Keywords

NATO remains the ultimate security guarantee for its members when faced with the threat of a potential military attack. This explains its attractiveness, especially when the security context becomes more challenging. Finland and Sweden’s historic decision to apply for membership of the alliance is a case in point. And the aspirations of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia to become members in the future confirms this. The credibility of NATO’s deterrence and collective defence capability is reliant on the US nuclear umbrella and US willingness to protect its allies. The election of Trump created uncertainties in this regard, but the Biden Administration reconfirmed US commitment to European security and defence in discourse and in practice. Still, “Trumpism” is not gone, and a more isolationist US president may very well be elected again in 2024 or 2028. This has also led to a stronger call for strategic autonomy.

Even though the need to improve European joint defence capacity has been on the agenda of both NATO and the EU, individually and in partnership for over a decade, it has not yet been fully achieved. The Russian invasion was a brutal reminder that Europe is still largely dependent on the US for its security. This added further momentum to the process of building up a stronger European defence capacity, which has already been ongoing for a decade. The EU’s adoption of the Strategic Compass in March 2022 (EEAS, 2022), shortly after the invasion, is crucial in this context. It had been under development for some time (since June 2020) but had to be rewritten due to the invasion. It was intended to represent a great leap forward, as it was to present an action plan towards 2030. Due to recent events, member states were more committed than ever to delivering joint defence capacity, and they sought to do so through greater flexibility, investing more and more efficiently, and cooperating more closely with partners, including NATO (EEAS, 2022).

The geopolitical situation makes Europe more committed and obliged than ever to build a stronger European capacity. The process of reinforcing European defence capacities have been on the agenda for many years. Over the past 15 years, a series of different initiatives, at different levels and in different formats, have been launched with this in mind.

A recurring question, however, has been whether these many different processes and initiatives result in a more fragmented and complicated European security structure, with unnecessary duplication as a result. Or whether they, through various cooperation agreements and coordination efforts, contribute to a more flexible and stronger European defence structure, where formal structures are less important than commitment to different initiatives. The aim of this chapter is to provide an answer.

The analysis is divided into three parts. First, we examine the main initiatives that have been taken in the area of defence integration over the past 15 years, starting with the initiatives that were taken in response to a more assertive Russia and a period of financial constraints. Second, we delve deeper into the various defence capability processes taken within the two key multilateral institutions, the EU and NATO, as well as the state of the cooperation agreements between them, and the less formal bilateral and multilateral initiatives taken outside the institutional frameworks. We will then determine whether these processes can be understood as parts of a Differentiated Defence Integration (DDI) process. Third, we discuss the extent to which these initiatives can be understood as contributing to collective defence capacity. We conclude by considering the potential implications for European defence architecture, the joint European capacity to act, and, consequently, increased European strategic autonomy.

4.1 The Enduring Call for More European Defence in NATO and the EU

Burden-sharing has been on the agenda of NATO for decades (Fiott, 2018), long before the Trump Administration was installed in the White House. Most American presidents have advocated this, and it has led to continued pressure on European allies to increase their defence spending. In 2006 clear targets for individual member state defence spending were set at 2% of GDP; however, NATO also agreed that 20% should be spent on investments. This has proven to be rather difficult, and the financial crisis that erupted in 2008 made it increasingly difficult to justify the use of scarce resources on defence.

Responding to such challenges, it became common to push for closer defence collaboration as well as integration. Thus, the call for increased “smart defence,” as a way of getting more out of national defence spending, was introduced at the Munich Security Conference in February 2011 (Rasmussen, 2011). The intention was to find ways to promote a series of multinational initiatives to develop the key capabilities the Alliance needs in order to face today’s security challenges in the most cost-efficient way. While it was launched in 2011 as a call for a bottom-up approach, since the Wales summit in 2014 it has become a more institutionalised practice in NATO through the launching of 21 High Visibility Projects. These address key capability areas such as air-to-air refuelling, ammunition, maritime unmanned systems, and command and control.

Similar processes have been initiated within the EU framework, starting with the Union’s equivalent, the “pooling and sharing” concept. According to the European Defence Agency (EDA), this should be understood as a process “when several Member States decide to use capabilities – either nationally owned or multi-nationally procured – on a collective basis” (EDA 2013). For a period between 2013 and 2017, the EU was fully engaged with handling one crisis after the other, with the Euro crisis, the migration crisis, and Brexit being the most important ones.

Still, it was the election of Trump in November 2016 that represented the first real wake-up call for the EU and European allies. This happened at a time when European security context became increasingly difficult due to a shift in the Russian policy, confirmed by the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. At a rally in Bavaria, Angela Merkel argued that: “The times in which we could completely depend on others are, to a certain extent, over… I’ve experienced that in the last few days. We Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands” (The Guardian, May 28). In late 2016, member states of the EU decided to make use of the Union’s PESCO mechanism. Interestingly, PESCO was a structure already written into the European Treaty of Lisbon of 2009, making it possible for members who were willing and able to move forward in their defence integration within the EU framework to do so. It had not been activated earlier due to differences between member states, but the new security context made it more attractive.

With Emmanuel Macron’s election as president in France in May 2017, a new period of stronger French leadership began. But there were also some important differences between France and Germany about the nature of PESCO. While France envisioned a small but ambitious group with serious capabilities making major practical leaps forward, Germany opted for a more inclusive approach that could potentially include all states, regardless of their military capability or willingness to integrate. As often is the case, this disagreement resulted in a compromise whereby PESCO would be inclusive, but not all states had to take part in all projects; and progress would be phased, which allowed for the development of new, common capabilities without having to resolve larger differences on end-goals first. The first PESCO projects were announced at the end of 2017. Since then, over 60 projects crucial for the development of a stronger European capacity, have been launched (Blockmans & Crosson, 2021, 2022).

While these two processes could have been perceived as competing against each other, they were instead quickly seen as being mutually reinforcing. Gradually, the two processes have also been increasingly coordinated through a call for closer EU–NATO cooperation. The 2016 Joint Declaration in Warsaw gave new substance to the EU-NATO strategic partnership, as it outlined seven concrete areas where cooperation between the two organisations should be enhanced: (1) countering hybrid threats; (2) operational cooperation including at sea and on migration; (3) cyber security and defence; (4) defence capabilities; (5) defence industry and research; (6) exercises; and (7) supporting Eastern and Southern partners’ capacity-building efforts. On the basis of the mandate established by the Joint Declaration, mutual sets of proposals were endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils in December 2016 and 2017. Altogether, 74 concrete actions are under implementation in these seven areas. Regular progress reports have been submitted highlighting the main achievements and added value of EU–NATO cooperation in different areas.

4.1.1 Strengthening European Collective Capacity

While most analysts would agree that the EU cannot (and should not) replace NATO when it comes to territorial defence, they also agree that all European states must do more to strengthen their collective capacity to act in response to the various threats Europe is facing. As there is a continually increasing overlap in membership between the two institutions, all initiatives to boost European defence are now welcome and contribute to reaching the same objective of strengthening collective European defence capacities.

Although an increase in national defence budgets is still needed, it has to be combined with an effective integration agenda. Still, defence integration is not exclusively occurring within the European Union; it is a set of ongoing processes that are taking place at different levels and in different formats and is therefore best described as DDI (Rieker and Giske, 2021). In such a framework, processes in NATO and the EU are both crucial, as are the many bilateral and minilateral defence cooperation initiatives that take place simultaneously. The French European Intervention Initiative (EI2) is an example of such an initiative, aiming at building a shared strategic culture that would enhance the ability of its members to act together on missions as part of NATO, the EU, UN, or other ad hoc coalitions. This is an initiative that aims to compensate for what the EU cannot deliver in the short term and increase the European joint capacity to act autonomously as and when needed.

In addition to the EI2, there are also a series of bilateral and minilateral defence cooperation initiatives that have been ongoing for some time, partly as a consequence of the push for bottom-up defence integration through smart defence or pooling and sharing initiatives. In the end, this has contributed to what we may call a DDI framework. French–British and French–German bilateral defence cooperation are crucial to this process, as is the Weimar triangle (France, Germany and Poland) and the many different sub-regional cooperation frameworks, such as the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), the Visegrád 4 cooperation, or the Benelux cooperation. While these all differ in effectiveness and have resulted in different degrees of cooperation, they all aim at contributing to an improved European defence capacity.

Analysts have focused on understanding the potential consequences of the many initiatives for European defence (Svendsen & Adler-Nissen, 2019). As we showed in Chap. 2, the concept of DI is now widely used by practitioners and academics to describe the internal process of European defence integration. PESCO is often referenced, denoting a key feature of this process: the search for the optimal balance between national autonomy on the one hand, and regional integration on the other (Blockmans & Crosson, 2021, 2022). However, as explained in Chap. 2, DI may also be used in the area of defence to capture a wider set of processes that are closely linked but initiated both within and outside the EU (Rieker, 2021a; Rieker & Giske, 2021). By applying a more comprehensive understanding of European defence integration, we will now show how this can be done, and how it can help us in making sense of the many initiatives that are taking place in this area.

4.2 How to Make Sense of the Complexity of European Defence Cooperation

DDI has been confirmed empirically through the CFSP, which was introduced with the Maastricht Treaty. The CFSP enabled horizontal differentiation by allowing Denmark and Malta to opt out of security and defence policy (later referred to as CSDP) (Groenendijk, 2019; Howorth, 2019a, 2019b). Later, it also permitted opt-ins by closely associated non-members, such as Norway. Additionally, it allowed for vertical differentiation, permitting certain members to move forward with higher levels of integration, such as the establishment of PESCO. Many of these processes have been studied in depth (Blockmans & Crosson, 2021, 2022; Faure et al., 2019; Howorth, 2019a, 2019b).

While it is no secret that this area remains dominated by intergovernmentalism and national autonomy, there has been a steady move towards greater involvement at the EU level, especially regarding the EEAS and the Commission. While highly contested, this move is now increasingly seen as necessary to make the EU a more capable actor in a more uncertain geopolitical context. As a full transfer of EU competence in this area is highly unlikely, a mix between intergovernmentalism and community policy will most likely continue to be the norm. Thus, DI in EU security and defence policy appears to have taken root. The recent decision to activate PESCO with an increased use of QMV for certain decisions within this group, and the establishment of a European Defence Fund (EDF) within the Commission, are concrete examples of differentiated vertical integration in CSDP.

While DI has become customary in the literature on EU security and defence policy, the processes that are not formally part of the EU are less recognised. This is unfortunate since including them is crucial if we want to capture the broader European defence capacity. This is why an additional step is needed, and why it is important to study (a) how the processes in the EU relate to the initiatives and processes taken by key EU members outside the EU framework; and (b) whether this increased complexity in European responses entails a weaker or a stronger European defence capacity.

The distinction between formal (treaty-based) and informal processes of DI has been understudied. Formal differentiation is easier to identify, as these are flexible formats of integration which are specified in agreements or treaties. Informal DI, however, is no less important, but includes many different processes that may be more challenging to recognise. In Chapter 2 we distinguished between four main types of informal DI. The first of these are opt-outs in the form of non-compliance with EU rules by certain member states in highly integrated areas (informal opt-outs). The second are the different views of the long-term objectives of the EU as a foreign policy actor, or its finalité. Third, we can find examples of informal opt-ins in cases where non-members make a unilateral decision to sign up for foreign policy declarations or follow EU policies. Last but not least, there are cases where certain member states push for integration initiatives outside the EU structure, with the aim of kick-starting a process that is perceived as difficult to agree upon within the Union.

While we can find examples of all these types of informal DI in the area of defence integration, we will give particular attention to the latter in the remaining part of this chapter. These non-EU initiatives are often taken by one or several member states, sometimes together with closely associated non-members. The objectives might differ, but the goals are most often to either integrate the area into the Union at a later stage (such as with the St. Malo process) or support the EU in strengthening Europe’s defence capacity (for instance, the EI2). Additionally, there are key initiatives taken by smaller member states, such as the defence cooperation initiatives taken by the Nordic countries (NORDEFCO), the Benelux Union and the Visegrád states (V4). While these sub-regional integration initiatives do not necessarily wish to be integrated into the Union, they are also driven by the desire to contribute to a strengthened European defence capacity. As Howorth (2018) has argued, this is also the case for strengthening the European pillar in NATO.

In sum, all the initiatives that are taken outside the EU contribute to a more differentiated, but potentially also stronger, European capacity in the field of security and defence. Therefore, if we want to capture the full potential of Europe’s defence capacity, all these initiatives need to be taken into account. To reflect the complexity of the ongoing European defence integration, the more generic definition of integration that we introduced in Chapter 2 is helpful. Such a definition makes it possible to understand European integration as something that goes beyond the EU. Integration can be understood as a function of vertical and horizontal integration on one hand and uniformity on the other, making it possible to include most of the European defence cooperation initiatives into this framework of DDI. Table 4.1 presents a simple overview of European DDI as a function of integration and uniformity.

Table 4.1 Differentiated defence integration as a function of levels of integration and uniformity
Full size table

As defence integration is taking place at different levels and in different institutional frameworks, it makes sense to dig a bit deeper into the levels of integration. We can evaluate how different initiatives score on the different dimensions of vertical integration outlined in Chapter 2—interdependency, consistency, structural connectedness, and decision-making capacity—and what this implies in the end for actorness and strategic autonomy.

Most European states are either EU or NATO members or both, meaning that economic and political interdependencies between the states are already high. Further cooperation in the field of defence creates an opportunity for further integration. Regarding consistency, agreement over the finalité of the initiative usually translates to a high score on the consistency dimension. Finally, formalised and institutionalised voting mechanisms and arenas for resource and information sharing will result in higher scores on the third and fourth dimensions. In the next two sections, we will go through a selection of the most important defence capability initiatives that have been taken within and outside the EU and discuss the extent to which these can be understood as interlinked processes that fit with our understanding of DDI.

4.2.1 Differentiated Defence Integration in the EU

The processes of EU defence integration have a long history and have largely been driven by France. In the 1950s, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman sought, together with his European partners, to create a highly integrated European defence community (EDC) in parallel to the other European communities that existed at that time (the European Coal and Steel Community and Euratom). This failed in the main not because of opposition to defence integration, but rather due to reluctance by the French parliament (primarily by de Gaulle’s political party) to support what was perceived as a defence community that would not be sufficiently independent of the US. After this failed attempt, it took some time before European defence integration returned to the agenda.

Real progress was made after the Cold War, first with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (which came into force the following year), and then as a response to the Union’s inability to prevent the Balkan wars. This led to the St Malo declaration between France and the UK in 1998, and subsequently the creation of the ESDP (later renamed the CSDP) in 1999. In 2004, the European Defence Agency (EDA) was established. With the Union’s (2016) Global Strategy, the EU raised its level of ambition. Macron’s election, and the revival of the French–German engine, prompted the creation of new defence initiatives and opportunities for cooperation, such as PESCO, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), the EDF, and the European Peace Facility (EPF).

The CSDP has always been a case of DI. It is based on an intergovernmental structure, with decisions made unanimously. Over time, the CSDP has integrated more supranational elements, where the EEAS, Commission and agencies have been given a more important role (Howorth, 2019a, 2019b). The signing of the Maastricht Treaty created the first instance of formal horizontal differentiation, as Denmark and Malta decided to opt out of European defence integration. With the various agreements between the EU and Norway, the EU also allowed for the possibility that a non-member could opt in and participate in CSDP operations. However, third-state participation in PESCO is set to be the exception, not the rule.

As with PESCO, the EDA allows for third-party participation, following certain rules of engagement. For one, there is an obligation to share the EU’s values and adopt EU intellectual rights regulations. Additionally, potential third parties need an administrative arrangement to take part in EDA projects and programmes. Only Norway, Switzerland, Serbia, and Ukraine have thus far concluded such agreements. While these opt-ins represent formal horizontal differentiation, there are also examples of more informal differentiation, especially with regard to the different views on what the development of a European defence should entail—whether it should primarily be concerned with crisis response or also include common defence.

While it is not controversial to argue that the CSDP is a case of DI, we will try to say something about the level of European DDI that has been achieved through this by going systematically through the four dimensions of vertical integration introduced in Chapter 2. By doing so, we can assess the level of integration in different areas of cooperation, showing how DI can be used as an analytical tool to investigate regional integration that includes the EU (as explored in this section), but also goes beyond (as we will see in the next section).

The first dimension, interdependency (both economic and political), is often referred to as the main driver of integration. Consequently, the more interdependent member states are in a specific field, the more likely it is that we will see a higher level of integration. As shown above, the development of the CSDP has taken time, but it has been gradually strengthened, especially in response to radical shifts and uncertainties. With PESCO, it can be argued that the CSDP has reached at least a certain level of this first dimension. To ensure further improvement in defence integration, the 25 states participating in the PESCO framework have subjected themselves to 20 binding commitments that highlight the need for cooperation. These agree to harmonise their defence apparatus; to identify common objectives; and to work together to develop joint programmes. Since March 2018, more than 60 PESCO projects have been put forward, covering a wide range of domains, including military disaster relief, surveillance, land, air and maritime capabilities, and cyber capabilities (EEAS, 2021).

The EDF works to support PESCO projects and offers incentives for defence cooperation; it also aims to stimulate innovation in defence research and strengthen defence capacities, providing economic interdependencies by making the EU the fourth largest defence investor in Europe and including defence cooperation in the EU budget. Additionally, it is said to provide a key contribution to European strategic autonomy (Bátora, 2021). Thus far, PESCO has produced a highly inclusive expression of enhanced cooperation by applying a modular approach to the field of defence (Blockmans & Crosson, 2021; EEAS, 2016). Consequently, the states most often involved in PESCO projects are Western European member states (France, Italy, Germany, and Spain), which are categorised as defence “frontrunners” and usually take the lead (Blockmans & Crosson, 2019, 2021, 2022).

Despite their names, neither the CSDP nor CFSP constitute a true “common” policy. Indeed, the field of defence cooperation and foreign policy has been characterised by a lack of consistency or unified standards and rules—the second dimension of integration. The establishment of CARD and the commitments made by the participating states notwithstanding, diverging interests remain, especially concerning the long-term objectives of security and defence integration. One way for the Union to get around this issue, particularly regarding PESCO projects, has been to focus on projects unrelated to any EU objective (Biscop, 2017).

The initiatives have become more ambitious (Blockmans & Crosson, 2021). The full impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, regarding a common EU foreign, security, and defence policy, remains to be seen. However, the invasion has sparked an increased willingness and ability to agree on a common policy—though the CSDP is not yet scoring high on the second dimension of consistency. One explanation for this is that the ambitions are too high. At the end of 2020, for instance, the CARD Report concluded that the EU/CSDP military ambition was unachievable within the current European defence landscape.

Despite the relatively low score on consistency for the CSDP and CFSP, we can identify higher scores with regard to the third dimension of structural connectedness. In fact, since the establishment of the CSDP, there have been regular meetings within common institutions and there is an ongoing process to strengthen common resources—which in turn creates arenas for mutual learning and transfer of knowledge. The EU’s integrated approach, as presented in their (2016) Global Strategy, calls for tailor-made and multi-faceted approaches to the situation on the ground. This requires sharing of knowledge and intelligence from CSDP members whenever and wherever possible. Most notably, CARD was initiated to provide a picture of the existing European defence capability landscape and identify areas of potential cooperation. Additionally, permanent political, military, and civilian structures have been created, such as the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC).

With regard to the fourth dimension, decision-making capacity, there are prevailing and structural limitations. CSDP missions require unanimity, creating issues related to actual decision-making capacity, as unanimity hinders a swift response to a crisis. Preventing rather than managing crises has a higher chance of success and limits violence on the ground. However, rapid response remains a challenge, as member states fail to agree on the situation on the ground and on the appropriate response (Meyer, 2020). As pointed out by Howorth (2014), of the 23 missions undertaken before 2009, only five were launched in under four weeks. To strengthen CSDP decision-making, the European Parliament has requested that existing decision-making structures be upgraded, formalised, and strengthened (Meyer, 2020) Seemingly, part of this solution would be to work towards a decoupled decision-making process, where the political decision to launch a CSDP operation is further removed from national decision-making than is the case today (Meyer, 2020, p. 13). However, the willingness of member states to allow this is limited (Lațici, 2021). Still, in response to the increased security challenges in and around Europe, there has been a continued call for a more effective and rapid decision-making process in areas related to the CFSP and CSDP. While this would allow for quicker decision-making and prevent EU foreign policy paralysis, it would also potentially weaken EU unity. This, in turn, would weaken the second dimension of integration as well as the democratic legitimacy of any decision. But it is nevertheless required if the EU is to be an actor capable of reacting more rapidly to crisis. The deterioration of European security has made this even more obvious, and the Strategic Compass therefore enables the use of more “flexibility in the decision-making processes” by a wider use of constructive abstention and delegation of authority (EEAS, 2022, p. 26).

When evaluating the level of integration of specifically EU defence/CSDP with regard to the four dimensions, it can be argued that the CSDP, in short, scores high on interdependency and structural connectedness. It also scores relatively high on consistency, mainly because of CARD, in the sense that rules and values are generally shared but there are differences concerning the long-term objective. However, there are still ways to go regarding decision-making capacity. For now, the EU scores relatively low on this dimension, but interestingly, there are developments towards both increased use of QMV, through constructive abstention, and delegating capacity (EEAS, 2022). The latter in reality means the different cooperation frameworks that exist beyond the EU but nevertheless contribute to European defence integration.

4.2.2 Non-EU Processes of Differentiated European Defence Integration

In addition to the formal processes of DI taking place within the EU structures, presented above, there are also a set of bilateral and multilateral processes that are taking place outside the institutional structures of EU but nevertheless have a clear aim of strengthening joint European security and defence capacities. Based on our understanding of DDI, these will be seen as integrated parts of this broader European defence integration, both in terms of vertical and horizontal integration. Ultimately, what is interesting is the extent to which European defence as a whole is integrated. We will start by outlining the European pillar in NATO, followed by the two most important bilateral initiatives in this area: namely, Franco-German cooperation and Franco-British cooperation. We will then move to discuss a series of sub-regional or minilateral defence cooperation formats.

4.2.2.1 The European Pillar in NATO

When talking about European defence integration, NATO is the key actor. Together with the initiatives and processes taking place within the EU, development towards a stronger European pillar of NATO must be an integral part of differentiated European defence integration. Through its integrated military structures and its partners, NATO scores high on interdependency and consistency and somewhat lower on structural connectedness and decision-making capacity. The two institutions also have a large degree of overlapping membership, as 22 (soon to be 23) of NATO’s 30 members are also members of the EU and have regular consultations. Non-EU NATO members, such as Norway, and non-NATO EU members, such as Sweden and (until recently) Finland, also participate in all EU–NATO meetings, further enhancing the transatlantic bond. However, there are still discrepancies regarding the long-term objectives of EU–NATO cooperation. While some (like Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, and Hungary) fear that a stronger role for the EU may undermine NATO and the transatlantic relationship, others (like Germany and Sweden) worry that France might push the EU in a more militaristic direction and undermine the softer-security identity of the EU (Rieker, 2021b).

Comparing the two institutions, their core tasks are somewhat different. For NATO, territorial defence remains the primary task (increasingly so after the Russian invasion of Ukraine), with international crisis management and cooperative security as key but secondary tasks. For the EU, the scope is much broader, covering the entire spectrum of security and defence—including territorial defence as specified in article 42.7 of the treaty of the EU. Given the complexity of the current security context, one can argue that both institutions together contribute to the collective defence of Europe with their various tools—civilian as well as military. But, beyond that, the EU (and its member states) is also contributing actively to strengthening member states’ military capacities through a series of defence integration initiatives that will ultimately serve NATO’s territorial defence objective and the capacity for military crisis response and management—whether through the EU or NATO.

Considering the security context and the uncertainty linked to the US’ long-term commitment to European defence, there is greater recognition that the two institutions must cooperate more closely. This is also why the two institutions adopted a Joint Declaration in 2016 that reflected on this necessity (Tusk et al., 2016, p. 1):

In light of the common challenges we are now confronting, we have to step-up our efforts: we need new ways of working together and a new level of ambition; because our security is interconnected; because together we can mobilize a broad range of tools to respond to the challenges we face; and because we have to make the most efficient use of resources. A stronger NATO and a stronger EU are mutually reinforcing. Together they can better provide security in Europe and beyond.

This cooperation has been strengthened ever since and was identified as a top priority after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022—both in the Union’s Strategic Compass (EEAS, 2022), and in the NATO’s newest Strategic Concept adopted at the NATO summit in June 2022 (NATO, 2022).

European security remains dependent on NATO, recalling the first dimension. Indeed, the aim of European defence initiatives has never been to compete with NATO regarding the (territorial) defence of member states (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022). This means that it makes sense to see NATO as an integrated part of an increasingly differentiated European defence integration. The process of strengthening the EU–NATO cooperation is ongoing but has now reached a new level. This has been evident in the coordinated response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and is likely to be further strengthened.

As shown in the first part of this chapter, NATO and the EU/CSDP have both contributed actively to an improved European security and defence capacity through various bottom-up mechanisms, referred to at an early stage as smart defence and pooling and sharing, and more recently these have become more institutionalised processes in both organisations. As these processes are to a large extent mutually reinforcing, and there is an increased overlap in membership, several researchers have also been arguing for a need to merge the two processes (Howorth, 2019a, 2019b; Valášek, 2017).

A more realistic scenario, however, is that the two processes will develop and jointly strengthen European defence in some form of complementarity, seeing the European pillar of NATO and the CSDP as two parts of a whole rather than competing entities. Structural connectedness can ensure complementary existence through burden-sharing and streamlining. The existing agreements between the two institutions are important steps in that direction. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has also made this type of cooperation more important than ever, as it is seen as the only way to improve Europe’s defence capacity significantly in the short run. This means that the development of an improved European defence capacity will most likely be based on closer coordination between existing institutions, as well as between existing institutions and various bilateral and minilateral frameworks.

4.2.2.2 Bilateral Defence Cooperation

There are two important bilateral defence cooperation agreements in Europe that must be analysed in this context: first, the Franco-German defence cooperation and the objective of creating a defence union between the two, as stated in the bilateral Aachen Treaty of 2019; and second, the Franco-British defence cooperation since 2010 and its future potential in a post-Brexit context.

While the Treaty of Aachen is a qualitatively new development in Franco-German relations, it builds on deep and comprehensive cooperation between the two countries that started in the 1960s. In 1963, with the Élysée Treaty, France and Germany had already set ambitious goals for bilateral cooperation in most areas, including in security and defence. On the strategic and tactical level, both countries were to harmonise their doctrines with a view towards arriving at joint concepts. Differing approaches during the Cold War made these ambitions difficult to realise until 1989 when, for the first time, a joint military unit—the French–German brigade—was created in the hope that it would serve as the embryo of a European army. Although this has not yet been the case, France and Germany have continued to collaborate closely in the post-Cold War era, both with regard to counterterrorism and in building a military-industrial complex that accounts for almost half of Europe’s capabilities. Despite good intentions on both sides, the French and German strategic and military cultures diverge to such a degree that they have, at times, proven very difficult to reconcile. However, the growing unease in Berlin and Paris during the Trump presidency over the reliability of the US and its security guarantees pushed both governments to take actions that once seemed inconceivable. This led to the signing of the Treaty of Aachen in January 2019, which ultimately is a renewal (and strengthening) of the 1963 Élysée Treaty.

Interestingly, the Treaty of Aachen commits the two countries to common defence, by arguing that they should “afford one another any means of assistance or aid within their power, including military force, in the event of an armed attack on their territories” (Aachen Treaty, 2019, Art. 4). During an hour-long interview at the Élysée Palace in Paris, Macron acknowledged that “all means” would also include the French nuclear deterrent force (Drozdiak, 2019). Under the Treaty, a French–German defence and security council is to be established as the decisive political body to guide these reciprocal engagements. In her speech at the signing ceremony, Chancellor Merkel said that Berlin and Paris had scrutinised “each and every word at length,” and vowed to build “a common military culture” that “contributes to the creation of a European army” (Drozdiak, 2019). While the Aachen Treaty adds several new items to the Franco-German security and defence agenda, according to Kunz and Kempin (2019, p. 2), it is “no blueprint for action, ready to be implemented,” and it may be some time before concrete results are evident. However, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, results may come sooner than expected. Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s announcement of a radical change in German security and defence policy (a zeitenwende), including a historic increase in the national defence budget is a clear indication in that direction (Sholz, 2022). If implemented, Germany will by far have the largest military in Europe.

Thus, Franco-German bilateral cooperation is likely to become a key element in the increasingly differentiated European integration in the area of security and defence. But what degree of DI are we talking about in the case of the Franco-German defence cooperation? How can this be understood with regard to vertical DI and dimensions of interdependency, consistency, structural connectedness and decision-making capacity? Concerning the first dimension, namely economic and political interdependency, Franco-German cooperation scores relatively high. France and Germany are highly interdependent through their EU membership, and their willingness to take the lead in pushing the integration process forward has been strong for decades. This has also been the case recently, in the area of defence, as reflected by the various initiatives taken.

With regard to consistency (i.e. common rules, values, and objectives), the picture is a bit more mixed: While they both subscribe to the rules, values, and objectives set by the EU, the two countries still have somewhat different interpretations of European defence and what it should entail. The main difference is linked to whether one should give priority to inclusive or exclusive institutional processes in the EU; whether one should give priority to long-term capacity building within the EU; or whether this should be combined with building a capacity to act among the willing and able. While France wants to prioritise exclusivity and capacity to act, Germany is more concerned with inclusivity and long-term capability development.

This difference, as we have seen with many other Franco-German differences, could be overcome if there is sufficient political willingness to do so, which will impact the fourth dimension: decision-making capacity. As decisions made in this format are dependent on consensus between France and Germany, finding common ground will move the process forward. As Krotz and Schramm (2021) show in a recent analysis of the Franco-German cooperation, France and Germany have in recent years exercised joint leadership in times of existential crisis—in response to the Eurozone crises, the migration crisis and then in response to the COVID-19 crisis. The radical shifts in European security and transatlantic relations we have been witnessing are therefore likely to motivate closer Franco-German cooperation in the field of defence.

It has been emphasised that Germany reacted remarkably passively to Macron’s many advances in this field following his 2017 election—whether it was to focus efforts and investments on creating an autonomous European defence, or the creation of a common strategic culture, intervention force or defence budget (Krotz & Schramm, 2021). However, this attitude has since been modified, first in response to a deeper and more structural transatlantic divide, and second in response to Russian aggression. It was a combination of the election of Donald Trump and the difficult Brexit negotiations that led to the signing of the Aachen Treaty in January 2019. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the German Zeitenwende (if implemented), and the re-election of Macron in France, it is also more likely than ever that this treaty will be followed up and implemented.

Concerning structural connectedness—which refers to the existence of contacts and meetings, common resources, and common institutions—we can see that this dimension is very much in place between the two countries. With more than 50 years of cooperation in most fields, including in the area of security and defence, the structural connectedness between the two countries is high. The permanent mechanisms for consultations in foreign, security, and defence affairs have been numerous, including the Franco-German Defence Commission (1982), the Franco-German Defence and Security Council (1988), the Blaesheim process with irregular and informal meetings (2001), and the Ministerial Councils (2003), which deepened the provision originally defined by the Élysée Treaty. Numerous initiatives have arisen from these meetings, such as the Franco-German brigade (1987) and Eurocorps (1992). All this has led to close cooperation between the two countries. Both countries also support the development of a common European army, but the meaning of this differs. While German politicians have traditionally stressed the contribution such an army would make to transatlantic security, the French have seen it as an indispensable component of an autonomous European defence policy (Krotz & Wolf, 2018).

Nevertheless, bilateral defence integration has been gradually strengthened, and has become a formalised form of bilateral cooperation that scores high on interdependency and structural connectedness. While it used to score low on consistency, external factors such as global threats and a continued transatlantic divide have led to more convergence. As both Germany and France are explicit that their cooperation is crucial for building a stronger European cooperation in this field, this bilateral agreement can be seen as part of an increasingly differentiated European defence integration framework and could be a framework for implementing EU decisions through a delegating capacity.

Another potentially important bilateral defence cooperation in Europe is that established between France and the UK in November 2010, when President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron signed the Lancaster House Treaties for French–British defence and security cooperation. This cooperation includes a treaty on defence and security cooperation, cooperation on the handling of nuclear weapons, the creation of a framework for exchanged between UK and French armed forces, and work on industrial and armament cooperation.

When it was signed, this agreement was seen as crucial for strengthening European defence capacity. While the Treaties did not have a formal link to the EU as such, they alluded to the EU’s CSDP. For instance, the parties agreed that they were reaffirming their commitment to supporting the role of the CSDP. Further, the parties consented to deploy troops together, agreed under the auspices of the CSDP (Pannier, 2013). This means that these agreements—which preceded Brexit—had at least the intention of becoming an important part of a European DI.

However, this became complicated following the UK’s decision to leave the EU in 2016. Since then—and even more so since the Aukus deal was signed in September 2021, a trilateral security pact between Australia, the UK, and the US for the Indo-Pacific region. Under this pact, the US and the UK will assist Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines. However, the creation of the pact also spelled the end of a French–Australian submarine deal, something that led to a diplomatic crisis as France felt betrayed by its close allies (The Guardian, 2021, September 19). At that time the cooperation had reached its lowest point. After Brexit, there was some hope (in both France and the UK) that this bilateral cooperation would be a way of keeping the UK integrated into a more flexible European defence integration. Aukus made it more difficult—at least for a period. Paradoxically, the UK and the French traditionally score higher on consistency in defence matters than France and Germany—at least when it comes to the willingness to use force. In the new security context since the Russian invasion, there might be greater willingness on both sides to find a way to revive these bilateral treaties and make them contribute to a stronger differentiated European defence capacity. However, this requires renewed trust and increased structural connectedness, which remains low since Brexit and even more so since Aukus.

A speech by Macron in Strasbourg in May 2022 called for “a European political community,” which would allow democratic European nations—not just EU members—who share a set of values to find new space for political and security cooperation. This initiative towards a new and broader framework for integration would include candidate countries, such as Ukraine, and closely associated countries, such as the UK. As such, it might be a way to compensate for this challenge, and to include non-members in a broader European integration structure. Macron’s statement is a response to the understanding that swift European integration cannot only happen through membership in the EU; instead, he calls on differentiation as something that has “always been fruitful for the European project” (Macron, 2022). At the same time, he has also made clear that this should not be considered as an alternative to enlargement (Macron, 2023).

In addition to the strengthening of the European pillar of NATO through EU–NATO cooperation and the bilateral defence arrangements presented above, a series of sub-regional defence cooperation initiatives have been launched that also have the ambition of strengthening European defence capacity. Initiatives have been implemented by the “big three,” such as the German Framework Nation Concept (FNC), the UK’s Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and the French European Intervention Initiative (EI2). Additionally, we can mention sub-regional cooperation initiatives between smaller countries, such as the one that exists among the Nordic states (NORDEFCO) and those between the Benelux states and the V4. In the following, we will discuss how and to what extent these initiatives must also be understood as an integrated part of an increasingly differentiated European defence structure.

The German FNC was initially created as a pragmatic and flexible framework for joint cooperation in the field of defence, whereby states cooperate voluntarily while retaining full sovereignty when desired. The FNC balances central coordination and decentralised implementation, allowing for the different geopolitical priorities and threat perceptions of NATO states (Glatz & Zapfe, 2017). The goal of the FNC is to develop European capabilities. It consists of around 20 partner nations, covering a wide area of defence cooperation in different areas such as medical and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) cooperation, civil–military cooperation (CIMIC), and logistics.

The FNC aims to close capability gaps and create a plan for a structured and collaborative force. Similar initiatives, on the other hand, have different foci. For instance, the JEF and EI2 aim to create a framework for multinational intervention forces in high-intensity cooperation. Thus far, however, it is only JEF that has managed to fulfil its ambitions. Today, the JEF consists of nine countries (Denmark, Finland, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway), in addition to the UK. It was publicly launched with a Letter of Intent as a NATO initiative at the September 2014 Wales Summit, subsumed under the new FNC rubric. In 2019, a series of maritime exercises occurred among JEF nations, known as Baltic Protector. This cooperation scores relatively high on interdependency, as all signatories are either members of the EU or closely associated states. The JEF also scores relatively high on consistency and structural connectedness. In a joint statement by the Defence Ministers of the JEF, the initiative was characterised as a “group of like-minded and proactive nations, with shared purpose and values, and a common focus on security and stability” (Hultqvist, 2022, para. 2), indicating a high level of consistency. Regarding structural connectedness, JEF creates an opportunity for the UK to uphold dialogue and regular consultations with other European states, even after Brexit.

The EI2 was announced a few years later, in 2017, as a joint military project between now-13 European countries—led by France, but outside of existing structures (both NATO and the EU/CSDP). It is a looser construct than the JEF in the sense that it wants to start by enhancing interaction on intelligence sharing, scenario planning, support operations, and doctrine. It intends to be resource-neutral and will make use of existing assets and other joint forces available to members. The idea is to prepare the ground for a common understanding of threats to facilitate common action, through a coalition of the willing. Though it is planned that it will operate with a “light” permanent secretariat based on the network of military liaison officers within the French defence ministry, it must be seen as a rather informal set-up. While this cooperation scores relatively high on interdependency, as all signatories are either members of the EU or closely associated states, it scores lower on consistency and structural connectedness. Nevertheless, it was established with the distinct aim of improving their score on these dimensions.

Sub-regional defence cooperation between the Nordic states (NORDEFCO), the Benelux Union, and the V4 was established primarily as means to pool and share within the EU framework or to contribute to NATO’s smart defence initiative. In other words, they are economically interdependent, scoring high on the first dimension. To create multilateral interdependencies with nation states’ military capabilities, a certain level of trust is required. NORDEFCO has thus been able to move forward in this dimension, as the Nordic states enjoy a fairly high level of multilateral trust (Järvenpää, 2017). The recent inclusion of Finland to NATO, as well as Sweden’s bid to join the Alliance and the Danish choice to join the CSDP, might also make such sub-regional security cooperation among the Nordics easier.

So, what type of DI do these sub-regional cooperation formats or minilateral initiatives represent? First, with regard to economic and political interdependencies, we can say that the states in all these minilateral formats are highly interdependent. This is largely because the initiatives consist of either EU member states or NATO members, adding to an already existing framework of cooperation and interdependency. Second, with regard to consistency—in terms of common rules, values, and objectives—there are some differences that remain due to different historical experiences and traditional defence policy orientation. However, these differences are less important when facing a perceived common threat, as has been highlighted in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Indeed, the decision by Sweden and Finland to join NATO and Denmark’s referendum to end its opt-out from the CSDP show how a common threat overshadows other inconsistencies.

Third, concerning structural connectedness, there are also variations; here, the Nordic cooperation is the most advanced, with regular and informal contacts on different levels. However, the general rule is that all cooperation frameworks strive for a low level of institutionalisation, focusing primarily on joint training and information sharing. In time, this will ultimately lead to the transfer of competencies. Finally, concerning decision-making capacities, there is a high degree of decision-making consensus and interdependence; though members retain their sovereignty, as part of a wider European integration process it could be used as a format for delegated authority. The lack of institutionalisation creates low levels of institutionalised voting mechanisms, meaning initiatives such as these generally score low on the fourth dimension.

Although these sub-regional cooperation initiatives have some level of success, they also have specific challenges. While the Benelux and the V4 have the advantage of having similar institutional affiliations, the Nordic countries are divided between non-EU allies (Norway and Iceland), non-allied EU members (Sweden and Finland), and (until recently) an allied EU member with opt-outs from EU defence cooperation (Denmark). But while the Benelux and the V4 have the same institutional affiliation, different security orientations remain (Sitter, 2021). While the Netherlands is Atlantic in its orientation, Belgium and Luxembourg are more oriented towards continental Europe—and towards France (Blockmans & Crosson, 2019). What this means is that, regarding consistency, shared ideas, and objectives, these initiatives score low. Additionally, these differences have placed some limitations around some of the initial ambitions. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is likely to strengthen these sub-regional cooperation initiatives as well. This is already evident regarding Nordic cooperation, as both Finland and Sweden have now applied for NATO membership and Denmark has decided to participate in the CSDP.

4.3 Implications for Strategic Autonomy

Following the above discussion, there is little doubt that we have seen the development of an increasingly differentiated European defence integration in Europe over the past decades. The question is whether or not this has led to an improved European defence capacity. Commonly, it is argued that this is not the case and that strategic autonomy for Europe is an illusion (Meijer & Brooks, 2021). This argument, however, is based on a narrow idea of what should be included in the concept of European defence, as it only focuses on initiatives taken within the EU framework.

By applying a broader understanding of European defence capacities, as we do in this chapter, we aimed to show that European defence cannot be limited to either the CSDP or the European pillar in NATO, nor to a combination thereof. These processes and initiatives, together with the initiatives and processes occurring outside of formal structures, create a wider network of European defence and security cooperation, resulting in a strengthening of European defence and capacity to act. Seen as part of a broader framework for European defence integration, all initiatives have a part to play in what we have referred to here as a system of DI. This chapter has looked at DI along four dimensions: political and economic interdependency, consistency, structural connectedness, and decision-making capacity. It has found that, for all initiatives taken both within and outside the EU, interdependency seems to be the key to integration. However, this dimension is not sufficient for developing a joint capacity to act. For this, we must also have a certain degree of consistency, structural connectedness and—last, but not least—decision-making capacity.

The first three dimensions have been fulfilled to a certain degree. Most of the initiatives can be categorised on a medium to high level of integration on interdependency and consistency. While the result for structural connectedness is more mixed, this is due to the lower score on the sub-dimensions of vertical integration: common institutions and transfer of competencies, where only NATO and the EU, as well as parts of the French–German cooperation, show some results. Overall, this tells us that the main challenge for European defence integration should be to improve the last dimension: collective decision-making capacity. It means that the main problem is not so much a lack of defence capacity, even if there still are obvious gaps that need to be filled (and processes have been initiated to do precisely that). Rather, the main obstacle is a continued lack of constructive thinking on how to build on the potential in the existing differentiated European defence structures that exist at different levels (low to high) of DI. This has resulted in a lack of political initiatives that allow for a) making the most out of the existing structures, and b) making use of the full potential of the many different types of (formal and informal) European defence integration processes. It remains to be seen whether a common threat perception, like the Russian illegal military invasion of Ukraine, may lead to a recognition of the value of the development of more flexible DI on all dimensions of integration discussed in this chapter: interdependency, consistency and structural connectedness, and decision-making capacity. Recent developments might suggest that it will.

The trend towards a more differentiated defence integration is likely to continue. Rather than resulting in a more fragmented and complicated European security structure, and thus unnecessary duplication, these different cooperation agreements and coordination efforts have the potential to contribute to a more flexible and stronger European defence structure—so long as there is the political will to make the most of them.