The European Union’s Contribution to the Implementation of the Ethnic Approach Within the Colombian Peace Agreement (2016–2021)

Abstract

The chapter examines to what extent the European Union is contributing to territorial peacebuilding through the implementation of the Peace Agreement’s ethnic approach. It is vital to support Colombia’s ethnic minorities—who are the main victims of the armed conflict and whose rights have historically been violated—in order to effectively contribute to reconciliation and positive peace. Likewise, ethnic communities have collective imaginaries and conceptions of territory that are different from those of modern society. As a result, territorial peace is in danger of replicating the liberal peace model if it does not effectively integrate these other perspectives when rebuilding governance. The conclusion of this research is that the European Union is sensitive to the situation and demands of ethnic peoples, and is supporting peace projects and initiatives with an ethnic aspect through cooperation programmes. However, in the first five years of implementation (2016–2021), it has not sufficiently supported the commitments adopted in the Peace Agreement with ethnic peoples, having underestimated the significance of the ethnic approach in its peacebuilding strategy in Colombia.

1 Introduction

After the territory of present-day Colombia was colonised, the white Catholic minority imposed its hegemony and developed a system of social stratification and segregation. This has led to numerous struggles by ethnic minorities, especially indigenous and Afro-Colombian groups, through which they have gained some recognition by the Colombian government. However, despite the progress made in the 20 years since the 1991 Constitution was adopted, their social, political and economic exclusion continues to perpetuate these divisions. Likewise, the armed conflict has affected ethnic peoples in a differential and disproportionate manner, as they live in the areas most affected by the hostilities. Despite the Peace Agreement signed between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC-EP), the humanitarian situation of ethnic peoples remains critical.

Building lasting peace in Colombia depends to a large extent on resolving the structural causes of the conflict, which are related to the discrimination and inequality suffered by these peoples. Compared to other peace processes, the territorial-based approach is positive because it recognises the country’s regional diversity and the differentiated impact of the war. It thus considers that actions cannot be standardised, but must respect this diversity and the local communities’ varying initiatives and needs. However, decolonial studies warn against the danger of reducing territorial peace to the devolution of state institutions to the territories, as this could lead to the expansion of the modern state and a development model based on the capitalist economy (liberal peace). The construction of the nation-state has been a historical process of violent territorial integration, based on the narrative of the failed integration of the outer regions, when these may in fact be the centre of life, security and refuge for local communities. Territory is a controversial notion that encompasses a range of projects, models and collective imaginaries of territoriality. On this point, the state project does not consider the notions of territoriality that emerge from ethnic communities (Iranzo, 2022; Peña, 2019; Rodríguez Iglesias, 2018).

Pressure from ethnic communities in the Havana negotiations successfully ensured that the Ethnic Chapter was incorporated into the Agreement within days of its signature. The Agreement contains a set of principles, safeguards and guarantees that protect ethnic communities’ interests and rights. It thus set a precedent for peace agreements around the world and is considered one of the most comprehensive, innovative and inclusive agreements ever reached (Koopman, 2020: 1; Kroc Institute, 2017: 12–13; 2021a: 8).

However, after five years of implementation, the ethnic commitments are lagging the furthest behind and most of these cannot be adequately enforced unless robust efforts are made to implement them (Kroc Institute, 2021c: 6).

In this chapter we look at ways in which the European Union (EU) has contributed to the implementation of the commitments made to ethnic peoples in the Agreement. The EU is one of the Agreement’s strategic international partners. The points assigned to the EU to support their implementation are the Comprehensive Rural Reform (Point 1) and the Reincorporation of former guerrillas (Point 3), for which the EU created the European Trust Fund for Colombia (EUTF). Likewise, the Delegation of the European Union (EU Delegation) to Colombia is carrying out a series of diplomatic actions, and supporting projects in the area of human rights and civil society that also contribute to different aspects of the Agreement. We will analyse these initiatives in light of their contribution to the ethnic approach.

This research has been conducted five years since the implementation of the Agreement began (2016–2021), and so it is a non-final review of the Agreement. Peacebuilding is a process that requires long-term changes, but the first few years after the signing of a peace agreement are crucial.¹

The results obtained in this research are based on the analysis of primary documentary sources (reports by national institutions and international organisations, as well as internal EU Delegation working documents) and 21 semi-structured interviews with EU Delegation staff and their technical assistants, coordinators of EU-funded projects and representatives of ethnic organisations.

The chapter is divided into five parts. After this introduction, Sect. 2 provides the context for the situation of ethnic communities during the armed conflict. Section 3 discusses the incorporation of the Ethnic Chapter into the Agreement and its level of implementation beyond the first five years. Section 4 then analyses the EU’s contribution to the implementation of the ethnic approach during this period. Finally, the last section concludes the chapter.

2 Ethnic Communities in the Armed Conflict

Colombia is a multi-ethnic and multicultural country where many ethnic groups of indigenous, Afro-descendant and Roma origin coexist. The indigenous population totals 1,905,607 people belonging to 115 indigenous groups. The Wayuu, Zenú, Nasa and Pastos are the most numerous, accounting for 58.1% of the country’s indigenous peoples. Most of the indigenous population lives in the departments of La Guajira, Cauca, Nariño, Córdoba and Sucre, although they do not constitute the majority in those areas. In the departments of Vaupés, Guainía, Vichada and Amazonas, the indigenous population represents more than 50% of the overall population (DANE, 2019a). Currently, 65 indigenous languages are still spoken (Landaburu, 1999) and there are 788 established indigenous resguardos² (ANT, 2021).

Colombia’s Afro-descendant population, also known as the Black, Afro-Colombian, Raizal and Palenquero population (NARP),³ numbers 4,671,160 people, or 9.4% of the total population, and is mainly located in the Colombian Pacific region and the Caribbean. In 2018 there were 196 collective territories of Black communities (DANE, 2021).

Finally, the Roma or Gypsy population is made up of 2,649 people, mostly belonging to two family groups, Kumpania and Vitsa. 72.4% still speak or understand Romani. Most of them live in the capital, Bogotá, and in the municipalities of Girón (Santander), Cucuta (Norte de Santander) and Sampues (Sucre) (DANE, 2019b).

The 1991 Constitution recognised the nation’s ethnic and cultural diversity and established the constitutional obligation to protect it.⁴ The Colombian government has also signed and ratified international instruments that recognise and protect the human rights of ethnic groups.⁵ That recognition creates an obligation for the government to respect the self-determination and self-government of ethnic groups, as well as the right to free, prior and informed consultation.⁶

Since then, there have been significant advances in the domestic policy framework for the protection of ethnic rights. However, there has been a clear gap between recognition and enforcement. In fact, from the 1990s onwards, political violence against indigenous people actually increased (UNHCR, 2006; United Nations Special Rapporteur, 2004).

The internal armed conflict has had a devastating impact on ethnic peoples. Despite their territorial rights, they have been forced to coexist with a variety of armed actors and live in the crossfire. Ethnic territories are historically located in remote and marginalised rural areas where the presence of state institutions has been reduced. They have therefore been favoured by armed groups as areas to take refuge, grow crops for illicit purposes and carry out illegal mining. Moreover, due to their high natural value, they are also coveted territories in which to develop mega-projects to exploit natural resources.

As a consequence, ethnic peoples have endured military occupation of their territories, massacres, targeted assassinations, disappearances, extrajudicial executions, mass displacement, confinement, forced recruitment, rape of women, arbitrary detentions, threats and the criminalisation of protest. Between 1974 and 2004, 6,745 individual human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law against indigenous people were recorded (Villa & Houghton, 2005: 59). In 2004, the Constitutional Court of Colombia recognised the disproportionate impact of the armed conflict on the indigenous population and declared 35 ethnic peoples to be at risk of physical and cultural extermination, forcing the Colombian government to provide them with special protection and draw up an Ethnic Safeguarding Plan However, the rights of indigenous peoples have continued to be violated in the absence of any effective protection (CCJ, 2015).

Ethnic peoples have been persecuted for resisting war and promoting peace, for defending their territory and opposing the extractive exploitation of natural resources, and for demanding that their individual and collective rights be fulfilled (United Nations Special Rapporteur, 2004: 9; 2018: 11). Ethnic peoples, especially indigenous peoples, have gained national and international recognition as agents of peace. A notable example of their contributions to peace is the creation of the Indigenous Guard, an unarmed community protection body that carries out non-violent resistance against armed actors (Sandoval Forero, 2008).

During the peace talks in Havana, organisations representing indigenous, Black, Afro-descendant, Raizal, Palenquero and Roma peoples mobilised to gain a place at the negotiating table as ethnic peoples and so jointly influence the negotiations. At the initiative of these organisations, the Ethnic Commission for Peace and Defence of Territorial Rights was created, which successfully advocated the inclusion in the Agreement of a series of ethnic commitments to protect their rights, which are contained in the Ethnic Chapter.

The signing of the Agreement has reduced some of the impacts associated with the armed conflict, such as forced recruitment and the effects of combat. However, the humanitarian situation of ethnic communities is still critical in the post-Agreement period. Following the demobilisation of the FARC-EP, a new cycle of violence has begun in rural areas, caused by territorial competition between criminal gangs, armed groups and FARC-EP dissidents. Violence is particularly concentrated in indigenous and Afro-Colombian territories, disproportionately affecting these communities, especially on the Pacific coast (United Nations Security Council, 2021: 15, 17). In many cases, the killing of social leaders and human rights defenders, as well as displacements and confinements, affects ethnic communities. For example, of 177 leaders and defenders murdered in 2021, 65 (37%) were ethnic leaders (55 indigenous and 10 Afro-Colombian) (INDEPAZ, 2021); and between July and September 2021 alone, 15,200 people were displaced and 46,321 were confined, of whom 44 and 96% respectively belonged to ethnic communities (United Nations Security Council, 2021: 3, 5). Likewise, since the Agreement was signed there have been 289 murders of former FARC-EP combatants, of whom 66 (22.8%) were of ethnic origin (22 indigenous and 44 Afro-Colombian) (United Nations Security Council, 2021: 14).

Furthermore, since the Agreement was signed, the problems that prevent ethnic communities from exercising self-determination have continued, particularly in relation to the autonomy of their territory; the exercise of free, prior and informed consultation; the lack of access to drinking water, sanitation and basic health services; nutritional problems; the contamination of water sources and other environmental impacts generated by mining; and the lack of effective recognition of ethnic authorities by the state. As we shall see, the delays in the implementation of the Agreement are impeding the fulfilment of the economic, social and cultural rights of ethnic peoples. Of particular concern is the situation of indigenous peoples at risk of physical and cultural extermination in Amazonas, Guainía, Norte de Santander, Putumayo and Vaupés (OHCHR, 2021: 15).

3 The Inclusion of an Ethnic Approach in the Colombian Peace Agreement and Its Implementation

3.1 The Ethnic Chapter of the Peace Agreement

The Ethnic Chapter of the Agreement is a compendium of principles, safeguards and guarantees that promote respect for the historical rights acquired by ethnic peoples. It establishes that in no case may the interpretation and implementation of the Agreement be detrimental to the rights of ethnic peoples (the principle of progressivity and non-regression).

The Chapter includes the recognition by the Colombian government and the FARC-EP of the historical conditions of injustice experienced by ethnic peoples and their particular suffering during the internal armed conflict, as well as the active role they have played in peacebuilding. Furthermore, the signatory parties ratified the constitutional and international legal framework for the protection of ethnic rights as an interpretative frame of reference, in particular: the right to prior, free and informed consultation; cultural objection, or the right to oppose and prevent policies or plans that threaten their culture and survival as peoples; the right to self-determination, autonomy and self-government; the right to social, economic and cultural identity and integrity; and their rights over the land and territory occupied ancestrally and/or traditionally (and its resources), as well as the restitution of those lands.

The Agreement recognises the cross-cutting nature of the ethnic approach, which implies that the ethnic and cultural perspective must be incorporated and guaranteed in the implementation of all the aspects of the Agreement. The Ethnic Chapter encapsulates a series of specific measures to be taken into account in the implementation of the different points of the Agreement, which are summarised in the table below:

Point of the agreement	Safeguards and guarantees
Point 1. Comprehensive Rural Reform (RRI)	✓ Respect for the legal conditions of collective property; for the mechanisms of protection and legal security of ethnic lands and territories; and for the broad notion of territory (cultural and spiritual dimension) ✓ Special protection of endangered peoples and of Ethnic Safeguard Plans
Point 1.1. Access to land through the Land Fund	✓ Inclusion of ethnic peoples as beneficiaries of the Fund, without impinging on the rights they have already acquired ✓ Adjudication and formalisation of land for the constitution, extension, regulation, restitution and resolution of conflicts over use and tenure ✓ Respect for the ecological role of land and ancestral land practices over productivity ✓ Participation in the creation of mechanisms to resolve conflicts over land use and land tenure, and to strengthen food production
Point 1.2. Development Plans with a Territorial Focus (PDET)	✓ Consultation with ethnic peoples for the implementation of PDETs in their territories ✓ Special attention to the life plans, environmental management plans and land-use planning or ethno-development of ethnic peoples
Point 2. Political participation	✓ Participation in Special Transitory Electoral Districts for Peace (CTEPs) when they coincide with ethnic territories ✓ Participation in the different participatory planning bodies created by the Agreement
Point 3. End of the conflict	✓ Incorporation of the ethnic and cultural perspective in the design and implementation of the Security and Protection Programme ✓ Strengthening of ethnic peoples’ own security systems (Indigenous Guard and Cimarrona Guard)
Point 4. Solution to the illicit drugs problem	✓ Participation and consultation in the design and implementation of the National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Crops Used for Illicit Purposes (PNIS) ✓ Respect for the cultural uses and consumption of traditional plants classed as used for illicit purposes ✓ Prioritisation of territories affected by crops used for illicit purposes belonging to ethnic peoples in danger of extinction or in a situation of confinement or displacement ✓ Consultation on the development of the Programme of Demining and Clearance ✓ Prioritisation of particularly affected indigenous peoples and community councils within the Demining Programme and the Land Return, Restoration and Restitution Programme
Point 5. Victims of the conflict	✓ Respect for the jurisdictional functions of traditional ethnic authorities within their territorial area ✓ Participation and consultation when designing judicial and extrajudicial mechanisms that affect them ✓ Creation of mechanisms for linking and coordinating the Special Jurisdiction for Peace with the Special Indigenous Jurisdiction and with Afro-Colombian authorities ✓ Creation of a Special Harmonisation Programme, in agreement with the ethnic peoples to promote the reincorporation of demobilised individuals in ethnic communities, and the creation of an educational and communicative strategy of ethnic non-discrimination
Point 6. Implementation mechanisms	✓ Creation of a Special High-Level Forum with Ethnic Peoples (IEANPE) to act as a consultant, representative and spokesperson for the Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Implementing the Final Agreement (CSIVI) ✓ The non-inclusion of budgetary agreements adopted with indigenous peoples prior to the Agreement as sources of funding for implementation

In conclusion, we see that the ethnic organisations that participated in the Colombian peace process successfully achieved recognition of the differential ethnic approach, to the extent that an Ethnic Chapter was incorporated, including the principles, safeguards and guarantees that would ensure that their ethnic rights would be respected. In this regard, the Colombian Peace Agreement became a benchmark in Latin America and the rest of the world.

Another question, which we address below, is to what extent the ethnic approach of the Agreement has been successfully implemented in the five-year period since it was signed.

3.2 The Implementation of the Ethnic Approach During the First Five-Year Period (2016–2021)

Despite the commitments made by the signatory parties to ethnic communities, according to the institutions in charge of monitoring and verifying the Agreement (the Centre for Research and Popular Education (CINEP) and the Resource Centre for Conflict Analysis (CERAC) jointly as Technical Secretariat (STCIV), and the Kroc Institute), the main delays in implementation are occurring specifically in relation to the ethnic approach.

The results so far show that insufficient progress has been made in implementing the ethnic commitments. After the first five-year period (December 2016–October 2021), a significant number of ethnic commitments have either not been initiated (15%) or have been completed to a minimal degree (60%). Of the commitments with the highest level of implementation, 13% have reached an intermediate level of progress and only 13% of the commitments have been fully implemented (Kroc Institute, 2021c: 6).⁷

Furthermore, there is a gap between the fulfilment of the ethnic commitments and the progress made on the other commitments contained in the Agreement (Fig. 1). There is a difference of 17% points between the general commitments and the ethnic commitments that have been fully implemented. This divergence in the levels of implementation means that many of the actions that required the cross-cutting application of the ethnic approach in the different points of the Agreement have probably not been carried out.

Fig. 1

(Source Own graph based on Kroc Institute (2021c: 6))

Levels of implementation of general commitments and ethnic commitments

The data collected by the Kroc Institute show that Point 1 on Comprehensive Rural Reform, Point 3 on the End of the Conflict and Point 4 on the Solution to the Illicit Drugs Problem have the lowest level of implementation of ethnic commitments, while Point 5 on the Victims of the Conflict and Point 6 on the Implementation, Verification and Public Endorsement mechanisms show the highest level of fulfilment of ethnic commitments. Below, we show the main advances made—as well as the remaining difficulties or challenges—in implementing the ethnic approach within each point of the Agreement.

• a. Comprehensive Rural Reform (Point 1).

Some of the main delays in incorporating the ethnic approach can be found in those aspects related to the Comprehensive Rural Reform (RRI): National Plans, Land Fund, Development Programs with a Territorial Focus (PDETs), Action Plans for Regional Transformation (PATR), etc.

Of the 16 National Plans provided for in the RRI, only 9 had been approved by November 2020 and none of these had properly incorporated the ethnic approach, as they do not contemplate consultation routes with ethnic peoples for planning actions and resources to ensure its implementation (Kroc Institute, 2021b: 54–55).

As of May 2020, 29,556 hectares had been handed over to ethnic peoples under the Land Fund for the collective titling of 27 indigenous resguardos and 4 Afro-descendant community councils (CPEC, 2020: 6), but there are long delays in resolving requests for the titling, extension and creation of inhabitable territories by both ethnic groups⁸; at the same time, the Roma people have not even been able to access these mechanisms (Kroc Institute, 2021a: 9–10, 28). Furthermore, among the ethnic population there is great concern over the actions of the National Land Agency (ANT), as these respond to processes that the communities initiated before the Agreement and no significant progress has been made since the Agreement was signed.

In relation to the PDETs and PATRs, the government states that the plans have been drawn up with the participation of ethnic peoples through 116 consultation routes in the 16 sub-regions, in which 517 community councils and 715 indigenous councils took part. As a result, of the 32,808 initiatives planned in this participatory process, 26% have been proposed by the ethnic organisations themselves (i.e. 8,381 ethnic initiatives); 28% have arisen from the communities’ general interests; and the remaining 47% have been proposed by non-ethnic communities outside the ethnic territories (CPEC, 2020: 57). However, the PDET ethnic initiatives have been implemented to minimal levels, as no progress has been made in agreeing on the concrete actions needed to implement them (Kroc Institute, 2021a: 10; 2021b: 55).

To boost the implementation of the PDETs, in 2020 the Territorial Renewal Agency (ART) made progress in strengthening the Special Consultation Mechanisms (MECs) in 9 of the 16 PDET sub-regions. The MECs are roundtable discussions with the ethnic authorities that can help to promote the prioritisation, operability, implementation and monitoring of the PDETs’ own ethnic initiatives. However, the MECs do not replace the prior consultation mechanism provided for in the Constitution and have not even taken place in regions where a significant number of ethnic communities are concentrated (e.g. Alto Patía, Norte del Cauca, Middle Pacific and Macarena-Guaviare) (Kroc Institute, 2021b: 56–57).

On the other hand, also in 2020, the government initiated a pilot test of the roadmap in the Catatumbo region with the participation of ethnic communities, and hopes to replicate it in the other regions. The challenge lies in ensuring the representative participation of ethnic communities in developing this roadmap, some of whom view it with suspicion (Kroc Institute, 2021a: 30).

Therefore, it is still necessary to move forward in collectively developing the PDET roadmap, to complete the MECs and connect them with the roadmaps, and to further develop the technical and financial resources needed to implement the ethnic initiatives and ensure prior consultation, as required by law (Kroc Institute, 2021a: 9, 30; 2021b: 65).

• b. Political Participation (Point 2) and effective participation in Agreement bodies and programmes

Progress on Point 2 is shown in the provision of training to citizen watchdog groups with an ethnic focus; in the dissemination of ethnic content through radio stations and digital platforms; and in the election of two representatives of ethnic communities to the National Council for Peace, Reconciliation and Coexistence (CNPRC), one of whom—the Afro-Colombian Francia Márquez—was elected as president of the Council (CPEC, 2020: 8; Kroc Institute, 2021b: 17).

As for the remaining challenges, there are concerns over the 16 candidates from ethnic peoples who were scheduled to participate in the Special Transitory Peace Voting Districts (CTEPs). The failure to regulate the CTEPs has made it impossible to ensure that the candidates can participate. Likewise, political and electoral reforms based on the recommendations of the Special Electoral Mission (MEE) have yet to be approved. These reforms would help to increase the political representativeness of the territories, for example by creating more voting stations in rural areas to make it easier for citizens to vote (Kroc Institute, 2021a: 25).

Furthermore, a cross-cutting issue that affects the entire Agreement, not just Point 2, is the effective participation of ethnic peoples, through their representatives, in all the bodies and programmes provided for in the Agreement, as well as in the processes of consultation and conflict resolution. Enabling communities to participate effectively is a determining factor in ensuring that the ethnic approach is properly included (Kroc Institute, 2021a: 23). Furthermore, should the lack of participation by ethnic communities lead to the violation of their rights to prior consultation and territorial autonomy, one of the main safeguards of the Ethnic Chapter—the non-regression of acquired ethnic rights—would be breached.

Ethnic representation has been achieved in some institutions (e.g. in the CNPRC), but there are still obstacles preventing ethnic peoples from participating. Since the first year of regulatory implementation through the Fast Track mechanism,⁹ not all the required ethnic consultations have taken place, especially with Afro-Colombian communities, and those that have taken place have not followed the protocols or are being implemented differently from what was originally agreed, as in the case of the ethnic approach of the Multipurpose Cadastral Information System¹⁰ (Frost, 2021; Kroc Institute, 2021a: 24–25).

The issues affecting effective ethnic participation are related to the lack of logistical, financial and technical guarantees. The greatest challenge lies in the PDET and the Comprehensive National Program for the Substitution of Crops Used for Illicit Purposes (PNIS), given that these consultation and implementation processes are the most expensive and logistically complex. Their application is also limited by the lack of technical knowledge of the regulations governing prior consultation, which could be resolved if the guidelines were properly disseminated (Kroc Institute, 2021b: 65), but so far this been carried out only partially (OHCHR, 2021: 16).

The lack of guarantees prevents ethnic peoples from having a real influence on policy, which particularly affects ethnic women. Ethnic women have been identified as less involved in the participatory processes of the Agreement’s programmes (Kroc Institute, 2021a: 25). For example, only 17% of ethnic women participated in the PNIS Municipal Planning Councils, which is considered an achievement (CPEC, 2020: 9). Furthermore, there is concern that participation is limited to consulting traditional leaders and that the diversity of voices and visions within the communities is overlooked (Frost, 2021).

• c. The End of the Conflict (Point 3)

The concerns of ethnic communities in this area are twofold: the reincorporation of demobilised ethnic guerrillas who wish to return to their communities of origin and the conflicts that this may generate¹¹; and the presence of Territorial Spaces for Training and Reincorporation (ETCR) within ethnic territories or near to them. The latter issue has two different aspects: on the one hand, failures in the socio-economic reincorporation process and in security guarantees for ex-combatants are leading to rearmament and recruitment into other armed groups (largely FARC-EP dissidents), which particularly affects security in those ethnic territories; on the other hand, the establishment of ETCRs in ethnic territories, as is the case of the ETCR of Los Monos, in the municipality of Caldono (Cauca), located in two indigenous resguardos, which sometimes generate territorial conflicts between the ex-combatants and the communities.

With regard to the reincorporation of demobilised ethnic guerrillas, the Agreement established that a Special Harmonisation Programme with an ethnic approach should be established in consultation with the communities. However, the consultation phases planned for 2018 could not be completed due to a lack of resources. It was not until 2020 that the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalisation (ARN) received a budget to establish this programme and prepare a consultation with the communities (CPEC, 2020: 112).

For the time being, the ARN has worked with the Organization of Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon (OPIAC) and the Community Council of the Alto Río Naya region to draw up specific guidelines to harmonise socio-economic reincorporation and the ethnic approach. However, they have yet to be disseminated, validated and regulated by most ethnic organisations. Likewise, there have been several positive experiences of coexistence between reincorporated and ethnic communities in Cauca and Chocó that could serve as a reference in similar contexts (STCIV, 2022: 56–59).

Furthermore, proper needs planning with an ethnic approach requires more efficient tracking of demobilised combatants who self-identify as belonging to an ethnic community, as well as the communities affected. To date there is no definite number of ex-combatants: it varies between 1,800 (14%) and 3,000 (23%) (STCIV, 2022: 56).

Regarding the lack of security in ethnic territories, the humanitarian situation is critical and the government’s response has been insufficient. Between 2016 and 2020, the Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia issued 137 early warnings of situations of risk for ethnic groups due to the presence of armed groups in their territories (OOC, 2020: 64).

The worsening security in ethnic territories is caused by delays in the implementation of the Agreement, specifically the planning of the security and protection programme with an ethnic approach, and the strengthening of ethnic peoples’ own security systems, recognised nationally and internationally, such as the Indigenous Guard and the Cimarrona Guard.

With the aim of calming and preventing violence in these territories, the Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia (2020: 100–101) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR, 2021: 17–18) recommend strengthening protection and prevention measures for social leaders and ethnic communities. A public policy is needed that recognises the Indigenous Guard and the Cimarrona Guard, coordinates their work and establishes their functions, operations and members (STCIV, 2022: 63).

In 2020, the National Protection Unit (UNP) made progress in characterising the Indigenous Guard and the Cimarrona Guard for individual and collective protection schemes, and in 2021 it provided equipment (basic resources and transport) to the Indigenous Guard in Tolima and an Afro-Colombian community in Chocó. Also, for the first time, the Constitutional Court of Colombia ordered the UNP and the Ministry of the Interior to coordinate with ethnic authorities in drawing up collective protection measures (United Nations Security Council, 2021: 14).

These mechanisms must be improved, because the persistent violence and insecurity in ethnic territories causes setbacks in the special rights of ethnic peoples—violating the principle of non-regression—and limits the chances to make progress in fulfilling ethnic commitments. Insecurity affects all points of the Agreement, e.g. by preventing: access to land, return and restitution and the implementation of development plans (Point 1); political participation (Point 2); humanitarian demining (Point 3); the eradication of illicit crops (Point 4); and the participation of victims in the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) and the Truth Commission, as well as the work of the Unit for the Search for Persons Deemed as Missing in the context of and due to the armed conflict (UBPD) (Point 5).

• d. The Solution to the Illicit Drugs Problem (Point 4)

The PNIS is being implemented through the signing of agreements with families, of which around 13,300 belong to ethnic communities that are mostly Afro-descendant. Most of the families linked to the programme have received a money transfer for immediate food assistance (UNODC, 2020).

By the end of 2020, progress had been made in the voluntary eradication of crops within indigenous resguardos and collective territories of Afro-descendant communities,¹² but no agreement has yet been reached on an ethnic route with a collective approach to address the voluntary substitution of crops used for illicit purposes in collective territories of ethnic communities (Kroc Institute, 2021b: 57).

In order to accelerate the implementation of the substitution programme, the government intends to replace the requirement to agree on an ethnic route, provided for in the Framework Plan for Implementation (PMI), with guidelines that regulate the implementation of substitution models with an ethnic approach. These guidelines were drafted by the Territorial Renewal Agency (ART) in 2020 and are expected to be agreed and validated by the communities. So far, the only consultation process within the PNIS seems to have been with the ethnic communities of Miranda and Jambaló in Cauca, and Tumaco in Nariño (Kroc Institute, 2021a: 25).

It is vital to complete the process of agreeing on a collective ethnic route or set of guidelines, both to further the implementation of the PNIS and to guarantee long-term peace in Colombia. The regions involved in the programme are of great interest to criminal structures focused on illegal economies, so the success of the PNIS—and thus of the Agreement—depends largely on progress in the socio-economic development of ethnic territories (Kroc Institute, 2021b: 57; 2021c: 24).

There has also been progress on preventing psychoactive substance use. DANE conducted studies on consumption among ethnic peoples, and the Colombian Ministry of Health developed ethnic guidelines for prevention programmes (CPEC, 2020: 10; Kroc Institute, 2021b: 55).

Finally, with regard to humanitarian demining, progress has been made both in consultations with ethnic peoples and in the implementation of demining operations in their territories (CPEC, 2020: 9–10). Further processes were announced for 2020 in indigenous resguardos in Cauca, Nariño and Caquetá. However, the process is advancing slowly. Most of the consultation processes for humanitarian demining have not been carried out, not even with the ethnic peoples who were prioritised in the Ethnic Chapter (STCIV, 2022: 69–70). The Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP) in Colombia has acknowledged the limited progress in this area and points to poor security conditions as one of the obstacles to demining (Kroc Institute, 2021a: 39).

• e. Victims of the Conflict (Point 5)

This area has seen some of the most significant progress in incorporating the ethnic approach, particularly in adapting the institutional infrastructure of the Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Recurrence (SIVJRNR), which has involved a variety of adjustments such as: creating specialised groups and directorates¹³; adapting employment regulations to achieve gender and ethnic equity among senior positions and civil servants; developing differential protocols, methodologies and routes; adapting information systems; and prioritising cases (Frost, 2021; Kroc Institute, 2021c: 17).

In relation to ethnic justice, protocols have been created to establish links with the indigenous jurisdiction, and there has also been a key recognition of the justice systems of Afro-descendants and Roma. This has been achieved through the process of prior consultation on all the protocols for relations and specific methodologies. Currently, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace is working on a strategy to include indigenous peoples in designing and implementing their own sanctions, including tasks and activities aimed at reparation (United Nations Security Council, 2021: 14).

Regarding the reparation of victims, 64% of Colombia’s collective victims belong to ethnic groups, and progress is being made in identifying those entitled to collective reparation and in developing plans. So far, 34 collective subjects have been compensated and 4 ethnic communities have received psychosocial care (CPEC, 2020: 10–11). In order to move forward in the comprehensive reparation of ethnic collectives, there needs to be better coordination between the SIVJRNR and the National System for the Attention and Comprehensive Reparation of Victims (SNARIV). For example, actions are still required to guarantee the return of 13 specific communities that were given priority in the Ethnic Chapter (Kroc Institute, 2021a: 44).

• f. Implementation, Verification and Public Endorsement mechanisms (Point 6)

Five years after the Agreement was signed, the general commitments of Point 6 have achieved the highest level of implementation (58% of commitments completed). However, the longest delays in this area are found in the ethnic commitments (Kroc Institute, 2021b: 147; 2021c: 8). Gaps are found both in the mechanisms in place to apply the ethnic approach and in the mechanisms for monitoring implementation.

Point 6.4 established the international community’s financial and technical mandate to accompany the implementation of the Agreement. Several accompanying countries and institutions were assigned to each of the points of the Agreement. Likewise, the terms of accompaniment were established for the implementation of the gender-based approach. However, no terms of accompaniment were established for the ethnic approach, which may be contributing to the delay and lack of effectiveness in fulfilling these commitments.

Another problem concerning the lack of mechanisms is that many of the 97 ethnic indicators in the PMI do not have consolidated factsheets,¹⁴ which delays implementation and makes it difficult to collect information to monitor the indicators (Kroc Institute, 2021b: 47; STCIV, 2021: 19).

Progress was made on this point through the creation of the Special High-Level Forum with Ethnic Peoples (IEANPE)¹⁵ Ethnic organisations asked the IEANPE to monitor and promote the commitments acquired in the Ethnic Chapter while the PMI is in place. However, technical and financial shortcomings limited its mandate during the first few years, especially at the territorial level. In May 2020, a work plan was drawn up and was able to function for two years through funding received from the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office.

4 The EU’s Contribution to Implementation

Five years into the process, it is clear that the international community is making a positive contribution to the implementation of the Colombian Peace Agreement. Accompaniment is playing a key role in channelling resources, promoting spaces for dialogue and consultation, and carrying out detailed monitoring of implementation (Kroc Institute, 2021b: 21). However, this international accompaniment mechanism is not working in the case of the Ethnic Chapter.

The EU is one of the Agreement’s strategic international partners. In this section we will analyse the EU Delegation’s peacebuilding strategy during the post-Agreement period (2016–2021) in relation to the ethnic approach. We will focus on analysing the ethnic component within: (a) the objectives, priorities and general guidelines of its peacebuilding policy; (b) the European Trust Fund for Colombia (EUTF), an instrument created in 2016 to support the implementation of the Agreement; and (c) actions in the area of human rights and civil society.

4.1 Objectives, Priorities and General Guidelines

Since the beginning of the post-Agreement period, the ethnic approach has not been a strategic objective or priority of the EU’s peacebuilding and cooperation policy in Colombia (Interviews E1a and E3).

This failure to prioritise the ethnic approach is reflected in the EU Delegation’s aid instruments. Respecting the needs and rights of ethnic communities is not a clear objective in the funding channels. In the calls for proposals of the different existing cooperation instruments, there are no specific funds earmarked for projects with ethnic populations and/or that focus on defending ethnic rights, demands or needs. Consequently, there are no such requirements for allocating resources in the terms of reference.

Likewise, the EU Delegation does not have an exclusive portfolio of projects with an ethnic approach, nor does it have a focal point or experts within its staff to promote and coordinate ethnic issues. As a result, there is no comprehensive monitoring or evaluation of ethnic needs and rights (by measuring an ethnic baseline and its progress), and no guidelines or methodologies have been established to guide the work done with ethnic communities. Moreover, it is not even clear that any guidelines exist to clarify what the EU Delegation considers the ethnic approach to be, or how ethnic issues should be dealt with in peacebuilding. Delegation staff themselves acknowledge that they do not know how to improve the way they support this approach (Interview E1a).

The failure to prioritise the ethnic approach also derives from the need to distribute limited funds among the different lines of cooperation (Interview E1a). Another reason cited is that the ethnic approach is so highly internalised in international cooperation in Colombia that it is not necessary to make an effort to differentiate project approaches or methodologies, and there is no need to prioritise them or give them a special focus. Furthermore, Delegation staff do not believe it is possible to demand that the ethnic approach be applied to all projects because not all areas have an ethnic population. The calls for proposals therefore only establish in general terms that projects should prioritise or include vulnerable populations, including ethnic communities (Interview E3; EU Delegation, n.d.: 5).

Likewise, the failure to incorporate specific funds for ethnic issues within the calls for proposals may be due to an attempt to mainstream the approach within the EU Delegation. Instead of lending direct support to ethnic projects—as was previously the case in some calls for proposals—an attempt is being made to ensure that all actions incorporate this approach (Interviews E6 and E7). This can be positive if the mainstreaming approach is properly applied to all actions, but there is a risk that the support will be diluted (Interview E6).

In contrast, the gender approach—which is the other fundamental cross-cutting axis of peacebuilding in Colombia—is a clear priority within the EU Delegation: it includes specific objectives, a project portfolio, expert staff, monitoring indicators, etc. This is due, inter alia, to a European Commission requirement. The European Commission uses indicators to establish minimum standards that projects must meet in their gender-based approach (Interview E3). Support for a gender-based approach was previously superficial, but has now become a requirement in the funding lines. The EU wants to take the lead in incorporating this approach into the international cooperation system and, as of 2021, with the start of the new programming phase for EU cooperation, 85% of its funds will have to finance projects whose objectives include a particular focus on women (Interview E1a).

Despite the lack of prioritisation in the documents, the EU Delegation does express its concern over ethnic issues. Ethnic—mainly indigenous—demands generate a great deal of sympathy among development workers based in Colombia, including those who form part of the Delegation (Interview E1a). For example, the ambassador of the EU to Colombia and the political section are in continuous talks with indigenous organisations (Interview E3). This sympathy may work to the advantage of actors and/or projects aligned with ethnic demands. De facto, the end result is that ethnic communities are recipients of cooperation funds, which is evidence of the Delegation’s concern (Interview E7).

In conclusion, the failure to prioritise the ethnic approach in the EU’s peacebuilding strategy in Colombia does not respond to a lack of interest in ethnic issues. Instead, it may be explained by several factors: (1) the need to decide how to allocate limited resources, so that rather than not being a priority at all, we would say that they are less of a priority than other issues; (2) with regard to decision-making and the governance of European funds, priorities are often determined by a European strategy that is broader than a country’s own domestic strategy, as in the case of the gender-based approach; (3) prioritisation can also be influenced by the lack of knowledge, well-established skills and/or expertise within the EU Delegation and/or the EU in the area of epistemologies and methodologies with an ethnic perspective; (4) the assumption that there is no need to delve deeper into the ethnic perspective because it is already internalised within Colombia, and that it can only be applied to projects where there is an ethnic population; (5) the attempt to mainstream the ethnic approach in all actions; and finally, (6) the excessive workload of Delegation staff, which may prevent them from creating a new portfolio of projects and carrying out the monitoring required.

All these factors appear to point to a more deep-rooted cause that would explain the failure to prioritise the ethnic approach within the EU Delegation’s strategy: it has underestimated the significance of the ethnic approach for achieving true positive and territorial peace in Colombia. If it had understood this, then the other factors might not have such an impact: the ethnic approach would be given priority over other actions; the need to support this approach could be advocated in Brussels; steps could be taken to acquire the expertise and knowledge to develop it; there would be a clearer need to apply it even in places where there is no ethnic population present (e.g. incorporating the approach at the institutional level); and Delegation staff would devote themselves specifically to promoting and coordinating these issues.

4.2 European Union Trust Fund for Colombia (EUTF)

In line with the current stance of the EU Delegation’s peacebuilding policy, the EUTF has also failed to make the ethnic approach a strategic priority. The EUTF was conceived as a tool to support the implementation of the Agreement. As such, it would have been the ideal instrument to support the fulfilment of the Ethnic Chapter. However, none of the ethnic commitments provided for in the Agreement has been included in the EUTF’s calls for proposals.

This is partly because the EU’s mandate in relation to the Agreement is to support the implementation of Point 1 on Comprehensive Rural Reform and Point 3.2 on the Reincorporation of the FARC-EP into civilian life in economic, social and political matters. However, although the implementation of the Ethnic Chapter is not part of the EU’s mandate (or that of any other cooperation agency), any action taken under the Agreement should meet the safeguards and guarantees of the ethnic approach, which ensure respect for the rights of ethnic peoples during the implementation process. On this point, the EU could have demanded that the ethnic approach be applied as a cross-cutting requirement for all rural development and reincorporation projects for ex-combatants, particularly in territories where ethnic communities are present. It is worth noting that in the areas where PDETs are being developed, there are 452 indigenous resguardos and 305 community councils (CPEC, 2018: 11).

EU Delegation staff acknowledge that the ethnic approach has not been a requirement for funding EUTF projects. When the projects were approved, the EUTF did not have clear guidelines on the differential ethnic approach, nor did it provide for specific ethnic indicators. Initially, the Delegation wanted to support the implementation of the Ethnic Chapter through the EUTF, in the framework of rural development actions. It sought the advice of a consulting firm on how to implement the approach, but did not pursue this course of action (Interview E1a and E6). Delegation staff felt that they had enough responsibility trying to make rural development and socio-economic reincorporation projects succeed (Interview E3). Furthermore, Brussels did not ask that the approach should be included, and during the project approval process the evaluators made no mention of the need to include it in the projects (Interview E3).

Nevertheless, the EU Delegation has tried to ensure that the approach is present “in some way” when the projects have been developed and implemented (Interview E1a). The idea is for projects to show a certain “ethnic sensitivity”, meaning that they try to be inclusive by helping the most vulnerable groups and showing awareness of any potential differences between beneficiary groups. The incorporation of this type of narrative is part of the usual praxis in Colombia. “When you work on this type of project, you always make ethnicity the focal point, especially in this country. To say that the indigenous and Afro population is not included is absurd” (Interview E3).

As a result, many of the projects financed by the EUTF state in their planning that the implementation will have a differential ethnic approach, although they do not specify how that will work. In fact, the EUTF does not give clear guidance on what this “sensitivity” consists of or how the projects should apply it. The EU Delegation has only requested that the executors disaggregate the data, i.e. record how many beneficiaries are indigenous, Afro-Colombian, women, young people, older people, etc. (Interview E3). The ethnic approach thus seems to be limited to social inclusivity, i.e. it has focused solely on the number of people belonging to ethnic groups who have benefited from the projects, without considering how or to what extent they have been attended to according to their differentiated needs and/or rights.

We also found a noticeable gap between the narrative and the practical application of the approach, probably as a consequence of the opacity and laxity of the EUTF guidelines. Up to November 2021, out of 31 projects financed and €127 million invested by the EUTF, we only identified 10 projects (32%)—worth €33.66 million—with a specific ethnic focus, where at least one action had been carried out with the ethnic population, such as: strengthening leadership and traditional governments, enhancing productive processes, facilitating participation in decision-making spaces, promoting reconciliation, developing violence prevention protocols, recovering indigenous cultivated areas and traditional plants, harmonising traditional and western medicine, etc. Another 7 projects (22%) include the ethnic differential approach in their development, although they do not have any objective or activity assigned for that purpose. The remaining 14 (45%) do not even mention the approach.

On a positive note, the laxity of the EUTF’s guidelines and requirements has allowed partners to broaden their activities with ethnic communities during the implementation phase (Interview E6). Similarly, the EU Delegation itself has been able to intervene in some projects to propose the inclusion of populations that had been excluded (Interview E3). Some of the ten aforementioned ethnic projects had not initially planned activities with ethnic populations or incorporated the ethnic approach in their narrative.

According to the EU Delegation, whether or not EUTF projects have an ethnic focus depends on the specific features of each context (Interview E3). However, it is worth asking what determines whether or not these contexts are different enough to need an ethnic approach. Comparing the local and regional contexts of the “ethnic” and “non-ethnic” projects, we find similar problems as regards the need for territorial planning, strengthening of productive processes, and reconciliation and reincorporation of ex-combatants. Likewise, the presence of the ethnic population does not seem to be the reason, since there is also an ethnic population in the areas where “non-ethnic” projects are implemented. For example, in the projects supporting the socio-economic reincorporation of ex-guerrillas organised through the cooperative group Solidarity Economy Communities (ECOMUN), there is an indigenous and Afro-descendant population, but they are not working on the ethnic approach¹⁶ They only manage the disaggregated data records requested by the EU Delegation (Interviews E10 and E11). Also, “ethnic” projects are implemented solely at the local level, even though the national scale of the projects should not prevent the ethnic approach from being applied. For example, the EU finances the national reincorporation policy, which provides for the adoption of a Harmonisation Programme with a differential ethnic and gender-based approach (CONPES, 2018: 121), and could therefore have had an impact on the implementation of the ethnic approach, as it has with the gender-based approach.

In addition to the contextual factor, the EU Delegation cites a second reason, which seems to have more explanatory weight: the projects with an ethnic component have implementing partners who are located in the territories and who have a long-standing history and relationship with ethnic communities; they therefore have specific approaches and methodologies they apply to ethnic populations (Interview E3). The project coordinators confirmed that, when developing the projects, the Delegation did not require any activities or objectives to be established with ethnic populations, nor did it introduce monitoring indicators, so that the inclusion of ethnic populations in their projects is simply due to their own experience and interests (Interviews E12, E14, E15, E16 and E17). The Delegation shows broad trust and respect for the decisions made by the implementing partners, and so whether or not the ethnic approach is included depends largely on them. In contrast, only one of the EUTF’s projects involved an ethnic organisation as a direct executor, and its experience was negative due to the complex bureaucracy involved (Interview E13).

Furthermore, we found that the projects financed by the EUTF do not sufficiently address one of the primary issues prioritised in the Ethnic Chapter, which is: prior, free and informed consultation (whose application is specifically provided for in the PDETs). The EU has an opportunity to make an impact through the “PDET Routes” project, which is still being implemented; for the moment, however, there are no plans to carry out any prior consultation process. Prior consultation is impossible given the timeframe of the project, which requires swift action. Instead, the initiatives to be implemented are communicated to the ethnic communities and an attempt is made to reach agreement with them on implementation. The infrastructure initiatives were approved by all the communities; however, the productive chain initiatives encountered difficulties in the indigenous communities, as they do not match their comprehensive vision of the chagras (indigenous agroforestry systems) (Interviews E19 and E20).

Nevertheless, some of the projects have contributed somewhat to the implementation of other ethnic commitments made in the Agreement. Specifically, the “Amazonía Joven” and “Rural Paz” projects have provided methodologies for the reconciliation and reincorporation of ex-combatants with an ethnic approach in Guaviare, Putumayo and Nariño (Interviews E14 and E18). And the “Humanicemos DH” project has completed humanitarian demining in an Embera resguardo in the municipality of La Montañita (Caquetá) (EU Delegation, 2021a: 6).

Lastly, it should be noted that, at the outset, the EUTF did not have monitoring indicators on ethnic issues, and so the ethnic focus of projects was not monitored or evaluated, except in the disaggregation of data. From mid-2020 onwards, the common indicator framework of the EUTF underwent a restructuring, and its indicators were aligned to the strategic pillars (Interviews E2 and E6). As a result, a quantitative ethnic indicator measuring the number of “indigenous governments [that] have received technical support for their process of planning and institutional strengthening” was included in the EUTF’s third Strategic Pillar on “Inclusion: youth, women, and ethnic groups” (European Fund for Peace, n.d.). As of December 2021, 58 traditional governments (representing 75% including indigenous councils and community councils) had received such support (EU Delegation, 2021a: 13). However, this indicator is inadequate for measuring all the needs of ethnic peoples. Moreover, as it was designed after the projects were approved, it did not influence the development, approval and allocation of project resources; rather, the monitoring system serves to systematise the results achieved by the EUTF.

In conclusion, the incorporation of the ethnic approach in the EUTF is shown to be only a secondary, complementary and non-mandatory criterion, which is not applied in 45% of the projects financed, and in 22% it is reduced to a mere reference, without any specific activity or objective being associated with it. As the EUTF gives no clear guidance on what the ethnic approach is—beyond including the ethnic population—or on the specific controls to apply, the implementation of the ethnic approach depends on the will and good practices of the implementing partners. Indeed, several of the “ethnic” projects have in common the fact that the implementing partners include organisations with extensive experience in working and forming relationships with ethnic communities, which has inspired them to implement the approach and develop their own differential methodologies.

4.3 Actions in the Area of Human Rights and Civil Society

Within the area of human rights and civil society developed by the EU Delegation to Colombia, there are a number of aspects that are relevant for peacebuilding with an ethnic approach.

Firstly, the EU Delegation has a particular interest in strengthening state protection systems for community leaders and human rights defenders. The Delegation’s political section and the ambassadors of Member States are concerned about the political violence in the country and its normalisation. This motivates them to carry out on-site visits and diplomatic actions to try to raise the Colombian government’s awareness of the seriousness of the situation and push it to improve its response (Interview E4). The Delegation attends to individual cases of threats and tries to ensure that the National Protection Unit (UNP) responds appropriately (Interview E1b and E4).

In 2019, the EU Delegation, together with 11 EU countries, launched the Defendamos la Vida (Defend Life) campaign through which several activities are carried out, including accompanying specific cases of human rights violations. One of the most recent cases of concern is the situation of violence in northern Cauca, which is affecting the Nasa indigenous communities. Since the beginning of 2022, a high-level commission has been closely monitoring the situation, and measures are being developed with the Association of Indigenous Councils of Northern Cauca (ACIN) and the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (CRIC) to strengthen their protection (Interviews E7 and E8).

The EU Delegation also has an emergency fund that ensures that defenders who are threatened can access urgent protection measures for themselves and their families. In the same vein, the Delegation uses the EU mechanism known as Protect Defenders to request support for human rights defenders at risk, including ethnic community leaders (Interview E1b).

Secondly, the EU has an interest in generating democratic governance ecosystems in areas particularly affected by the armed conflict. To that end, it strives to boost communities’ capacity for decision-making and participation, and establish platforms for dialogue between public institutions and civil society organisations (CSOs) (Interview E5). Furthermore, the EU Delegation believes that lending support to CSOs is an indirect way to influence the sphere of human rights. The Delegation thus supports ethnic organisations to help them improve both their capacity to advocate with institutions and their prevention and self-protection systems (Interview E1b).

To increase its engagement with civil society, since 2014 the EU Delegation has established a Roadmap detailing the support needs of CSOs. This instrument, which is agreed with CSOs every three years, sets out the EU’s priorities for civil society. For example, in the framework of the 2018–2020 Roadmap, an effort was made to strengthen the governments and the plans for life and ethno-development of the Kofán people and the Afro-Colombian communities of Putumayo and Nariño (EU Delegation, 2021b: 13).

Thirdly, the EU Delegation has two lines of financial assistance or instruments—the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and the Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities thematic programme (CSO-LA)—through which projects strengthening human rights and civil society are supported, with ethnic populations as the main beneficiaries (DCI, 2018).

The 2014 EIDHR call for proposals had a specific batch of funding dedicated to supporting indigenous communities in the area of territorial and environmental rights. Within that, a project was approved to strengthen the capacities of the ACIN and the Indigenous Organisation of Antioquia (OIA) to defend their collective rights. The calls for proposals that followed (2017 and 2019) did not include this specific batch of funding; despite this, a project was approved to support the protection systems of 30 indigenous communities in Antioquia and Chocó, with the aim of training their representatives and the Indigenous Guard and providing them with equipment, enabling them to strengthen their self-protection plans (EU Delegation, 2021c).

Through the CSO-LA instrument, in 2017 the EU Delegation approved two peace education projects that included several ethnic communities among their beneficiaries: one with the Nasa indigenous communities of Toribío, in northern Cauca; and another with the Afro-descendant communities of the Naya River, in Buenaventura. A similar project is currently being implemented with indigenous and Afro-Colombian youth leaders in Putumayo and northern Nariño to boost their capacities in sustainable entrepreneurship (Interview E7).

Fourthly, through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), the EU Delegation has supported a range of key initiatives to promote the implementation of the Agreement, focused, for example, on: humanitarian demining, disseminating the culture of peace, reincorporating former child combatants, strengthening protection systems, supporting the Truth, Coexistence and Non-Recurrence Commission (CEV) and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), etc. (Interview E21). In particular, we can highlight four initiatives that promote the needs and/or rights of ethnic peoples: (1) strengthening the Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia to improve its protection response to social leaders; (2) enhancing protection plans at the local level with the OHCHR’s support; (3) supporting the creation of Local Justice Systems (LJS) that integrate indigenous and Afro-Colombian justice mechanisms; and (4) demining with priority attention to indigenous communities in highly affected areas (Guardans et al., 2019).

Furthermore, important differences were observed between indigenous and Afro-descendant ethnic communities. While we found that Afro-Colombian communities are also recipients of EU aid, indigenous communities receive more attention (Interviews E1b and E6). This may be due to the fact that during the armed conflict indigenous people have played a more relevant and visible role as actors in the defence of peace and human rights, and that their governments and communities suffer greatly from persecution, stigmatisation and criminalisation. Indigenous communities are also respected for their sustainable development model and their potential for environmental conservation, which is aligned with EU interests (Interview E4).

Finally, there is a positive perception among ethnic communities—both indigenous and Afro-descendant—with regard to the EU’s actions. Both groups consider the EU’s contribution to peacebuilding to be appropriate and necessary (Interviews E13, E15, E19 and E20). However, this positive assessment is based on a general perception of the EU’s role in Colombia. Given that the EU lacks representation on the ground and direct relations with the communities, those communities can only assess the EU’s economic contribution to their projects (Interview E15). They consider that contribution to be insufficient, both because the projects are failing to yield better results and because there are numerous communities in need that do not receive any aid (Interviews E8, E9 and E13). Indigenous communities are the only ones who highlight the support received by the EU with regard to insecurity and human rights violations (Interview E8).

5 Conclusions

During the negotiations in Havana, ethnic communities successfully introduced the Ethnic Chapter of the Agreement, which contains a set of principles, safeguards and guarantees that must be complied with during implementation so that acquired ethnic rights are not undermined. However, after the first five years of implementation (2016–2021), the institutions in charge of monitoring and verifying the Agreement are concerned about the lags that are occurring in the fulfilment of ethnic commitments (especially in relation to the effective participation of ethnic peoples in decision-making spaces and the exercise of prior consultation), as well as the new cycle of violence that continues to disproportionately affect ethnic communities.

In this article, we have analysed the extent to which the EU has incorporated the ethnic approach into its peacebuilding strategy. Although the implementation of the Ethnic Chapter is not one of its tasks—nor is it the task of any institution—the ethnic approach cuts across the entire Agreement and any action taken should guarantee its fulfilment. In addition, compliance with ethnic commitments is especially delayed in Point 1 and Point 3 of the Agreement, which are the ones covered by the EU mandate.

Our findings show that, during the first five years of implementation, the ethnic approach has not been a strategic priority for the EU in Colombia. The ethnic approach only appears to have been incorporated in a secondary, complementary and non-mandatory way in the EUTF; indeed, no specific budget allocations focus on it, nor is it a requirement for allocating resources. Likewise, there is a lack of clear guidelines and direction on what the ethnic approach is and how it should be implemented, beyond the mere inclusion of the ethnic population among the beneficiaries. As a consequence, only 32% of the projects financed by the EUTF have a specific ethnic component. It is also apparent that, although the ethnic approach is a common practice in the country, there is a gap between narrative and practice. Whether or not the ethnic perspective is applied to projects depends on the implementing organisations having the proper knowledge, field experience and relationships with ethnic communities.

As well as the strategic guidelines, the terms of reference of the calls for proposals and the quality indicators, which can serve to clarify where EU cooperation in Colombia is heading, this chapter has also analysed the EU Delegation’s specific actions and the initiatives it has financed through its various cooperation channels and instruments. We find that there is sufficient evidence to confirm that ethnic communities, and especially indigenous communities, are considered strategic partners of the EU in Colombia. In other words, despite a lack of explicit prioritisation in the related documents, the EU Delegation is nonetheless contributing to the well-being of ethnic communities, particularly by defending human rights, enhancing protection systems, and strengthening their organisational capacity to participate and influence public policies. To that end, it uses a range of financing instruments and channels available to it, as well as the discreet diplomatic and advocacy actions that the EU carries out with the government.

There are also reasons that lead us to believe that ethnic identity is not the reason why ethnic communities—particularly indigenous communities—become beneficiaries of EU action in Colombia, but rather other characteristics that define them: (1) they inhabit the areas most affected by the armed conflict (crops used for illicit purposes, illegal mining, lack of services and infrastructure, etc.) where international cooperation efforts are focused; (2) they are frequent victims of systematic violations of human rights and international humanitarian law; (3) they have organisations and governments that play a leading role in Colombian civil society; and (4) they are the primary defenders of the environment and sustainable development.

To conclude one outstanding issue for the EU Delegation since the Agreement was signed is its support for the implementation of the Ethnic Chapter, which could have already been carried out if the ethnic approach had been clearly incorporated into the EUTF. The EU’s peacebuilding strategy in Colombia should strengthen this approach over the next 10 years. Implementing the ethnic approach is an ambitious—and costly—challenge, given the complexity of the participatory and intercultural processes involved, but it also constitutes one of the main opportunities to truly contribute to positive peacebuilding with a territorial approach in Colombia.

Interviews

Code	Profile of the person interviewed	Date
E1a	Staff of the EU Delegation to Colombia	September 29, 2021
E1b	Staff of the EU Delegation to Colombia	November 6, 2021
E2	Staff of the EU Delegation to Colombia	December 8, 2021
E3	Staff of the EU Delegation to Colombia	February 7, 2022
E4	Staff of the EU Delegation to Colombia	February 16, 2022
E5	Technical assistant of the EU Delegation to Colombia	April 29, 2021
E6	Technical assistant of the EU Delegation to Colombia	March 14, 2022
E7	Technical assistant of the EU Delegation to Colombia	April 8, 2022
E8	Representative of ethnic organisation	April 6, 2022
E9	Representative of ethnic organisation	April 13, 2022
E10	Coordinator of a EU-funded project	February 7, 2022
E11	Coordinator of a EU-funded project	March 3, 2022
E12	Coordinator of a EU-funded project	March 15, 2022
E13	Coordinator of a EU-funded project	March 17, 2022
E14	Coordinator of a EU-funded project	March 21, 2022
E15	Coordinator of a EU-funded project	March 22, 2022
E16	Coordinator of a EU-funded project	March 24, 2022
E17	Coordinator of a EU-funded project	April 5, 2022
E18	Coordinator of a EU-funded project	April 13, 2022
E19	Coordinator of a EU-funded project	April 28, 2022
E20	Coordinator of a EU-funded project	April 28, 2022
E21	Coordinator of a EU-funded project	May 17, 2022