Women and LGBTQ+ are commonly categorized as those in need of protection, yet their voices in the design of security measures are usually excluded by their so-called protectors. States also frequently use protection of women and vulnerable civilians to gain attention and justify or legitimize military intervention (Kandiyoti 2007). Indeed, states in violent conflict commonly engage in a narrative of the myth of protection, where the security measures designed to ‘protect’ expose the vulnerable to conflict rather than provide so-called protection. Examining protection through a gendered lens provides a critical mirror for which to examine internal and external policies of protection as well as a roadmap towards improvement.

Although much of this chapter focuses on women and women’s groups, gender is a term that is far wider and more inclusionary term. Gender refers to the socially constructed characteristics pertaining to masculinity and femininity, including social norms, cultural roles, sexual orientation, inequalities and rights. LGBTQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer) is commonly invisible, especially in Palestine, and remains one of the least protected groups and most vulnerable to exploitation. More research into the lived realities of LGBTQ communities in Palestine is needed as the current research, including on ‘pink washing’ and vulnerabilities to exploitation, barely scratches the surface.

It should be noted that the focus on resilience and role of women NGO’s does not imply that women are any more peaceful than men. Indeed, surveys have indicated very similar political views between women and men with Israeli women holding more right-wing attitudes than their male counterparts. Also, women play multiple roles as soldiers, terrorists and activists beyond the stereotypes of victims, peacemakers and NGO workers. Thus, the focus on gender and resilience is not intended to imply gender as a primary solution, as this would also place too much burden on women. Still a focus on gender from a women’s perspective as well as youth opens up areas of needs and potential spheres of transformation, ‘within the domain of protection’, that break down traditional divisions and binaries within the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.

The emphasis on protection commonly makes women invisible or portrays them as vulnerable victims, incapable of participating in a protection regime. International and domestic appeals for donations tend to represent women as the primary civilians who are victims of slaughter and abuse and most in need of relief. The key challenge is the absence of participation of women and the exclusion of local civil society/NGO inclusion in any discussion on security issues. Issues prioritizing security of civilians whether focused on disarmament, demobilization, security measures and/or judicial reform, fall short and are without meaningful participation by women.

A key international advancement on gender inclusive intervention was the 2000 UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325, which promoted the participation of women in all aspects of the peace process, involving peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The resolution reflected international recognition that in the context of armed conflict, women are more than victims in need of protection (Bond and Sherret 2012). Formed in 2000, the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) was mandated to address gender through SCR 1325 and other UN resolutions on issues related to peace, security, protection and exclusion. Given the overlapping agendas of protection and prevention, UN policymakers and feminist scholars have begun to create synergies between R2P and WPS agendas (Davies and Teitt 2012). In parallel to the R2P norms, the three pillars of WPS focus on protection, prevention and participation. Although the synergies are evident on the normative level, they have failed to make advances on the operational level. Operationalizing protection in a divisive context has remained a challenge for both R2P and WPS.

Protection of a population should not entail disempowerment, dependence on the protector, exclusion or removal of rights and liberties. Traditional notions and tools in security commonly fall victim to the myth of protection, where the military is ostensibly used to protect the vulnerable population but instead fails to do so or exploits its superior position of power (Moyan 2013). Significant power imbalances between the protector and protected creates dependencies and opens up room for exploitation. As noted by Young, there is an implicit bargain in the masculinity protector role, the male protector confronts the outside aggressors, while those under his protection submit to his order (Young 2003). “States often justify their expectations of obedience and loyalty, as well as their establishment of surveillance, police, intimidation, detention, and the repression of criticism and dissent, by appeal to their role as protectors of citizens” (Young 2003, p. 7). This removes any sense of sovereignty of voice for vulnerable members.

The notion of sovereignty as responsibility under the framework of R2P has provided a fundamental shift in the narrative from a state-centric towards a human-centric approach to security. Human security “is an approach prefaced on the normative claim that the ultimate referent for security ought to be the human individual, not the state or some other collective” (Bellamy 2016). Amending international security approaches from state to individual human security suggest the use of non-lethal tools and a deeper emphasis on inclusion and resilience (Chandler 2012). This is a welcome step for gender scholars disputing traditional state-centric notions of national protection with its strong reliance on military tools and obedience. Issues related to gender and implementation of SCR 1325 tend to be sidelined under the dominant military security agenda. An examination of protection issues within the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, and Gaza in particular, provides a prime case where R2P norms are applicable. However, the responsible authorities and the international community have not taken steps prioritizing human protection. While Israeli and Palestinian leadership rhetoric may address gender issues, however, it typically takes the form of accusations hurled at the other side without contributing to protection or inclusion of women and other gender stakeholders/members.

Given the Gaza wars, the exposure of civilians to potential war atrocities, lack of law and order and the humanitarian disaster and the sanctions, the population of Gaza is in dire need of protection. However, both R2P and WPS agendas are currently far removed from official discussions on protection and security in Gaza. Although women are engaged as fighters, soldiers, activists, practitioners and mid-range leaders, they are far removed from decisions related to security and protection. Both Israel and Hamas authorities, which run Gaza, engage in a ‘myth of protection’ where finite resources go towards military build-up, while protection of the most vulnerable is non-existent. In Gaza, widespread and systematic attacks perpetuated against the civilian population and a lack of security by any relevant local authorities manifests a failure of protection for a population that has nowhere to flee. This is an example of a case where R2P is applicable, however, the distance between the norm and its operationalization appears to be unbridgeable. It is also an example of a wide distance between the relationship between the rhetoric on the importance of SCR 1325 and the applied lack of inclusion and protection of women.

Gender and the Principles of Protection

The relationship between the protector and protected is always asymmetric since one has access to legitimate force and the other is dependent (Stiehm 1982). The use of military carries with it many unintended effects including: increase in levels of violence, sex trade, trafficking, escalation of human rights abuses and heightened patriarchy (Enloe 2001). Emphasizing human security in line with prioritizing protection of population under the R2P agenda suggests a wider approach to security. As noted by Hoogensen and Stuvoy: “security must be linked to empowerment of the individual: ‘victimization and agency are seen as two parts of a reality that should be addressed together rather than as opposites, as is usually the case’” (Hoogensen and Stuvoy 2006, p. 211). A human-centric approach to security is useful for reaching a consensus on a genuine protection of civilians in a difficult conflict context.

Implementation of SCR 1325 and priorities under a WPS agenda provide a roadmap towards a more inclusive intervention. Aspects of SCR 1325 relevant to protection include: attention to the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, inclusion of gender perspectives in peacekeeping, and participation in decision-making concerning peacemaking and protection (Dharmapuri 2012). There is also recognition of the connection between gender inequality, gender-based violence and patterns of abuse that give rise to atrocity crimes (Teitt 2014).

A focus on protection, however, can be a thorny issue due to the common categorization between victims, such as Middle East women and the omnipotent international community as the potential protectors. Not only are there worrisome colonial undertones, the categorization of women as victims can exclude them from taking a role in the construction of a protection regime. Although women are as much part of a conflict today as men, their participation in discussions on security and peace efforts continues to be neglected (Hafner-Burton 2014). In addition, the degree of danger posed by a particular threat is usually defined by the protector whose interest could be to exaggerate the threat and whose exaggerations may also increase or provoke the threat (Stiehm 1982). Protection of the population implies the use of tools and actions that empower and not disempower the individual.

Though unintended effects of external protection are of considerable concern, not providing protection is no less problematic. Lack of effective police, state security, and a non-functioning judiciary, open opportunities for privatization of security which commonly results in the exploitation of vulnerable populations. The state and armed groups routinely let the vulnerable suffer during a conflict, while diverting resources to the military. A shift in emphasizing and prioritizing from the state to human security sets a moral standard for state behaviour with respect to the whole population residing under its authority. R2P norms, which prioritize protection of individuals over states, imply not only when but also how to intervene.

Scholars and practitioners have also recommended that protection should switch from a paradigm of liberal interventionism to one of resilience. As noted by Chandler “the resilience paradigm clearly puts the agency of those most need of assistance at the center, stressing a program of empowerment and capacity-building” (Chandler 2012, p. 216). Though fundamental, a focus on prevention and resilience may not be sufficient in the most difficult conflicts. Effective international intervention is also unlikely to be developed with a top-down approach that implies the exclusion and marginalization of women. Top-down security, such as those from the national governments or international organizations, often do not address the security needs at a grassroot bottom-up level. With a focus on the individual, human security encourages the integration of non-state and bottom-up perspectives to security (Hoogensen and Stuvoy 2006). Inclusive participation, including of domestic institutions, civil society, the police and the judiciary, is fundamental towards constructing an effective protection regime.

In today’s conflict settings, where perpetrators of violence commonly hide among the civilians, civilian policing is a far more effective tool than the military. Participation in peacemaking, disarmament, demobilization, the security sector and judicial reform can work towards reparations and non-recurrence. Another aspect of concern is the common absence of consultations with women’s civil society. As noted by UN Women, “women’s groups often represent and voice women’s priorities and concerns, and indeed are more likely to do so than women within negotiating delegations, who are bound to their particular party’s interests” (UN Women 2012).

Distinguishing between the types of participation is fundamental towards an effective inclusion of women within a protection regime. Catherine O’Rourke pointed to key challenges in participation and distinguished between five types of gender participation: participation as the presence of role models, participation as representation, participation as deliberation, participation as inclusion and participation as expertise (O’Rourke 2014). Participation as role models highlights inclusion of women in international peace and security which provides an example to other women and gives evidence that women can perform in high-level positions. Participation as representation is fundamental provided it is fully representative. O’Rourke suggests justice as the most convincing argument for representation noting that “the central claim of the ‘justice’ argument is that, for the diversity of women’s interests to be represented, women must be present in their diversity” (O’Rourke 2014, p. 12). Participation as deliberation focuses on the importance of inclusion of women and women’s groups in consultation in decision-making processes. Participation as inclusion points to efforts to secure women’s role as beneficiaries to: humanitarian assistance, resettlement, reintegration and other programmatic responses. Finally, several UN resolutions have highlighted the importance of participation of gender experts, notably as external protection advisors and the strengthening of national gender expertise.

Despite UN Resolutions such as 1325, which promotes the inclusion of women in all aspects of peace process, international norms continue to be ignored. Women, for the most part, are not included in discussions on security or in peace talks either as mediators or as participants. UN Women found that from the 31 peace processes between 1992 and 2011, women only constituted four percent of signatories and 2% of mediators (UN Women 2012). Women’s exclusion from peace talks has had significant consequences for the extent to which issues of concern to them are addressed. Still, there has been normative progress which has influenced policies and strategies related to gender. The next section will examine the practice of gender and protection in Israel/Palestine with a focus on some of the key challenges, notably in Jerusalem and Gaza.

Gender and Protection Within the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict

The violent occupation, lack of political solutions and the militarization of Israeli and Palestinian societies have had a dire effect on gender. Resources go towards security measures that exclude women and fail to address protection for the most vulnerable population. There is a deep interconnectedness between the occupation, economic sanctions, religious extremism, lack of law and order and the disproportionate impact of the conflict on women and visible and invisible minorities. For decades, Israeli soldiers and Palestinian armed groups have also been engaged in ongoing cycles of violence contributing to vulnerability to war crimes. Although many civilians in Israel are fearful for their security, the population most vulnerable to lack of protection and war atrocities are civilians living under the Israeli occupation, especially in Gaza. A 2017 report by UN Women stated that; “Palestinian women and girls are exposed to threats to life, liberty and security as a direct result of Israeli occupation policies on a regular basis, in clear violation of the rights to life, liberty and security” (UN Women 2017). UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres highlighted Gaza to be one of the ‘most dramatic humanitarian crises’ (UN News 2017) while the Office of the Quartet noted in 2016 that it is ‘imperative that immediate steps are taken to avoid the looming humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza’ (Quartet 2016).

The intergenerational conflict has led to militarization of Israeli and Palestinian societies, contributing to a culture of violence and glorification of the military. As noted by Galia Golan, ‘serving in the military carries with it not only the function of masculine identity formation but it also provides glorification as warrior/hero serving the collective, in what may be deemed the epitome of citizenship’ (Golan 2019, p. 222). Manipulation of public emotions including fear campaigns conducted by the Netanyahu government is ‘designed to heighten nationalism as a bond (or diversion) for a society torn by many social and economic rifts, thereby strengthening loyalty to the present government and support for whatever militarist policies it deems necessary – all of which add to the importance of security with all its incumbent gender aspects’ (Golan 2019, p. 229).

Women, however, play all roles within the conflict including as violent perpetrators. Israeli women serve in the army and Palestinian women have perpetuated many attacks as lone wolves or part of Palestinian armed factions. The conflict takes place in urban settings where the lines between civilians and combatants is not always clear. As noted by Weizman, ‘civilians become combatants, and combatants become civilians again; identity can be changed as quickly as gender can be feigned: the transformation of a woman into a fighting man can occur at the speed that it takes an undercover ‘Arabized’ Israeli soldier or a camouflaged Palestinian fighter to pull a machine gun out from under a dress’ (Weizman 2006, p. 67).

International intervention in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict has been divided and for the most part ineffective in either moving forward with a peace process or strengthening the protection of civilians. The United Nations, the Quartet, the EU, the Arab League as well as individual states have all faced divisions within their respective organizations as well as between them weakening and making ineffective any international response aiming to intervene beyond humanitarian aid. Within Gaza, no local or external authority is currently able or willing to provide protection for the population, leaving a generation of women, children and other civilians vulnerable to war crimes. The state-centric focus of security has contributed to the justification of local security measures that prioritize the protection of some groups while infringing on the security of others.

The applicability of R2P in the Gaza context has been given little consideration due to the complex context and divisions on the fundamentals of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The debates on the status of Gaza and the Occupied Palestinian Territories have placed a question mark on the responsibility of protection for the three relevant authorities: Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. There is an additional lack of consensus on the severity of the violence and culpability for war crimes. Despite lack of protection and vulnerability to war crimes, R2P has not been on the agenda for any of the key interveners in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, including the Quartet, Arab league, EU, US and the UN.

While international gender norms are on Israeli and Palestinian national agendas, implementation has not addressed the needs of protection for the most vulnerable within a conflict context. Israel used the introduction of women into peace negotiations and implementation of 1325 to gain international legitimacy. The engagement of women in peace negotiations such as Minister Tzipi Livni leading the negotiations at Annapolis Conference was pointed out as evidence of implementation of SCR 1325. Israeli grassroot organizations worked on a National Action Plan (NAP); however, its focus was on areas of national consensus while strategic and military issues trumped proposals on gender, peace and security and the needs of the most vulnerable. As noted by Sarai Aharoni, Israeli ‘[w]omen’s groups were using the newly introduced normative framework to gain support, legitimacy and resources; while the state was using the work done by women’s NGO’s as a means to foster a more positive image in the international arena’ (Aharoni 2014, p. 17). The proposed plan only made one reference to Gaza, which suggested providing humanitarian aid to women and children (Action Plan 2013). Israel has yet to approve, hitherto implement, any national action plan.

Palestinian National Action Plan (NAP 2017–2019) developed its first action plan through a consultative process that was endorsed by the Palestinian Authority. The plan identified priority programmes, projects and activities and encouraged allocation of resources. The NAP is aimed at “protecting Palestinian women and girls from violations of the Israeli occupation, holding it accountable internationally while ensuring the participation of women without discrimination both locally and on the international stage” (NAP 2015). In Gaza, the NAP focuses on conducting a survey and data base on service providers, activation of a national referral system, the development of projects for women and girls and mainstreaming gender into the reconstruction process (NAP 2015). The Palestinian NAP has had little influence on the policies of Israel or Hamas and thus far has only been able to influence protection though civil society or policies of the international community.

Issues related to gender have largely remained invisible under the larger accusations of wrongdoing by Israel and Palestinian armed groups. Although the reality of women is visibly different for those living in Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and under Israeli versus Palestinian Authority, all civilians are vulnerable to purposeful attacks. Civilians are impacted by terrorism and rocket attacks that target indiscriminately and serve to justify the Israeli military crackdown on the Palestinian population. Rocket fire and terrorism aimed at civilians and civilian infrastructure infringes on human security and is considered a war crime. It should be noted the relative low number of Israeli civilian casualties are linked to the alarms and safe rooms. Escalation of violence has also resulted in Israel using draconian security measures that impact on security of individuals, particularly those who are already members of vulnerable groups.

As one of the most divided and polarized cities in the world, Jerusalem’s diplomatic and political status is controversial and unresolved. Since the 1967 Six-Day-War, when Israel occupied East Jerusalem and united the city under Israeli administration and control, the realities have been dramatically different for Palestinian residents living in East Jerusalem and Israeli residents living mostly in West Jerusalem. While the Israeli residents, comprising about 65% of the population, have full rights and access to all services, Palestinian residents, comprising of about 35% of the population, live mostly in less developed East Jerusalem, do not have Israeli citizenship and lack full socio/economic rights and access to equal services and rights including infrastructure, education, freedom of movement, political representation and policing. Checkpoints, lack of Palestinian police and general feelings of vulnerability affect mainly Palestinians women and youth. Palestinian women have also the highest levels of unemployment, with about one quarter of Palestinian women employed in Jerusalem.

The wide differences between the everyday realities of Palestinian and Israeli women and men touches every aspect of lives including education, housing, employment, environment, transportation, security and social services. Gender is one of the fundamental distinctive categories in Jerusalem including: national identity, religious affiliation (including the divisions between the secular and the religious) and socio-economic differences. Previous research focused on women in Jerusalem has noted that most women feel safe within ‘their territory’ or national neighbourhoods, but are fearful when entering areas of others (Raanan 2014). This is especially the case for religious Muslim women and religious Jewish women who tend to spend time in the secular neighbourhoods of Jerusalem and avoid each other’s neighbourhoods. In addition, Palestinian women feel a deeper sense of insecurity than their Jewish counterparts and Palestinian men. This sentiment mirrors the sentiment of Muslim women in Israel.

Many Israeli civilians express personal security fears at the hands of state institutions. In a 2016 survey, conducted by the Israeli Knesset on the Status of Women, more than 59% of women and 54% of men polled were concerned about being harmed by state institutions (Knesset Survey 2016). Most concerned were Palestinian/Arab women of whom 74% worried about damaging behaviour by state agencies that would negatively affect their personal security (Knesset Survey 2016). As noted by MK Dov Khenin (Joint List), ‘Israeli society lives in fear…Unfortunately, there are those who build their politics on fear. There are different aspects to the Israeli women’s sense of lack of personal security – physical, sectorial, economic, social and more’ (Knesset Survey 2016).

Within Israel, Palestinian women and girls are particularly vulnerable in East Jerusalem where the inadequate security is compounded by institutional isolation and lack of citizenship. Lack of Israeli citizenship for East Jerusalem residents and lack of connection to the Palestinian Authority has left the residents vulnerable to harsh collective security measures, expulsion and abuse by local security authorities. Jerusalem Women’s Coalition, which includes women NGO’s and East Jerusalem Feminists, in October 2015 issued an urgent request for international protection. “We …call upon the international community to protect our families, community, and children. We are calling for the protection of our bodily safety and security when in our homes, walking in our neighborhood, reaching schools, clinics, work places, and worships venues” (Coalition 2015).

Palestinian women living in the West Bank and Gaza are impacted by additional factors that negatively affect their lives including the military occupation, external violence (military and settler), internal (domestic violence), sanctions, lack of freedom of movement, lack of adequate access to police and judicial bodies, poverty, evictions, collective punishment, house demolitions, among others. UN Resolution 2010/6 expressed deep concern regarding the “grave situation of Palestinian women in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, resulting from the severe impact of the ongoing illegal Israeli occupation and all of its manifestations…” (UNESC 2017). Gender issues such as trafficking of girls, forced prostitution, child marriages and femicide (‘honor killings’) are all too common but kept out of the limelight (Institute of Justice 2016). The protection regime is especially problematic in East Jerusalem and Area C of West Bank where there is no Palestinian Authority and Palestinian residents do not trust Israeli police or the military (Spitka 2019). However, when it comes to vulnerability to war crimes and crimes against humanity and the potential application of Pillar III of R2P, Gaza is the most relevant context.

The most recent escalation in 2018 stemmed from mass non-violent protests along the security barrier between Gaza and Israel, resulting in the deaths of dozens of young Palestinian protesters and shooting injuries of more than 3000 people. Israel justified the shooting of live ammunition by IDF snipers as security measures against a potential breach into Israel, targeting any individual who came within 300-metre range of the security barrier, including well-marked journalists and medical staff. The shootings of the unarmed protesters prompted calls for a UN investigation and the creation of an international protection unit. However, once again due to lack of international unity and decisiveness, there has been no accountability and the results of the investigation have been ignored.

Gaza, Gender and Protection Tools

With a population of 1.8 million, Gaza is one of the most densely populated areas of the world, with little law and order, cut off from the outside world and entirely dependent on Hamas and foreign aid. Cycles of violence, including Israeli bombardment campaigns and incursions into Gaza, have affected the majority of the civilian population that has nowhere to flee. Economic blockades, severe fuel and water shortages, and Israeli restrictions on many items including basic construction materials have left much of the population vulnerable to not only violence but also natural elements. The reality of women in Gaza lies under a layer of harshness of the occupation, militarism, chauvinism, exploitation, political recriminations and opportunism. The 9-year blockade of Gaza has had major implications for women, exacerbating pre-existing vulnerabilities and limiting access to basic services (UN Women 2016). The sensitivity of exposing the situation of women living under multi-layers of oppression by Hamas, Israeli occupation and international blockade has left women and LGBTQ particularly vulnerable to atrocities. The current notion is that responsibility to protect in Gaza is shared between Israel as the occupying power, Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas, which runs the de facto government. Whether Gaza is perceived as an occupied territory or as part of an independent state of Palestine, no authority is currently providing protection for the civilian population of Gaza. The triangle of authority means that while the different authorities point fingers at opposing sides for human rights infringements and war atrocities, none provide adequate protect for the most vulnerable population.

The internal division between Palestinian groups Hamas and Fatah has led to fundamentally different realities for women in the West Bank and those in Gaza living under siege and the de facto Hamas authority (UN Women 2016). Gender-based crimes are compounded in areas with weakest legal authority without adequate policing where perpetrators can act without impunity. In Gaza, the strict social codes of segregation imply that women and girls are confined to the private sphere and are commonly reliant on male family members for their livelihoods as well as access to critical information about the security situation, humanitarian assistance and other services (UN Women/UN OCHA 2016). Gaza has one of the highest incidents of violence against women in the world with more than half of the women experiencing GBV (Statistics 2011). Sawa, a Palestinian NGO that runs a help-line for women and kids, note dramatic increases in cases of violence against women during conflict escalations (Otero 2012). Although gender-based violence is beyond the scope of this paper, there is interconnectedness between the hardship of the occupation, absence of rule of law and lack of security and protection for women and non-heterosexual minorities. The police do not act, domestic violence is not criminalized and the only institutions providing protection for women are civil society organizations, which are also vulnerable to attack (UN Women Interview 2017). Homosexuality in Gaza remains illegal and punishable by death and this vulnerability has been exploited by Israel. The ongoing blockade of Gaza and the lack of recognition of the Hamas authority implies that the international community has also been limited in strengthening protection.

The 2008 and 2014 Gaza wars caused many civilian deaths, accusations of war crimes, threats of sanctions and discussions about bringing those responsible to justice. However, a lack of consensus among the key interveners resulted in no intervention beyond investigations and humanitarian assistance. The 2014 hostilities, which were a response to rocket fire and a terrorist incident against Israeli youth, destroyed residential buildings and schools, resulting in many civilian deaths, destruction of infrastructure and a displacement of close to a third of the population of Gaza. The UN report noted that of the 2,251 people killed in Gaza, 1,462 were civilians. Non-governmental organizations have estimated that 241 women and 370 children were killed while inside their homes. The 2014 Gaza war was especially hard on women with a long-term impact. “This war was different from previous wars, especially for women. Civilians were attacked particularly in their homes. The home is the domain of the women…” (UN Human Rights Council 2009, p. 31). OCHA noted that women and girls in the Gaza Strip were disproportionally affected by the hostilities due to discrimination, lack of access to basic services, lack of inheritance and property rights and wide scale displacement, which in turn increased their exposure to gender-based violence (OCHA 2015).

Israeli justification for the military campaign was the ongoing rocket fire launched by armed groups from Gaza. Between July and August 2014, Palestinian militants indiscriminately fired 4,881 rockets and 1,753 mortars towards Israel, killing 6 civilians (UN Human Rights Council 2009). Alarms and safe rooms prevented loss of more Israeli lives. The protection of the civilian population was essentially non-existent in Gaza. Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) claimed that measures such as leaflets recommending evacuation and a small blast on the roof served as warnings for people to evacuate buildings targeted for destruction. The warnings were confusing, while Hamas recommended to civilians to ignore IDF warnings and IDF considered anyone who remained a voluntary shield. Also, many civilians had nowhere to flee; no location in Gaza was considered safe, and those areas that were designated as “safe” such as UN schools were targeted.

While Israel and Palestinian armed groups including Hamas have arguably crossed red lines and failed to provide adequate protection for civilians in Gaza, the international community has remained divided over the use of tools and responses that go beyond humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian response without a political solution or a prioritization of protection has not contributed to creating or strengthening anyone’s security in Gaza. Unlike in the West Bank, there is little attempt to address women’s rights or well-being, and the dire situation is compounded by a lack of training of police and the judiciary. As noted by a representative from UN Women: “the missing practice is that we do not work with institutions of the de facto [Gaza] authorities. In other contexts, we would work with the courts, the judges, the prosecutors, the police, the social workers for women’s rights but we do not do that in this case” (Interview UN Women 2017).

Although the larger political issues are ignored, some of the humanitarian projects that target women do contribute towards their protection. With about 14% of Khan Younis public spaces associated with high levels of harassment and crime, and 50% deemed unsafe by residents, the project was to assist in fostering a sense of security for women on a tiny strip of Gaza beach (UN Habitat 2021). In a recent UN Habitat project addressing the lack of safety for women and girls in public spaces in Gaza, a project built a new safe, inclusive, and accessible public space for women and children (UN Habitat 2021).

Gender and Peace

The 2016 Allen Plan was a key proposal under Obama administration and an example of traditional military-centred solutions that define the discussions on protection in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The Allan plan was drafted by US and Israeli military officers; Ilan Goldenberg, Major General Gadi Shamni, Nimrod Novik and Colonel Kris Bauma, focusing solely on Israeli security needs and failing to conduct consultations with women or civil society (Tibon and Harel 2017). It made no reference to R2P or WPS and highlighted the most important steps as: establishment of a counterterrorism system, security at crossings, an airport in the Jordan Valley and Gaza, and the establishment of a broader regional security framework with the support of US military troops (Goldenberg et al. 2016). The steps in the document made no proposals to address the protection of vulnerable civilians or ideas on security and protection arrangements for Gaza. It recommended that under the new plan, Israel would still have the right to defend itself in extreme situations and ‘would receive American diplomatic support in the aftermath’ (Goldenberg et al. 2016, p. 6). The Palestinian state was supposed to be de-militarized under this plan leaving Israel in charge of security if it was unhappy with Palestinian efforts to repress the population and prevent violence. Under Trump, Palestinians and all women and gender issues were completely ignored.

There has been little discussion let alone consensus on the appropriate protection tools for civilians most vulnerable to atrocity crimes. Divisive diplomatic intervention has been ineffective in contributing towards a protection regime. Humanitarian intervention has addressed some of the effects of the occupation and not addressed its impact or its source. Coercive tools including sanctions have been employed against Hamas with harsh impacts on the suffering of the civilian population but with little effect on the Hamas leadership in Gaza. Diplomatic or popular actions against Israel, including the populist led BDS movement (Boycotts, Disinvestment, Sanctions) have failed to gain an international consensus. Although Palestinians have joined the International Criminal Court (ICC) in hopes of prosecuting Israel for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity during the Gaza war, it remains to be seen whether the court will be able to investigate the war atrocities, given the lack of support and cooperation from Israel and the US.

Perceptions, Justifications and a Road Map Towards a Protection Regime

There is currently a substantial gap between the protection agenda fostered by local and international humanitarian organizations working on issues related to gender and protection, and national security priorities of state representatives within Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Participation of women is limited to those areas that do not threaten national or state agendas. Participation has yet to include equal representation in deliberation and expertise. Examining the lack of Israeli women in formal peace processes, Aharoni noted that ‘the dominant framing of peace as a security-related issue and the centrality of militarized masculinity led to a strict identification of ideal-type negotiating skills with masculinity’ (Aharoni 2014, p. 381). In Gaza, there are also limited consultations between women’s civil society groups, women’s NGO’s that focus on protection and national and international protection agencies.

Women and gender issues have played a marginal role in official discussions on peace and security in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Final status discussions at Camp David (2005) had no senior female participants, and while the Madrid Conference (1991) included Hanan Ashrawi and the Annapolis conference (2007) had Tzipy Livni, their roles and influence were marginal. In Israel, two ‘gendering forces’ shaping Israeli society hinder the inclusion of women in dialogue on security: a strong Jewish familial tradition and ‘a militaristic culture that places national security concerns in the center of public and private life’ (Aharoni 2014, p. 7). However, the simple inclusion of women in peace negotiations is not sufficient. For gender inclusion to be effective, women need to be included in their full diversity in all aspects and all areas including or especially in security.

Women are commonly portrayed as the main victims and beneficiaries of aid and serve to assist fundraising to donors. However, the humanitarian assistance neither prevents violence nor addresses the issue of ongoing atrocities. Organizations such as UN WOMEN, OCHA, UNFPA, OHCHR as well as national NGO’s have been engaged in emergency responses attempting to address gaps in the distribution of humanitarian assistance (UN Women/UN OCHA 2016). Numerous local and international organizations, including UN Women, Oxfam and Sawa, provide gender training courses to women to inform them about their rights under 1325, but these make only marginal contributions to their level of protection in Gaza. In the West Bank, the Palestinian civilian police established a Family Protection Unit though EU support. The protection unit opened branches in 10 districts within Area A of the West Bank and aspires to build more effective protection from violence for women and children. There has been no attempt or plans to extend this effort into Area C or Gaza. In Gaza, Palestinian and international NGO’s efforts have been limited to offering women legal consultation and assistance under Sharia law.

The current international intervention in Gaza is focused on humanitarian assistance, ignoring the protection of women and LGBTQ. Protection measures such as the creation of ‘safe areas’, including schools where many women and children were herded during the 2014 airstrikes, are not appropriate since individuals were not safe as many were erroneously or deliberately targeted. Although Hamas and Israel prioritize security, measures are aimed at destruction of the other and not human protection. Women, girls and gender minorities living in Gaza are particularly vulnerable since they have no one to turn to for protection. Atrocities against sexual minorities are also common but not monitored or investigated due to fear of repercussions. Lack of protection against Israeli incursions affects all residents of Gaza.

In a densely populated setting such as Gaza, envisioning protection that uses traditional military tools is not an option if one prioritizes the protection of the most vulnerable. An international policing mission, training of female and gender sensitive police officers and judges are measures far more likely to enhance protection. As noted by gender scholars, the design of security must be part of empowerment and not disempowerment of individuals. Although local and international non-governmental organizations contain much gender and protection expertise, they are far removed from top-level discussions on security. From the five types of participation: the presence of role models, representation, deliberation, inclusion, and expertise, Israel and Palestine can mainly claim to have limited participation as role models due to the brief public participation of Hanan Ashrawi and Tzipi Livni.

The widespread Palestinian demonstrations in Gaza during May/June 2018 resulted in more than 130 deaths and 3000 injuries from shots fired by IDF snipers. The lethal use of force against unarmed Palestinian civilians was condemned by most countries and human rights groups. Human Rights Watch (HRW) noted that lethal force against demonstrators who posed no imminent threat to life may amount to war crimes (HRW 2018). In addition, according to HRW, Palestinians in Gaza are entitled to protection under the Geneva Conventions as an occupied people and any willful killing of them would constitute a war crime (HRW 2018). Kuwait on 30 May 2018 circulated a draft SCR condemning Israel’s use of force against the civilians, calling for the establishment of a UN protection mission in Gaza. The Kuwaiti-drafted resolution was vetoed by the US. There are thus fundamental challenges to the operationalization of protection. First, a proposed protection unit under the UN would have to pass the Security Council and it would be challenging to establish a unit with a strong enough mandate to influence the behavior of Israel or Hamas. The protection of civilians in Gaza is dependent on Israel refraining from military attacks on the territory and a complete overhaul of the current legal and national institutions within Gaza.

Currently, the international community is using protection tools that focus on humanitarian assistance and monitoring that contribute to understanding protection needs but fails to provide them. The shifting of the narrative from a state-centric to a human-centric approach to security can provide a potential normative framework for building a consensus prioritizing the protection of all civilians. However, the protection measures should be inclusive and part of larger peacemaking effort that ends collective punishment against civilians in Gaza and opens a roadmap prioritizing protection of the whole population. Currently, R2P is not on the agenda and the norm has had no impact on prioritizing protection of the population from war atrocities. The gap between international norms on R2P and WPS, and the operationalization of protection in a divisive context like Gaza remain very wide.

Conclusion

While vulnerability of women and children is commonly used to hurl accusations at conflicting sides or gain the attention of donors, state-centric traditional security measures have remained in place and not contributed to enhancing protection. Indeed, a more common reality is a myth of protection, where the focus is ostensibly on the protection of women and other vulnerable groups, while efforts and resources go towards security measures that exclude women or humanitarian measures or handouts, that fail to address protection. Given the cycles of violence and lack of protection by any authority, the population in Israel/Palestine, most notably in Gaza and Area C of the West Bank is vulnerable to ongoing war atrocities. There has been little effort on the part of the national actors or key interveners to prioritize and construct a consensus focused on protection. Likewise, there has been little discussion on R2P in Gaza, within the Security Council, the Quartet or among key interveners. The lack of focus on human security has contributed to a non-existent protection regime and little consultation with primary providers of protection. SCR 1325 and WPS agenda could provide a roadmap towards a more inclusive dialogue on effective protection. Considering the number and the longevity of NGO’s working on issues of protection, the expertise on protection issues in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is not in short supply. Human security and responsibility to protect the most vulnerable population, however, has not been a priority.