Keywords

4.1 Further Correlating Legitimacy Theory and Ethos Analysis

As an analytical tool, the triad of (A) conformative, (B) selective, and (C) manipulative legitimation also ties in well with the concept of ethos, as imported from the rhetorical tradition. The way we see it, ethos-construction and legitimation go hand in hand. They are not identical concepts, as they are part of different scholarly fields, traditions, and conceptual apparatuses, but they can easily be associated and correlated. This is highly relevant to the present subject, as constructing an ethos that is trustworthy in a certain context is a way of gaining legitimacy, and the triad thus enables us to differentiate between strategies of ethos-argumentation. Before expounding on this, we however need to further develop and refine our discussion of ethos.

As already iterated, the concept of ethos is a central part of classical rhetoric. The word ethos (plural: ethoi) has the same root as ethics, and the rhetorical concept, conventionally traced to Aristotle, concerns the speaker’s character, such as it is performed through the speech (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1356a). In the Aristotelian sense, ethos is thus a part of the discourse constructed within a rhetorical situation (cf. Bitzer 1968) through the use of speech, gestures, and other symbolic means. In modern theory, the Aristotelian sense of ethos has been called the discursive, or secondary, ethos, conceptually paired with the speakers’ prior, or primary, ethos, which precedes the discursive construction of the rhetorical agent’s ethos (e.g. Amossy 2001). Thus, the prior ethos is something the speaker brings with her into a rhetorical situation—in essence, her already established image—while the discursive ethos is the image she builds for herself through symbolic action within the situation.

Now, it should be noted that, in general, the rhetorical situations in which green promises occur are complex ones (a point elaborated in Chap. 8), actualizing a mixture of different discourses and possible rhetorics (e.g. Frandsen and Johansen 2011). As any comprehensive analysis needs to accommodate this complexity, we argue that it makes sense to employ the distinction between prior and discursively constructed ethoi. In addition, this distinction should not be understood as a dichotomy sharply dividing two necessarily separate categories, allowing neither a third nor any phenomena not firmly assigned to either side of the divide. Instead, it is perhaps better conceptualized as a type of sliding scale distinction. In using the sliding scale metaphor, our conceptualization takes account of the fact that discourses, and indeed rhetorical situations, can be differently delimited, in time and space, as well as in scope. They are not to be understood as given phenomena, but rather as interpretive constructs. That transitions are gradual does not, however, preclude that the distinction between a prior and discursive ethos—i.e. an ethos that should be placed closer to either end of a spectrum—provides a useful analytical tool.

The modern distinction between two forms of ethos seems to have been underemployed in contemporary scholarship on green marketing, despite the fact that it provides a helpful tool for the analysis of legitimacy and that the basic concept of ethos has been used both regularly and broadly. Wæraas and Ihlen (2009) and Frandsen and Johansen (2011), for instance, both utilize the concept of ethos in analysis of organizational legitimation strategies and corporate identity management. However, most contributions, including these two, tend to focus on ethos as discursive ethos, leaving us with uncharted territory as to the possibilities entailed by ethos-analysis. We want to explore this territory, and further develop the possibilities of co-reading institutional legitimacy theory and rhetorical theory. Let us begin by relating the distinction between different kinds of ethoi to the aforementioned triad of legitimacy theory:

  1. A.

    Conformative legitimation largely coincides with constructing a discursive ethos conforming to the values and norms of the organization’s environment.

  2. B.

    Selective legitimation entails, either, an astute use of a prior ethos, exploiting an organization’s already established image upon entering a chosen (new) environment where this image is beneficial, or, that a new actor makes a clever choice of environment, where the actor can more easily construct a persuasive discursive ethos.

  3. C.

    Manipulative legitimation, finally, is a way of changing what is considered a trustworthy ethos, by influencing the cultural norms and values governing how corporate images are perceived.

This indicates that the scheme of different legitimacy strategies ties in well with some of the concepts of rhetorical theory. In particular, the modern distinction between prior and discursive ethos enables us to highlight fruitful connections between the teachings of rhetoric and institutional legitimacy theory. In our view, this distinction can be used to elaborate the analytical framework of green legitimation. It can thereby support the ambition to illuminate the rhetorical or discursive dimensions of green legitimation processes. The distinction enables us to account for the fact that legitimation processes have a dynamic aspect, in both a social and temporal sense. It is important not to reduce the rhetorical analysis of legitimation to a study of texts as isolated and atemporal artifacts. In merging the scheme of legitimation strategies with a contemporary understanding of ethos, we structure the observed phenomena as part of a social dynamic which, as we will show later on, also furthers a constructive approach. While they are forerunners in highlighting the rhetorical dimension of green legitimation processes, the referenced articles by Frandsen and Johansen and Wæraas and Ihlen do not thematize this dynamic quality of ethos, at least not in a way that best utilizes the rich contributions of the rhetorical tradition. This is understandable, as they are able to reach their direct objectives anyway, but it means that rhetoric is conceptualized in an unnecessarily narrow way, as basically verbal expressions designed to influence. Such a construction of rhetoric is fully in line with an Aristotelian tradition, but in Chap. 5 we explore a different rendering of rhetoric, which better serves to account for what we consider to be essential aspects of green legitimation. Before venturing into this alternative vision there is, however, reason to elaborate a bit on the Aristotelian paradigm. The manifestations of this paradigm are far from limited to the texts we engage with here. On the contrary, Aristotelianism is prolific in contemporary rhetorical studies and the paradigm seems to be the dominant perspective in interdisciplinary research, where the Aristotelian conception of rhetoric is regularly imported. Interestingly, this dominance seems unaffected by the paradigm’s limitations—which do exist, especially as concern rhetorical ethics. In the following sections, we want to problematize parts of the Aristotelian paradigm, in order to provide openings for a more constructive approach.

4.2 The Aristotelian Paradigm—Dominant Albeit Deficient

Before returning to its problems, let us say something about the relevance and conceptual merits of the Aristotelian paradigm by further developing on how it has affected contemporary research. Here, Wæraas and Ihlen (2009) provide a way in, as they very clearly build on the conceptual architecture of classical Greek rhetoric. In analyzing legitimation as a symbolic, and primarily verbal (that is: word-using), activity, they note the importance of ethos in explicit persuasion processes. In line with the Aristotelian tradition, they see ethos as essentially discursively constructed, and they note the three traditional strategies for constructing the speaker’s character as trustworthy, that is, by demonstrating:

  • (α) virtue (aretē);

  • (β) practical wisdom (phronēsis), and

  • (γ) goodwill toward the audience (eunoia).

This trifold division is central to Aristotle’s teaching on ethos (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1378a and passim), emphasizing the importance of showing (α) your good moral character, (β) your good sense, sagacity, and expertise and to overall try to come across as intelligent and knowledgeable (about the subject at hand). Further, you should (γ) demonstrate your goodwill toward the audience, that is, eunoia. In the Aristotelian tradition eunoia is tied to his conception of friendship (philia), entailing that the speaker should signify three things: (γ1) connectedness and similarity with the audience (identification), (γ2) commonality of value, affirming their basic aspirations and beliefs, and (γ3) having the same friends and enemies, affirming their prejudices.

Wæraas and Ihlen (2009) adopt this trifold division (α – γ) and let the Aristotelian scheme guide their research, performing a qualitative study of documents reporting on the sustainability efforts of three major American companies. In doing so, they find that most claims in the reports were attributable to three general themes, corresponding to aretē, phronēsis, and eunoia. They label their themes:

  1. (i)

    “We clean up our own act” (aretē),

  2. (ii)

    “We improve the world” (phronēsis), and

  3. (iii)

    “We are like you” (eunoia).

Interestingly, however, their analysis also revealed a fourth theme, concerning endorsements and approvals from third parties, which the authors label: (iv) “Others approve of us.” This fourth theme is obviously an important one and useful for constructing an environmental ethos. The rhetorical technique is also widely used (cf. e.g. Futerra 2008; TerraChoice 2009). It is however harder to fit into the traditional Aristotelian scheme (especially if the pigeonholes furnished by aretē, phronēsis, and eunoia are already occupied). The lack of fit is largely due to Aristotle not presenting rhetoric as a dynamic social performance. Instead, his analysis implies a conception of rhetoric as a set of atemporal rules and guidelines, frozen in time (cf. Haskins 2004; Bengtson 2019).

The closest concept to the “others approve of us” theme, in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, seems to be the brief mention of witnesses, provided the third party is considered a witness, and its approval as evidence of a company’s green legitimacy. However, Aristotle views witnesses as a non-artistic mode of persuasion, which, in his technical jargon, means that he equals witnesses to laws, oaths, contracts, and torture—all topics he locates outside the art of rhetoric. In our view, this would surely be an unsatisfying positioning of the analytical theme “others approve of us”, as it obviously performs functions which rhetoric should be able to account for, considering that it can, and is widely used to, support arguments concerning certain organizational ethoi (among other things). Invoking the ethoi of others can certainly be used to support aretē, which allows for relating this technique to the Aristotelian paradigm. Still, such an understanding is reductive, as it fails to accommodate essential aspects of the “others approve of us”-theme, and, in any case, the technique differs from the more typical cases of illustrating one’s virtuosity (Wæraas and Ihlen 2009) in such a way that the Aristotelian understanding is just not very helpful.Footnote 1

The studies by Wæraas and Ihlen and Frandsen and Johansen have made important contributions to the discussions on green marketing. They have shown how the conceptual apparatus of classical rhetoric can be applied to the problem of organizational legitimation, and how the relationship between the organization and its surrounding environment can be conceptualized as a verbal activity, as well as illustrated some of the promising possibilities of the institutional approach. However, the authors themselves acknowledge the need for further theoretical, methodological, and empirical development, and thus call for further research. The legitimacy of such calls is indicated already in the fact that the Aristotelian scheme cannot incorporate an important and prevalent technique of ethos construction: the lending of someone else’s ethos by putting words in their mouth. The Aristotelian paradigm thus has its limits, one being the non-comprehensiveness of the analytical scheme for examining ethos.

In our view, however, there are more significant shortcomings. Perhaps the most important one stems from Aristotle’s view of rhetoric as an amoral art—normatively empty, practically nihilist. Admittedly, the Aristotelian separation of ethics and rhetoric seems less definitive when considering that, in practice, the same teacher taught both arts, to the same students. Nevertheless, his decoupling has had a massive historical influence and is still dominant today. The ideology is often conveyed by phrases akin to “Rhetoric, in itself, is neither good nor evil, for it is merely a tool”—a trope often used to refute accusations against the subject of rhetoric, based on the perceived immorality of a speaker using “rhetorical” means of persuasion. Thus, the Aristotelian paradigm entails that the subject of rhetoric has nothing to say about morality, normative values, or the Good. Rhetoric can utilize existent values, but these values are external to rhetoric, and rhetoricians, qua rhetoricians, have nothing to contribute when it comes to the normativity of the legitimation process—other than the advice to strategically use whatever is already out there, in the cultural value systems of the polis.

Such a conception of rhetoric is not without problems, especially as regards the political genre (genos politicon, genus deliberativum), and, despite its dominance today, parts of the Aristotelian paradigm were a matter of controversy already in classical Athens and Rome. Hence, there are other classical authors who have more to contribute to the discussions on construction and performance of ethos, as well as to the post performance analysis of an actor’s ethos. Recalling these classical teachings can be fruitful today. They can help us distinguish, and perhaps even reconsider, some of the notions about rhetoric, and thus green marketing, that are now generally taken for granted.

4.3 Appearances, Doxa, and the Amorality of Rhetoric

We need to dwell a bit on the structure, and possible limitations, of the Aristotelian paradigm, as this provides necessary background for our later discussions. Thus, it should first be noted that Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric as an amoral tool is inextricably tied to the concept of doxa, which is a key concept in many conceptualizations of rhetoric, and to fundamental questions of rhetorical ontology. Simply put, rhetorical ontology concerns the role of rhetoric for a human understanding of being. We will circle back to this, but first we need to expand on the concept of doxa, which is commonly understood as popular opinion. Thus, when rhetoric is situated in relation to doxa, it is framed as an art that deals with the utilization and manipulation of opinions in the public domain (Bengtson 2019; on implications for law, cf. Mossberg 2020). Interestingly, however, in classical Greek, the term doxa has more meanings than “opinion”. Taking account of this polysemy can be a way of highlighting the difference between, on the one hand, a traditional modern understanding of communication as an exchange of statements transmitting information, and, on the other hand, the classical experience where language use was understood as intrinsically linked to questions of reputation and appearances. For instance, the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1953, 2000), who was well versed in classical Greek, has described the multiple meanings of doxa thusly:

Mit dem Namen δόξα wird Vielfältiges genannt: 1. Ansehen als Ruhm, 2. Ansehen als schlichte Ansicht, die etwas bietet, 3. Ansehen als: nur so aussehen: der ‘Schein’ als bloßer Anschein. 4. Ansicht, die ein Mensch sich bildet, Meinung.

[The term δόξα [doxa] names various things 1) aspect, or respect, as glory; 2) aspect as the sheer view, that something offers; 3) aspect as: merely looking so, “seeming” as mere semblance; 4) a view, that a person constructs for himself, opinion.]

The implication is that rhetoric—as an art dealing with doxa—is intimately linked to questions of how we reveal ourselves to others through symbols, as well as to how we view others, and the related problem of authenticity.

Plato’s (in)famous deriding of rhetoric could be read in light of this ontological positioning of rhetoric. His criticism emphasizes rhetoric’s relation to public opinion, which in his understanding is equivalent to false knowledge and mere semblance. Aristotle, on the other hand, is often attributed with restoring rhetoric’s status as an art, legitimizing a systematic treatment of doxa. However, Aristotle’s restoration comes at a cost, as the rhetoric he proposes is cut loose and delimited from questions of ethics—it becomes mere technique. This separation is perhaps never clearer than in Aristotle’s discussions of ethos, where he declares that, from the perspective of rhetoric, the speaker’s ethos is to be found in the speech and nowhere else. He thereby puts aside questions of the speaker’s moral standing or reputation beyond the speech and focuses merely on the image that is presented through it. This is indeed an odd move in Greek society, where reputation and honor were of utmost importance. Systematically, however, it is a clever move, as it allows Aristotle to put rhetoric into a neat little box, as an art concerned only with persuasive performance, effectively neutralizing some of Plato’s criticisms.

If we want to interpret Aristotle as sympathetically as possible in relation to our present project, and differently than sketched in the preceding section, we could argue that limiting the analysis to only the discursive ethos (viewing ethos as entirely constructed through the performance) aligns with the rhetorical ontology implied in the very concept of doxa. As Heidegger hints at, being is no more than what is presented and apprehended. In other words, to be glorious or honorable, in the public domain of classical Athens, is to be presented and apprehended as such. Consequently, if one is presented and apprehended as such, this is in effect how one is—as, from the perspective of rhetorical ontology, being is always socially and thereby rhetorically constructed.

For our discussions of green marketing, such an alternative reading of Aristotle provides us with a proto-variant of the legitimation dynamic between organization and its environment, which, in this context, can be understood as the surrounding society. The Aristotelian variant would however still be strangely limited to the present moment of the speech act, as it excludes the aspect of “prior ethos”—implying a reductionist view of the rhetorical situation. Therefore, it fails to address whether green legitimation has any real ethical consequences. These limitations correspond to aspects that we, in our previous discussion of ethos in organizational theory, presented as in need of further development. Thereby, they provide additional support for the need to go beyond an Aristotelian understanding.