Keywords

Findings from the Theoretical Chapters

In the theoretical chapters we framed the big picture of party–democracy relationships. Chapters 2–4 showed that the theory today is lagging behind real-life changes in governing (including in various democracies), in general, and in the analysis of the existence, characteristics and roles of political parties, in particular.

Early liberal thought did not clearly define the link between society and the state. Also, political science research into governing in the globalized world has rather forgotten about political parties but instead has fragmented into many subfields with narrower focuses on governing. Increasingly, actors other than political parties have been recognized. The idea of ‘governing’ has been narrowed to ‘governance based on networks of various actors’. The question is how much, if any, space exists today for the ‘social contract’ within a particular society, in the context of multiple economic, social and political ties beyond the nation state? What is the role of parties in governing? Empirically, parties do not seem to go away.

By contrast, the literature on parties has more or less forgotten about the broader context of party politics. At the same time, it has been very eager to look into the details of particular aspects of party politics, especially manifestos, ideological positioning, elections and governments, mostly in the developed world. In the conditions of northern America and Europe, multiple roles of parties in relation to democracy have been revealed. As a rule, parties and party politics in other parts of the world have been analysed in the frame of regional studies, so they have not informed the party literature to any great extent. There is a need for a more holistic and comparative study, of the synchronic and diachronic variety, of governing and political parties.

However, it is important to acknowledge that liberal democracy is not the only model of governing in the current world. From old ideas, illiberalism has also been increasingly renewing itself. The minimalist criteria of democracy based on empirical liberalism additionally complicates the situation in which we study democracy and parties. Last but not least, economic, social and political preconditions for governing have radically changed: as democracy appears to be in crisis, the alternatives seem to have been developing spontaneously rather than on the basis of innovative ideas on democratic governing.

Interestingly, it has been in the non-Western world that the role of parties has more often been understood in a bigger picture (as shown in Chapter 3). The literature on transitions to democracy has taken into account the bigger picture, beyond elections and parties (national contextual factors and external factors). By contrast, the literature on the consolidation of democracy has developed this approach to a somewhat lesser degree, while the literature on the decline of democracy and the rise of autocracy lacks a holistic approach and is scattered into many areas of research. At the same time, it has ignored the fact that even consolidated democracies have been losing their democratic qualities. There therefore remains the question of which preconditions (structure) allow this to happen, what the triggers of such processes are and what the role of agency is in these processes.

Chapter 4 showed that research focusing only on the Western world and using a narrow Eurocentric view of parties and governing misses out a whole spectrum of important variations in phenomena as well as the opportunity for more thorough scientific and fruitful research. Nevertheless, even the inclusion of scattered findings from various parts of the world appears to be helpful in revealing not only the usual measures of party, and party system, characteristics (such as institutionalization, fragmentation, and polarization) but also the relationships between various actors (party elites, party supporters, citizens, interest groups, and social movements). Post-socialist countries appear to be a special research segment. However, as part of the non-western world with today’s different global linkages, they may serve as an interesting interconnecting class of cases in comparative research.

All in all, in the theoretical chapters we revealed several layers of theories on parties and democracy: philosophy, the literature on democracy, and the literature on parties. On the basis of the case study we turn back to the bigger picture and offer thoughts for further theoretical and empirical research.

The main thesis of this book is that party, and party system, characteristics are just one segment of the multiple dynamic factors in the dynamic relationships between politics, economy and society that converge into particular forms of government at particular points in time. There are therefore no particular party or party system characteristics per se which influence democracy, but rather a combination of various factors which may together lead to particular changes in democracy.

The case study of Slovenia offers a longitudinal comparative analysis of dynamic changes in parties and democracy and the relationships between parties and democracy in a changing domestic and international context. Throughout the whole period, Slovenia has combined a parliamentary constitutional system and a proportional electoral system.

In the next section we first summarize the findings from Slovenia and then set out what the study contributes to the theoretical understanding of the relationships between parties and democracy. We conclude with ideas for further research.

Summary of Findings from the Slovenia Case Study

The goal of this case study was to explain, inductively: (1) how democratic backsliding is produced, (2) how it is stopped, (3) in what circumstances these two phenomena happen, and (4) what the role of the characteristics of parties and party systems is in these processes.

To reveal the complexities in the relationship between the characteristics of a party system and democracy we also asked the following questions: What enables the characteristics of a party system to coincide with a decline in democracy? To what extent do contextual variations matter when studying the relationship between party system characteristics and democracy? Does the institutionalization of the party system matter? Does the persistence of parties with roots in the previous regime matter? Does the polar structure of the party system matter? Do answers to these questions differ at different points in time?

In order to answer these questions, the whole period from the transition to democracy until the end of the democratic backsliding was studied. This approach proved to be fruitful, as it allowed a sequence of periods with different evaluations of democracy, as well as combinations of various factors, to be described.

When looking at the sequence of periods with respect to democracy, based on the V-Dem evaluations, only three periods are visible: the transition to democracy, the consolidation of democracy and the short-term backsliding in democracy. By contrast, the analysis of contextual changes (particularly economic, socio-economic and macro-political trends) shows that in the frame of the consolidated democracy, several important factors evolved that were damaging for democracy. As a result, we demonstrated that there is an additional sub-period within the period of consolidated democracy. This is the period between 2004 and 2020, within which several fruitful preconditions for democratic backsliding evolved (Table 8.1). However, these did not appear to be sufficient for the actual backsliding detected by the democracy evaluation until the Slovenian Democratic Party took over the government without elections and declared a state of emergency in the context of managing the international health crisis (2020).

Table 8.1 Factors in the fluidity of democracy
Full size table

These findings are combined with those that reveal periods of change in the party system characteristics. These periods only partially overlap with the periods in the evaluation of democracy.

In this section we first summarize the findings on the sequential changes in democracy and the party system. We then answer the questions that explicitly address parties and party systems as factors of democracy.

Contextual and Party Factors in the Transition to Democracy

The findings from the Slovenia case study on the radical increase in the positive V-Dem evaluation of democracy in this period resonate with findings from the literature on transitions to democracy.

The contextual factors were mostly supportive of the transition to democracy. The economic crisis contributed to the delegitimizing of the old system, but at the same time the socio-economic preconditions for a transition to democracy were comparably favourable. Strong civil and political opposition, and an adaptive old elite, produced a combination of bottom-up and top-down adaptations favourable for a democratic transition. Pressures from the politics at the Yugoslav level and the army contributed to the development of common goals and critical decisions: the transition to capitalism, the establishment of a liberal democratic system, the creation of an independent state, and a pro-European orientation. In spite of the war in the neighbourhood, peace—a necessary condition for a successful transition to democracy—predominantly prevailed. Also, external factors were favourable for democratization: economic ties with the West, particularly with Germany, which had been there since socialist times, a swift international recognition of Slovenia’s independence and the global context of the third wave of democratization were also supportive. In particular, the old elite had learned from the examples of earlier negotiated transitions in Poland and Hungary.

The party and party system characteristics had been mixed in terms of support for democracy. However, the bipolar competition that was clearly present had been smoothed into transpolar collaboration on major political issues through external pressures and the adaptability of the old elite. This led to the establishment of a new independent state and the constitutional basis of the new economic and political system.

Contextual and Party Factors in Consolidation of Democracy (1992–2000)

The economy was strong and social inequalities were maintained. External factors were mainly supportive of economic development and democratic politics. Together with the central European countries, Slovenia was involved in European accession programmes and evaluations of its democracy. There were not many shocks, either domestic (economic change was gradual and was not dependent on foreign loans) or external, with the partial exception of a refugee crisis related to the war in the former Yugoslavia.

The party and party system characteristics were mixed (as shown in the following sections), but they were, overall, supportive of democratic transition. A three-block dynamic evolved, with a social–liberal party in the centre. The political parties collaborated in the swift preparation for Slovenia joining the EU, and by doing so limited the space for political competition. The institutional party roots and the politically experienced cadre had contributed to some elements of the closed party system since 1992 (the rule under Liberal Democracy of Slovenia). While, at first, two parties with their roots in the former regime formed a big segment of the institutionalized parties, several new parties also gradually succeeded in becoming institutionalized, although the social roots of these parties remained problematic because of citizens’ low levels of trust in, and disappointment with, party behaviour.

Contextual and Party Factors in the Period of Increased Challenges to Democracy (2004–2020)

Within this period, the overall evaluation of democracy showed that it was constantly quite high, with no noticeable disturbances. However, the economic, socio-economic and political factors significantly changed in the context of the management of the international financial and economic crisis and in the whole of the period since this crisis.

Slovenia’s experiences confirm that economic problems, poverty (Cheibub et al. 1996) and, in particular, economic crises (Lipset 1994) may hurt democratization and the consolidation of a democracy. What should be noted for Slovenia is that it may not be a statistically detectable decline in the level of social inequality per se but, rather, citizens’ perception that such a decline is occurring in an unjust way that matters. This produces dissatisfaction with government and the potential for protest.

External factors increasingly became at best unsupportive of the consolidation of democracy, and maybe were even damaging for democracy. Unsupportive and damaging impacts accumulated with increasing frequency over this period. In competition with other parts of the developed world, the EU’s policies took a neoliberal turn from 2004 onwards, bringing about a new cleavage in the bipolar structure of competition between pro-welfare state and against welfare state. A global crisis of capitalism grew into an international financial and economic crisis. The Eurozone turned to austerity measures in the management of the international financial and economic crisis, putting pressure on what had until then been the predominantly pro-welfare state orientation of Slovenia. On the global scale, an increase in social inequality and a trend towards de-democratization evolved, while additional international crises (particularly the international migration crisis and the international health crisis) evolved into external shocks. The trends in the management of the health crisis especially damaged certain elements of democracy and also made such measures more acceptable in Slovenia.

National party elites were not able to meet the challenges of the post-2004 period. They not only failed to produce new national developmental goals after the achievement of the previous ones, but they exhibited poor management of the extensive availability of money after Slovenia joined the Eurozone in 2007. The government was also late in its response to the international financial and economic crisis, while at the same time turning to international loans to reduce the socio-economic impacts on citizens in the short term. However, this made Slovenia much more vulnerable to external neoliberal pressures than ever before.

Rather than focusing on solving developmental problems on the basis of ideological and political debates, the parties turned to simplified bipolar competition. This was established with the succession of the centre-right government led by the Slovenian Democratic Party and the centre-left government led by the successor of the reformed Communist Party. Soon after the Social Democrats won the 2008 elections, the consensus on the constitution diminished. In 2009, the programme of the Second Republic (Slovenia 2.0) was announced as an alternative to ‘socialist’ Slovenia (Slovenia 1.0). Since then, polarization led to unprecedented polar segmentation and conflicts in public discourse, the mass media and social media, among party and non-party actors.

The parties became alienated from the citizens’ expectations and thereby contributed to the crisis of party representation. While the parties did not respond to the citizens’ main expectations, particularly in the period after joining the EU, party behaviour and voters’ behaviour led to intense destabilization of the party system, and to political polarization (also including increasing political violence in terms of hate speech and personalized polarization, rather than competition based on policy alternatives for Slovenia’s development). These are all factors that have been recognized in the literature as contributing to the decline of democracy.

The party system during this period accumulated several characteristics that together proved to be gradually ever more damaging for democracy: besides the evolution of the Slovenia 2.0 programme, there was also strong polarization (the strengthening of the more extremist party positions and new, more radical, parties, as well as party system polarization), personalization of parties, deinstitutionalization (including the decline of the only persisting old party) and increased problems with the formation and management of governing coalitions.

The parties also changed substantially. On the one hand, a combination of the (mis)use of state resources and the use of non-transparent domestic and international sources evolved into a peculiarly non-transparent business model for party finances. On the other hand, a variety of parties emerged after a series of early elections: a party of the social movement type (the Left), parties of the electoral committee type led by publicly recognized individuals from various milieus (Miro Cerar’s Party, Pozitive Slovenia, etc.) and, more recently, an electoral committee led by a wealthy individual who came directly from business to politics that merged with a formally registered but inactive party organization (Movement Svoboda). In fact, the turning of parties into narrowly focused electoral parties damaged their overall representative role. This phenomenon went hand in hand with parties’ increased primary focus on the positioning of their ‘own’ individuals into state institutions and state-owned companies.

Democracy itself also became a challenging factor for democracy. A series of early elections started the radical replacement of members of parliament and of the cadre in the executive with people without political experience. With such a hyper-accountability based on elections, politics and political institutions became radically de-professionalized.

However, these are not all the elements that eroded Slovenia’s democracy after 2004. Quite a few other elements of this erosion accumulated without being particularly noted by measurements of democracy. Among them were: the empowerment of the executive arising from Slovenia joining the EU (import of democratic deficit from the EU; weakening of domestic democratic constraints on the executive); the increasing subordination of the parliament to the executive; the decline in social partnership, which put pressure on party elites to govern more in line with citizens’ expectations of maintaining good economic results and low social inequality; the erosion of the democratic political culture, including political leaders with a softened democratic commitment; and illiberal practices, particularly by rightist politicians, including attacks on the judiciary and journalists.

Contextual and Party Factors of the Short Radical Decline in Democracy (2020–2021)

The democratic backsliding was quick and time-limited. However, it was set in train by a complex set of political and non-political factors in the previous period.

The fertile ground for democratic backsliding was based on long-term pre-existing contextual and political trends: the trend towards de-democratization, and a global crisis of capitalism, which had been particularly exposed in the international financial and economic crisis.

The democratic backsliding in Slovenia was caused by an accumulation of economic, socio-economic, domestic, political and international factors, including the management of the COVID-19 crisis and the state of emergency. It was the state of emergency that allowed various aspects of the decline in democracy (presented in more detail in the previous chapters) to occur. It even brought unprecedented political violence into political discourse and unprecedent physical violence against anti-government protesters.

The international situation contributed to the normalization of extraordinary measures that had already been reducing the normal democratic functioning. This phenomenon evolved during the already pre-existing global decline of democracy.

Looking at the relevant agencies, the democratic backsliding was co-produced by the implementation of the alternative political programme of the party of the prime minister, by weak coalition partners, by coalition partners who followed their goals in accordance with their narrow interests and by weak parliamentary opposition.

There were counter-backsliding non-party actors who substantially contributed to the empowerment of opposition parties and the legitimization of a would-be party led by Robert Golob. Democratic backsliding was stopped by the 2022 election results, which were based on an extraordinary election turnout, encouraged by broad civil society activities.

How and in What Circumstances Is Democratic Backsliding Produced?

The democratic backsliding was produced by the accumulation of multiple domestic and external factors and the introduction of the state of emergency.

Based on the Slovenia case study, the standard list can be amended by additional factors which may explain the breakdown in democracy, such as those set out in the section on the contextual and party factors in the period of increased challenges to democracy (2004–2020).

How Is Democratic Backsliding Stopped?

The democratic backsliding was stopped by extensive civil society activities against measures that had been reducing the quality of democracy, by pressure on the parliamentary parties, by the provision of alternative independent sources of information and analysis, and by the mobilization of citizens to participate in the elections. The external factors need additional in-depth analysis. However, based on the available information, there was support by international NGOs for NGOs working against democratic backsliding, and their pressure on the Slovenian government helped domestic actors. Of the EU institutions, the European Parliament’s working body, which openly criticized the situation in Slovenia and put pressure on Slovenia’s government, was particularly important. The role of external factors in support of the actors for and against democratic backsliding needs to be researched in more detail.

In spite of the fact that the backsliding was disrupted, it needs to be acknowledged that after the 2022 elections many of the circumstances that allowed democratic backsliding are still present in Slovenia. Additional factors have also appeared, such as the wars in Ukraine and Izrael/Gaza, with important consequences for the national economy, social inequality and security. More detailed research is needed into the structural, agency and procedural factors creating further fluidity of democracy. This is a subject for future research.

What Is the Role of the Party and Party System Characteristics in These Processes?

The parties and the party system have evolved away from their primary role of representation. Rather than offering ideological and political ideas for Slovenia’s development, they either lost their parliamentary positions or joined in with the growing polarization, populism and personalization of politics. The empty spaces have been filled by new political parties, which have lacked programmatic clarity. The substantial share of such new parties has led to the deinstitutionalization of the whole party system.

However, this has damaged not only the institutionalization of the party system in a narrow sense, but also the closure of the party system (unstable governments and a series of early elections; poor government management). A whole new phenomenon evolved with the radical de-professionalization of politics, with ‘new faces’ (people without political experience) coming into politics. This has, in fact, hurt both parliament as an institution and the government as an institution.

Shifts in the circumstances of the state funding for parties and the still significant share of the state-owned economy have led to additional vulnerability of the representative role of parties and democracy. On the one hand, the weak parties have become more vulnerable to special interests. On the other hand, the more experienced parties have been particularly active in using the state-owned economy and other resources for the furthering of narrow party interests and their clientele.

Obviously, the destabilization of parties and the party system, and the polarization and personalization of politics, have become increasingly damaging for democracy. However, it is not possible to say that the democratic backsliding was the result of these factors alone.

What Enables the Characteristics of a Party System to Coincide with a Decline in Democracy?

In Slovenia the extraordinary circumstances of the international health crisis enabled and normalized the state of emergency. This situation allowed limits to be imposed on many citizens’ rights, including the right to protest against the government, and in practice it increased the power of the executive in relation to the parliament. Other enablers were weak coalition partners in the government, which was led by a party with an alternative programme, weak parliamentary opposition to the authoritarian turn, and external support for the SDP.

Nevertheless, on the basis of the Slovenia case study alone we cannot say what the necessary and sufficient factors are either for the continuity of consolidated democracy or for democratic backsliding. Further comparative research is needed to answer these questions.

Does the Institutionalization of the Party System Matter for Democracy?

It is true that this institutionalization matters to some extent, but democracy does not follow automatically (as we showed in the previous sections).

Contrary to the thesis that it is the institutionalization of party systems as a whole (and not individual party institutionalization) that matters for democratic survival, our study has shown that a significant growth in the proportion of poorly institutionalized parties in the party system does indeed have an impact on the poor institutionalization of the party system as a whole. Therefore it is the size and not just the level of the institutionalization of individual units (parties or party blocks) that matters.

Another very important finding is that (in the frame of party and party system institutionalization) various kinds of social rootedness of the party’s matter. (1) During the transition, new political parties referred back to the historical roots of nineteenth and early twentieth century Slovenian parties. In this way they clearly indicated their positioning within a broad range of ideological families of parties. Besides that, they had their own social roots (by representing particular parts of society). (2) Since 2004, new political parties have predominantly tended to declaratively position themselves on the liberal centre, with the aim either to revive the remains of the Liberal Democracy party of the 1990s or to create a whole new centre-oriented party. Nevertheless, citizens are always in the position of waiting to discover what kind of policies they will actually adopt when in power. These new parties, emerging just before elections, have been election committees without a pre-existing pool of cadre for filling positions in parliament and government. The poor and extremely unstable ideological profiling of new parties and their poor organizational resources, including leaders with underdeveloped political competences, contribute not only to poorly institutionalized parties, but also to the poor institutionalization of the overall party system and government. (3) The only long-term parliamentary parties (Janša’s Slovenian Democratic party and the Social Democrats) have evolved into parties of interests.

Another finding that requires further research is that a deinstitutionalized party system and poorly institutionalized parties are increasingly vulnerable to special interests, which have been increasingly noted as more influential power centres than party institutions. During the 1990s Janez Drnovšek talked about the danger of ‘old boys’ who agree on certain things outside formal politics (Kaos v Sloveniji 2018). In the past this situation was clearly seen with Miro Cerar (he talked about conflict among the parties and their networks in the process of privatization at that time) (Starič 2015) as well as other leading politicians from various political parties (e.g. Milan Erjavec, Dejan Židan, and Borut Pahor) (Čokl and Mlakar 2023). Video clips from the 1990s of interviews with leading politicians on this theme are still available (Kaos v Sloveniji 2018).

Additionally, we would like to point out here that parties and democracy within one country may change considerably over decades. Of course, it is not only parties, but also the party system, that changes. Democracy also changes because of both changes in the domestic functioning of the constitutionally determined political system and the adaptation of the national party system to the regional political system of the European Union.

In the case study we showed how the relationship changed. The question of why it changed appears to be too complex to be studied within the political framework alone. We cannot say that there were party and party system characteristics that caused short-term democratic backsliding. However, it is obvious that parties can (mis)use the particular circumstances. To do this, a particular programmatic orientation is needed. In Slovenia there has only been one party with such a programme, and at the same time it has already become substantially institutionalized since it initially evolved in the transition.

Does the Persistence of Parties with Roots in the Previous Regime Matter?

The recent decline in democracy has shown that the institutionalization of the party system may benefit from the persistence of parties with roots in the previous regime. However, these parties, too, may face problems with adapting to ever-changing circumstances, and sooner or later may decline. There were two factors that diminished this impact. First, there was a generational change, with experienced politicians either passing away or retiring. Second, these parties faced limitations in their adaptability to the ever-changing circumstances and sooner or later suffered a decline. Today the only old party rooted in the socialist regime, the Social Democrats, functions primarily as a systemic mature party—a system of interests.

It is interesting that the Social Democrats, one of the two most institutionalized political organizations from the old regime (the second being the successor of the former socialist youth organization, which evolved into the Liberal Democracy party), has been the only long-term parliamentary party that has not had a particularly recognized political personality.

Does the Polar Structure of the Party System Matter?

Party system polarization, as shown in Slovenia’s case, is not a simple phenomenon. In fact there are several different kinds of polarization. Polarization may be based on the crucial ideological–political positioning of parties, like the bipolarity arising from the communist vs anti-communist cleavage in the transitional period. By contrast, the most recent polarization has primarily arisen from the personalized anti-Janša vs pro-Janša cleavage and, in 2022, even the pro-Golob vs pro-Janša cleavage. Such competition has been found to be damaging for democracy, despite the polarization contributing to the high electoral turnout.

Can Party System Characteristics per se Have an Impact on Democracy?

The findings from the empirical research are that party and party system characteristics are just one segment of the dynamic multiple factors in a dynamic relationship between politics, economy and society that converge into particular forms of government under particular international circumstances at particular points in time.

The Slovenia case study also does not speak in favour of simple and direct causal linkages between (1) low institutionalization of the party system (including a dynamic but persistent fragmentation) and a decline in democracy; (2) the polar structure of the party system and a decline in democracy; or (3) the share of parties with roots in the previous regime (which contribute to the institutionalization of the party system) and a decline in democracy.

Although party system institutionalization and polarization may matter, these two characteristics cannot by themselves explain democratic backsliding. They also cannot explain on their own why transitions to democracy are successful, why democracy is consolidated, or why consolidated democracy may become endangered.

Old and New Findings from the Slovenia Case Study with Some Comparative Aspects

In this section we summarize the findings from the Slovenia case study, put them into a comparative perspective and relate them to the puzzles from the real world presented in Chapter 1.

Our research suggests that it makes sense to study the relevant factors in different periods of a fluid democracy; these are the factors influencing (1) successful consolidation; (2) damage to a consolidated democracy; (3) democratic decline; and (4) the reversal of a democratic decline.

It appears that at the core of the factors in all the four cases may be the economy, social inequality, the setting of social developmental goals, and political efficiency in implementing those goals, as well as external factors. These factors are already known from the literature on transition and, at least to some extent, that on the consolidation of democracy (Lipset 1994; Cheibub et al. 1996). However, not enough research has been conducted on the factors influencing the endurance of democracy, the decline of democracy and the reversal of such decline. These factors are exactly those that are important for knowledge on how to deal with threats to democracy.

This finding is also very relevant for studies of democratic backsliding in post-socialist countries, particularly Poland and Hungary (Bernhard 2021). However, so far too much attention has been paid to political leaders and politics, and not enough to other factors (domestic economic problems, changes in global capitalism and the multiplication of international crises) (Dauderstädt 2022; Stiglitz 2022; Jeriček Klanšček and Furman 2023). Analysing democratic backsliding by looking at individual politicians’ politics has proved to be an oversimplification. Contextual and agency factors that contribute to and/or oppose democratic backsliding are important. Our research also leads to the conclusion that focusing just on individual political leaders and particular trends in governing misses the important roles of ‘enablers’ (party supporters, citizens, and interest groups), and domestic and external contextual factors.

The case findings for Slovenia resonate with the thesis that autocratic episodes are more likely in years when a state of emergency is declared (Lührmann and Rooney 2021, 630). What was peculiar to Slovenia was that the government behaved as if the state of emergency still existed when formally it was no longer in place. However, the government faced fierce opposition from civil society. Unlike in Poland and Hungary, the preconditions for gradual backsliding were obviously missing. The precise preconditions that need to be fulfilled for gradual democratic backsliding still need to be researched in more detail in the framework of comparative research.

What the Slovenia case study does not show is an impact of institutional choices and institutional engineering. However, the analysis of Poland and Hungary has established that these may matter very much. They matter not only for the takeover of leadership by the executive power, but also for maintaining a constitutional majority for illiberal changes in the constitution and in public policies.

Further comparative research will also need to take into account other factors affecting democracy and the relationship between parties and democracy. Based on previous research, additional domestic and external political factors may also become important, such as adaptation by the former regime party, the strength of the illiberal government, the weakness of democratic government, competition among former opposition parties, the role of the Catholic church and religion in general, rightist civil society networks and mass media, and the institutional characteristics that determine the achievement of the constitutional majority and enable the democratic backsliding party to prolong its position in power (see e.g. Bernhard 2021). Such comparative research may be inspired by research into the factors of democracy in the studied countries in periods of transition and the consolidation of democracy.

Our study resonates with the thesis that international influences on democratization have grown (Levitsky and Way 2006). Beside the international crisis considered in the Slovenia case study, we detected effects from party and non-party actors’ international networks and linkages. What we found in the case study and in the literature points to the increased importance of international mutual learning among actors supportive of democracy and among actors working to damage democracy. Moreover, problems with international dark money flows have been increasing, and these have also been recognized as a factor in elections (Fitzgerald and Provost 2019; Scott 2021; Damski 2023; Longman-Rood 2023). Some studies have also revealed that international coalitions among countries going through the process of democratic backsliding may also have an impact on the role of supranational democratic influences, such as the EU (Holesch and Kyriazi 2022). Much more research is needed in this field in the future, while taking into account the bigger picture of party politics in today’s global economic and geopolitical context.

Furthermore, we are able to confirm that the list of variables expected to explain the breakdown of democracy is becoming ever longer as empirical analyses of more and more case studies are provided (Offe and Schmitter 1996; Sutter 2002; Hagopian 2004; Kapstein and Converse 2008; Chou 2011; Svolik 2019; Masterson 2023; Moss et al. 2023; Haughton et al. 2022). The case study of Slovenia has pointed to several additional factors, particularly the characteristics of the parties, the partners in the coalition led by the party favouring radical change in the system, variations in the quality of polarization, and variety in the social rootedness of parties.

There is no consensus on exactly which factors make a crucial difference for actual changes in democracy. Rather, the role of context has increasingly been acknowledged to be very important (Ware 1987; Randall and Svåsand 2002; Levitsky and Cameron 2003; Lawson 2010; Osei 2013; Lupu 2015; Dargent and Muñoz 2011; Vormann and Weinman 2021). Our research echoes this same claim.

What has been a rather surprising finding for Slovenia is that, after several decades of democracy, there was a rather sudden and radical decline in the professionalization of politics. We are not aware of a similar phenomenon in countries like Poland or Hungary. This is not only about the generational change due to the deaths and retirements of the transitional politicians. Since 2011, it has been due to voters’ disillusionment with the older parties and their support for completely new parties that do not have pre-existing organizational resources, including pools of sympathizers, members and cadre. After several decades, the level of political knowledge, intellectual capacity and practical political competence therefore radically declined in circumstances where there were many shocks and crises needing efficient political management.

Slovenia’s case also points to changes in the quality of parties. Political parties in the party system have not only changed in terms of the renewal of the party system over time. The character of the parties changed over time. In the transition period, new parties emerged from various social groups (intellectuals, farmers, craftsmen, ethnic groups, etc.) and old ones adapted to the changing environment. In the consolidation period, a core of parties that already existed (old and new) consolidated, while increasingly developing the characteristics of cartel parties. Then, particularly after 2004, two trends appeared: a substantial (trans)formation of parties into parties of interests, and a reduction in party autonomy due to pressures of particular socio-economic interests with a weakening of the traditional party social roots because of the links with particular special interests. How exactly, and to what extent, these trends developed needs further research, but they resonate with the acknowledged party transformations in the west from about two decades ago (as described in the chapters at the beginning of this book). Comparative research among a variety of cases appears to be potentially very valuable.

Furthermore, the relations between parties and the state are very important, for several reasons. First, the interest of parties in taking advantage of state resources to further their factional interests is one of the great challenges to the positive roles of parties in a democracy. The findings for Slovenia resonate with the thesis that factions contribute to the erosion of democracy from the top (Bartels 2023). Second, the question is how strong are parties in relation to interest groups and whether parties linkages to the state may serve as vehicles for interest groups to excessive use of state resources.

All in all, the findings of the case study on Slovenia resonate with previous findings on the impacts—both positive and negative—of parties on democracy. Parties’ incentives to commit themselves to democracy are very relevant (Stokes 1999). When this commitment is diminished and parties turn into primarily electoral parties (as is also seen in the recent developments in Slovenia), this damages democracy. Indeed, parties may and do contribute to the fundamental transformation of democracy at the expense of its representative qualities.

Nevertheless, Slovenia’s case shows that it is important to embrace a more complete understanding of party and non-party agency in relation to the fluidity of democracy. While studies of transitions to democracy have acknowledged the role of agency, and the whole subfield of research on civil society flourished during the 1990s, this interest seems to have faded away. Knowing that changes in democracy are not predetermined, researchers need to pay more attention to this segment of factors affecting democracy.

Our research points not only to the problem of trust (as noted by Runciman 2019), but also to the most fundamental issue of governing a modern society—the problem of defective political representation. This is seen in the very deep gap between citizens’ substantive expectations and (party) governing. These findings point to the need to combine research looking at party politics with research looking at the macro picture of the dynamics of economic and socio-economic qualities (and particularly social inequalities).

In further comparative research, it would be important to reveal what citizens consider good representation to be. For Slovenia’s citizens this includes ensuring a well-functioning economy without shocks, maintaining low levels of social inequality that are at the same time considered to be just, and having a predominant inclination towards moderate politics and politicians. It may be that there are considerable variations among countries with regard to how their citizens understand good political representation in general and party representation in particular.

Conclusions

Ways of steering societies in the context of intensified global economic, social, technological and geopolitical changes have been under stress. There is a need to think about and debate these dilemmas on the philosophical and political theory level as well as on the level of various academic disciplines, and between these two levels. A particular challenge for political scientists is to deal with the open issue of governing that is inclusive for those who are governed.

To a large extent, our research reports on an empirical case study on the fluidity of democracy in one country over several decades. With the help of comparative perspectives, we found that there is no constant general trend in democratic backsliding, and that democratization remains a contentious process. This therefore means that, rather than democratic backsliding, it is the fluidity of democracy that needs to hold our interest.

In a discussion on the fluidity of democracy we can reveal periods with particular characteristics. The question is empirical, and case studies are helpful in establishing the basis for comparative research and summarizing the common findings in theoretical models. However, individual cases may neither fit into ideal models of particular stages, nor follow the sequence of the stages of such ideal models. Furthermore, studying particular stages in the changing democratic qualities of government (in the case of Slovenia: the transition to democracy, the consolidation of democracy, the gradual loss of the qualities of the consolidated democracy, democratic backsliding, and the reversal of democratic backsliding) in isolation probably prevents one from obtaining important insights into the preconditions for the transition from one stage to another in the direction of the sequence or its reversal. For example, democratic backsliding cannot be fully understood if it is studied in isolation from the governing models that precede the democratic backsliding. As when studying transitions to democracy, it is relevant to analyse whether and how periods and stages of democratic qualities may be interconnected.

Although it may be helpful to use a stage-by-stage approach in revealing the fluidity of democracy, it is of crucial importance to recognize that stages do not evolve automatically. Thus democratic backsliding does not inevitably lead to a breakdown of democracy and ultimately to a hybrid or authoritarian regime. However, the question remains as to whether and how experiences with democratic backsliding (even when they are short-term) may have an impact on the fluidity of future democracy.

There is probably no single answer to questions about when, where and why democratic backsliding occurs. Rather, it appears to be more fruitful to focus one’s research on the combinations of factors that together produce democratic backsliding. Our research also points to the need to explain not only the decline, but also the stability and fluidity, of democracy in various contexts.

The time factor has been shown by our research to be very important. It matters in several ways. It is particularly worth taking into account the quality of the dynamics (gradual vs sudden changes) and the accumulation of domestic and external factors within a short window of time that work in favour of a challenge, or damage, to democracy. Sudden changes in the quality of democracy are rare, but they mostly appear at specific times. In the literature the introduction of a state of emergency has been quite widely discussed, but it should not be forgotten that big security threats (such as terrorist attacks) and direct and indirect involvement in war also create windows of opportunity that are supportive of radical changes in government. With the trend for numerous international crises to accumulate and also, most recently, with the direct and indirect impacts of new wars, this factor has gained importance for democracy on the global scale.

More precisely, the question of what happens after democratic backsliding comes to an end on the basis of elections remains open. Many of the circumstances which had allowed democratic backsliding to occur may still be present and may come into play again. What we now know for sure is that backsliding is not predetermined. The actors may make a difference. However, our research has shown that political parties are not the only actors who can critically co-determine the outcome of democratic backsliding. According to our case study findings, it is particularly important that the role of civil society and the international links of both supporters of democracy and actors in democratic backsliding are fully recognized.

The traditionally complex view of the factors determining the models of governing, which had developed to give an understanding of transitions to democracy, needs to be revived in order to give a better understanding of the fluidity of democracy. This is particularly important in the global context of the changing characteristics of capitalism, radical changes in social inequalities, frequent economic and non-economic international crises (some also being managed by the introduction of states of emergency), and direct and indirect involvement in wars. Developments within particular states cannot be fully understood without recognizing that they are linked with actors and phenomena beyond the national borders.

There needs to be a revival in critical research attention on political parties, as in real life they play very different roles in relation to democracy. A decrease in the fulfilment of parties’ representative roles was recognized in Western societies long ago (Bartolini and Mair 2001; van Biezen 2004). The crisis of representation/intermediation through partisan channels, with extreme growth in the role of political parties in the staffing of public positions and in profiting from public policies, known as partitocrazia (Schmitter 1997, Note 23) is also becoming ever bigger in the post-socialist contexts. What has been taking place more often in both contexts is the increasing weaknesses of parties, which fail to ‘control major areas of policy-making due to trans-national and technocratic forces’ (Schmitter 1997, Note 23); the more parties become dependent upon resources provided directly or indirectly by the state, the more they fail to provide this control (Schmitter 1997, Note 23).

Our research warns that political parties are not, per se, a public good. In particular, state funding does not automatically make them a public good. Do parties really steer societies by taking into account broader social interests, or do they function as instruments for the implementation of narrow private interests?

The technological revolution has opened up a whole new aspect for governing (private, public and mixed) and party politics. This is not only about the digitalization of parties and elections and the use and misuse of artificial intelligence for achieving political goals. The basic questions of democracy are being re-opened: what information, and information of what quality, is available to whom, from whom and for what purpose? What impacts does and will this have on the redistribution of power in governing? How have the characteristics and roles of citizens, interest groups, civil society organizations and political parties changed, and how will they change? Political science needs to catch up with real-life developments and join in solving the newly emerging problems of democracy.

We believe that the findings from our research are relevant not only to central and eastern European countries, but also to social spaces beyond the post-socialist contexts. They should encourage further in-depth case studies and broad comparative research.

Political scientists need to deal more efficiently with methodological nationalism and to take into account more systematically factors beyond the nation state that co-determine governing within the nation state borders, within supranational polities such as that of the EU, and in the global international arena.