Keywords

Evidently, actorness requires a base level of common goals, resources, interdependences, and objectives. However, having resources or common policies is not enough. To function as an effective foreign policy actor, there needs to be political will and sufficient decision-making capacity to bring these policies to action. Actorness in international politics may be understood in various ways. While some scholars stress the importance of internal resources (Rhinard & Sjöstedt, 2019; Sjöstedt, 1977), others put more emphasis on the perceptions of international society (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). In this chapter we argue that there are two basic preconditions that must be fulfilled to claim global actorness: (i) The capacity to formulate clear objectives and to make decisions according to these objectives; and (ii) The existence of necessary administrative and operational capabilities to implement these decisions (March & Olsen, 1995; Rieker, 2009, 2013). In this chapter we first investigate the extent to which Europe, with the EU as its core—EU(rope)—has managed to develop the capabilities to pursue a global role, and then we move on to identify the levels of European DI. Finally, we will discuss what this tells us about the existence of European strategic autonomy on the global stage.

3.1 Visions and Decisions

So far, the EU and its member states have adopted a wide range of declarations and agreed on ambitious objectives within the area of foreign and security policy, which would indicate that the political will to strengthen the EU as a security policy actor is in place. While it was more of a long-term objective in the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union, it has now, especially since the events of 2022, become a reality.

The formulation of a clear vision and common objectives was first made explicit in the European Security Strategy that was adopted in December 2003, where member states for the first time identified potential threats, strategic objectives, and implications for the instruments of the EU (European Council, 2003). To implement these objectives, the EU had to be able to make decisions that commit its members to action. As was seen in relation to the Iraq War in 2003, the EU will not be able to act if its various member states differ deeply in their approaches and views concerning a given conflict. In the case of Iraq there was a divide between those who supported a US-led war and those who were opposed. Another example was when EU countries failed to send troops to Congo in November 2008—a country then on the brink of erupting into civil war. Whereas France was keen to send EU battle groups, which have been developed for precisely such cases, Germany feared that such an EU force could weaken the legitimacy of the UN operation in the country.

Despite occasional difficulties in making decisions, there have been many instances of internal “crises” or major international events that led to decisions which have made the EU gradually more capable of acting. While the CFSP was established in the wake of the end of the Cold War, the establishment of the security and defence policy (then the European Security and Defence Policy, ESDP) came about as a consequence of the Balkan wars and the recognition that the EU would have to strengthen its capacity for both preventing and handling potential international crises in its neighbourhood. Moreover, the events of 9/11 led to a strengthening of the EU’s anti-terror policy, while internal disagreements among member states prior to the Iraq War helped to bring about the adoption of a European Security Strategy. Finally, the enlargement of the EU led to institutional reforms, here materialised in the establishment of the HR/VP and the EEAS, which aims at making an enlarged Union more capable of acting—including in security policy.

Simultaneously, despite differing opinions, broad agreement within the EU emerged as to what kind of security policy orientation it should have. For instance, there was no doubt about the importance of multilateral institutions, and that the focus should be on a broad approach to security where conflict prevention and civilian crisis management play an important role, in addition to the development of a military crisis management capacity. Thus, members agree on the overarching objectives even though they may from time to time find it difficult to make decisions in relation to specific crises and conflicts.

3.2 Responding to a Changing Context

The EU has been forced to adjust its objectives several times since 2003, when the first security strategy was adopted. First, the broad enlargement of the EU in 2004 changed the character of the EU. Second, the security context changed again with a more aggressive Russia and a more assertive China. The Russian use of military power in Georgia in 2008 and then later its illegal annexation of Crimea represented a real shift in European security which required adjustments to the European approach. In June 2016, the Global Strategy (EEAS, 2016) was presented and it oriented the EU’s approach away from its ideal of being exclusively a force of good or normative power to be more concerned with how to protect European interests and the European way of life in a more contested world. “Principled Pragmatism” became the new mantra, guiding the EU’s policies. It was argued that a certain securitisation of the European approach was needed to protect the normative basis of the Union.

While the global strategy continues to guide the Union’s global approach, it was supplemented by documents that aim to make the EU more coherent, and better at making decisions, and act in accordance with the Union’s overarching objectives. First, the Strategic Compass (EEAS, 2022), which was adopted in March 2022, shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, laying out what the EU needs to do to improve its capacity to act, to secure, to invest, and to be better at cooperating with partners to “enhance its strategic autonomy and to […] safeguard its values and interests” (p. 23).

Many processes have led to these key documents, culminating with the Strategic Compass. Two of the most important are related to the promotion of an integrated approach to crisis response and long-term defence capability development. The gradual development of a comprehensive and/or integrated approach has led to improved synergies between the different instruments of the EU’s external action on the one hand, and foreign security and defence policy on the other. The promotion of long-term capability development in the military domain, which started in 2017 with the PESCO programmes and the establishment of the EDF (more on this in Chapter 5), has also been crucial as it has led to a shift in EU security and defence policy, giving priority to long-term capacity building, which in the end is a precondition for strategic autonomy.

Second, the European Economic Security Strategy (2023), which was presented by the European Commission in June 2023 (European Commission, 2023), making the Union better equipped to commonly identify and assess the risks to European economic security, and to use strategically the available tools for dealing with these risks (Such as FDI screening and anti-coercion mechanisms) and to develop new tools where needed. However, perhaps the most interesting change is the Union’s gradual improved capacity to make decisions in times of deep crisis. Since 2008, the EU has been in constant crisis mode, and it has become stronger through these crises (Riddervold et al., 2021). This has been particularly evident with regard to the two major crises that have shaped the beginning of this decade, namely the Union’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic and its response to the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has led a to a series of innovative decisions and made the EU both individually and with its partners a stronger global actor.

3.3 Capabilities and Resources

In addition to the ability to formulate objectives and make decisions, an actor also needs certain administrative capabilities to be able to act. According to March and Olsen (1995, p. 91) these include four key capacities: (i) a well-functioning set of rules, rights and authorities; (ii) necessary resources (in the form of budgets, staffs, and equipment); (iii) knowledge and competence; and (iv) organisational capacity. In this part of the chapter, we will examine the extent to which EU(rope) possesses these administrative capabilities in foreign, security, and defence policy, which in many ways lay the foundation for whether or not we can talk about a global Europe or European strategic autonomy.

3.3.1 Rules and Regulatory Power

3.3.1.1 Formal and Informal Rules (Practices) Regulating a Policy Area

The EU is equipped with a set of formal rules and practices to regulate the area of foreign and security policy. A smooth functioning set of rules, rights, and authorities is necessary to act, since this clarifies what the actor can do, in what way, and with what kind of means. The Union was set up as a “community of law”; its cornerstones are respect for the rule of law and the fundamental rights on which it is founded—as stipulated in Art. 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU, 2009). When supporting rule of law reform and constitution building in other regions, the EU aims to ensure the same level of respect for fundamental values and democratic culture as in its own member states (Art. 205).

The Union’s external action consists of different parts that are all covered by Title V of the TEU. In addition to the CFSP/CSDP, which are still largely intergovernmental, the Union’s commercial and trade policy is also an important part of EU’s external action. This is an area where the EU has exclusive competencies and is thus acting on behalf of member states. In an area such as climate negotiations, the EU is also seen as a unitary actor, but the competence is mixed, which means that both the EU as such and member states take part and are signatories. Still, in this area, practice has shown that member states are highly coordinated and, thus far, the EU has been acting as a unitary actor (and a frontrunner) in this field. Other areas where the EU is highly coordinated but not a unitary actor are development assistance and humanitarian aid, as well as energy policy. In the field of development and humanitarian aid, both the European Union and its member states practice their own policies. Still, member states’ policies intend to complement and support the development cooperation carried out by the Union. Energy policy is also an example of shared competencies, where the EU is assisting its member states, through the establishment of an energy union, to facilitate delivery of affordable, secure, and sustainable energy. Finally, there are areas where EU institutions have more of a coordinating role where most of the assets are at the member state level, such as civil protection and cyber security (more on this below).

In addition to identifying the overarching goals and principles, the CFSP shall be in accordance with the UN Charter and with international law. These rules also lay out a more detailed set of rules clarifying the competencies of the different EU institutions. As the EU is consistently evolving, the rules are also constantly updated.

For instance, whereas the CFSP was included in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, the establishment of a High Representative for CFSP was not introduced in the Treaty until 1997. The position was meant to be held by the Secretary General of the Council, thereby contributing to making this policy area more visible at the overall EU level. The Commission—otherwise the most important institution of the European Union—has traditionally had a more limited role in the area of foreign and security policy. Still, its role has also expanded somewhat over time. This has been evident in the move towards an ideal of having an integrated approach to crisis response, for instance, where the objective is to have better coordination of the different instruments that the EU has at its disposal. In addition, the Commission has, through the budget, a certain role concerning implementation of at least parts of CFSP/CSDP. It has also established a Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space, which manages the EDF, and is developing a space strategy with a similar fund (IRIS2). Another area that is closely linked to CSDP is the Union’s work on cyber security, which is also to be found under the Directorate-General for Communications Network, Content, and Technology.

Thus, the EU is equipped with a set of formal rules and established practices in the field of foreign and security policy, which also have been gradually strengthened over time. Gradually, EU institutions have been increasingly important as agenda setters. While CFSP is an intergovernmental form of cooperation, which means that most of the decisions are taken unanimously, there is a trend towards greater influence at the EU level. The establishment of an HR/VP has led to a gradual strengthening of the role of the Commission in this policy area. The EEAS assists the HR/VP in fulfilling their mandate and establishes a European diplomatic service, often existing in parallel to member states’ services (even though some member states have reduced their own national diplomatic corps since the establishment of EEAS).

The Commission also plays a role through its various funding mechanisms, such as the Foreign Policy Instruments. But the Commission has more responsibility for policy areas that can be defined as part of the broader area of external action. Global trade is the most important, where the EU has exclusive competences and therefore is acting on behalf of member states. Other areas, such as development aid and humanitarian action, are common EU policies with a common budget, but these policies also exist in parallel to member states’ policies. Since Von der Leyen was elected President of the European Commission, this institution has also taken a more important role. Her framing of the Commission as a “geopolitical Commission,” for instance, has been important for positioning the Commission as a key actor in this domain (Von der Leyen, 2019).

The anti-coercion mechanism is another instrument that would empower the Commission, in specific situations of coercion, to take trade, investment, or other restrictive measures towards the non-EU country exerting the pressure. Finally, the Commission has also proposed a European Democracy Action Plan that aims to empower citizens and build more resilient democracies across the EU by promoting free and fair elections, strengthening media freedom, and countering disinformation.

3.3.1.2 The EU as a Regulatory Power

In addition to regulating the competencies between the different levels and institutions, some of EU’s rules and regulations also have a significant global impact, and are therefore key elements of the Union as a global actor.

This has been very well presented by Anu Bradford in her book “the Brussels effect” (Bradford, 2020), where she emphasises the Union’s regulatory power. In her view, the common narrative of the EU’s weakness as an international actor overlooks a crucial dimension of its power, which in many ways remains unaffected by recent crises. That is the Union’s unilateral power to regulate global markets, through its ability to set standards in competition policy, environmental protection, food safety, the protection of privacy, and the regulation of hate speech in social media. We could also add the standards for the use of Artificial Intelligence, which is likely to be one of the most important types of regulation in the years to come—and is likely to have global implications.

Even though the EU regulates only its internal market, multinational corporations often have an incentive to standardise their production globally and adhere their production to a single set of rules, as opposed to customising their production to each individual market. As Bradford argues, regulatory power is one of the few areas where unilateralism still works, and in this field the EU is ahead of the US, which, thus far, has been less interested in regulating market forces. But it is a different kind of unilateralism, in the sense that it is not about imposing rules on third parties, but rather about the third party willingly adopting them (Bradford, 2020, Introduction).

3.3.2 Resources

It can be argued that a set of rules, rights, and authorities that clarifies what the different levels in the governance system can do, in what way, and with what kind of means, is in place, but is also constantly evolving—and is flexible enough to be adjusted when needed. In addition to a formal set of rules, an actor also needs certain resources, such as a stable budget, staff, and equipment.

While most of the EU budget continues to go to various transfers within the EU, the single market, and natural resources and environment, there has been a constant increase in the budget for external relations, including security and defence. For instance, the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the period 2021–2027 dedicates 2.2% to security, defence, and crisis response and 10% to development, humanitarian aid, and pre-accession assistance. While the biggest budget lines are still cohesion and values (35%), natural resources and environment (30%), and single market, innovation, and digital (15%),Footnote 1 there has been a substantial increase in external action and security compared to the previous MFF. First, the “security and defence” budget line has been singled out as an independent area for the first time, and no longer as part of the broader Global Europe heading. This has been done without reducing the budget frame for external action (now called Neighbourhood and the world, which still gets its 10%). Another area that has been given priority is “Migration and border management.” In the previous MFF, this area was part of the heading “security and citizenship,” which also included health, food security, culture, and justice and to which only 1.6% of the budget was dedicated. Now the specific area of Migration and border management gets 2.7%.

As the EU budget goes to activities where the Commission has a role, the security and defence part of the budget goes to various programmes that intend to strengthen the security and safety of European citizens (e.g. an internal security fund), improving Europe’s defence capacities (e.g. EDF), and providing the tools to respond to crises. Concerning EU military operations or military support to third countries, which are part of CSDP and mainly intergovernmental, the expenses are covered by national contributions or off-budget arrangements such as the European Peace Facility (EPF), an instrument that since the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been used to fund weapons delivery to Ukraine.

Another part of the budget that is key for the EU’s role in the world falls under the heading “neighbourhood and the world,” which includes funding instruments that cover pre-accession support, development aid, and humanitarian assistance. While most of the other headings are funding internal policies, policies under the heading “single market innovation and digital” also have a security dimension, since they cover the area of digital security, cyber security, and satellite communication. Finally, the heading that covers “cohesion, resilience and values” is also about security broadly speaking and cannot be ignored. To have the full overview of EU(rope)’s resources that form the foundations for a strategic autonomy, however, we need to include the resources of member states as well as associated member states, which also contribute to European actorness in the end—albeit through DI.

Besides budgets, an actor must also have both staff and the equipment necessary for implementing policies. A security policy actor cannot function properly without civilian and military capabilities. The EU is often considered to have relatively limited resources in this area, but this depends on what is included. In civilian preparedness, for instance, member states have pledged to make a certain number of civilians and military capabilities available for EU international crisis management or civil protection. The EU level is also building up its own resources in certain areas. A concrete example is the post-COVID-19 initiative of establishing the “RescEU reserve.” This includes a fleet of firefighting planes and helicopters, medical evacuation planes, and a stockpile of medical items and field hospitals that can respond to health emergencies, as well as mobile shelters for those displaced. Furthermore, the EU is also developing a reserve to respond to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. This is an upgrade to the Civil Protection Mechanism, which has been relying exclusively on member states’ capacities.

In international crisis management, the EU still relies on member states’ resources for conducting crisis management operations (civilian or military). However, with regard to long-term European defence capacity building—a crucial process to make European strategic autonomy a reality—the Commission has become a key actor through its financial mechanisms or incentives to promote defence industry integration. Beyond this, it is the PESCO framework under the EEAS that is a legally binding cooperation framework for developing defence capabilities. The EU has also become more open to drawing on and utilising member states’ facilities, as well as developing a closer cooperation with NATO and other bilateral and subnational cooperation frameworks. The fact that the EU has been able to carry out close to 40 (smaller, but still important) CSDP missions, mainly in its immediate and wider neighbourhood—and that there have been more if we include the various ad hoc European coalitions (e.g. Task force Takuba, Emasoch) that have been initiated—indicates that it does have a certain amount of resources available.

3.3.3 A Continuous Learning Process

A third type of administrative capability necessary for an actor is security policy expertise, experience, and knowledge. As individuals acquire knowledge and skills through education and training, institutions represent enshrined knowledge in traditions and rules. Skills and knowledge therefore depend on a combination of good recruitment policies, good leadership, good training programmes, and the appropriate use of advice emanating from the expertise of reputable research institutes and think-tanks. For the EU, security policy competence will hinge on a combination of the institution’s ability to draw on the expertise of its member states and its ability to develop specific programmes for training and learning.

It has been argued that the EU is a young and inexperienced security policy actor (Hoffman, 2000; Kagan, 2003; Toje, 2011; Renard, 2014). Such criticisms fail to account for the fact that member states all come with extensive experience—from their individual security policies, as well as through participation in other multilateral structures such as NATO and the UN. In turn, this expertise will be channelled into the EU through national participation in various expert groups (the Commission) and working groups or committees (the Council). But it will also automatically contribute to the existence of a European security experience that is of a more informal character, but no less necessary.

The EU has proven surprisingly adaptable to the new security policy context—perhaps even more so than many individual member states. Perhaps because the EC/EU had no clearly defined security policy until after the Cold War, it was easier to adapt to a new era. Unlike well-established security policy actors, the EU did not have to go through long and difficult restructuring processes: It could start to develop a security policy from scratch. Since then, the EU has taken a range of initiatives to increase its expertise in this field. For one thing, both the Commission and the Council have made use of expertise from various research institutes and think-tanks. The EU’s own Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in Paris is frequently used, as is the European Policy Centre in Brussels. The EU also established a separate college, the European Security and Defence College (founded in 2005), which trains civilian and military personnel. Training programmes for civilian‒military coordination have been implemented as well as a range of civilian and military crisis management exercises. This is an ongoing process. The EU has built up a certain degree of expertise in this field, both by virtue of the experience held by its member states, and by developing its own learning programmes.

Of a more informal character are French initiatives to foster a strategic European culture. Both EI2 and ICE have this as their main ambition. Both initiatives include members that are not members of the EU and show that we can talk about a developing EU(ropean) skill set. The European pillar in NATO is, of course, also contributing actively to this. This will be explored in further detail in Chapter 5.

3.3.4 Hybridity and Organisational Skills

Organisational skills are the final but perhaps most important capability essential to an actor’s ability to take collective action. While such skills also depend on the presence of other capabilities (rules, resources, and expertise), all these must be applied effectively. As March and Olsen argue, “Without organizational talents, experience, and understanding, the other capabilities are likely to be lost in problems of coordination and control […]” (March & Olsen, 1995, p. 95). There are many institutions at several levels that play a role in EU security policy. In fact, the Commission, the Council, various independent agencies, and member states all contribute to the development and implementation of EU foreign policy. Although there are regulations for how they are to operate together, these are often of such a general character that uncertainties remain concerning the distribution of responsibilities, both within and between institutions.

Coordination problems within the Commission relate first and foremost to the fact that there are several Directorate-Generals and underlying bodies responsible for the external relations and security policy of the EU. Due to internal communication problems, the Commission does not always manage to act in a unified way. In some cases, this has led to contradictory policies towards third countries (Duke, 2006, p. 10). However, various reform measures have been implemented to remedy these problems and the Commission has gradually become far more coordinated in its approach.

By contrast, coordination problems within the Council are of a different nature, with political as well as institutional dimensions. While the political dimension concerns the traditional problem of coordination between member states within a policy area, where most formal decisions are taken by unanimity, the institutional dimension is about coordination problems between civilian and military personnel. While problems covered by the political dimension have no solution in the short term and will from time to time continue to impose certain restrictions on the EU’s ability to act, those covered by the institutional dimension have led to the creation of structures designed to strengthen civil‒military cooperation.

Coordination between the Commission and the EEAS has been improved with the High Representative also being Vice President of the Commission, as well as through development of various more flexible funding mechanisms. The leadership of EU(ropean) foreign policy will continue to be complex due to its different levels and actors. The recent crises in the EU, however, have shown that European unity is still possible to achieve when common action is needed. The Union’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the invasion of Ukraine are cases in point.

3.4 The Degree of Differentiation

What does this discussion of the EU’s global role and actorness tell us about the level of DI in European foreign policy? Relying on the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2, the analysis in this section builds on the above analysis of EU(ropean) administrative capabilities and thus actorness. It will show how the wider foreign policy area scores on what we have identified as the two key features of Differentiation, namely integration and uniformity.

3.4.1 The Level of Integration

As mentioned in Chapter 2, we can distinguish between different levels of integration/disintegration. We see this as a continuum between no integration on the one hand (a state of competition and/or conflict) and full integration on the other hand, which in practice would imply some form of federation.

While most policy areas in the EU can be placed somewhere between these two extremes, precisely where to place a certain policy area on this continuum is not self-evident. This is also the case for a policy area that has come to be so broadly defined as European foreign and security policy. By distinguishing between the different dimensions of vertical and horizontal integration, we will come somewhat closer to a categorisation.

On a scale of high to low levels of vertical integration, the broader area of foreign, security, and defence policy spans the scale. The area includes everything from a predominantly intergovernmental CFSP/CSDP—and thus a rather low level of vertical integration (although continuously evolving—to the more unitary character of the EU as a regulatory power, where there is a high degree of vertical integration and transfer of competencies (with high score on all dimensions: interdependency, consistency, structural connectedness, and decision-making capacity). This makes deciding on the exact level of DI a rather difficult task.

The same goes for the second dimension, namely horizontal integration, where there have been different examples of both opt-outs and opt-ins and these have changed over time. The Danish decision to hold on to its opt-out from the CSDP from 1993 to 2022 is a case in point. While the decision in 1993 was based on a fear that the EU might develop a defence policy that could potentially undermine NATO, this fear was no longer realistic in 2022. Rather, the illegal invasion of Ukraine and the uncertainty linked to the upcoming US Presidential election in 2024 made it important to take full part in EU(ropean) defence integration. At the other end of the spectrum, we have Norway, which has opted for the opposite strategy, namely, to opt in to the CFSP and the CSDP. This cooperation is based on a set of formal agreements, such as agreements that regulate Norway’s participation in CSDP, but also a set of diplomatic informal practices, like the practice of signing up to most of the EU’s foreign policy declarations as well as most sanctions.

Interestingly, seven years after the Brexit referendum, the UK is also searching for a way to re-connect with the EU in the area of foreign and security policy (Whitman, 2023). But horizontal DI is more than just opt-outs and opt-ins; it may also include inter-institutional cooperation, such as the EU–NATO cooperation that has been increasingly institutionalised, in particular since 2016. The same goes for the complex network of bilateral and minilateral European defence cooperation framework (more on this in Chapter 4).

While the EU might be rather willing to find solutions to integrate non-members, there are some practical challenges, as the borders between internal and external policies have become increasingly blurred. Concerning areas that are closer to the Union’s common policies, where the Commission has a greater role, there is no simple way to establish close cooperation with third countries without developing a set of cumbersome third-party agreements.

3.4.2 The Level of Uniformity

As argued in Chapter 2, the dimension of uniformity is also key to identifying the level of integration. In fact, uniformity will vary between no harmonisation, which would imply a state of competition or conflict, and full harmonisation. In Europe, examples of the former would be the relationship between Russia and Ukraine; EU/associated partners and Russia; Serbia and Kosovo; and Greece and Turkey, to mention some. Examples of full harmonisation, however, would be in the areas of trade and the EU as a global standard setter.

In most cases, we would expect a close relationship between the level of integration and uniformity, although this is not always the case. There are several examples of a type of differentiation characterised by a rather low level of integration and a rather high level of uniformity. Four examples from areas where the EU and member states have shared competencies illustrate this very well. First, there is the EU’s climate policy, which is characterised by a low level of (formal) integration, but a high level of coordination and harmonisation in global climate negotiations. Second, the Union’s development policy is characterised by a high level of coordination and a rather high level of horizontal integration, as likeminded European countries, like Norway and the UK, have maintained a policy that is highly in line with the EU and member states. Third, the Union’s energy policy, which in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been reframed through the RepowerEU programme, that aims at delivering affordable, secure, and sustainable energy to its citizens; this, together with the Green Deal and EU’s Fit for 55 package, will potentially have global implications. Finally, there is the strengthening of a joint European space policy. As space is becoming increasingly critical for European societies and economy, it is also a key enabler for security. This is why space has been defined as a strategic domain in the Strategic Compass and member states have called for an EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence which implies a low level of formal integration, but potentially high level of cooperation and harmonisation.

Another set of examples would be areas where the EU has a coordinating or supporting role in relation to member states. An example of this form of DI would be the various forms of Civil Protection, including cyber security, which is characterised by low levels of formal integration, but still high level of coordination among member states—with the EU only being allowed to intervene to support, coordinate, or complement the action of its member states. In the Civil Protection Mechanism, Norway is a fully associated third party. The EU also has this type of supporting competency in another area that is indirectly linked to individual and societal security, namely the protection and improvement of human health. Since the COVID-19 experience, the Norwegian authorities also see the value of having a form of association in this area (Veggeland & Time, 2022).

Finally, there is the CFSP/CSDP which is defined as an area of “special competence,” meaning that it is characterised by specific institutional features. It has a low level of formal vertical integration. However, there is still some kind of coordination that goes beyond a purely interstate relationship. First, the policy is defined and implemented by the European Council, consisting of the heads of states or governments of the member states, and by the Council of the European Union, consisting of a representative of each member state at ministerial level. In addition, the President of the European Council and the HR/VP represent the EU in matters of common foreign and security policy. While this policy area started out as an intergovernmental type of cooperation, it has over time developed into a hybrid type. The establishment of and cooperation with PESCO and EDF shows that the DI element is increasingly institutionalised (Blockmans & Crosson, ). This means that we gradually see more uniformity here as well.

In addition to all these aspects, there is, of course, external differentiation, which includes various cooperation frameworks beyond the EU. First, there are frameworks that imply a high level of cooperation and coordination, such as the enlargement agenda and ENP, but also the increasingly institutionalised EU-NATO cooperation. Second, there are frameworks that are either less formal, such as the EPC or the E3, or are more formal but still less capable, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which is hampered by an ongoing war between two of its members (Russia and Ukraine).

Table 3.1 below presents an overview of EU(ropean) global actorness more systematically as a function of levels of integration and uniformity.

Table 3.1 EU(ropean) global actorness as a function of levels of integration and uniformity
Full size table

3.5 Agency, Actorness, and Strategic Autonomy

What does this tell us about EU as a global actor and the potential for having a certain degree of strategic autonomy or sovereignty? The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that the EU does not have to develop into a full federation to become a global actor that also has a degree of autonomy. By applying a more expansive definition of what constitutes European integration, we see that Europe already has obtained a degree of autonomy, but that this is obtained through a network of DI.

What this means is that the EU has a role to play on the global scene, and not only in the area where the EU has exclusive powers, such as trade and market regulation. The EU, in cooperation with its member states and associated partners, is also playing an increasingly important role in many other areas that are either characterised by shared competences, such as climate, development, humanitarian aid; through having a supporting role, such as the EU has in the area of civil protection and public health; or through special competence, as the EU has developed in the fields of CFSP/CSDP. The different types of EU(ropean) DI that characterise this broader field of European foreign security and defence policy is complex, but it works, and it is increasingly updated and refined—often in relation to crises that need to be solved (Riddervold et al., 2021).

Still, DI in this broader field of foreign, security, and defence policy is not simply occurring on its own. It is pushed forward by certain actors—sometimes by EU institutions, sometimes by certain member states, and sometimes by associated partners. In such a broad field, the same actors will not take the lead in all areas. While France (often supported by Germany) has tended to take the lead in most of these areas, other member states have been pushing for specific agendas—such as Sweden and Finland pushing the Conflict Prevention agenda in the early 2000, or the integrated approach that has defined the Union’s foreign policy and security policy (Rieker, 2006).

We have also seen that the European Commission has increasingly taken the lead, especially since 2019. The promotion of a geopolitical Commission is a case in point, but so too is the development of the capacity to respond decisively to serious crises, as has been the case with COVID-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and increasingly so vis-à-vis China.