Keywords

To paint a complete picture of the state of European strategic autonomy, we need a framework for analysing it, through which we can consider both the formal and the informal processes that enable European actorness in the security field. We also need a framework that captures the comprehensiveness of European actorness. This chapter seeks to conceptualise the multi-actor character of what we refer to here as EU(ropean) foreign and security policy. We take a holistic approach to European foreign and security policy—a policy that covers multiple areas and is carried out by a multitude of actors and institutions. While the framework builds on institutional approaches, such as the literatures on multi-level governance and DI, it adds a new dimension by applying a somewhat broader definition of European integration—a definition that captures more than just the processes that occur within the EU.

Applying a broader approach towards European integration allows us to continue to perceive the EU as central to the European integration process, while also allowing for the inclusion of other processes that in some ways, either formally or informally, are linked to the EU. We argue that such a framework better captures the dynamics of today’s increasingly complex EU(ropean) integration process, characterised by opt-outs and opt-ins, formal and informal processes, enhanced cooperation, and various forms of governance led by actors at different levels and with different types of relations to the EU (Rieker, 2021a; Rieker & Giske, 2021). As we will show in this chapter, a more generic definition of integration helps us develop a framework that captures this complexity and see clearly the different roles EU institutions play in the various policy areas. The intention is to present a more inclusive conceptual framework that fills two key gaps in the existing literature on European integration in this area.

First, no theory fully captures the multi-actorness that has become a permanent feature of what we refer to as “the broader area” of EU foreign, security, and defence policy. This broader area includes more than the intergovernmental CFSP and its defence component, the CSDP. It also includes a whole range of areas of policy conducted by the European Commission or its agencies that directly or indirectly contributes to EU foreign policy and EU security policy. These areas include, among others, trade, development, and humanitarian aid, as well as areas more directly geared towards security, such as the Union’s civil protection mechanisms (RescEU); its energy security (RePowerEU); its capacity to counter hybrid threats; and its enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which aims to extend the European security community.

Second, no theory includes capacity at the level of member states and associated states in a systematic manner that does not undermine EU-level capacity (Moravcsik, 1998, 2010). Including this gives a more comprehensive understanding of what contributes to European strategic autonomy. This means that we also need to include the series of processes that are initiated by individual member states outside the framework of the Union, but that are nevertheless closely linked to, and often even framed as, EU policies. Examples of such initiatives could be the E3 initiative towards Iran; the EPC; the European Intervention Initiative (EI2); or even EU–NATO cooperation in specific fields. All of these processes and frameworks have the potential to contribute to European strategic autonomy, understood as an improved European capacity to take care of its own security.

2.1 The Limits of Mainstream Theories

Mainstream integration and International Relations (IR) theories have always been part of the academic debate surrounding EU security policy (Wilga & Karolewski, 2014). Still, no existing theory has thus far been able to fully capture the multi-actorness of this field. We can distinguish between two categories of approaches. The first is a series of approaches that see EU security policy as nothing more than the sum of its parts. In this category we include various examples from the realist school of thought, as well as its sub-genres. The second is a series of approaches that accept that the EU has a certain level of actorness. Here, we find liberal, neo-functionalist approaches and some constructivist approaches, as well as a series of perspectives that put emphasis on the actual functioning of the EU as a multi-level or differentiated foreign policy actor.

In this section we will present an overview of what the different theoretical approaches have to say about European integration in the field of security policy. As this overview suggests, most traditional theories of European integration primarily focus on why integration takes place and what drives it forward, but they have had less to say about how the EU and its different policy fields operate. To compensate for this, we argue that there is a need for an increased focus on the functioning of the EU as a hybrid actor. A focus on the mechanisms of DI or on the EU as a multi-actor might be more useful than other approaches. Additionally, we include a focus on agency, so as not to completely lose sight of what drives the process forward, or of what might halt it or even reverse it.

2.1.1 EU Foreign and Security Policy as Only the Sum of Its Parts

Traditionally, it has been difficult to combine realism with European integration in general, since IR and EU scholars often view realism as a theory of non-integration (Cladi & Locatelli, 2012). Stanley Hoffman’s distinction between “high” and “low” politics made it easy to explain why the EU was for a long time absent from the field of foreign and security policy (Dijkstra & Vanhoonacker-Kormoss, 2017). “High” politics is traditionally seen as the business of sovereign states, which tend to be extremely reluctant to surrender authority to a supranational institution. The various realist approaches see EU foreign and security policy as nothing more than the combined effort of member states’ foreign and security policies, which can only deliver common denominator-based policies.

However, as the realist block has branched off in different directions, the gap between European integration and realism has (at least partially) been bridged, and the usefulness of the theory to the study of the EU has been acknowledged (Reichwein, 2015). From the perspective of neo-realism, the behaviour of states is a result of their relative power and position in the international anarchical system. Consequently, the transformation of Europe into a rule-based interstate system has confounded neo-realists (Hyde-Price, 2018). However, revisions made to neo-realist theory during the 1990s and 2000s made neo-realism better suited to explain the European situation, as it tried to explain the high degree of cooperation that resulted in the creation of the CFSP. Based on Kenneth N. Waltz’s theory on the balance of power (Waltz, 1979), the creation of the CFSP has been linked to member states’ desire to act as a counterbalance to the US, as well as an attempt to balance out one another (Reichwein, 2015).

However, the revised neo-realist focus on European integration was short-lived and, as a consequence, the EU remains under-theorised in neo-realist thought. Assumptions made by neo-realists predict that, as states operate in an anarchical order, the EU as we know it will eventually break down—even though cooperation is necessary to balance against the US (Mearsheimer, 2014; Walt, 2004). However, collapse has thus far been averted, and the EU has muddled through several crises that ought to have led to its downfall (Riddervold et al., 2021). This shows that realist theories lack predictive capability when it comes to EU security policy. Thus, the main focus of realism has remained the nation state and the cooperation (or lack thereof) between sovereign actors, neglecting the values and interests of the EU has a whole. As a result, when it comes to analysing the multi-actor character of the EU and of EU foreign and security policy, realism falls short.

2.1.2 EU Foreign and Security Policy as More Than the Sum of Its Parts

Realists nurture the idea that institutions are based on the interests of the great powers, and that they reflect the power-distribution of the world and lack the ability to directly affect states and state behaviour. Institutionalists disagree with this assumption and consider institutions to be central to international stability and peace. Following the writings of Michael Smith, the process of institutionalisation can be seen as the main cause of EU cooperation in the field of security policy (Smith, 2004). Institutional approaches suggest that when faced with a crisis, the EU is likely to cope in a more or less satisfactory way, as opposed to breaking down. Crises tend to make institutions stronger rather than weaker (Riddervold et al., 2021). Governance systems handle turbulence by strengthening already existing cooperation practices, arrangements, and methods, following the logic of path dependency (March & Olsen, 1998; Olsen, 2009; Pierson, 2004; Skowronek, 1982). Institutions may also improvise, adapting and creating novel ways of employing existing mechanisms (Ansell, 2021; Ansell et al., 2017). This may in turn trigger more integration, since the experienced turbulence may cause institutional soul-searching and the adaptation of existing structures (Emery & Giauque, 2014; Kingdon, 1984; Lodge & Wegrich, 2012). However, this does not explain why some member states become more integrated than others. It also fails to explain the inclusion of areas which are not formally part of the Union’s foreign and security policy.

The grand theory of neo-functionalism, developed by Ernst Haas, makes “generalisations about the processes by which political communities are formed among sovereign states” (Haas, 1958, p. 106). Questioning realism, his work was among the first to argue that (at the time, Western) Europe could be transformed by making the cross-border flow of money and people easier. Rather than seeing states as the only relevant players, neo-functionalism emphasised regional integration marked by multiple, diverse, and changing actors that interact in spite of national borders (Haas, 1964; Niemann, 2021). Such actors create functional links by developing a regional network across state borders. The network provides the demand for functionally specific regional institutions dealing with non-existential matters. Through the spillover effect, cooperation functionally spreads to other areas, leading to the eventual decline of national sovereignty and rise of supranational institutions (McCormick, 2015). Eventually, as citizens place more and more of their expectations on the region rather than the nation state, governments are pressured to give more authority to the regional organisations, creating a self-sustaining process of cooperation and spillover, which then evolves into closer political integration (Niemann, 2021; Ruggie et al., 2005). Nation-state governments respond to these developments either by accepting and adapting to them, or by ignoring or sabotaging the attempts to integrate made by the regional institutions (Mattli, 1999). By the 1970s, neo-functionalism eventually fell out of favour, in part because of its lack of predictive capability, as European integration had ostensibly not advanced as much as the theory assumed it would (McCormick, 2015).

A liberal intergovernmentalist (LI) perspective, as developed by Andrew Moravcsik, suggests that the degree of EU integration is decided by the preferences and relative bargaining power of member states rather than spillover from one area to another (Moravcsik, 1993). In areas such as security policy, member states may choose to integrate further to minimise the potentially negative costs of non-integration, either through treaty changes or through less formal agreements. However, the outcomes of bargaining processes usually mirror pre-existing preferences of member states, especially the members most likely to remain relatively unaffected by the bargaining (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009; Schimmelfennig, 2021). LI thus posits a two-level game, where intergovernmental bargains are established based on pressures formed at the domestic level. The demands from interest groups, voters, parties, and bureaucracies that member states governments face at home determine their positions in international negotiations. European integration moves forward as governments use the information available to them in negotiations at the EU level to reach agreements which they in turn promote to audiences at home (McCormick, 2015). While LI helps explain the interplay between member states and EU institutions, it still does not explain the differentiated character which European integration has taken over the past decades and the fact that the EU institutions have developed a certain degree of agency in their own right.

Constructivism challenges the idea that material interests are sufficient to explain European integration more extensively and resolutely than classical realism, neo-functionalism, or LI. According to constructivists, the historical and social origins of political structures should be accounted for to a much greater extent (McCormick, 2015). Rather than arguing for balancing or economic interdependence as the main drivers for integration, a variety of scholars have claimed that identity and norms are key factors in EU integration, as the various actors aim to create a common institution based on these norms (Hooghe & Marks, 2004; Kuhn, 2019; Liebert, 2016).

Central to this branch of constructivist approaches (often referred to as soft constructivism) is the idea that the EU is crucial when it comes to sharing and spreading norms, ideas and beliefs among both member and non-member states, while placing emphasis on the importance of social interactions. Contrary to the previously discussed theories, these constructivist approaches maintain that membership in the EU has a deep impact on member states’ self-representation as international actors. Following constructivism, the EU’s common foreign and security policy is made possible through discourse and practices, which trickle down to the level of the member states, effectively redefining their interests (Smith, 2004). Integration is explained through the creation of a common identity, often (but not necessarily) taking the form of some sort of normative power (Manners, 2002, 2006). A more recent branch of constructivist scholarship has been less focused on the importance of norms and values and paid more attention to how policy is practised (Adler & Svendsen, 2019). However, constructivism fails to address why some members willingly opt out of parts of the integration process or choose to leave it behind, as the UK did.

2.1.3 The Added Value of Multi-level Governance and Differentiated Integration

Some theoretical frameworks, at times referred to by the general term “post-functionalist” approaches, focus on the role of institutions rather than the drivers of integration, and aim to describe their importance in political, social, and economic life (Ansell, 2021; March & Olsen, 1983; Pollack, 2007; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Thelen, 1999). One of the more successful attempts at capturing the European political order is provided by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2001, 2003) in their multi-level governance (MLG) approach (Benz, 2012; Piattoni, 2010; Smith, 2004). They claim that, as European integration has moved into core areas of national state sovereignty, public opinion has become more sceptical of the integration project. As a result, whereas EU-friendly elites previously encountered general consensus, they now face more widespread dissent (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Schimmelfennig, 2017). For the first time, disintegration becomes a possibility, making scholars question how integration works, rather than why it takes place and either progresses further or reverses and results in disintegration (Hooghe & Marks, 2019). The multi-level governance approach explores the relationship between the various levels and policy areas involved, their interconnectedness, and how the interplay between different levels produces policies (Smith, 2004).

Following Ernst Haas, the assumption that the EU operates at more than one level, and that both national and supranational levels should be considered, has been present since the very beginning of EU studies. Building on Hooghe and Marks (2001), the challenge has been to theorise the mechanisms of multi-level governance. The introduction of Differentiated Integration (DI) as a new sub-field in EU studies has constituted an attempt to take up this challenge, helping us to better understand the actual functioning of European (and not only EU) foreign and security policy by exploring why and how some actors choose to integrate further when others do not.

DI captures a key feature of the EU, namely the search for balance between national autonomy and regional integration. In recent years, DI has proven increasingly relevant, for instance, through its ability to capture the complexity of the EU’s multi-level governance structure. With the introduction of the pillar structure with the Maastricht Treaty, which established the CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) as two separate pillars alongside economic integration, DI became institutionalised. While the pillar structure was abandoned with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the concept has remained relevant in describing a system of EU governance in which inner groups of EU member states participate in integration processes at different speeds across different policy areas. The DI concept has been explored by several scholars, and today there is a large conceptual and empirical literature on DI (see Dyson & Sepos, 2010; Gänzle et al., 2020; Holzinger & Schimmelfennig, 2012; Holzinger & Tosun, 2019; Hvidsten & Hovi, 2015; Jensen & Slapin, 2012; Leuffen et al., 2013; Warleigh-Lack, 2015; Schimmelfennig & Winzen, 2019; Leruth et al., 2022).

It can be argued that a certain level of scholarly agreement concerning the main features of DI has emerged. First, that DI is concerned with differing degrees of the transfer of power from the national to the European level of governance, referred to as vertical DI. Second, that it may include various types or degrees of participation by both member states and associated states, with the possibility for opt-outs from, and opt-ins to, certain parts of the EU integration process, known as horizontal DI. Relevant empirical case studies can be divided into two main categories: those focusing on how differentiation plays out with regard to specific models of membership or association, known as opt-outs and opt-ins; and those that investigate how these models have been implemented in specific policy areas.

What is still missing, however, is an approach that enables us to incorporate both the many processes that occur in or across several different policy areas within the EU framework, and those that are initiated outside formal institutions but still actively contribute to a stronger European foreign and security policy and, ultimately, European strategic autonomy as well. This is what we aim to develop here.

2.1.4 Differentiated Integration in European Foreign, Security, and Defence Policy

The EU has gradually adopted an integrated approach to foreign and security policy, manifesting its aim of developing a policy that recognises the complexity of this field. This policy involves a broader security concept, which extends to different policy areas with different characteristics and levels of integration. It was developed as a consequence of a changing international context, where there are no longer clear-cut borders between internal and external policies. Today, this broader policy area of security includes areas where the Commission has a certain degree of authority, such as civil protection and crisis response, as well as areas where the main competencies remain with member states, as in the case of defence.

Until recently, DI was most likely to take place in areas with low levels of integration, where there was an urgent need to develop a stronger role for the EU. In Schimmelfennig’s words: DI “remains a promising instrument to facilitate further enlargement and kick-start integration in new policy areas” (Schimmelfennig & Winzen, 2019). This has also been confirmed empirically, as the CFSP allowed for a certain degree of horizontal differentiation by permitting Denmark to opt out of the CSDP for many years, until it elected to join in 2022. Later, closely associated non-members, like Norway, have been permitted to opt in to the very same policy. The EU also allows for vertical differentiation, by permitting member states to move forward with higher levels of integration, as with the establishment of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The decision to activate PESCO, with greater use of qualified majority voting (QMV) for certain decisions within this group, and the establishment of a Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space and a European Defence Fund (EDF) within the Commission, are concrete examples of differentiated vertical integration in the area of CSDP (Blockmans & Crosson, 2021, 2022).

Although EU foreign, security, and defence policy is still primarily dominated by intergovernmentalism and national autonomy, there has been a move towards greater involvement of EU institutions, notably the European External Action Service (EEAS)Footnote 1 and the Commission. This was highly contested for a time but is now increasingly seen as necessary to make the EU a more capable actor. Even though integration in CFSP/CSDP has moved forward, it is unlikely that we will see a full transfer of power to the EU in this area, as member states are reluctant to give up their national sovereignty in this field. Instead, a certain degree of vertical differentiation is more likely to be the norm—a mix between intergovernmentalism and community policy. Thus, in the EU’s foreign, security, and defence policy, DI is here to stay.

What is interesting, however, is that we can also observe a much broader differentiated European integration process taking place on the continent. These processes are closely related to EU processes but go beyond the formal institutions. As these processes are also crucial for the building of European strategic autonomy, they need to be added to the conceptual framework in order to get a full picture of the status of European strategic autonomy. Such a framework needs to take into account the different levels of vertical and horizontal integration in the various parts of EU security policy, but it also needs to include the policies that are not formally part of EU foreign and security policy, but that are still key for developing a European policy in this area—and thus also EU(ropean) strategic autonomy. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has created a profound uncertainty in Europe, but also a new momentum to use DI strategically in order to increase European strategic autonomy as well as making EU(rope) a more capable of operating more efficiently together with the US, but also alone if required.

2.2 EU(ropean) Strategic Autonomy Through Differentiated Integration

In this section we will present a conceptual framework for understanding what constitutes current EU(ropean) security policy and strategic autonomy and how the different parts of this framework are interlinked. However, before the framework as such is presented, there are two important clarifications that are needed: which EU policies we need to include alongside the CFSP/CSDP; and why we need to include the informal parts of integration, in addition to the parts that are formal or treaty-based.

2.2.1 Moving Beyond the CFSP/CSDP

In the Union’s CFSP, DI has become increasingly institutionalised. A greater role for EU diplomacy and EU foreign policy was secured by the Lisbon Treaty through the establishment of the EEAS and the strengthening of the mandate of the High Representative for CFSP, who also holds the position of Vice President of the Commission and therefore has a say in the EU’s trade, development, neighbourhood and aid policies. Thus, the Union’s foreign and security policy must be understood as a mix of CFSP/CSDP and of the areas that are developed and implemented by the Commission alone or in cooperation with the EEAS and member states. In the field of crisis management or crisis response, this is referred to as the Union’s integrated approach. This means that the borders between the areas where the Commission has already developed or is developing a competence alongside member states’ national policies—such as in humanitarian aid, civil protection and crisis response, cyber, and space—and areas where member states still are the key actors—such as major foreign policy decisions like economic sanctions and deployment of CSDP missions—have become increasingly blurred or at least interlinked (Svendsen, 2021). This has been particularly evident in the Union’s response to the Ukraine war, where most of the Union’s foreign policy instruments—both those that are under the competencies of the Commission and as well as those of member states—have been activated to create a common European added value (Rieker et al., 2023).

But not even an integrated approach to foreign and security policy is sufficient to capture all aspects of the EU’s global role today. For this, we also need to include the external dimensions of various internal policies, such as internal market dynamics, climate regulations, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), etc. These processes have been referred to as the Union’s regulatory power. This has also been labelled the “Brussels effect” (Bradford, 2020), referring to the EU’s power to shape global standards and regulations. As these policy areas are usually characterised by greater integration and EU actorness, they contribute, together with the areas that are less integrated, to an EU foreign policy that is both differentiated and multi-faceted.

2.2.2 Moving Beyond Formal Differentiated Integration

While an understanding of EU foreign and security policy as a broad framework involving actions across different policy areas has at least been accepted in theory, what is less recognised is the importance of including processes that are not formally part of the EU, but are still closely linked to it. EU studies have a tendency to be overly normative and often see such processes as a challenge or something that may undermine the EU—rather than something that may strengthen it. We argue that we need to include these aspects as well, in order to have a better understanding of the functioning of EU(ropean) security policy, meaning EU security policy (in the strictest sense) as well as policies that in practice are closely linked to the EU but not formally EU policies.

There are several such initiatives in the history of European integration. They often start outside the EU and later become EU policies. Sometimes they remain outside EU structures, but are still closely linked to EU policies. To capture this broader European role, we need to include a study of how policymaking processes in the EU relate to the various initiatives and processes undertaken by member states outside the EU framework, and whether this increased complexity in European responses promotes weaker or stronger European actorness in the foreign and security policy field (Cross, 2021; Rieker, 2021a; Rieker & Giske, 2021).

The distinction between formal (treaty-based) and informal processes of DI has thus far been inadequately studied. While the importance of including this distinction has been highlighted, it has still been largely overlooked in most empirical analyses. The reason is probably that formal differentiation is easier to identify, as it involves flexible formats of integration that are specified in agreements or treaties. Informal DI, on the other hand, may include many different types of processes and can therefore be more difficult to isolate. Based on Rieker (2021a), we distinguish between four main types of informal DI, making it easier to include these aspects in empirical analyses.

First are opt-outs in the form of non-compliance with EU rules, norms, and principles by certain member states (understood as informal opt-outs). While non-compliance with rules is most obvious in highly integrated areas (such as the internal market), the non-compliance with fundamental norms and principles may affect all policy areas. Examples of such informal non-compliance would be foreign policy decisions made by member states in their unilateral foreign policies that are at odds with fundamental EU policies and/or principles (Sitter, 2021). The developments in Hungary under Victor Orbán, where we see a move away from the normative basis of the European Union, may be an example of this type of differentiation. In time, this sort of differentiation may affect the functioning of EU foreign and security policy, including the ambitions of building strategic autonomy.

A second type of informal differentiation entails differing views of the long-term objectives of the EU as a foreign policy actor. This situation, common in the history of European integration, has often resulted in vague compromises, with a certain degree of “constructive ambiguity” in official documents and official EU discourse. This allows for differing interpretations and thus some kind of informal opt-out. Here, we may note the various interpretations of the development of a “European security and defence capacity,” which historically has meant one thing in Sweden, and something quite different in France (Rieker, 2021b).

Third, we find examples of informal differentiation with opt-ins in cases where non-members decide unilaterally to sign foreign and security policy declarations or follow EU policies. An example of this type of differentiation would be Norway’s policy alignment with the CFSP. So far, Norway has signed up to close to 100% of all EU CFSP declarations as well as sanctions, making them a highly integrated non-member in this field.

Finally, there are cases where certain member states push for integration initiatives outside the EU structure, to kick-start a process seen as difficult to agree on within the Union. Such initiatives are often undertaken by one or several member states (sometimes also together with closely associated non-members), with the implicit or explicit aim of either (i) integrating the area into the Union at a later stage; or (ii) supporting the EU in strengthening Europe’s role on the global stage or its strategic autonomy (Billon-Galland & Whitman, 2021; Rieker, 2021a). Two obvious examples of the former would be the Schengen Cooperation and the British–French St. Malo Declaration of 1998.Footnote 2 Four examples of the latter would be the E3 Iran format, the EI2,Footnote 3 the Intelligence College in Europe (ICE),Footnote 4 or the EPC.Footnote 5

Another example of a process that was initiated by a member state outside the EU framework was the initiative taken by Germany to externalise border management, which led to the EU–Turkey migration deal of 2016. While this agreement became a formal part of EU–Turkey relations, the initial push was made by Germany, highlighting the centrality of agency in integration processes. Initiatives can also be taken by smaller member states, such as Sweden’s push for a greater focus on conflict prevention in the early 2000s—which has now become a key feature of EU foreign and security policy—or the more recent multilateral defence initiatives taken by the Nordic, the Benelux, and (for a period) the Visegrád Group (V4) countries (Rieker, 2021a). All these initiatives have had the implicit or explicit intention of contributing to a strengthening of the European capacity to act together.

We may also include the processes aimed at strengthening the European pillar in NATO, as these processes contribute to a more differentiated, but potentially also stronger, European joint capacity in the field of security and defence (Howorth, 2019). The recent inclusion of Finland in NATO has certainly strengthened Europe’s role in NATO. Although Sweden’s application (at the time of writing) still awaits Turkish ratification, EU–NATO cooperation has been reinforced as a consequence of the current geopolitical situation, and Europe has increased its common stance.

What all of these processes indicate is that, as long as there continues to be widespread reluctance to transfer competences to the EU level in this area at the same time as there is increased demand for greater European responsibility for its own security and well-being, we are likely to continue to see more DI in all parts of European foreign, security, and defence policy.

In the remaining part of this chapter, we present a comprehensive conceptual framework for analysing processes that take place outside of the EU framework but have an impact on it, as well as the linkages between them, which may help to better understand how EU foreign and security policy can become more integrated without necessarily implying a fully-fledged common foreign and security policy in the traditional sense.

2.2.3 Differentiated Integration as a Function of Levels of Integration and Uniformity

Given the need for a broader approach to European security policy, which includes both formal EU policies and processes that are not formal EU policies but are nevertheless closely linked to them, we need to apply a concept of integration that not only includes the transfer of competencies from member states to the EU level, but also the whole spectrum of processes that foster greater density and intensity in the relations between some of the constitutive elements of a specific regional system. From such a generic definition, which is largely inspired by the work of Jim March (March, 1999), European integration can be understood as a continuum with no integration or interstate cooperation at one end and full integration or federation at the other end. Everything between these two extremes will then be some type of DI.

Such a definition of integration incorporates both the vertical/horizontal dimension, the formal/informal dimension, and the inclusive/exclusive dimension of integration processes. This means that it can readily be applied to specific studies of processes within the EU, as well as to the many different regional processes that are not formally part of the EU but are still closely linked to it.

With such an understanding of DI, we can more easily capture the dynamics of the different parts of an increasingly complex EU(ropean) integration process, characterised by opt-outs and opt-ins, enhanced cooperation and various forms of multi-level governance. This will help structure our empirical analysis and avoid having too narrow a conceptual framework that risks excluding important processes that are crucial to European foreign and security policy. It will therefore also give a better idea of what European strategic autonomy entails.

By adding the feature of uniformity to vertical and horizontal integration, we are able to distinguish between different types of differentiated integration and disintegration. While integration varies on a continuum between no integration on the one side (competition or conflict), and full integration (federal state) on the other, uniformity will vary between no uniformity (divergence) on the one hand and full uniformity or harmonisation on the other. Combining these two dimensions, we can present a table (Table 2.1) that shows different ideal types of DI. Note that the categories of no integration or full integration have been taken out, as neither are relevant for European differentiated integration. We distinguish between low, medium, and high degrees of integration, which all are examples of DI.

Table 2.1 Differentiated (dis)integration as a function of levels of integration and uniformity
Full size table

It is possible to have full uniformity—the harmonisation of policies—without any form of integration. This would imply a high level of cooperation but does not necessarily entail integration. However, the other way around is not possible, as you will need at least a certain level of uniformity to start on a pathway towards integration. Instances between no and full integration, and between some and full cooperation, are characterised as some form of DI. How, then, can we distinguish between different levels of integration?

One way of doing this is to utilise March’s (1999) three dimensions of integration: interdependency, consistency, and structural connectedness. Interdependence refers to the degree to which the different parts of the system (often states) are economically or politically dependent on each other. Consistency refers to the members’ actions and beliefs, which make them coordinated or coherent in the form of some common rules, values, and/or objectives. Finally, structural connectedness refers to a network vision of integration where the focus is on the number and pattern of different bilateral or trilateral relationships within the system of members and associated members, such as contacts and meetings, common resources, common institutions, and the level of transfer of competencies/learning.

In addition to these three dimensions proposed by March, we include a fourth dimension, which we think is crucial in order for integration to deliver results: namely, decision-making capacity. The reason for this is that while interdependency, consistency and structural connectedness are necessary conditions for common action, they are not sufficient. They will always depend on the existence of a decision-making capacity that can transform political will into action. This dimension could be operationalised either as QMV or by a delegating capacity, making it possible to delegate a response or action to a member state or a group of member states and associated non-members. All dimensions are important dimensions of horizontal integration. However, only the last two are relevant for vertical integration, as they require a transfer of competencies to another level.

While these four dimensions of integration (interdependency, consistency, structural connectedness, and decision-making capacity) are crucial, they are not necessarily strongly correlated: There may be high levels of integration in one dimension and less in another. For instance, we can see high levels of consistency in an area where we have lower levels of interdependence and structural connectedness. With regard to EU(rope’s) foreign and security policy, we can argue that there is a high level of consistency and interdependence, but that the structural connectedness varies or can take different forms. Sometimes this occurs within parts of the EU foreign and security policy field, and sometimes beyond but still closely linked to it, thus contributing to a higher level of European integration.

A fully integrated system will require high scores on all dimensions. Since most processes will fall somewhere in the middle (see Table 2.1), a framework with these different dimensions makes it possible to say something more substantial about the different forms of DI. The exact level of integration may be difficult to identify—at least with a high degree of precision. This is why we have chosen to distinguish only between low, medium, and high levels of integration. While the low level of integration will be reserved for processes and cooperation formats that can refer to a relatively high score on only one of the four dimensions of integration, medium integration would imply a high score on two dimensions, with a requirement of a medium to high score on either the dimension of consistency or decision-making. Finally, a high level of integration would imply a high score on three out of four, with the requirement of a high score on consistency or decision-making.

2.2.4 Introducing the Role of Agency

Although the different dimensions of the integration process or continuum are useful and can facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of the concept of DI, they do not provide us with a new understanding of what drives these processes forward, what slows them down, or what sends them into reverse. To be able to answer such questions as well, the framework needs to include the role of agency. But agency does not necessarily have to come from member states. It can also be found within the EU institutions themselves. Thus, we assume that some types of push- and/or pull-factors, coming from the different levels of government in the European DI process—meaning the EU level or member state level—are relevant for whichever type of DI is involved.

Here, we identify four roles that the various levels of government may take in this process of integration: leaders, followers, laggards, or disruptors/leavers. What motivates them, which is the main concern of most established theories—be it national interests, norms, path dependency, or something else—is of less interest to us in this context. We also assume, contrary to most established theories of IR and European integration that have a tendency to choose one over the other, that this will vary over time and from policy area to policy area, and can therefore only be identified empirically on a case-by-case basis. So, what do we mean by leaders, followers, laggards, or disruptors/leavers?

The first categories are leaders and followers. They cover actors that drive the processes of integration forward, either through taking initiative or through working towards the same goal and not disrupting the process. Leaders often include the EU institutions themselves. For instance, both the Commission and the EEAS propose specific courses of international action. Additionally, there may be a combination, as with the many joint initiatives that often come from the High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) and the Commission. This equally occurs either in areas where the Commission has a certain degree of independent competence or in intergovernmental policy fields. In intergovernmental policy fields, where joint initiatives are presented for adoption by member states, there is always a risk that the initiatives will be blocked or changed by certain member states when a final decision is to be made. So far, most of these joint initiatives have been adopted in the end, which also demonstrates that the agenda-setting power of EU institutions such as the Commission and the HR/VP is significant in these areas too (Riddervold & Bosilca, 2021). The Commission has traditionally been rather reluctant to take a very visible role. This has changed, and the promotion of the current Commission as a “geopolitical commission” is evidence of such a change. This approach has also been implemented in the Union’s responses to Russia’s illegal military invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

In the areas dominated by intergovernmentalism, individual member states often take the lead alone or as a group. Different member states may assume a leading role at different times and in different areas. In the area of security and defence, France has traditionally played a particularly important role and led the push for integration—alone or together with other members. For instance, French collaboration with the UK on the St. Malo declaration in 1998 was a crucial part of the process towards what later became the CSDP. France has also cooperated with Germany, strongly supporting the Commission’s initiative (from 2016) to activate PESCO and establish a European Defence Fund (EDF). Additionally, France has initiated several processes outside the EU, with the intent of contributing to a stronger European defence capacity. Here, we may note various attempts to strengthen the European pillar within NATO, or independent initiatives taken to strengthen multilateral defence cooperation among the European allies and partner countries, such as the EI2 (Rieker, 2021a). Initiatives to strengthen bilateral defence cooperation/integration should also be mentioned, such as the Lancaster House Agreements with the UK from 2010 or the Aachen agreement with Germany from 2019. It is evident that most of the progress made in this area has been pushed forward by either France alone or France acting together with other EU members, with most of the other members (and associated non-members) as followers.

In spite of these leaders, integration takes time. The main reason is that there are still a number of different member states who still view the integration processes with considerable scepticism. These countries can be referred to as laggards. While some—like Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, and Hungary—have traditionally worried that a stronger role for the EU may undermine NATO and the transatlantic relationship, others—like Germany and Sweden—worry that France might push the EU in a more interventionist direction and undermine the soft-security identity of the EU. Finally, some member states (like Poland and Hungary) are more challenging than the laggards and have a deeper scepticism of the EU; they call into question the normative foundations of the EU. Rather than laggards, these are perhaps better described as disruptors. They represent a greater challenge than the laggards, as they may have a more transformative impact of the processes (Sitter, 2021). Sometimes the disruptors end up becoming leavers, like the UK. In principle, leavers only become a challenge if they grow in number. From a theoretical perspective, if Hungary left the EU right now, the integration process would likely benefit from it, as Hungary slows the integration process down. And without Brexit, the EU would most likely not have been able to agree on PESCO, EDF or a Next Generation EU, to mention some.Footnote 6 Through a DI perspective, the UK can potentially still contribute to the strengthening of a European foreign and security policy through some type of participation in a transformed E3 format, the EI2 or perhaps the European Political Community, which seeks to include different types of neighbouring countries, from EEA countries and ENP partners to leavers like the UK.

2.3 Concluding Remarks

The main purpose of this chapter has been to conceptualise the EU(rope)’s multi-actorness. The chapter started by presenting an overview of the relevant academic literature and identified a few gaps in these contributions. While there is a rather substantial body of literature on multi-level governance and DI, none of these contributions have so far been able to capture the multi-actorness that has now become a permanent feature of European foreign and security policy. The main reason for this is that an excessively narrow understanding of the concepts of European and security integration and European foreign and security policy is often applied.

For some time, it has been common to refer to the comprehensiveness of EU foreign and security policy. This means that there is a general agreement that there is a need to move beyond the area of CFSP and external relations, and that analysis of the EU as a global actor also has to include the Union as a global standard setter. What is still less common is to include the many policy processes that are initiated outside the formal framework of the EU but still closely linked to its policies.

By applying a more inclusive approach to both integration and foreign and security policy, it is possible to capture the actual functioning of not only the EU, but of European foreign and security policy. Very often it is argued that it is important to distinguish between what is EU and what is European. However, such a distinction is becoming increasingly difficult in a European context that is increasingly characterised by DI—often with the EU at its core, but with other processes playing an important role in defining what European foreign and security policy actorness is all about.

In this chapter, we have presented an analytical framework that captures the comprehensiveness of European actorness by showing how it goes beyond the EU—even though the EU is at the core. The idea has been to shed light on how different European processes are linked together through a system of DI. By doing this, we allow for the possibility that processes and initiatives that are usually studied separately—and sometimes even interpreted as signs of fragmentation—could in some cases be understood as different parts of a greater whole. We also contribute to an understanding of European foreign and security policy that is far more coherent than often argued—and one that also has the potential of producing greater European strategic autonomy. As most analysis is based on conventional understandings of how international politics and the EU are functioning, this aspect is often ignored.

In the next three chapters, we will show how this works in practice. First, we will use this conceptual framework to study the development of Europe as a global actor (Chapter 3). Then, we will move to European security and defence, where we will focus on the different policies and processes directed towards building more resilient European societies—or strengthening European common societal security through a whole-of-society approach as well as through more conventional European defence (Chapter 4). Finally, we will move on to focus on the EU(ropean) role in building a regional security community (Chapter 5).