Keywords

Introduction

The Dutch state decentralised the authority for the implementation of social security whereby the implementing agencies received more responsibilities. Dutch social security is mainly conducted by municipalities (social assistance agencies) and the Dutch Employee Insurance Agency. In 2022, 174.800 unemployment benefits, 395.000 welfare benefits, 3.538.400 general old age benefits and 828.500 disability benefits were provided in the Netherlands.Footnote 1 Yet, despite decentralisation, the state keeps pulling the strings by implementing stricter and more repressive laws.

In this chapter, the implementation of social security legislation is investigated from an implementer’s perspective. These are the professionals who shape the policy. These professionals work with a paradoxical reality, they should treat all citizens alike and at the same time they must act responsively in individual cases (Lipsky, 2010, p. xii). The encounters between welfare professionals and citizens are studied based on interviews with professionals and observations of interactions between professionals and citizens at five agencies. The central question is: How do welfare professionals interpret and apply rules in encounters with citizens within the Dutch social security context?

This chapter gives an insight to how, despite the stricter Fraud Act, welfare professionals are still able to leave their mark on social security legislation.Footnote 2 It shows how welfare professionals execute rules and how they find informal ways to use rules in favour of the citizens. In the section “Encounters Between Welfare Professionals and Citizens: The Situation in the Netherlands”, I discuss the Dutch social security legislation. I address the legal context, the implementing agencies and the two most important obligations for citizens: the obligation to apply for jobs and the obligation to report information. In section “Street-Level Bureaucrats and Their Enforcement Styles”, I will go into detail about the theoretical framework of street-level bureaucrats and enforcement styles. In the section “Methods”, I address the methods, and in section “Encounters Between Welfare Professionals and Citizens in Practice”, I discuss the encounters between welfare professionals and citizens and the influence of rules. In section “Differences in Enforcement Styles Further Explored”, I provide a description of the variation in enforcement styles and provide possible explanations for this variation related to organisation context, age and gender. In the last section “Paradoxical Reality in the Social Security Practice”, I conclude that welfare professionals differ in how they interpret the rules and how they respond to rule violations, and that they are able to find space between the rules to implement the social security legislation as they consider best.

Encounters Between Welfare Professionals and Citizens: The Situation in the Netherlands

In 2013, the Tightening Enforcement and Sanction Policy Social Affairs and Employment legislation (also called the Fraud Act) came into effect. The law is known as a tough law with little room for discretion,Footnote 3 and Dutch media speak of a ‘hard approach’.Footnote 4 The National Ombudsman (2014) states that the fines are ‘excessive’, that innocent civilians ‘are in a fix’ and that the Fraud Act deals with benevolent citizens as criminals. In the section below, I describe the Participation Act implemented by municipalities and the Employee Insurance Act implemented by the Employee Insurance Agency.Footnote 5 In the last two sections, I address the two key obligations that welfare professionals enforce.

Participation Act

The Participation Act (Participatiewet) is a general provision. If someone cannot provide for his or her own livelihood and is not (or no longer) eligible for another scheme, he or she can appeal to the Participation Act. Both an income test and an asset test are needed to qualify. In 2022, the standard amount per month for the maximum assistance benefit for a single person was €1.225,67 and for married couples €1.660,36. The Participation Act is implemented by municipalities. They bear financial responsibility for providing benefits. The implementation is done by official departments, often referred to as ‘social assistance agencies’. In addition to providing benefits, the municipality also has a task related to reintegrating unemployed persons into the labour market.

Unemployment Act

The Employee Insurance Act (Werkloosheidswet) is intended for employees. This concerns persons with a public or private employment relationship and all kinds of categories assimilated to them. The employer is liable to pay contributions for the employee. Employers’ insurance is aimed at absorbing the loss of income when employees can no longer work or work less hours. The act provides a temporary benefit in the event of full or partial loss of work. The benefit consists of a basic payment of at least three months (first two months 75% of the daily wage and from the third month 70% of the daily wage). The duration of the benefit depends on the employment history of the employee. The act is implemented by the Employee Insurance Agency. This is an independent administrative body commissioned by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment for the national implementation of official insurance. The agency also has a reintegration task.

Obligation to Apply for Jobs

The obligation to apply for jobs is monitored by the welfare professional during the reintegration interview with clients. For Participation Act beneficiaries, the obligation to apply for jobs means that they are obliged to obtain, accept and keep generally accepted work to the best of their ability. Municipalities can determine the exact interpretation of this obligation by local regulation, their internal work processes or leave it to the welfare professionals. There is no uniformity between municipalities in the number of required applications and the amount of a measure for violation of this obligation.

For unemployment beneficiaries, the obligation is to make efforts to find work as soon as possible. The law requires beneficiaries to make sufficient efforts to obtain suitable employment. The Employee Insurance Agency specifies this in the obligation to perform at least four concrete and verifiable job search activities every four weeks. The uniformed work process is based on a ‘matrix of measures’, a tool for determining and enforcing (possibly) culpable behaviour. If it is the first time a benefit recipient has been late in submitting their job application, a warning is issued. If it is the second time, a measure for ‘failure to provide information in good time’ will follow: the benefit will be reduced by 5% for one month. In case of recidivism, the benefit will be reduced by 10% for one month. If a benefit recipient has not (sufficiently) applied for work, a measure for ‘not trying to obtain suitable work’ is implied. The benefit will be reduced by 25% for four months. In case of recidivism, the benefit will be 50% for four months.

Obligation to Report Information

The obligation to provide information is similar for both implementing agencies. This obligation means that beneficiaries must report everything that may affect the right to or amount of the benefit. This includes information about work, income and living situation. At both agencies, professionals check the obligation to provide information during reintegration interviews, through (anonymous) reports by citizens and the agencies can combine different information datasets to detect fraud or conduct random investigations.

If the obligation is violated, the beneficiary has to pay back the amount of benefit unduly paid as a result of the violation of the obligation to provide information (‘disadvantaged amount’) and an administrative fine must be imposed. If the obligation has been intentionally violated (a deliberate act or omission which resulted in the unjustified or excessive amount of assistance being received), the administrative fine is set at 100% of the amount of the violation. A fine of 75% is imposed if there is gross misconduct (a serious degree of negligence, bordering on intentional, resulting in unjustified or excessive amounts of assistance being received) with regard to the violation of the obligation to provide information. In the case of normal culpability (there is no intent, but the violation is culpable), a fine of 50% is issued. An obvious mistake also falls under ‘normal culpability’. In the case of reduced culpability (the violation cannot be fully blamed), the fine is reduced to 25% of the amount of the infringement. An official report is drawn up if the (expected) amount of damage exceeds the declaration limit of €50,000. In these cases, criminal prosecution takes place by the Public Prosecution Service.

Street-Level Bureaucrats and Their Enforcement Styles

The enforcement of social security legislation is investigated from a bottom-up perspective and this research is conducted within the street-level bureaucrat framework (Lipsky, 1980). In the first section, I will go into more detail about this perspective. The framework of street-level bureaucrats assumes that the functioning of an organisation can only be fully understood by analysing the actions of welfare professionals at the street level. In analysing the actions of welfare professionals at the street level, I use the theoretical framework of Kagan (1989) and May and Winter (2011) to classify the behaviour of front-line officials.

Street-Level Bureaucrats

It is important to examine enforcement practices because that is where policy takes shape. The welfare professional represents the government and is the gateway to benefits for citizens. A description of implementation practice provides insight into how social security legislation is applied in concrete situations. It is where policies become alive for citizens and the decisions by professionals can have a huge impact on citizens’ lives.

Welfare professionals (front-line officials) are a typical example of street-level bureaucrats (Van Berkel et al., 2010; Benda & Fenger, 2014; Doornbos, 2011; May & Wood, 2003). This term was first used by Lipsky (1980) and refers to employees who have daily contact with clients. They have some discretion, limited time and resources, work for an organisation with often vague and conflicting goals, their work is difficult to control and they have involuntary clients because clients cannot go elsewhere for the services that the street-level bureaucrats provide (Lipsky, 1980, pp. 27–28; Doornbos, 2011. See also Hupe & Hill, 2007). Street-level bureaucrats have ‘extensive and difficult-to-constrain discretion of policy implementation’ (Maynard-Moody & Portillo 2018, p. 258). In their encounters with clients, they decide who gets what and when. Street-level bureaucrats work with a paradoxical reality. They should treat all citizens the same and at the same time they must act responsively in individual cases when appropriate (Lipsky, 2010, p. xii). Street-level bureaucrats develop routines to deal with this reality. They create constant opportunities to act with discretion and they try to stick to previous discretionary abilities (Lipsky, 2010, p. 19).

Enforcement Styles

The concept of enforcement style was developed in the 1980s and has since been empirically researched and theoretically explored (Lo et al., 2009, p. 2709; May & Burby, 1998, p. 157). The concept is useful for empirically investigating differences in enforcement behaviour. Several definitions of the concept of enforcement style exist (McAllister, 2010, pp. 62–63; Lo et al., 2009, p. 2709; May & Winter, 2000, p. 145; May & Burby, 1998, pp. 159–160). At its core, an enforcement style encompasses the behaviour of front-line officials in their daily interactions with clients to promote compliance with rules. It involves street-level behaviour of front-line officials of implementing agencies (May & Winter, 2000, p. 145).

Kagan (1989, p. 92) identifies two stages of enforcement. The first stage is how officials define and evaluate (non-)compliance (‘the way in which officials assess “compliance” or “non-compliance” with regulatory objectives’). They may interpret rules literally or flexibly. The second stage Kagan describes is the way officials respond when they have decided that a violation has occurred (‘what do officials do once they have decided that the regulated enterprise’s actions are “violations”’). This response to violations can be punitive and focused on sanctions (punishment) in order to achieve compliance or by convincing and persuading clients to comply (persuasion). Kagan describes these stages as ‘two activities embedded in the idea of “enforcement style”’.

May and Winter (2000, p. 145) describe an enforcement style as a pattern of actions. The enforcement styles describe how officials act in their daily contact with clients. Their conceptualisation builds on Kagan and they distinguish two dimensions similar to the stages Kagan distinguishes: the ‘mode of rule application’ and the ‘response to violation’. This delineation into two dimensions distinguishes legal interpretation of rules and reaction to violations. The mode of rule application can be strict or flexible to a greater or lesser extent, and the response to violations can be persuasive or punitive to a greater or lesser extent. They show that the degree of formalism and the degree of coercion can be viewed separately (McAllister, 2010, p. 63). May and Winter examined the enforcement styles of Danish inspectors of livestock farms and they describe seven potential enforcement styles: accommodative style, flexible style, legalistic style, rule-bound enforcers, token enforcers, persuasive enforcers and insistent enforcers (May & Winter, 2000, p. 150).

Researchers analyse enforcement styles based on different dimensions (May & Winter, 2011, 1999; McAllister, 2010; Lo et al., 2009; Gormley, 1998; Braithwaite et al., 1987; Grabosky & Braithwaite, 1986). In this study, I use a model of enforcement styles based on Kagan (1989) and May and Winter (2000, 2011) as a framework for analysis (Kagan, 1989; May & Winter, 1999, 2011).Footnote 6 I use a simplified model, in which I combine the two dimensions into four possible enforcement styles: flexible punishment, strict punishment, flexible persuasion and strict persuasion. This distinction between enforcement styles is ideal–typical. Based on the strict enforcement trend (Fraud Act) in the Netherlands, the expectation is that most welfare professionals have a strict punitive enforcement style.

Methods

In order to investigate the encounters between welfare professionals and clients, I observed professionals during interactions with clients and I interviewed professionals at three municipalities (social assistance agencies) and two Employee Insurance Agencies. When choosing the municipalities, three criteria were used: the location (spread across the country), the size of the agency (some smaller, some bigger) and the enforcement reputation of the agency.Footnote 7 When selecting the Employee Insurance Agencies, it was decided to disregard locations with pilots in the field of enforcement and locations where there was more room for developing their own policy (‘the living labs’). I was present at the agencies for a total of eleven months in the period September 2015 to June 2017. Observations were made during the daily routine of welfare professionals and they provided a picture of the daily activities of welfare professionals and their interaction with citizens. I have conducted 65 interviews with welfare professionals based on their position, age, gender and work experience. All observation notes and interview transcripts were coded with Atlas.ti. In this chapter, welfare professionals have been given fictitious names.

In order to give a structured insight into the enforcement practice in the Dutch social security context, I use a typology of enforcement styles based on two dimensions. The dimension ‘method of rule application’ was scored based on whether or not exceptions were allowed, the definition of a violation used, choice for or the client or the rule, and preference for customisation or uniformity. The dimension ‘response to a rule violation’ was scored according to the chosen enforcement activities (informing, intervening, warning, imposing measures, imposing fines), possible exemption from obligations and use of reintegration projects. Although the classification of this typology is static, it does give an idea of the possible variations in enforcement practice.

Encounters Between Welfare Professionals and Citizens in Practice

In the studied enforcement agencies, I found three styles of enforcement. The strict punitive enforcement style is most common, followed closely by the flexible persuasive enforcement style. The flexible punitive enforcement style occurs to a lesser degree. I did not find the enforcement style of strict persuasion in practice. In the enforcement practice, professionals cannot apply the rules strictly and at the same time respond persuasively to violations. This combination is not possible. In social security law, strict interpretation of the rules implies a punitive response to violations. The law gives no room for persuasion.Footnote 8 In the following sections I show by means of statements from welfare professionals and notes of conversations between welfare professionals and clients what the three enforcement styles look like in practice.

Strict Punitive Enforcement Style

Strict punishment implies that welfare professionals apply the rules rigidly and consistently and that they react with sanctions to (possible) rule violations. Alwin (Employee Insurance Agency), Saskia (Employee Insurance Agency) and Samara (municipality) can be characterised as professionals with a strict and punitive enforcement style. For these professionals, monitoring and checking is part of their daily work.

Alwin::

‘It’s part of the job. I think everyone should do it because the Dutch legislation is set up for that. The Employee Insurance Agency implements it and, in the end, that’s all of us. I think checking is absolutely part of it. If we didn’t enforce the rules, that would create chaos.’

Appropriate to this style of enforcement is that the welfare professional prefers the rules to the clients when asked. Welfare professionals with this enforcement style indicate that the rules are the focus, not the client. When making enforcement decisions, they think about the rules first, and then about their clients.

Saskia::

‘The rules, simply because in this country we have all chosen to make rules about certain things. We have to follow them. The moment you put the client above the rules, I will do it my way, my colleague does it her way and so on. Look, uniformity will never be complete, and certainly not in this way. In principle everyone should be treated the same way.’

Some welfare professionals indicate that they apply the rules in a strict literal manner because of uniformity. Professionals with this enforcement style specify that they find it important to treat everyone equally.

Saskia::

‘In general, all rules are the same for everyone. And that’s true everywhere. I just say 'the police don’t discriminate either, when you get in your car you know you can’t drive through a red light.'’

Samara::

‘Treating everyone equally is what we have to do, because there are rules. […] And the fact that I find someone pathetic or nice, that doesn’t matter. I can’t do anything with it.’

Alwin::

‘I think it’s important in any job that you take responsibility. And that is also done here. However, I think that can be done even more. The responsibility to enforce in the right way. So, you register properly, do it the same as others. Follow the processes but also do the same for the client. A client cannot sit at a birthday or at a party or whatever and say 'I have been treated this way by the Employee Insurance Agency and you this way that is very different’.’

Professionals with this style do not readily choose to withhold a sanction. They are not afraid to ask questions or confront clients when something has not gone well. According to Saskia, there are no good reasons not to check and sanction and Alwin indicates that he always registers violations. When violations occur, they react in a punitive manner. A formal and business-like attitude suits this.

Saskia::

‘In general, I am more formal than informal. I know that about myself. Only to a greater or lesser extent, it can vary from client to client. It also depends a bit on my role. When it comes to my advisory role, it can sometimes be a bit business-like. If it’s about the intermediary role, then of course you also try to convince people and if informal is more appropriate there, then I am [more informal]. When it comes to enforcement, I take a very business-like approach.’

Fitting for this enforcement style is that professionals consider their monitoring role as very important. Samara sees this monitoring as a way to encourage benefit recipients to comply with the rules.

Samara::

‘It is community money, though. It’s also my tax money. And at the end of the day, it doesn’t help the client either if they get benefits wrongly. Because if it comes to the fore, he has to pay back everything and a fine on top of it. They only get further into trouble.’

The fact that these professionals apply the rules strictly does not necessarily mean that they stand behind the rule or that they think the penalties are appropriate. The point is that despite their (possible) opinion about the sanctions, they choose to impose them.

Saskia::

‘I think it’s pretty fierce sometimes. But yes, that’s how it is established. You have to deal with that.’

Flexible Persuasive Enforcement Style

In a flexible and persuasive enforcement style, the welfare professionals apply the rules flexibly and respond persuasively to violations.Footnote 9 Professionals with this style are Jan (municipality) and Martijn (Employee Insurance Agency). Professionals with this style experience freedom to make their own decisions. Martijn indicated that he makes his own decisions every day and he does not see this as deviating from the rules. Jan says that he interprets the law broadly when it is to the client’s advantage.

Jan::

‘The law is made by the legislator, who came up with the law for certain reasons. And if you go and study the law, you see that within every law there is a framework. And you have freedom. You see people anxiously just don’t dare to take that freedom, which is enclosed within a law. If I’m given the opportunity, if I feel I have to take advantage of the frameworks, then I do so. All for the sake of my client.’

Fitting with this style is that professionals take little punitive action. Martijn says he imposes a measure less than once a month. If a benefit recipient misses an appointment (for which, according to the work process, a measure should be imposed), he does not consider this a reason to impose a sanction.

Researcher::

‘And if that client doesn’t show up at your office, for example?’

Martijn::

‘Then he still doesn’t get [a measure of] 5% with me.’

Researcher::

‘Because then you send him a letter, you call him, what do you do?’

Martijn::

‘I always call and then I ask what’s going on. […] First I have to hear what the story is. Is it indeed justified that he can’t come, or is it someone who really completely forgot? Then I’m not going to impose a sanction right away. I think that’s too crazy.’

Researcher::

‘So then you just make a new appointment?’

Martijn::

‘I make a new appointment if the client says 'oh god I completely forgot, I’m at home or I didn’t see it or I’m at the hairdressers, or I don’t know what.' You have that once in a while, that can happen. I mean, I forget things sometimes too.’

With a flexible and persuasive method of enforcement, in situations where the rules would require them to impose a sanction, welfare professionals often choose not to impose a fine or measure. Martijn explains that it can be a choice not to enforce. For example, to prevent clients from doing nothing at all. He indicates that clients can be lucky with this. Jan indicates that he even prefers not to impose a fine at all.

Jan::

‘If it can’t be done, if it doesn’t have to be done, I don’t impose fines on people. People already have enough to worry about and I have to impose a fine. Well sorry, I don’t want that. If I can get out of it, I will. I try to do that as much as possible, but sometimes I just have to. Then I talk to the client. Often, I have managed to get one of our clients to say 'I understand, you’re doing your job and you can’t do anything else, yes I have been stupid, blah blah blah'.’

Researcher::

‘Then you give a warning?’

Jan::

‘You can’t pass that on. […] I always try to dismiss it with a warning. Suppose this client, for example, has a debt of €43,000, wife deceased, and no contact with his child. I am also a father of children. Maybe he has no contact with his children because of problems with his ex-partner and things like that and then you make his life even more miserable when he does something wrong to impose a fine on him? Well sorry, no.’

Welfare professionals with this style take the liberty to interpret and apply the law broadly. Martijn does not strictly interpret the obligation of applying four times every four weeks. In interviews with clients, he adds up the application activities from all periods and if this is sufficient in total, the client has fulfilled the application obligation according to Martijn.

Martijn::

‘I look at the big picture. I don’t look at four applications every four weeks. I don’t find that relevant.’

Researcher::

‘So if the client has six job applications in the first period and two in the second period?’

Martijn::

‘That’s fine with me. I do tell the client then that it is not convenient. Because now it looks like he has applied insufficiently. Nevertheless, it happens very often that clients put application activities in the wrong period. If you are going to enforce that, you are wrong. Then you are going to rebuke him because he did not do two job applications, but he did them in the previous period. In the end, the important thing is that the client finds work.’

The work process and the rules are not central for these professionals. They prefer to choose customisation and sanctioning is seen as a negative approach. Both components emerge in the following situation. I asked Martijn in the situation described above if he is going to impose a recovery deadline:

Martijn::

‘Absurd, it’s about customisation, about the client view. Then you are wrong. Most colleagues will think like this. […] It’s about the client’s perspective. I don’t make it a problem. If you enforce 'tjak-tjak', then you are pissing outside the pot. Then you overshoot as the Employee Insurance Agency. You have to make enforcement negotiable. You have to keep clients enthusiastic. You don’t have to act like a policeman.’

What emerges with these professionals is that they do not see themselves as inspectors or as persons who hand out sanctions.

Researcher::

‘How do you feel about your controlling role?’

Martijn::

‘I don’t sit here as a control officer. Just politically speaking, I don’t have a control role. And I don’t want to.’

They are convinced that most clients who fail to fulfil obligations do not do so intentionally.

Jan::

‘Because it hasn’t come up that someone is intentionally trying to defraud the service or misuse community funds. Until possibly proven. There have been misses and people have been fined or people have fallen through. But I’m keeping it as an incident.’

Flexible Punitive Enforcement Style

With a flexible punitive enforcement style, welfare professionals apply rules flexibly and respond punitively to rule violations. Tom (municipality) and Jos (municipality) are examples. Both indicate that it is important that the rules are not always put central.

Jos::

‘I think a good enforcer not only looks at the rules, but also at circumstances.’

Tom::

‘Assistance starts with the client, not the rule. […] You can’t do this work from paper. Maybe it will go flawlessly and it will be technically correct, but the moral and the human, I don’t see how you can then give substance and esteem to that. […] My client is leading; I think that’s the way it should be. That is also what Article 18 requires of me.’

The professionals indicate that they experience freedom to deviate from rules.

Tom::

‘Sometimes you have to dare to step over a rule. […] A woman who may lose her son and husband. Then you can be very formal and indicate 'this and this you still have to report everything'. You know in advance that she won’t make it. At that point, you just have to have the guts to say 'you know what, I’m going to cut corners and see from there.' That means that we have now granted assistance first and we’re going to check again afterwards to see if it’s all right. That is daring to step over a rule.’

Jos indicates that he experiences freedom to make choices and to take his own direction in fraud investigations. Tom indicates that he makes the assessment and he takes decisions in the consulting room and he does not have to consult with his manager.

Tom::

‘It is weird that we say 'the client has his own responsibility' and then we don’t dare to take it ourselves. Therefore, I am in favour of that. Let me determine it. I just calculate that there can be mistakes in it, period. I assume everyone is doing their job to the best of their conscience.’

Appropriate to this style is that the professionals are clear in what they will and will not tolerate and that sanctions are imposed in case of violations. Tom indicates that he would never choose not to impose a fine in a situation where a fine is the appropriate response. This style involves professionals seeing themselves as watchful for fraud. Tom describes this as something that comes with his job and as something that ‘has to be done’.

Tom::

‘I always keep in mind the possibility that the story is different from what they tell me. I think you pretty much try to rule out any inconsistencies. Now that seems like a soulish and very easy thing to do, but it’s a born suspicion to see ‘hey is that right?’. The moment he passes that test, he’s in. Then I do trust him.’

These professionals do not believe that sanctionable behaviour should be borne by the benefit recipient.

Tom::

‘I always start with ‘you tricked me.’ That’s behind you, you’ll pay for that now and you’ll remain dependent on social security. You did this once, but you won’t do this to me twice. That’s how I open after fraud by default. Then it’s up to him to do something with that, but I don’t feel like letting that haunt him for the rest of his life. I personally never feel hurt in that either.’

Differences in Enforcement Styles Further Explored

The expectation that most welfare professionals would have a strict punitive enforcement style is only partly confirmed. Although the most common enforcement style is a punitive enforcement style, many professionals have a flexible persuasive or flexible punitive enforcement style. The prevalence of the enforcement styles between both types of agencies is similar. Both at the municipalities and the Employee Insurance Agencies, the punitive enforcement style is most common, closely followed by professionals with the flexible persuasive enforcement style. At both agencies, there are some professionals with the flexible punitive style and no professionals with the strict persuasive enforcement style.

There is also variation at the level of individual agencies. In the first municipality, the style of strict punishment is almost non-existent. Most professionals at the first municipality apply the rules flexibly and respond persuasively to violations. The employees can be characterised as professionals with a flexible persuasive enforcement style. At the second municipality, there is little evidence of flexible persuasion. The professionals can be characterised as having a more strict and punitive enforcement style. Almost all professionals respond to violations in a punitive manner. Most professionals apply the rules strictly. Only a few can be characterised as less strict. At the third municipality, all three styles are found. The professionals at the third municipality differ the most in their enforcement style. Some professionals apply the rules flexibly, while others apply the rules strictly. The degree of punishment in responding to violations also differs. One professional clearly has a different enforcement style; this professional has a flexible persuasive enforcement style.

A similar distribution to the municipalities, I also encountered at the Employee Insurance Agencies. At the first agency, most professionals have a punitive enforcement style. The first agency mainly employs professionals with a strict punitive enforcement style. The professionals surveyed can be characterised as professionals who respond to violations in a punitive manner. Most professionals apply the rules strictly. The flexible persuasion is almost non-existent. Only one professional can be characterised as flexible and persuasive. In addition, two professionals can also be characterised as flexible rule followers, however, they react punitively to violations. At the second agency, most professionals have a flexible enforcement style. The flexible persuasive enforcement style is relatively common and the strict punitive style is almost non-existent. The enforcement styles of the professionals vary. Some professionals have a flexible persuasive enforcement style while others respond more punitively to violations and apply the rules more strictly. Overall, professionals at the second agency have a more flexible and more persuasive enforcement style than professionals at the first agency.

Possible explanations for the variance in enforcement styles can be found both at the level of the individual professional and in the organisational context. At the level of the professional, the variation in enforcement styles within agencies can be partly explained by their age, work history and gender. My research shows that older professionals (55 years and older) apply rules more flexibly and respond less punitively to violations than the younger age groups.Footnote 10 Hawkins (1984) also finds in his research that older inspectors are more flexible than younger inspectors. Older inspectors are according to Hawkins sympathetic to the difficulties and costs of compliance while younger enforcers emphasise formal enforcement and see all cases as potential prosecutions. Pautz and Rinfret (2016) find in their research that the older the enforcer, the higher the level of trust in interaction with the enforcer. Gormley (1998) has opposite findings, finding in his research that older inspectors are actually harsher critics and younger inspectors are milder. Finally, Hedge and colleagues (1988) find no relationship between the age of the inspector and his enforcement behaviour. Thus, the various studies are not unambiguous about the correlation between age and enforcement style.

The impression is further that welfare professionals often stay with the same employer for a long time. As a result, it is likely that the length of time they are employed by the implementing agency is related to the age of the employees. Gormley (1998), who expected younger, less experienced employees to work more ‘by the book’, while older and more experienced employees rely more on their own judgement, indeed find in his research that more experienced employees rely more on their own judgement.

I also found a correlation between the gender of the professional and their enforcement style. The majority of women respond punitively to rule violations. Looking at the men, as many respond with punishment as with persuasion. Of the men, the majority apply the rules flexibly. About as many women apply the rules flexibly as strictly. Women are more likely to respond punitively to violations and men are more likely to apply the rules flexibly. However, Benda and Fenger (2014) find their qualitative research on social security employees does not show clear differences between men and women.

Possible explanations for the variance in enforcement styles in the organisational context are the enforcement policy, frequency of contact with the citizens and the direction by the management. There is a correlation between the (local) enforcement policy and enforcement styles of the professional. An implementing agency with a strict enforcement policy has employees with a more strict and punitive enforcement style than an implementing agency with a less strict enforcement policy. Wood (2003) examined four building inspections in four cities and found that context is a significant predictor of the enforcement approach.

In analysing the differences in the frequency of contact between the agencies studied, I found that in agencies where professionals have more frequent contact with clients and know welfare recipients better, professionals enforce more persuasively than in agencies where employees have less contact with clients. Professionals’ choice of persuasion or punishment appears to be related to Donald Black’s (1987) relational distance. He argued that the greater the distance between employee and client, the greater the likelihood of enabling justice. In practice, when there is a ‘relationship’ between a professional and the citizen, the persuasive approach is usually chosen. This conclusion is confirmed in several studies. For example, Grabosky and Braithwaite’s (1986) research finds support for the assumption that the theory of relational distance is an explanatory factor for differences in enforcement between enforcement agencies. They find that the larger the number of businesses to be enforced, the more frequent the use of criminal sanctions. And professionals who have more frequent contact with clients, punish less formally than employees who have less contact with clients. So, it could be the case that professionals who have frequent contact with citizens (in other words, who ‘know clients’) are less punitive because of relational distance. Hutter (1989) also finds confirmation for the relational distance thesis in her research. She finds that enforcers who enforce in a small community typically know the individuals and assume that they are dealing with good, respectable persons who need advice and education; while enforcers who work with larger communities have a more suspicious attitude that makes them more likely to choose formal enforcement options.

I further found that the direction by the management of the enforcement agencies studied varies. This direction varies from emphasising work processes and formal rules to giving professionals freedom to make their own decisions. A lot of discretionary space can lead to a more flexible and persuasive enforcement style by giving professionals room for a broader interpretation of the law. At the same time, discretionary space can lead to variation in enforcement styles as professionals decide how to enforce.

Paradoxical Reality in the Social Security Practice

This research provides insight into the closed world of social security enforcement and shows that welfare professionals differ in how they enforce rules. The central question of this research was: How do welfare professionals interpret and apply rules in encounters with citizens within the Dutch social security context? I investigated the enforcement styles of welfare professionals in the Netherlands based on the dimensions ‘rule interpretation’ (the degree of formalism) and ‘response to rule violation’ (the degree of coercion) (based on May & Winter, 2011). This research shows that welfare professionals differ in their enforcement styles. Professionals differ in how flexible or strict they interpreted the rules and what they define as a rule violation. Professionals also differ in how they respond to rule violations, some respond more persuasively while others choose to react more punitively.

The paradoxical reality described by Lipsky (2010), can also be found in the implementation practice of social security law enforcement in the Netherlands. Lipsky described the paradoxical reality as the dilemma of street-level bureaucrats to treat all citizens the same and act responsively in individual cases. The different enforcement styles give an insight into how welfare professionals deal with this dilemma. At the implementing agencies, the enforcement styles of strict punishment, flexible punishment and flexible persuasion were found. I have not encountered the enforcement style of strict persuasion in social security practice. It could be argued that some professionals tend more towards ‘treating all citizens’ the same, for example, the professionals that are classified as having a strict punitive enforcement style. These are professionals who interpret the rules literally. They argue that a literal interpretation of the rules is necessary for uniformity. Professionals with this enforcement style feel that monitoring and checking is part of daily work and choose uniformity in enforcement. Not imposing a sanction is not an option for these employees.

Other professionals tend more towards ‘responsiveness’, as for example the professionals with a flexible persuasive enforcement style or with a flexible punitive enforcement style. They interpreted the rules more flexible, and in a flexible persuasive enforcement style, the professional applies the rules flexibly and tries to persuade the client to comply. Professionals with this enforcement style choose the ‘client’ in case they have to make a choice between the ‘rules’ and the ‘client’. When a choice has to be made between ‘treat everyone equally’ and ‘customisation’, these professionals choose ‘customisation’. Professionals with a flexible punitive enforcement style apply rules flexibly and they respond to violations with sanctions motivated by the understanding that sanctioning is part of their job and that clients have responsibilities. These professionals indicate that rules do not always have to be central and that they experience freedom to deviate from rules.