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5.1 Isocrates: Rhetorical Action for the Civic Good

So far we have argued for the need for a constructive turn in the scholarly discussion of green marketing, described some such attempts from the field of organizational rhetoric, and discussed the Aristotelian paradigm that these attempts conform to. We will now provide a somewhat different history of rhetoric and its relation to virtue. This presentation works both to further illustrate the historical paradigms at play in these discussions and to outline a possible new constructive paradigm relevant for us today. In doing so, we focus on the contributions by the classical rhetoricians Isocrates, Cicero, and Quintilian. Their ways of combining questions related to ethos, virtue, and rhetoric present us with an alternative to the Platonic view that public rhetoric should be viewed with suspicion, as well as to the Aristotelian view that the art of rhetoric should be understood as a neutral, amoral tool, separate from ethics. We argue that Isocrates, Cicero, and Quintilian provide us with better building blocks for combining institutional theory and rhetorical perspectives.

For both chronological and substantial reasons, we first turn to the influential Athenian Isocrates. He set up his own school around 390 BC, barely preceding Plato (cf. e.g. Mikkola 1954; Eucken 1983). As a teacher of oratory, Isocrates puts the ethical character of the speaker dead center. While Plato looked upon public life with skepticism, Isocrates celebrated the value of civic life and its duties. He saw public life as a life of virtue and portrayed his own teachings as providing students the ability to reason well in the polis and to contribute to the collective good. In relation to the concept of virtue, Isocrates emphasizes virtues such as justice (dikaiosynē) and moderation (sōphrosynē) but also piety (hosios), courage (andreía), and wisdom (sofía) (cf. Chase 2009).

What is most interesting, however, in Isocrates’ view on the ethics of the rhetor is not specific virtues. Instead, it is his consistency in relating the virtues of the speaker to the question of the common good. For Isocrates the common good was tied to the cause of pan-Hellenism, that is, the idea of a greater Greek nation, united by the commonality of its people and the Hellenistic culture, distinguishing them from the barbarians. To grasp the significance of his highly situated understanding of the common good, it needs to be contrasted with the competing notions at the time, when the art of public speaking was understood as a technique for personal gain. In fact, professional teachers of rhetoric are commonly said to have first emerged to help households protect their interests in disputes over the ownership of land (Cicero, Brutus 46; cf. e.g. Cole 1991). Isocrates places rhetoric in a much larger context. In many ways, his views on pan-Hellenism and Athenian society can be described as a value conservative position. In fact, the origin of the idea of pan-Hellenism is conventionally attributed to the Greek’s resistance to the Persian invasions of 490 and 480–479 BC, implying the goal of conserving Hellenistic culture. However, the specifics of his value system do not diminish the conceptual significance of his way of positioning rhetorical civic work as contributing to the common good.

This aspect of Isocratean rhetoric has been explored by communications scholar Kenneth R. Chase (2009), who argues that, for Isocrates, the key virtue is piety. The Greek word is hosios (ὅσιος) which has strong religious connotations. In Chase’s reading, Isocrates understands piety as an attitudinal commitment toward acting in accordance with the moral implications of something greater than oneself (such as, but not necessarily limited to, the divine).

Following a similar line of thought, rhetoric scholar Robert Hariman (2004) argues that Isocrates’ perspective is far from obsolete. In fact, he claims that, in the present-day environmental discourse, we can find an equivalent to the Isocratean notion of pan-Hellenism:

Let’s describe panhellenism as an attempt to identify a new class of political problems, and to create political harmony by expanding the horizon of politics, and to ensure cultural sustainability amidst large-scale forces of change. What, then, would be the best articulation of this program today?

In a word: ecology. An Isocratean politics would be one that would argue for a global political concord to address those problems that the individual states are incapable of solving on their own. The problems include ozone depletion, resource exhaustion, the distribution of wealth and scarcity, population growth and movement, and bio-extinction.

Hariman also sketches a model of the Isocratean pedagogy that could instill both mastery of persuasion and growth in virtue. The first step of the pedagogy is to focus on questions related to “the common good”, which are the only ones that can instill honorable character. The second step is for the aspiring orator to look around for the best available examples of actions, and then contemplate and appraise those examples. Such a pedagogy could of course be incorporated in an educational system, such as Isocrates’ school, or contemporary higher education. However, the most interesting aspect of Isocrates’ pedagogy is that it is not limited to the classroom. On the contrary, only the plethora of voices of the city can provide the illustration and inspiration requisite for forming a truly virtuous character. Interestingly, this pedagogical perspective does not rest on a denunciation of self-interest, as often is the case in Plato’s writings. Instead, the defining characteristic of the ideal virtuous orator is that he pursues his self-interests in a way that aligns with the common good.

What cues can we take from Isocrates? Let us answer that question with another question—an explorative one: Would it be possible to shift focus in marketing education, as well as in the public discourse on marketing, toward questions of public good, and in addition put more focus on contemplating and appraising the very best of examples, rather than on shaming the bad ones? In other words, what would happen if we viewed marketing neither as suspicious manipulation, nor as a neutral, amoral tool, but instead considered how self-interest through marketing could be channeled toward the common good?

In Isocrates’ understanding of pan-Hellenism as a common good, we can see a clear link to how institutional theory discusses social norms and values. The Isocratean model however seems to go further than the Scandinavian form of institutional theory. His model portrays the organization not only as a translator of institutionally sanctioned norms (including institutionalized rules as well as less formalized cultural-cognitive ideas). The organization is something more, as it can act as a performative implementer and proponent of these very norms. And, acting thusly, it can function as an example, encouraging others to imitate it—effectively aiding the societal impact of the adopted virtues. The organization thus becomes a rhetorical co-creator of the norms of the value system.

5.2 Cicero on Harmonious Propriety, and Quintilian on Character Development

Three centuries later, the Roman statesman Marcus Tullius Cicero presented eloquentia (eloquence) and sapientia (wisdom) in combination as the cornerstone of his own theory of rhetoric. He thereby combined rhetoric with ethics, politics, and philosophy. Beyond that, Cicero highlighted decorum, or the ability to adhere to decorum, as the most essential virtue of rhetoric (Kapust 2011, with further references). This virtue encapsulates the capacity to meet the expectations and standards of the audience. For Cicero, decorum was both a moral virtue and a rhetorical virtue (e.g. On duties [De officiis] I.95; Orator 70 et seq). It spans from judgments regarding adherence to the overarching value systems of the audience and their views on society to questions of the appropriate style and even the correct postures. In the Ciceronian understanding, decorum is thus central to inventio and actio, but it effectively spans all the parts of rhetoric. In this emphasis on decorum, we can once again see a connection to the formative power of the social environment, which is an object of study also for institutional theory.

For present purposes, the most interesting aspect of Cicero’s discussion is his emphasis on the importance of decorum in relation to the character of the speaker. According to him, there should be harmony and propriety between the speech and the character of the speaker, as well as between the speech and the character of the audience. In this light, another Ciceronian virtue, the related prudentia, takes on a specific meaning. Prudency does not simply lie in a search for truth. Rather, it lies in the practical capacity to adhere to the values and views of the audience, while at the same time being authentic in relation to one’s own character and individual nature. The understanding of decorum and prudency, as consistency with one’s own character, also has a temporal dimension: Being consistent (constantia) is a matter of being true to oneself over time. In Cicero’s words (On duties 1.111–12):

it can be nothing more than the uniform consistency in the course of our lives as a whole and all its individual actions. And this uniform consistency one could not maintain by copying the personal traits of others and eliminating one’s own.

Relating back to the present day and the problem of green promises, this temporal constantia is a point that seems relevant to, for example, sustainability reporting. It would imply the need to be consistent with one’s earlier reports and statements of goals. It would thus not be very virtuous to keep “forgetting” one’s previous statements, when making new reports—reports where one can instead just formulate new goals to be later forgotten, etc. In summary, Cicero, in his view of the ideal orator, not only incorporates the virtues of adapting to the audience but also of staying true to oneself. Additionally, he argues that this rhetorical virtue of consistency cannot be reached without authenticity. Hence, it cannot be mere semblance, in the Platonic sense.

While Cicero provides arguments for the necessity of moral consistency between the speaker and his discourse, a century later, the Roman educator Marcus Fabius Quintilian takes this line of thought one step further, namely, by arguing that rhetoric could replace moral philosophy—and that rhetoric, in itself, constitutes a virtue (Walzer 2006). He is critical toward the (Aristotelian) separation between rhetoric and philosophy. In his eyes, such a division meant that the important—and, to Quintilian, inherently rhetorical—questions of ethics and moral virtue were in effect detached from the art of rhetoric, even though rhetoric ought to be the primary pedagogical vehicle for these subjects. In line with his convictions, Quintilian’s teachings incorporate ideas about, and strategies for, character formation, aiming to promote aspiring orators to internalize good ethical principles.

Simply put, he claims that we can teach ethics as part of a rhetorical training program—and that we, in fact, can teach it through rhetoric. In Quintilian’s portrayal, the ideal orator—that is, “the good man, trained in the art of oratory”, known to the latinites as vir bonus dicendi peritus—knows both what is expedient and what is honorable. The orator knows how to utilize societal values expediently but is also guided and regulated by virtue in that very process.

The historian of rhetoric Arthur Walzer (2006) argues that Quintilian’s work provides a hierarchy of values. What is honorable, from a societal perspective, takes moral precedence over what is situationally expedient. The primary principle is, however, to not risk one’s own honor. In thus giving hierarchical priority to the speaker’s honor, Quintilian echoes the Ciceronian theme about the fundamental value of consistency, while simultaneously providing an ethical model where both the practice of rhetoric and the pursuit for legitimacy can be acknowledged as virtuous—as good.

5.3 Lessons from Classical Rhetoric

What conclusions can we draw from Quintilian’s perspective, today? Of course, we cannot state as fact that there is an inherently moral “good core” in the art of rhetoric and that we can teach ethics through rhetoric, just because Quintilian said so. Nevertheless, recalling his position is valuable, as it de-naturalizes the dominant view of today. It can help subvert the cognitive legitimacy of the position that rhetoric—or marketing—is in itself neutral or amoral, and therefore ought to be taught separate from ethics. In other words, by re-conceptualizing marketing or corporate communications through Quintilian, we can undermine the position that it should be taught as mere technique, free of value.

Our approach in this book, aiming for a list of virtues for green marketing, could—in light of this—be understood as an experiment, investigating what would happen if we revived the Quintilian paradigm of rhetoric (building on the Isocratean and Ciceronian ones), rather than just continued reproducing the Aristotelian paradigm. In other words: What would happen if we—in lieu of an ethically neutral rhetoric (Aristotle), or a morally degenerate rhetoric (Plato)—dare to explore the idea of a morally constructive rhetoric, where symbolic action matters, as a matter of ethics? What possibilities would that entail?

Following this route, we could take more cues from Quintilian and his program for rhetorical education than the mere position that rhetoric could be seen as a discipline for teaching virtue. The rhetorical critic Robert E. Terrill (2016) has explicated how Quintilian’s educative program provides a model for how to use the teaching of rhetoric (or communication, or writing, or marketing—or even law, we hazard to add) as an education in virtue. Interestingly, in Terrill’s reading, Quintilian’s program is focused on imitation—a technique which, as already mentioned, contemporary scholars have identified as a basic strategy for gaining legitimacy.

Terrill’s argument is that the practice of rhetoric, according to Quintilian, is the manifest performance of ethical judgment. Terrill argues that imitative pedagogy, including textual replication and ethical emulation, provides a way both to form character and to reflect on that very formation. Importantly, the ethical perspective of Quintilian (and that of Cicero and Isocrates) is not based on eternal rules or strict moral codes. Instead, it is based on an adherence to the situational characteristics, including one’s own character and the values of the audience. Generally speaking, we could, from Quintilian, derive an understanding of rhetoric—and, by extension, of contemporary marketing—as a social arena where virtues are reproduced, by implicit manifestation. To put it simply, when an organization for instance tells the truth, this is a manifestation that implies the virtuosity of truth telling.

Admittedly, this positive description probably differs from the common understanding of green marketing today, as this seems to be more skeptical, or even cynical. However, one of the goals of this book is to discuss if, and how, a more ethically constructive dynamic can be facilitated within our contemporary market economy. To us, it seems that reading contemporary discourse on green legitimation through an Isocratean lens and adding a Ciceronian and Quintilian perspective to the discussions on the construction of green ethoi can open new avenues for exploration. Such a mode of inquiry can thus suggest novel ideas worth trying out.

Building on Wæraas and Ihlen’s (2009) conceptualization of legitimation as a verbal activity, we have here attempted to illustrate how the rhetorical tradition can offer more than a mere typology to better understand the argumentative forms of such verbal acts. The rhetorical tradition also provides a model for a normatively constructive dynamic. Public rhetoric can be understood and discussed as the formative performance of ethical judgment: a performance that is not locked to a temporal present, but part of an ongoing social dynamic, continually (re)negotiating the common good. Thus, public rhetoric, ideally including green marketing, can be more than mere semblance, or a manipulative tool to reach strategic goals of self-interest.