Keywords

This book has provided an alternative analysis of the state of European foreign and security policy, based on a broader understanding of key terms: European integration, strategic autonomy and security. We wanted to show how the meaning of European strategic autonomy changes when a broader understanding of these concepts is applied. The analysis has illustrated how a better understanding of the interlinkage between the various formal and informal and internal and external initiatives that are occurring simultaneously gives us a more accurate picture of the status of European strategic autonomy.

Chapter 2 provided an overview of the relevant academic literature and showed why existing IR theories are not sufficient to capture and explain the multi-actorness of the broader European foreign and security policy. We then demonstrated why the existing literature of multi-level governance and DI also applies a narrow understanding of EU integration and security, and that we need to include both formal and informal, as well as internal (EU) and external (non-EU) processes in order to fully capture European strategic autonomy. To fill these gaps, we presented an alternative conceptual framework, which we then applied to analyse Europe’s role as a foreign policy actor (Chapter 3), its role in regional defence integration (Chapter 4), and its role as a builder of regional security (Chapter 5).

The analysis in these three empirical chapters has enabled us to better capture the dynamics of today’s increasingly complex European integration process, characterised by opt-outs and opt-ins, formal and informal processes, enhanced cooperation, and various forms of governance led by actors at different levels and with different types of relations to the EU.

One of the conclusions we can draw from this analysis is that while actorness seems to depend on two assets—the capacity to formulate clear objectives and to make decisions in line with these objectives, and the existence of necessary administrative and operational capabilities to implement these decisions (Chapter 2)—European actorness cannot be limited to the EU. In support of our initial assumption, to capture European actorness we need to go beyond the borders of the EU, and include policies and initiatives that also include non-EU members as well. Even though, the EU remains at the core of most of these processes, formally or informally, it often includes more than the EU and EU members. This is why we introduce the concept of “EU(ropean) strategic autonomy” as it recognises the key role that is played by the EU, but also the importance of other actors that are not formally members of the Union.

Thus, in Chapter 2 we presented a framework for analysing this complexity as a form of DI. We based this on a definition of (vertical and horizontal) integration that sees it as a continuum between a state of purely interstate cooperation at one end and full integration or federation at the other end (March, 1999) and considered everything in-between a case of DI. To distinguish between different levels of DI, we applied March’s three dimensions of integration: (i) interdependency, both political and economic; (ii) consistency, referring to common rules, values, and objectives; and (iii) structural connectedness, referring to contacts, meetings, common institutions, and the transfer of competencies. We then added our own fourth dimension, namely decision-making capacity, which we suggested could be operationalised in two ways—as QMV and/or as delegating capacity. By including delegating capacity, we take into account the actions of certain member states—explicitly or implicitly on behalf of the Union. On top of this, we introduced uniformity as a key dimension, arguing that European integration is a function of vertical and horizontal integration and level of uniformity (degree of harmonisation).

The three empirical chapters presented some interesting empirical findings. First, Chapter 3 showed how such a broader conceptualisation of European integration and security can help us to better understand how EU(rope)—the EU and associated partners—functions as a global actor. It started by analysing how it scores on the dimensions of actorness as well as the dimensions of (differentiated) integration presented in Chapter 2. The chapter concluded that despite certain limits, EU(rope) can claim to have a certain degree of actorness and thus also a certain degree of autonomy. This means that it is playing an increasingly important global role in most policy areas, even though these are characterised by different types of governance structures: Some are characterised by exclusive competences, others by shared competences (such as climate, development, humanitarian aid), by a more supporting role (as the EU has in the area of civil protection and public health), or even by some type of special competence such as the EU has developed in the fields of CFSP/CSDP. This EU(ropean) foreign security and defence policy is perhaps complex, and has certain limitations, but it is also flexible and is continuously being updated and refined—often in response to crises.

In Chapter 4, we moved to take a closer look at the development of a European defence capacity. While Chapter 3 has shown that strategic autonomy is about far more than defence, defence is undeniably an important part of this concept. This chapter also clearly shows that there is no reason to fear that building stronger European strategic autonomy in the area of defence would automatically undermine NATO or the transatlantic alliance. On the contrary, it is more likely that such a process will pave the way for European states to take on increased responsibility together, including within the alliance. In the end, increased burden-sharing depends on the European NATO members increasing their own military and defence capabilities. But to be able to make a difference, with regard to burden-sharing, increased national defence spending will never be enough. It must be supplemented with real European defence integration. This is an ongoing process that is currently taking place at different levels and in different formats, often pushed forward by EU incentives within the PESCO format and by the European Defence Fund.

Finally, Chapter 5 showed how the Union works to build regional security through a variety of initiatives, policies, and agreements with its neighbouring states. It showed that through closer cooperation with the countries of the neighbourhood—whether through the EEA Agreement, bilateral agreements, decentralised agencies, the ENP, or through granting candidacy—the EU has created a network of cooperation and external DI. Through increased contacts and slow but steady increase of uniformity, they also enhance the security of the entire region through increased interdependency, consistency, and connectedness, but it also has the potential of leading to a strengthening of a European actorness and strategic autonomy. While this process is at times slow and contested, as the cooperation between EU and Turkey, the set of formal and informal arenas provide forums where disagreements can be discussed, and common action can be agreed upon.

Based on the analysis presented through these five chapters, we can conclude that the current formal and informal DI process is shaping EU(rope) as an actor that can also claim increasing strategic autonomy. The reason why Europe is often underestimated as an actor is precisely because most analyses continue to be based on a rather narrow understanding of key concepts, such as European integration, security, and strategic autonomy. With a broader interpretation of these concepts, European strategic autonomy is perhaps not as unlikely or difficult to be achieved as often suggested.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has led to greater unity among the European states as well as a new momentum to the enlargement process. While this could be interpreted as the beginning of a period towards less differentiated integration and a higher degree of general integration across the board, it is more likely that some form of Differentiated Integration will prevail. As there is an urgent need to improve European security, different European cooperation frameworks (such as the EU, NATO, and various forms of sub-regional formats) with different levels of integration, are likely to be the way to produce a European actorness and strategic autonomy. While the EU is at the core of most of these processes, the differentiated integration process also goes beyond the EU.

Increased interdependency (both political and economic), consistency, structural connectedness, and decision-making capacity have all led to a more capable European actor in what we have referred to as the broader area of security and defence. We have argued that it is not enough to simply consider military and defence capabilities in this area, but that it is necessary to include areas such as trade, development, humanitarian assistance, cyber, and health, to mention some. Additionally, to get a full measure of European capacities, it is not enough to only consider internal EU processes in these fields. External initiatives between EU and non-EU but nevertheless European states need to be included as well. So far, all these initiatives taken together indicate that Europe is continuously evolving, with the EU as its core, to improve its capacity to handle various geopolitical challenges. The future is uncertain, but it is not unlikely that a flexible and DI process will be able to adjust itself so that it can also handle future challenges as they occur.