Blaustein and His Times

Abstract

Leopold Blaustein (1905–1942 [or 1944]) was educated at Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov and graduated under Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938), a student of Franz Brentano (1838–1917) in Vienna. Blaustein’s academic activity covered almost two decades—the 1920s and 1930s—when philosophy in Poland was renewed as a scientific discipline and dominated by (but certainly not reducible to) the Lvov–Warsaw School. Roman Ingarden (1893–1970), who was also Blaustein’s teacher in Lvov, once described this renewal as a change in the “philosophical atmosphere” in Poland; for him, Twardowski “[…] did in fact outline in a certain sense a new period of Polish philosophy. Namely, he imposed on philosophical research in Poland a new style of work.” Ingarden explains that this renewal consisted in an attempt to have clear-cut philosophical notions and well-defined language, in addition to solid justifications for discussed theses. To that extent, Twardowski’s efforts can be regarded as a broad meta-philosophical project which was developed in diverging directions, including logic, ontology, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, etc.

Leopold Blaustein (1905–1942 [?]) was educated at Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov and graduated under Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938), a student of Franz Brentano (1838–1917) in Vienna. Blaustein’s academic activity covered almost two decades—the 1920s and 1930s—when philosophy in Poland was renewed as a scientific discipline and dominated by (but certainly not reducible to) the Lvov–Warsaw School. Roman Ingarden (1893–1970), who was also Blaustein’s teacher in Lvov, once described this renewal as a change in the “philosophical atmosphere” in Poland; for him, Twardowski “[…] did in fact outline in a certain sense a new period of Polish philosophy. Namely, he imposed on philosophical research in Poland a new style of work.”¹ Ingarden explains that this renewal consisted in an attempt to have clear-cut philosophical notions and well-defined language, in addition to solid justifications for discussed theses. To that extent, Twardowski’s efforts can be regarded as a broad meta-philosophical project which was developed in diverging directions, including logic, ontology, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, etc.²

Undoubtedly, Blaustein’s writings bore the mark of Twardowski’s training, but his thought was also shaped by other intellectual and philosophical trends or debates in Poland. Of course, one can argue that many of these trends were not specific to Poland, as they tended to mirror the main trends of European philosophical enterprises. As Blaustein had studied under the leading scholars of that time, he referred to and discussed many ideas formulated by German and French philosophers. For instance, he studied in Freiburg im Breisgau for a few weeks under Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), and he held a fellowship in Berlin when it was the epicenter of Gestalt psychology, not to mention that he participated in Carl Stumpf’s (1848–1936) lectures there. Therefore, the main task of the present chapter is to sketch Blaustein’s intellectual biography in the context of the main philosophical trends in Poland and Europe. Additionally, I also aim to present the main ideas of selected scholars Blaustein engaged with or to whom he referred. First, I address the idea that Twardowski renewed philosophy in Poland and track the Brentanian themes in his thought. Against this background, I will proceed with a discussion of the development of Blaustein’s philosophy, his early accounts and later projects.

2.1 The Lvov–Warsaw School

2.1.1 The Brentanian Framework of the Lvov–Warsaw School

Twardowski was appointed a professor of philosophy in Lvov in 1895, when the city was part of the Habsburg Empire. Poland was not an independent country at that time, but Lvov University had relative autonomy and mainly held courses in the Polish language. Twardowski’s first courses concerned “Logika” [“Logic”] (WS 1895/6) and “Przegląd dziejów filozofii od czasów najdawniejszych pod koniec wieku XVIII” [“A Survey of the History of Philosophy from the Oldest Period to the End of the Eighteenth Century”] (SS 1896). From the very beginning, his view on philosophy was in fact Brentanian. After all, he studied in Vienna under Brentano from 1885 to 1889.³ He participated in Brentano’s lectures at that time, including “Die elementare Logik und die in ihr nöthigen Reformen” (1884), “Praktische Philosophie” (WS 1887) and “Deskriptive Psychologie”⁴ (WS 1887/88, WS 1888/89), not to mention Brentano’s seminars.⁵ Twardowski was familiar with Brentano’s published works, for instance, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte or Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis. Both works were quoted by Twardowski in his 1892 doctoral dissertation on Descartes⁶ and in his 1894 Habilitationsschrift. Thus, it should come as no surprise that Twardowski noted in “Selbstdarstellung” that his studies in Vienna were dominated by Brentano, and he testified that “Brentano became for me the model of a philosophical researcher.”⁷ Indeed, Twardowski used his Vienna teacher’s concept of philosophy. In general, according to Twardowski, philosophy ought to be analytic and thus a non-system philosophy; additionally, it has to make scientific claims and maintain a justified methodological basis. Due to his teaching activity, this Brentanian thought became, as Ingarden put it, a kind of opinio communis for many students trained in Lvov for a few decades of the twentieth century.⁸

Twardowski promoted Brentano’s philosophy, but this was not easy because philosophy in Poland was developing in different directions at the turn of the twentieth century and was not oriented toward science. Until the 1870s, idealism played a dominant role. This form of philosophy, which was developed as Polish Messianism (e.g., Józef Hoene-Wroński [1776–1853], August Cieszkowski [1814–1894], or Karol Libelt [1807–1875], a student of Hegel), was based on critical readings of Kant, Fichte or Hegel. It adopted a system approach in philosophy and had a clear metaphysical and speculative background, not to mention irrational tendencies. In the 1880s and later, many scholars attempted to overcome this early idealistic trend. Two main reactions are worth mentioning. Some scholars (e.g., Henryk Goldberg [1845–1915] or Adam Mahrburg [1860–1913]) have referred in this regard to positivism and have tried to bind philosophy with science to begin the reform of philosophy. Other philosophers (e.g., Stanisław Brzozowski [1878–1911]) rejected uncritical positivist approval for science and developed a sort of philosophy of life. For them, the phenomenon of life, though ambiguous and difficult to analyze, addressed the problem of speculative tendencies. However, many projects developed by these philosophers were ultimately irrational. Against this background, Twardowski’s project, which was originally formulated in the 1890s with a strong emphasis on rationalism and a non-system, non-speculative approach, seemed to pose radical opposition to these tendencies. Of course, Twardowski was not the only philosopher who attempted to reform philosophy at that time. Ingarden noticed that “[t]he postulate of ‘philosophy as an exact science’ was also raised more and more frequently from various sides in the 1890s. Thus, for example, [this postulate] was raised in Cracow by Stefan Pawlicki (1839–1916), and in Warsaw by Adam Mahrburg (1860–1913), who was known as a connoisseur of Greek philosophy and an adherent of Neo-Kantianism.”⁹ What made Twardowski’s attempts unique in this regard was the Brentanian framework of his postulates. Therefore, which themes of Brentano’s philosophy were subsequently developed by Twardowski?

First, in Jan Woleński’s assessment, Brentano’s famous fourth habilitation thesis—which assumes that “[…] the true method of philosophy is none other than that of the science of nature”¹⁰—was the “key” to understanding the concept of philosophy in the Lvov–Warsaw School.¹¹ It is plausible that Twardowski understood this thesis as an attempt to adopt general scientific procedures in philosophy. Generally, for him, philosophy is not a sort of worldview. It makes scientific claims, so its results are intersubjectively verifiable. This also leads to the adoption of a non-speculative approach. To quote Woleński once again, Twardowski

[…] maintained that being faithful to the facts and principles of logic, understood as the very theory of the scientific method, constitutes a necessary condition to do philosophy as a science and avoid metaphysics. Twardowski used the term “metaphycisism” to refer to the attitude which consisted in considering some philosophical problems in a nonscientific way.¹²

This idea of Brentano may be regarded as the basis of Twardowski’s meta-philosophy, if the term “meta-philosophy” is understood as the study of what philosophy is, what its aims are, etc. In addition to the general remark that Twardowski followed Brentano in understanding philosophy as science, Woleński listed some of Brentano’s specific ideas which can be found in Twardowski’s writings: (1) the idea that mental phenomena are intentional; (2) the division between actions and products; (3) the theory of truth; and (4) the idea of reforming logic.¹³ This list was recently enlarged by Arianna Betti, who added four more ideas: (5) descriptive psychology is the fundamental science; (6) descriptive analysis is the method of descriptive psychology; (7) descriptive psychology precedes genetic or experimental psychology; and (8) ethics has cognitive content based on emotional experience.¹⁴ I will not discuss these references here because they are well examined by Woleński, Betti, and others.¹⁵ Instead, it is worth noting that both Woleński and Betti show that although Twardowski’s philosophical project originated in Brentano’s meta-philosophy, it was strongly inspired by his descriptive psychology. Of course, the Lvov–Warsaw School developed in different directions, of which logic was and still is one of the most studied; however, Twardowski’s psychology, which was—like for his Vienna teacher—primarily a philosophical enterprise, was a very strong trend within the School.¹⁶ As we will see in the following, this is also of crucial importance for understanding Blaustein’s philosophy.

2.1.2 The Psychological Trend of the Lvov–Warsaw School

After Twardowski’s arrival in Lvov, it was clear that philosophy was understood by him in the Brentanian fashion as descriptive psychology. In his inaugural lecture given at the University of Lvov on November 15, 1895, Twardowski defined the subject matter of philosophy as mental phenomena (zjawiska umysłowe).¹⁷ In Lvov, he held many courses related to psychology; he not only discussed specific topics but also held general courses. From the very beginning, he struggled with other views on psychology. In accordance with Brentano, for many years, he was skeptical about Wilhelm Wundt’s (1832–1920) project of physiological psychology.¹⁸ In this regard, he disputed with Mahrburg,¹⁹ Wundt’s student, on the relation of psychology to physiology, and with Władysław Heinrich (1869–1957), a student of Richard Avenarius (1843–1896), who established the first psychological laboratory in Poland at Jagiellonian University. For years, Twardowski tried to argue that he had set up the first laboratory in Lvov before Heinrich since he held classes on experimental psychology as early as 1898/99.²⁰ As shown by Włodzimierz Szewczuk, however, Twardowski’s claims were unjustified.²¹ Overall, Twardowski promoted Brentanian-style psychology, which descriptively analyzes mental phenomena and attempts to classify them.²² For now, it is important to note that his early psychological writings and teaching activities were the beginning of the psychological trend of the Lvov–Warsaw School.

According to Teresa Rzepa, the development of can be divided into three main periods.²³ In general, the first period begins with Twardowski’s recruitment by the University of Lvov in 1895; however, as Rzepa notices, one could also consider the first period to have begun in 1885, when Twardowski began his studies in Vienna, or it could be 1897, when he published an important article, “Psychologia wobec fizyologii i filozofii” [“Psychology vs. Physiology and Philosophy”],²⁴ in which he held (in the Brentanian fashion) that philosophy, as a scientific enterprise, can be developed only as psychology. In any case, the first period ended in 1901, when Władysław Witwicki (1878–1948) defended his doctoral thesis in psychology that had been written under Twardowski’s supervision. When Blaustein studied in Lvov, Witwicki already had a chair in psychology at the University of Warsaw, but his view on psychology was also very popular in Lvov. Witwicki studied philosophy in Lvov and later (in 1901/02) he also studied psychology in Vienna under Alois Höfler (1853–1922) and in Leipzig under Wundt. His concept of psychology was clearly shaped by Twardowski.²⁵ Witwicki’s doctorate—following Wioletta Miskiewicz²⁶—was the first thesis written under Twardowski “in the spirit” of Brentano. It concerned ambition as a mental phenomenon, which was understood by Witwicki as a disposition to certain feelings based upon beliefs.²⁷ He continued the Brentanian line of thought in his 1904 habilitation thesis on the phenomenon of will. Later, Witwicki became one of the key figures of Polish psychology. He was the author of an important handbook on psychology, published for the first time in 1925,²⁸ which was highly rated by, for instance, Ingarden.²⁹ In the mid-1930s, Blaustein explicitly expressed his positive assessment of Witwicki’s project, which was open to interdisciplinary research.³⁰ Moreover, with Irena Filozofówna (1906–1967), one of Witwicki’s students, Blaustein discussed the use of hypotheses in psychological descriptions and the structure of aesthetic experiences—more precisely, the role that assumptions play in experience. Filozofówna was skeptical about parts of Blaustein’s analysis of aesthetic experience. I will write more about Filozofówna in Sect. 2.3.1.

The second period, defined by Rzepa, covered the years 1902–1919. This was a time of dynamic development for Lvov psychology. In Rzepa’s opinion, this period was “[…] clearly organized around Twardowski’s psychological views. The specific feature of that period was the work undertaken by the Master [i.e., Twardowski] and his students to establish Polish psychological vocabulary.”³¹ The fact that Polish psychological vocabulary was coined in this period is also connected with attempts at translating texts of leading psychologists of that time into Polish; for instance, Twardowski and his students attempted to translate some works of Théodule-Armand Ribot (1839–1916), a French psychologist, a lecturer at the École Normale Supérieur and the Sorbonne, a professor at the College of France, who in his Essai sur l’imagination créatrice used the term “schematic presentations” (images schématiques), which was later used by Blaustein.³² This period was also important because, in 1910 and later in 1913, Twardowski published two substantial texts on psychology: O metodzie psychologii. Przyczynek do metodologii porównawczej badan naukowych [On the Method of Psychology. An Introduction to the Comparative Methodology of Scientific Research]³³ and—written as an encyclopedia entry—O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i o jej rozwoju [On Psychology, its Subject Matter, Aims, Method, Relation to Other Sciences and Development].³⁴ Both texts redefined Twardowski’s early views on psychology as he presented them in the essay “Psychologia wobec fizyologii i filozofii” [“Psychology vs. Physiology and Philosophy”]. Both texts also inspired Blaustein in his original explorations, e.g., by defining the subject matter of psychology as psychic life or by emphasizing introspection as the basis of infallible knowledge.³⁵ Despite Twardowski’s attempts, he was unable to establish a chair in psychology in Lvov before 1919, but he succeeded in supervising further doctoral theses in psychology that were written by, for instance, Stefan Baley (1885–1952) (who also studied under Stumpf in Berlin) or Salomon Igel (1889–1942). In 1917, Stefan Błachowski (1889–1962), who was educated in Lvov and Vienna, completed his habilitation thesis in Lvov. According to Rzepa, the second period ended in 1919, when Błachowski and Ludwik Jaxa-Bykowski (1881–1948) became professors of psychology in Poznań.³⁶

In Rzepa’s view, the third period of the development of psychology in the Lvov–Warsaw School was the 1920–1939 period,³⁷ which began with the inauguration of a department of psychology in Lvov. This department was chaired by Twardowski until his retirement in 1928 and later by Mieczysław Kreutz (1893–1971), Twardowski’s student, who received a doctoral degree in 1924. This period was characterized by original developments in psychology by Twardowski’s students, who attempted to expand and sometimes to criticize Twardowski’s theories. Rzepa lists a few of Twardowski’s students who were important for the development of Lvov psychology in this period: Walter Auerbach (1900–1942 [?]), Eugenia Ginsberg-Blaustein (1905–1942 [?]) (Blaustein’s wife), Helena Słoniewska (1897–1982), and Tadeusz Witwicki (1902–1970), son of Władysław Witwicki. Rzepa lists Blaustein among the members of Twardowski’s last group of students, who were adherents of the descriptive-psychological trend of the School.

2.2 The Early Period of the Development of Blaustein’s Philosophy

2.2.1 Blaustein’s Studies in Lvov

Blaustein was born in 1905 into a Polish–Jewish family. Scholars generally agree that his life still needs to be rediscovered; in this vein, Zofia Rosińska holds that “[t]he story of […] Blaustein’s life is full of question marks and qualifiers like ‘maybe,’ ‘perhaps,’ ‘probably.’”³⁸ For example, it is uncertain when he began his philosophy studies at Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov. He became a student at the Faculty of Philosophy around 1923, when Twardowski’s position at the university was very strong. Of course, his thought was not determined solely by Twardowski. Indeed, Mieczysław Andrzej Dąbrowski,³⁹ Ryszard Jadczak,⁴⁰ Rosińska,⁴¹ and, more recently, Miskiewicz⁴² call Blaustein a “student of Twardowski” to emphasize the dominant role of Twardowski in Blaustein’s philosophical education, but they indicate that Ingarden’s and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s (1890–1963) influences are equally important. Indeed, Blaustein’s thought was shaped by Ingarden and Ajdukiewicz, both of whom were Blaustein’s teachers in Lvov. In his early books, in Przedstawienia imaginatywnne [Imaginative Presentations] and Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne [Schematic and Symbolic Presentations], Blaustein explicitly referred to these scholars to express his gratitude for the discussions during his student years, which helped him to accomplish both texts.⁴³ With this in mind, one might inquire into the contributions these three scholars made to Blaustein’s philosophical development.

Allow me to start with Twardowski, whom Blaustein always treated with great respect. In Blaustein’s posthumous reminiscences about Twardowski, published in 1939 as “Kazimierz Twardowski i jego uczniowie” [“Kazimierz Twardowski and His Students”], he emphasized that Twardowski’s key contribution in his teaching was that he did not limit his students in their own research but put pressure on them to apply adequate rigor to their work.⁴⁴ In his 1939 text, he called Twardowski the “Socrates of Polish philosophy” and “Master” (Mistrz) to emphasize his undeniable contribution to teaching students in Lvov. Blaustein’s letters to Twardowski mostly began with the incipit “Beloved Professor” (Kochany Panie Profesorze).⁴⁵ Indeed, Twardowski supported his student. For instance, he planned to finance a private fellowship to support Blaustein when he was in Berlin. However, Twardowski was also critical of some of Blaustein’s ideas, including his project of humanistic psychology; although the project was well argued, its main idea was misleading, in Twardowski’s view.⁴⁶

Clearly, Blaustein’s writings abide by the general rules of Twardowski’s meta-philosophical program, as defined above in Sect. 2.1.1. Blaustein was careful to use clear definitions, refined distinctions, and clearly structured arguments, but he also attempted to adopt an adequate methodology. Nonetheless, Twardowski’s influence on Blaustein was not limited to meta-philosophical rules but concerned first and foremost his view on descriptive psychology. Blaustein was clear that his own research was conducted on the “border with psychology.”⁴⁷ For Blaustein, like for Twardowski, philosophy can be regarded as a scientific discipline if it is taken as a form of descriptive psychology. The main task of psychology thus defined is to descriptively analyze mental phenomena and, against this background, to classify them. In this regard, Blaustein was inspired by, among other things, Twardowski’s theory of presentations (images and concepts), which was formulated as early as 1898. Blaustein regarded his own original classification of presentations as an improvement of Twardowski’s view on images.⁴⁸

In addition, Twardowski encouraged Blaustein to adopt the frameworks of Bolzano and Brentano in reading Husserl’s theory of intentionality. Twardowski was the supervisor of Blaustein’s doctoral dissertation, which was defended in 1927 in Lvov. It explores the hypothesis that Husserl’s theory of intentionality may be understood by referring to the philosophical legacies of Bolzano and Brentano. This hypothesis was clearly inspired by Twardowski. To show this, one can refer to the 336^th meeting of the Polish Philosophical Society, which took place on March 5, 1938, where Blaustein presented a paper entitled “Rola Kazimierza Twardowskiego w filozofii niemieckiej na przełomie XIX i XX wieku” [“The Role of Kazimierz Twardowski in German Philosophy at the Turn of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century”]. In this talk, he claimed that Twardowski was the first of Brentano’s students to synthesize his teacher’s philosophy with Bolzano’s theory. In this vein, Blaustein wrote that Bolzano was “discovered” by Twardowski.⁴⁹ Additionally, in Blaustein’s reading of Husserl, the emphasis on the problem of content followed from Twardowski. In his thesis, Blaustein preferred the phenomenological method defined in Husserl’s earlier Logische Untersuchungen over that in the later Ideen I. Given that the former book defined phenomenology as descriptive psychology,⁵⁰ whereas the latter work defined it as a transcendental enterprise, the emphasis put by Blaustein on the former comes as no surprise. In sum, Twardowski was one of the key figures in determining Blaustein’s view of philosophy (understood as descriptive psychology) and his account of Husserl’s theory.

Blaustein’s philosophical explorations, however, cannot be read only in the context of Twardowski. Some references to Ingarden are just as important. Ingarden studied philosophy and mathematics in Lvov for a year in 1911/12, but he was not regarded as a member of the Lvov–Warsaw School. Even though he was in touch with Twardowski, with whom he corresponded for years,⁵¹ and attempted to attain his habilitation degree in Lvov, his approach was regarded as different from that promoted by Twardowski. Ingarden was commonly regarded as a phenomenologist because of his studies in Göttingen and later in Freiburg im Breisgau, where he met, among others, Husserl, Adolf Reinach (1883–1917), and Max Scheler (1874–1928). Admittedly, Husserl’s philosophy was discussed by the members of the Lvov–Warsaw School, e.g., by Władysław Tatarkiewicz (1886–1980),⁵² but Ingarden also made efforts to introduce phenomenology into the philosophical discourse in Poland, e.g., by commenting on Husserl’s new publications.⁵³ He also discussed with members of the School, arguing in favor of a phenomenological–eidetic point of view.⁵⁴ In 1925, Ingarden finally received a habilitation degree and became a Dozent in Lvov two years after Blaustein’s arrival at the university. At that time, Blaustein was familiar with Ingarden’s texts. For instance, in his thesis on Husserl, Blaustein—following Ingarden⁵⁵—differentiated objects which are only experienced (erlebt) by consciousness and objects given in an intuition (durchlebt); this enabled him to criticize Husserl’s view on sensations. As we will see, however, Blaustein was skeptical of Ingarden’s method which—in his opinion—fells into a vicious circle.

Furthermore, Blaustein’s aesthetics can be read in the framework of polemics over parts of Ingarden’s philosophy. Of course, these polemics are rooted in Blaustein’s student years, when Ingarden started lecturing on the literary work of art. In 1927, Blaustein participated in this course, as well as in Ingarden’s later seminars on aesthetics in 1934–1939.⁵⁶ Starting from 1927, Ingarden discussed the details of his own theory with his students, which was fully developed later in 1931 in his main book on aesthetics, Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft [The Literary Work of Art. An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic, and Theory of Literature]. Given this, Blaustein had the opportunity to follow Ingarden’s considerations in statu nascendi. In his post-war reminiscences concerning Blaustein, Ingarden recalled that in his Lvov period, he met Blaustein “almost daily,” and they discussed aesthetics extensively. He wrote:

Blaustein was a young man at that time; he began his third year of university studies, but he was mature and advanced in his studies; you could discuss with him as with a colleague. Therefore, from his first visits with me in September 1925 until the outbreak of the war, we met each other almost every day, either when he was still listening to my lectures and participating in my classes and later in a seminar or at the meetings of the Polish Philosophical Society or, finally, in the last years before the war, at the aesthetic seminar that I held from 1934 until the outbreak of the war. However, we also met each other privately at many of the philosophical chats at my house.⁵⁷

Indeed, in Blaustein’s writings on aesthetics, one finds some hints and themes which seem to justify the thesis that Blaustein was partly inspired by Ingarden. For example, both Ingarden and Blaustein used the term “representation” to describe the phenomenon of the actor–character relationship in the theater. Therefore, it should not be surprising that Ingarden explicitly referred to Blaustein as “my student” [mój uczeń]⁵⁸ in one of his letters. In this vein, Bohdan Dziemidok indeed classifies Blaustein as a “supporter” of Ingarden’s theory of the aesthetic object.⁵⁹ For Dziemidok, both Ingarden and Blaustein comprehended the aesthetic object as created by the subject. In contrast to Dziemidok, however, there are important differences between the two approaches, which make it impossible to comprehend Blaustein as a mere follower of Ingarden’s aesthetics. Ingarden was aware of these differences, and he later saw a gap between him and Blaustein.⁶⁰

In the passage quoted above, Ingarden mentioned that he first met Blaustein in September 1925. Nevertheless, in June, before this happened, he was informed of Blaustein’s interest in Husserl’s philosophy by Ajdukiewicz, a prominent member of the Lvov–Warsaw School. Ajdukiewicz studied in Lvov in 1908–1912. His doctoral dissertation—written under Twardowski’s supervision—concerned Kant’s theory of space. After receiving his doctoral degree, he went to Göttingen for two semesters in 1913/14.⁶¹ Ajdukiewicz was less interested in Husserl’s phenomenology than in David Hilbert’s (1862–1943) views on mathematics and Reinach’s theory; for example, he prepared for Reinach a study entitled Ein Beitrag zur Analyse des Bewegungsbegriffes. Nonetheless, one can note the themes of Husserl’s theory in Ajdukiewicz’s semantics, especially in regard to the concept of meanings as the essences of meaning-intending acts.

References to Husserl were also present in Ajdukiewicz’s later works, including his lectures on logic given in 1924/25. Blaustein participated in these lectures and referred to them in his book on schematic and symbolic presentations.⁶² More precisely, Blaustein held that he adopted the distinction between the ontological and psychic meaning of the term “representation” in accordance with Ajdukiewicz’s concept of ontological and psychological content: whereas the former defines content without reference to psychic life, the latter does establish such reference. It is worth mentioning that during his lectures, Ajdukiewicz used the term “content” in the context of the sematic relation between a name and its object; for him, “content” mediates between a name and its object. As he wrote, “[…] due to it [i.e., content] one intends the object.”⁶³ It seems that Ajdukiewicz’s view on content as an intending factor also sheds more light on Blaustein’s view of Husserl’s intentionality as a de re relation.⁶⁴ Overall, it may be noted that Blaustein highly valued Ajdukiewicz’s theory of meaning. In 1930, Blaustein published a review of Ajdukiewicz’s O znaczeniu wyrażeń [On the Meaning of Expressions]; in this review, Ajdukiewicz’s theory is presented as “original,” “accurate,” and “rigorously formulated.”⁶⁵ In his text, Blaustein is clear that Ajdukiewicz’s position is deeply rooted in Husserl’s idea that the meaning of certain expressions is a type.

As shown, all three scholars (Twardowski, Ingarden, and Ajdukiewicz) inspired Blaustein’s own philosophical explorations, not to mention his examination of Husserl’s phenomenology. Surprisingly, it is hard to say why Blaustein was interested in Husserl’s theory. Of course, it was discussed at Twardowski’s seminars. Twardowski valued Husserl’s Untersuchungen; he even encouraged his students to translate the book into Polish, even though this project never materialized.⁶⁶ Thus, it may be argued that Twardowski recommended Blaustein to confront his theory of content with that of Husserl.⁶⁷ However, as has already been suggested above, Blaustein became a critical reader of both Twardowski and Husserl: he noticed the limits of Twardowski’s classification of presentations, or he saw flaws in Husserl’s content theory. As early as 1925, during his studies in Lvov, Blaustein went to Freiburg im Breisgau to meet Husserl in person. This fellowship would mark an important point in Blaustein’s intellectual biography.

2.2.2 Fellowship Stays in Germany

It was Ajdukiewicz who asked Ingarden to write a letter of recommendations to Husserl to support Blaustein. Ajdukiewicz called Blaustein an “extremely talented” student who was interested in phenomenology. In a letter to Ingarden from June 14, 1925, Ajdukiewicz wrote:

I have the following request for you, the fulfillment of which will not be difficult for you […]. Well, our student, a very talented one, Mr. Leopold Blaustein (a Jew), a very modest and decent boy, is going to Freiburg in July, to the “messiah” Husserl. He wrote a thesis about “Act, Content and Object” in Husserl’s theory and did so very thoroughly. He read the entire pre-Husserlian and post-Husserlian literature devoted to the topic and fell in love with Husserl. He is very shy and very afraid to go to Husserl. Well, I would like to ask you to write to H[usserl] about the fact that such a young man is going to see him, so that H[usserl] welcomes him kindly. This meeting could be useful both for phenomenology and for our philosophy because the boy is very talented and extremely reliable. Moreover, I would ask you to tell me where he could stay and eat cheaply in Freiburg and with whom he could successfully seek contact from among Husserl’s students.⁶⁸

It is difficult to say whether Ingarden replied to Ajdukiewicz’s letter. However, Ingarden wrote to Husserl. His letter has been lost, but in his reply from June 27, Husserl wrote:

Of course, Mr. Blaustein will be warmly welcomed, just like anyone recommended by you or your colleague Ajduk[iewicz]. Of course, I cannot devote much time to him, especially now, when so many people want to talk personally with me about their doubts or the work they have begun; the habilitation of Dr. Kaufmann is also in question—and the seminar! Nonetheless, maybe it can be somehow figured out, and he can take part in the seminar. I give lectures until July 30^th, included.⁶⁹

In the summer semester of 1925, Husserl held the Einleitung in die phänomenologische Psychologie lecture series and a seminar, Übungen in der Analyse und Deskription rein geistiger Akte und Deskription rein geistiger Akte und Gebilde.⁷⁰ It seems that Blaustein arrived in Freiburg at the beginning of July, yet the exact date of his arrival is unknown. Unfortunately, Blaustein’s name cannot be found in “Quästurakten,” which makes it impossible to verify which lectures he attended.⁷¹ In the 1930 text “Edmund Husserl i jego fenomenologia” [“Edmund Husserl and His Phenomenology”], one finds a suggestion that Blaustein participated in both of Husserl’s classes, i.e., in the lectures on psychology and in the seminar. He was aware of the significance of the lectures; he claimed, for instance, that only on the basis of these lectures is one able to understand Husserl’s view of psychology in relation to philosophy and to respond adequately to the realism–idealism controversy.⁷² He also noticed that almost half of the group of students who participated in Husserl’s seminar came from abroad, including 1 Englishman, 2 Americans, 1 Russian, 1 Hungarian, 1 Ukrainian, 1 Latvian, and 2 Chinese attendees.⁷³ Only 3 women participated in the seminar. Blaustein wrote that Husserl was open to young students and always interested in someone’s life and views on theater, literature, or music. According to Blaustein, Husserl recommended individual studies on concrete phenomena but, of course, only in the limits in which they present themselves. Blaustein, however, was skeptical about Husserl’s way of teaching; he was dissatisfied with the fact that Husserl wanted to support only students who followed his own philosophical project. In this regard, Blaustein compared the way in which students were educated in Freiburg and in Lvov: in his assessment, students in Lvov enjoyed broader research freedom. Husserl presented to Blaustein a concept of philosophy which is rooted in ethical and moral claims. In Blaustein’s words, Husserl should say that “[p]hilosophy is heroism” and “[p]hilosophy is a moral objective for mankind.”⁷⁴ Only truth enables one to achieve moral value. For this reason, the essence of philosophy lies in the responsibility for doing reliable and rigorous science. In conclusion, Blaustein called Husserl a “dignified priest of philosophy.”

Of course, the 1930 text was primarily written as a contribution to celebrate Husserl’s seventieth birthday, and it is difficult to argue on this basis about Husserl’s alleged influence on Blaustein. Nonetheless, Husserl’s ideas became a constant element of Blaustein’s writings. As already noted, Blaustein went to Freiburg to study directly under Husserl and to consult with him about his dissertation on acts, content, and objects. Two first parts of the dissertation were sent to Twardowski in June 1925, i.e., before Blaustein’s trip to Freiburg; only the third part, which was devoted to a critical assessment of Husserl’s theory of intentionality, was written later and sent to Twardowski as late as November 1925.⁷⁵ The version sent to Twardowski and later annotated by him and Blaustein contained a direct reference to Husserl’s 1925 lectures in the fragment devoted to the question of the real and intentional parts of conscious acts.⁷⁶ The reference expressed in a footnote was later included in the printed version of the book, published in 1928.⁷⁷ This reference to Husserl’s 1925 lectures, however, is the only clear fragment of the dissertation which refers to Blaustein’s stay in Freiburg. Interestingly, Blaustein sent a copy of his 1928 book to Husserl with a handwritten dedication.⁷⁸ All things considered, it can be argued that, during his fellowship stay in Germany, Blaustein tried to bridge the gap between Twardowski’s descriptive psychology and Husserl’s phenomenological psychology.⁷⁹ Blaustein had many occasions to discuss with Husserl in Freiburg, and it seems that he made a good impression on him. In a letter to Twardowski from October 7, 1927, Ingarden reported his personal exchanges with Husserl and noted that Husserl remembered Blaustein “fondly.”⁸⁰

After his return to Lvov, Blaustein attempted to make progress with his studies on Husserl to complete his doctoral dissertation. In his journal, Twardowski noted a few talks given by Blaustein at that time, including talks on April 21, May 28, June 4, 1926, February 19, 1927, and discussions in the epistemological section of the Polish Philosophical Society on June 14, 1926, February 26, and April 30, 1927.⁸¹ This intense period resulted in Blaustein completing his dissertation. In his review, Twardowski appreciated Blaustein’s attempts to present a holistic account of Husserl’s theory of content, especially the project to situate the theory within the tradition of Brentano.⁸² Twardowski also underlined the author’s efforts to account for the analyzed theories as clearly as possible, even though the theories themselves do not get close to comprehensively and clearly expressing their core object, i.e., the description of the act–content–object relation (in Twardowski’s opinion). Consequently, Twardowski recommended the reviewed thesis for publication and helped his student prepare it for printing.⁸³ Blaustein’s philosophy exam was on May 19, 1927, and—in Twardowski’s assessment—he passed it “very well.”⁸⁴ The final exam took place on November 18, 1927.⁸⁵ Later, he took a job in the ninth gymnasium in Lvov as a teacher of German and philosophy.⁸⁶

According to Twardowski’s recommendations, Blaustein received a fellowship to go to Berlin,⁸⁷ where he had the opportunity to work on the final version of his dissertation, published later in 1928. The stay in Berlin was, as it seems, one of the milestones of Blaustein’s philosophical development at that time. He arrived in Berlin at the beginning of December 1927. In a letter to Twardowski from December 11, Blaustein included the following list of courses he attended in Berlin: Stumpf’s “Hauptprobleme der Philosophie” [“Main Problems of Philosophy”], Max Wertheimer’s (1880–1943) “Logik” [“Logic”], Kurt Lewin’s (1890–1947) “Kinderpsychologie” [“Child Psychology”], Max Dessoir’s (1867–1947) “Philosophie der Kunst” [“Philosophy of Art”], and Wolfgang Köhler’s (1887–1967) “Die philosophische Lage der Gegenwart” [“The Philosophical Position of Presence”], as well as his “Biologische Psychologie” [“Biological Psychology”].⁸⁸ He also mentioned the classes of David Baumgardt (1890–1963), Eduard Spranger (1882–1963), and others. He reported to Twardowski that he was very satisfied with his studies in Berlin. He planned to stay there for 3 months or even longer if he had enough money. During his stay, he met with Wertheimer many times and with Stumpf a few times.⁸⁹ On many occasions, Blaustein attempted to promote Twardowski’s habilitation thesis from 1894, Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen [On the Content and Object of Presentations], and other ideas of Twardowski’s students, e.g., Ajdukiewicz’s axiomatization of classical logic.⁹⁰ Later, Blaustein participated in seminars organized by Wertheimer at the Berlin Psychological Institute, where he discussed phenomenology with the Gestaltists. In his letter to Twardowski dated February 13, 1928, he wrote:

Frequent conversations about phenomenology with Stumpf, Hoffmann, Lewin, Baumgardt, etc. forced me to be increasingly precise about my own position. I have already written to the beloved professor that some of these scholars agreed with some of my theses and have taken a similar position. Now, I have systematically described them and presented them to Köhler. I received lively approval and encouragement to publish [this text]. For now, however, I will limit myself to delivering a lecture at the meeting of the epistemological section [of the Polish Philosophical Society] and initiating a substantive discussion on phenomenology at home [i.e., Lvov]. In this lecture, I try to discover and criticize the basic dogmatic assumptions of phenomenology.⁹¹

Blaustein’s commentary expressed in the above quotation shows the background of his polemics against Husserl, formulated after his return to Poland in April 1928. First, his aim was to define his own attitude toward phenomenology. Moreover, to do this, he talked with leading Gestaltists, including Stumpf, Hoffmann, Lewin, and Köhler. Finally, phenomenology, in his opinion, proved “dogmatic” since it accepted unjustified assumptions, and by doing so, it fell into the petitio principii fallacy.⁹² All in all, Blaustein’s stay in Berlin inspired him in his original studies in other fields, not just his studies on the theoretical basis of descriptive psychology, e.g., in regard to the question of the use of experiments in descriptive psychology.⁹³

Of course, Blaustein’s stay in Berlin was not limited to psychology (the Gestaltists and Dilthey’s students) or phenomenology.⁹⁴ While in Berlin, he even wrote a short book on Hebbel’s dramas⁹⁵ that was well reviewed by German–Jewish scholars.⁹⁶ At the same time, Blaustein attempted to promote Polish philosophy, e.g., he tried to establish cooperation between two important journals, Kant-Studien and Ruch Filozoficzny [The Philosophical Movement], to encourage German editors to publish summaries of Polish works⁹⁷; he also attempted to organize a Polish–German philosophical symposium.⁹⁸ It is also worth noting another project that Blaustein was focused on in Berlin. In a letter to Twardowski from January 11, 1928, Blaustein noted that three–quarters of his efforts were devoted to Polish philosophy but that he also planned to establish closer cooperation with Hebrew University in Jerusalem.⁹⁹ He wanted to edit and publish a philosophical journal that would publish articles in various European languages and their translations into Hebrew. Blaustein declared that the journal would not be limited to Jewish authors but would be open to all authors. Baumgardt offered to edit the German edition of the journal, and—as Blaustein reported to Twardowski—other philosophers, e.g., Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945), Moritz Geiger (1880–1937), and Levin, were also interested in closer cooperation. The original version of the journal, which was planned to be published in Jerusalem, was to be edited by Hugo Bergmann (1883–1975). Blaustein mentioned that the project was developing, and other scholars from England and the United States wanted to support it. Nonetheless, even though many scholars were involved, the project did not succeed. Despite this, Blaustein’s stay in Berlin was apparently successful, as he had much work to do after his return to Lvov.

2.3 Further Developments

2.3.1 Theoretical Considerations in 1928–1931

The last letter to Twardowski sent by Blaustein from Berlin is dated February 18, 1928. After his return to Poland, Blaustein met his teacher a few times to report his studies in Germany in detail.¹⁰⁰ It seems that this was an intense time for Blaustein: he was attempting to complete a number of projects initiated in Berlin, but he first had to finalize publication of his dissertation and other texts he had been working on even before his stay in Berlin. Accordingly, after his return, Blaustein finally published his dissertation, Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia [Husserl’s Theory of Act, Content and Object of Presentation]. The book met with a range of reactions from reviewers. Whereas Ingarden critically reviewed Blaustein’s book (he claimed, e.g., that the book does not take into account Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, as defined in Ideen I),¹⁰¹ Walter Auerbach¹⁰² (ca. 1900–1942 [?]) wrote a positive review, and he appreciated the clarity of Blaustein’s theses and arguments.¹⁰³

When he was in Berlin, Blaustein planned to write a paper on phenomenology to discuss its methodological basis. A few weeks after his return, he presented two important talks at the 284^th and 285^th meetings of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov. The meetings were organized on April 28 and May 5, 1928, respectively. During these meetings, Blaustein presented a two-part paper entitled “Próba krytycznej oceny fenomenologii” [“An Attempt at a Critical Assessment of Phenomenology”].¹⁰⁴ This paper discussed a systematic account of the phenomenological method by defining five theoretical problems in using it. Both talks seemed to address Husserl’s phenomenology, yet it seems they were directed against Ingarden. For instance, Blaustein reads Husserl’s essences as timeless entities, which is false if one takes into account Husserl’s early critical assessment of the modern theory of abstraction or his late theory of eidetic variation; after all, Husserl rejected the practice of hypostasizing ideas as general objects. In turn, one finds a Platonic-style concept of essences in Ingarden’s early works on phenomenology.

In any case, these two talks created tension between Blaustein and Ingarden and can be read in a broader context. Radosław Kuliniak, Dorota Leszczyna, and Mariusz Pandura¹⁰⁵ put forward the hypothesis that Blaustein’s 1928 talks were intended to attack Ingarden and to weaken the position of phenomenology after Ingarden’s return to Lvov. This hypothesis presents Ingarden and Blaustein as rivals for a chair at the university in Lvov. The story surrounding Ingarden’s attempts to receive a professorship in Lvov was, as it seems, one with countless twists and turns and ultimately one of deep frustration.¹⁰⁶ Although he became a Dozent in 1925, he was unable to receive a professorship. Even Husserl’s intervention, who, in a personal letter, put pressure on Twardowski to employ Ingarden as a professor, did not succeed.¹⁰⁷ In 1928, it was clear that Twardowski would retire soon; arguably, Blaustein wanted to receive Twardowski’s chair after his retirement. In Ingarden’s eyes, as it seems, in his 1928 talks, Blaustein tried to present himself as an adherent of Twardowski and his psychology. Despite Blaustein’s attempts to present himself as the successor to Twardowski, the chair was given to Ingarden in 1931. If Kuliniak and others are indeed right and Blaustein’s intention was to weaken Ingarden’s position to obtain a chair at the university, his plan did not succeed. The only result was Blaustein’s clear declaration of an alleged triumph of descriptive psychology over (eidetic) phenomenology.

In 1928 and 1929, Blaustein worked on two other books that were planned as a development of his account of Husserl. In 1930 and 1931, he published his main theoretical works on aesthetics: Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations] and Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne [Schematic and Symbolic Presentations], respectively. Following Blaustein’s self-commentary, his 1928 book on Husserl’s theory of content was the basis of his “general theory of presentations” (ogólna nauka o przedstawieniach),¹⁰⁸ whereas the two other books used this general theory in the field of aesthetics. His theory was highly rated by the reviewers. Auerbach, for instance, emphasized the novelty of the idea of imaginative presentations and their objects.¹⁰⁹ Bohdan Zawadzki (1902–1966),¹¹⁰ Adam Wiegner (1889–1967),¹¹¹ and others¹¹² praised Blaustein’s ideas and theoretical distinctions. An exception in this context was the critical reviews of Blaustein’s works which were published by Filozofówna (later: Schiller) in 1931 and 1932.¹¹³

Irena Schiller (née Filozofówna) was a psychologist, pedagogue, and theater historian.¹¹⁴ She studied at Warsaw University at the end of the 1920s. There, she met Władysław Witwicki, who, as shown above, was Twardowski’s student and one of the leading scholars in psychology in Poland. Filozofówna was inspired by Witwicki to interpret Meinong’s idea of assumptions (Annahmen) as the basis of theater actors’ experiences.¹¹⁵ She received her PhD in 1932 on the basis of her work on the psychological analysis of the actor’s play at the stage. Her point was that assumptions are a necessary element of every experience, and for this reason, every mental phenomenon includes judgments in addition to presentations. With this in mind, Filozofówna appreciated the “unquestionable value” of Blaustein’s detailed descriptions,¹¹⁶ but she questioned his thesis that presentations differ from judgments, which can but do not have to accompany aesthetic experience. The Filozofówna–Blaustein debate was very complex and spawned a few polemical texts.¹¹⁷ In addition, it can be read in a few parallel frameworks, as it enables one to define some details of, for instance, Blaustein’s view on the phenomenological method,¹¹⁸ his account of the structure of aesthetic experience, or his view on the Graz School.¹¹⁹

The publication of Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne [Schematic and Symbolic Presentations] marked the end of this early period of the development of Blaustein’s theoretical explorations in the field of descriptive psychology. In his letter to Twardowski from September 1, 1930, Blaustein wrote as follows:

I regret to say that with the completion of this book, it seems my work in the field of presentations, which began at the beginning of 1924, so six years ago, ends now; [my work] resulted in four books and 7 lectures in this field of psychology. To my beloved professor, who showed and recommended these studies to me six years ago, I would like to thank you today. As I am now “an author in search of a topic,” I would like to ask for advice and guidance, just as in the past [when I asked as] a “new” student.¹²⁰

In light of this passage, one might describe 1928–31 as the period in which Blaustein worked on the basics of his theory of presentations. He attempted to present this theory as his original contribution to descriptive psychology and to philosophy. This was the reason for an exchange with Ingarden, who published Das literarische Kunstwerk in 1931. In a footnote to § 57 of the book, which discusses the theater play, Ingarden noted that a theory comparable to that presented in his book can be found in Blaustein’s Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations]. However, he wrote that he had not read Blaustein’s book before the publication of Das literarische Kunstwerk.¹²¹ In response, from 1930 to 1937, Blaustein published three reviews of Ingarden’s book on the literary work of art. The details of these reviews are not important here.¹²² Let me only note that Blaustein suggested that the theory of purely intentional objects elaborated by Ingarden was comparable to his own theory of imaginative objects. Ingarden tried to polemicize with Blaustein, and in 1931, he sent a reply to his review to Polskie Archiwum Psychologii [Polish Archive of Psychology] (the journal in which the review was published), in which he accused Blaustein of plagiarizing his theory of purely intentional objects.¹²³ Nonetheless, Ingarden’s reply was never published, as it was blocked by Baley, who was Twardowski’s and Stumpf’s former student and the editor-in-chief of the journal. In a personal chronicle, Ingarden noted that Blaustein referred to Ingarden’s ideas without relevant citations.¹²⁴ Although it was easy for Ingarden to call Blaustein a plagiarist, we cannot be sure that this was the case; rather, as already shown, Ingarden and Blaustein came up with the basics of their theories as a result of a long-standing exchange of ideas.

Finally, it may be noted that in 1930 Blaustein married Eugenia Ginsberg (1905–1942), Twardowski’s student who wrote a dissertation on Husserl’s whole–part theory, translated later by Blaustein into German.¹²⁵ In his journal, Twardowski noted that the wedding took place on June 29.¹²⁶ At this time, Blaustein still worked in gymnasiums in Lvov. In 1931, he probably realized that it was pointless to apply for a job at the university as Ingarden had finally received a professorship. In turn, Blaustein reoriented his studies and consequently enlarged the scope of the topics he discussed.

2.3.2 Original Explorations in the 1930s

Blaustein’s activity in the 1930s can be described as a series of attempts to apply philosophy in different fields. Since he was working in secondary schools in Lvov, he had studied how philosophy should be taught in schools, and he had explored other pedagogical topics.¹²⁷ Nevertheless, he referred to descriptive psychology as the framework of his pedagogical explorations. For instance, he inquired into the psychological grounds of children’s laziness. It should come as no surprise that Blaustein was the chair of the group of teachers who taught philosophical propaedeutics in Lvov’s secondary schools; this group cooperated closely with the Polish Philosophical Society. In an official letter from April 22, 1937, Blaustein—on behalf of the members of the group—expressed his gratitude to Twardowski for his help in organizing the group’s meetings.¹²⁸ Blaustein was also involved in a philosophical contest for secondary school students that was organized by the Polish Philosophical Society.

Blaustein, who did not have a chair at Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov, cooperated with the Society on a few projects. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the talks he gave at the meetings of the Society. For instance, on April 25, 1931, he gave a talk on self-esteem; on October 6, 1934, he gave one on humanistic psychology (the talk, which explored Dilthey’s and Spranger’s accounts of psychology, was later enlarged and published in Przegląd Filozoficzny [The Philosophical Review]¹²⁹); on February 22, 1936, he gave a talk on the psychology of feelings.¹³⁰ This list, of course, is longer, but it is worth noting another of Blaustein’s projects at that time, namely, a book series called “Biblioteczka Filozoficzna” [“A Philosophical Library”]. This project was initiated in 1933 by Blaustein, who was elected as a member of the board of the book series together with Ingarden and Ajdukiewicz.¹³¹ Later, the board was enlarged, but despite Blaustein’s efforts, the project was not fully developed by the outbreak of World War II, and only a few texts were published.

Of course, Blaustein’s activity was not limited to the Society. For instance, he translated into German Alfred Tarski’s (1901–1983) text on the concept of truth in formalized languages (in German: “Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen”), which was later published in 1935 in the first volume of Studia Philosophica and became an important study in the field of logic.¹³² More importantly, however, he made progress with his original studies in aesthetics. Whereas in texts published in 1928–31, Blaustein focused mainly on theoretical issues, such as the theory of presentations, later in the 1930s, he adapted these early theoretical tools in the field of aesthetics to examine concrete phenomena. This division mirrors Miskiewicz’s idea of two trends in Blaustein’s work: theoretical and applied.¹³³ While his theoretical works concerned the main concepts and the methodological basis of describing conscious experiences, Blaustein’s applied studies used these theoretical tools to analyze concrete phenomena. With this in mind, one can label Blaustein’s original explorations in the 1930s as applications of descriptive tools in studying concrete aesthetic experiences. In this regard, two projects are worth mentioning, both of which concern media.

The first research topic concerned the structure and character of the experiences of a cinemagoer. Blaustein’s interest in the film experience can be seen as early as his 1927/28 fellowship in Berlin. While there, Blaustein observed that scholars at the Berlin Psychological Institute used a camera to design and plan experiments; for him, the following question was more fundamental: how should one describe the cinemagoer’s experiences? In one of his letters to Twardowski, he wrote that he planned to explore the structure of the presentations involved in these types of lived experiences.¹³⁴ As already shown, after his return to Lvov, he published a few theoretical works, including the 1928 book on Husserl, the 1930 Przedstawienia imaginatywnne [Imaginative Presentations], and the 1931 Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne [Schematic and Symbolic Presentations]. In these books, Blaustein formulated the basics of his general theory of presentations. In a few fragments, he refers to film or to watching movies in the cinema as examples to explain the nuances of his insights.¹³⁵ However, his project concerning the experience of film was formulated later, namely, in 1933, in Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego [Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer]. The study contained a detailed analysis of the structure of the movie experience. It should be mentioned that Blaustein informed Twardowski about his work on the psychology of the cinema experience even before publication of the book: in a letter to his teacher from July 17, 1933, he wrote that he was working on a manuscript that he had started in December 1932.¹³⁶ He attached a short summary and a table of contents. Kotarbiński invited him to talk about the cinema experience at a meeting of the Warsaw Philosophical Society.¹³⁷ Later, in 1936/37, he also published a series of articles in the Polish journal Ruch Pedagogiczny [The Pedagogical Movement] that explored the educational role of cinema.¹³⁸

The second project concerned the experience of radio. The 1930s was a period in which radio was growing in popularity. Polish Radio was founded in 1925, and the regional station in Lvov started broadcasting in 1930.¹³⁹ In 1936, Blaustein started paying more attention to the experience of radio by considering, among other things, whether the term “theater of imagination”—used by Polish scholars at that time—was fully justified.¹⁴⁰ This topic was discussed by Blaustein on October 15, 1936, during Ingarden’s seminar on aesthetics. The talk concerned the question of the radio experience, but the text has since been lost.¹⁴¹ During the discussion, Blaustein’s account was extensively criticized by Ajdukiewicz, who asked about the linguistic framework of this type of experience. In 1938, Blaustein published a book that summarized his explorations: O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego [On the Perception of Radio Drama]. The book contained insights into the structure of the radio phenomenon and concrete practical instructions on how to improve the reception of a broadcast. It should be noted that this book was published by the Research Bureau of Polish Radio. This was probably why Blaustein attached a list of practical suggestions at the end of the book. A French translation of a shorter version of the text, without the attachment devoted to the radio audience or the list of practical advice, was also published later in Kwartalnik Psychologiczny [The Psychological Quarterly] as “Étude sur la perception des pièces radiophoniques.”¹⁴²

As shown, Blaustein’s explorations in the 1930s were dominated by aesthetic studies on concrete phenomena such as the experiences of a cinemagoer or a radio listener. His growing interest in aesthetics was finally planned to be summarized in a longer study, Die ästhetische Perzeption, written in German, which was completed in 1939 just before the outbreak of World War II.¹⁴³ The topic of the role of perception in aesthetic experiences was present in Blaustein’s studies in the 1930s; for instance, he presented a paper on perception in the aesthetic experience in 1936 at the Polish Philosophical Congress in Krakow; this paper was published later in 1937 in Przegląd Filozoficzny [The Philosophical Review].¹⁴⁴ Moreover, in 1937, he participated in Deuxième Congrès International d’esthétique et de science de l’art, which took place in Paris. On this occasion, Blaustein presented a paper titled “Das imaginative Kunstwerk und seine Gegebenheitsweise,” which summarized his aesthetics.¹⁴⁵ If one follows these texts and Blaustein’s other theoretical and applied (cinema, radio, etc.) studies from the 1930s, one can get an impression of how Blaustein’s Die ästhetische Perzeption may help scholars understand how he developed his main arguments. Unfortunately, the only copy of the manuscript (which was sent for publication in the third volume of Studia Philosophica) was lost during the war.¹⁴⁶ Despite this, one can conclude that Blaustein’s philosophical explorations in the 1930s enabled him to formulate his original account of aesthetics. Ingarden summarized Blaustein’s contribution to philosophy as follows:

During the outbreak of the war, he was a mature man and a mature researcher who could have left a permanent mark on Polish intellectual life. The fact that this did not happen was due to the hard fate that befells his generation. However, even if his life’s work did not acquire the form it certainly would have if he had survived the war, his research achievements are not without significance and should not be forgotten or wasted.¹⁴⁷

Blaustein’s exact date of death is unknown. Scholars note that he died (together with his wife and their son) in the Jewish Ghetto in Lvov in 1942 or 1944.¹⁴⁸ It is known that German Nazis entered Lvov on June 30, 1941, and Janowska Ghetto was established a few months later.¹⁴⁹ The German authorities decided to relocate Jews there in December 1941. In 1942 and later, the Germans organized a few large-scale deportations and (in 1943) mass shootings. In 1943, the Ghetto was reorganized as the Janowska Street labor camp, though all the Jews had already been deported or killed before this happened. With this in mind, one might hold that it is unlikely that Blaustein died in 1944, but again, the exact date of his death is unknown.¹⁵⁰

***The aim of this chapter was to show the development of Blaustein’s research activity in the context of the main philosophical movements in Poland and abroad, given his fellowship stays. My further aim was to present the central ideas of selected scholars that were later elaborated by Blaustein. This was necessary since, as shown above, his thought developed across different fields. Of course, Twardowski and the Lvov–Warsaw School played dominant roles. Blaustein’s writings adopted the meta-philosophical rules of rigorous analysis that were used and promoted by Twardowski and his students in Lvov; however, the value of these writings did not lie in following Twardowski’s meta-philosophical enterprise.

Blaustein’s main contribution to philosophy lies in his detailed descriptive analyses of different types of mental phenomena. While tracking the background of Blaustein’s philosophy, I have suggested that this very context inspired Blaustein to favor Husserl’s view on phenomenology understood as descriptive psychology (in light of the first edition of Untersuchungen). This held true despite Blaustein being familiar with Husserl’s phenomenological psychology project, as he had participated in 1925 in Husserl’s lectures on this topic. His stay in Germany enabled him to juxtapose phenomenological tools with descriptive-psychological tools. Later, he traveled to Berlin, where he had exchanges with Dilthey’s students and members of the Berlin School of Gestalt psychology. Certainly, both stays in Germany are important if one is to understand Blaustein’s reformulations of both descriptive psychology and phenomenology. Ultimately, it may be argued that the complex legacy of nineteenth- and twentieth-century psychology and philosophy determined his original explorations of aesthetics in the 1930s. His aesthetics can also be read in the framework of Ingarden’s philosophy. In light of the elements of Blaustein’s intellectual biography discussed above, it is clear that the examination of his philosophy has to account for all of these different contexts, including the psychological trends of his method, his view on descriptive psychology, his criticism of phenomenology, and the use of these divergent methods in aesthetics. I will follow this line in the following chapters.