement that the Israeli Border Police, … should ‘not be afraid’ of investigations effectively invites them to use excessive force” (Human Rights Watch 2021). Shootings of unarmed demonstrators haves also been officially justified by the IDF and Israeli courts because those killed were deemed key instigators. As stated in 2019 IDF document: ‘Specifically, where the threat from the violent riot reaches the level of a real and imminent threat to the life or bodily integrity of Israeli civilians or IDF forces, and all relevant non-lethal means have been exhausted, IDF forces may employ precise and measured fire against a “key instigator” or “key rioter”, in order to remove the real and imminent danger posed by the riot’ (IDF Document 2019).

Many Israeli NGO’s have given up trying to achieve accountability and justice within Israel. The executive director of B’Tselem, Hagai El-Ad noted; ‘over the years, we have made hundreds of applications to relevant authorities for cases of Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces to be investigated, but meaningful accountability was never realizsed. Six years ago, we concluded that what we were dealing with is not merely a dysfunctional investigation mechanism but an organizsed, systemic whitewash operation. As a result, we made the decision to continue our work on such killings— – but without ever engaging in Israel’s so-called “investigations”’ (El-Ad 2022). Although there has been little reflection by Israeli military officers while holding high positions, reflections are common after they are out of service. Ami Ayalon, a former director of the Israeli security service Shin Bet, noted that while carrying out anti-terrorist operations, he gained empathy for “the enemy” (Ayalon and David 2020). As Ayalon observes, if Israel wanted to end terrorism, “we couldn’t continue regarding them as eternal enemies, and we needed to stop dehumanizing them as animals on the prowl. They are people who desire, and deserve, the same national rights we have” (Ayalon and David 2020).

The 2022 elections of the extreme right haves also put the military on a direct collision course with the newly elected politicians. The new government has pledged to legalize settlements, take steps towards annexation of most of the West Bank, legislate anti-LGBTQ laws, implement administrative measures that deepen religious monopoly over life, normalize corruption by preventing trials against politicians and espouse aggressive belligerency towards the Palestinians (Pinkas 2022). The shifting of the border police and security of the West Bank under the new leadership of Ben-Gvir is not only likely to lead to more violent escalations but has also created ripples between the IDF and the government. Former and current IDF leadership has been publicly warning against the increase in political incitement and taken a strong stance against the newly elected extreme politicians. In response to new leadership and policies, former IDF West Bank Chief said,; 'I Expect More and More Violence' (Sokol 2023). General Nitzan Alon, the former head of the IDF’s Central Command from 2012 to 2015, publicly noted that Israel is “playing with matches” in light of the PA’s weakness and “lack of legitimacy” among Palestinians (Sokol 2023).

Back- and -forth insults and threats between the IDF and the new Israeli leadership have escalated tensions within Israel. Just days after being elected, Itamar Ben-Gvir publicly challenged a military investigation and a 10-day jail sentence handed down to an Israeli soldier who threatened left-wing Jewish activists in Hebron. In a widely seen video, the Jewish activist was seen being choke held and beaten by Israeli soldiers in Hebron. The soldier was caught on video telling the left-wing activists that “Ben-Gvir is going to bring order, you’ve had it” (Kubovich 2022a, 2022b). When the Israeli activist asked if he was doing anything against the law, the soldier responded “you do everything against the law. I decide what the law is and you are acting against the law” (Joffre 2022). The Israeli soldier was wearing a badge with a skull reading: “One shot. One kill. No remorse. I decide” (Joffre 2022). Another video from Hebron during the same week showed a soldier pushing an Israeli journalist and shouting “I don’t like leftists. Get out of here. I’ll mess you up.” The punishment of the soldiers by the IDF landed the IDF chief in a heated public dispute with Ben-Gvir. Ben-Gvir noted that the IDF chief of staff and the army leadership need to think twice about this type of punishment, and that “It can't be that anarchists come, curse, spit, and attack our heroic soldiers” (Kubovich 2022a, 2022b). Israeli military chief, Aviv Kochavi, publicly responded that “We'll allow no politician, neither from the right nor from the left, to interfere in command decisions” (Kubovich 2022a, 2022b). Ben-Gvir responded to the chief of staff's comments, saying he “would expect from the Chief of Staff that just as he demanded a soldier not to make political statements, he himself should also refrain from political statements,”, adding that while he has “has no intention of interfering with the punishment, the policy must change” (Kubovich 2022a, 2022b). The public war of words between the more cautious Israeli military against political incitement of the newly elected extremist leadership is not the first to take place in Israel, though given the popularity of the IDF, it’s unclear which institution will come out on top, whether the newly elected politicians will replace the top brass of the Israeli military or the public will stand behind the military, the most trusted institution in Israel and force a reining in of the new politicians.

Conclusion

The protracted nature and gridlock of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has helped to sustain the dissociation between principles and practices (Yakter 2022). Israeli security measures have had an inverse effect on the well-being of Palestinians as well as Israeli civilians. A majority of both Israeli and Palestinian civilians feel a strong sense of insecurity. It’s questionable to what extent any Israeli institution, including the police, can be perceived as protecting the Palestinian population living within or outside of the green line. There is a far greater emphasis on protection of Israeli soldiers thaen of civilians. Indeed, a soldier’s life is valued beyond that of a civilian and their actions are beyond recrimination. Problematic incidents are not a matter of individual incidents or ‘collateral damage’ but rather rules of engagement and systematic oppression. Current policies and actions can be described as ethnic cleansing in East Jerusalem and aArea C of the West Bank, apartheid policies within Israel and ongoing war atrocities within West Bank and Gaza. Separation, collective punishment and economic and political rewards are also utilized to maintain control and prevent Palestinian unity. However, much of the younger generation of Palestinians are connected via social media where borders and green lines have little meaning.

Key Israeli strategies in the Occupied Palestinian territories focus on: bombardments, economic purchasing of elites, intimidation and ethnic cleansing. Bombing Gazans into submission, buying West Bank Palestinians that can be bought and intimidating or ethnically cleansing Palestinians living in East Jerusalem have become justifiable tools for security. For Palestinian civilians, especially those living in Gaza, there is no distinction between combatants and non-combatants. In 2014, members of the prestigious IDF unit 8200 of refuseniks called for the need to establish a clear distinction between intelligence gathering against Israel's enemies—hostile states and terror organizations—and ordinary Palestinian citizens. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, children and youth are notably vulnerable.

Civilian protection, however, can also be utilized to bridge divisions and create a consensus on a roadmap towards change. Political discussions can also be fostered by deeper and more impartial international engagement and inclusivity. Discussions led by the USnited States have excluded the opposition, women and civil society. Both Israeli and Palestinian NGO’s and civil society are on the front lines of the conflict and should participate in any negotiations. Their participation, as will be discussed later chapters, can improve the potential for an agreement.