The Basics of Blaustein’s Descriptive Psychology in the Context of Twardowski’s Theory of Presentations

Abstract

Blaustein’s project of philosophical psychology, for which he used the term “descriptive psychology” (psychologia deskryptywna), was—as already stated in Chap. 3—deeply rooted in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century heritage of psychology; however, Blaustein was a critical reader of this rich legacy. He elaborated different approaches and sought efficient tools to analyze psychic life. Psychology was, for him, a descriptive method which accounted for mental phenomena as wholes that ought to be analyzed or described as a combination of the simplest parts. The general purpose of this discipline was to classify mental phenomena. Nonetheless, whereas Brentano or Twardowski attempted to address a unified and complete taxonomy of mental phenomena, including presentations, judgments, emotions and (eventually defined as a separate class) will, Blaustein instead focused solely on presentations. Of course, in his writings, one finds some clues that he preferred Twardowski’s four-class taxonomy over Brentano’s three-part division; however, again, there is no in-depth discussion of this categorization. Instead, Blaustein formulated an interesting and original analysis of different classes of presentations. With these ideas in mind, the present chapter aims to introduce the basics of Blaustein’s descriptive psychology by discussing the sources, main ideas, arguments, and development of his theory of presentations. By doing so, I will explore the theoretical background of his philosophy, but a few remarks are necessary here.

Blaustein’s project of philosophical psychology, for which he used the term “descriptive psychology” (psychologia deskryptywna),¹ was—as already stated in Chap. 3—deeply rooted in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century heritage of psychology; however, Blaustein was a critical reader of this rich legacy. He elaborated different approaches and sought efficient tools to analyze psychic life. Psychology was, for him, a descriptive method which accounted for mental phenomena as wholes that ought to be analyzed or described as a combination of the simplest parts. The general purpose of this discipline was to classify mental phenomena. Nonetheless, whereas Brentano or Twardowski attempted to address a unified and complete taxonomy of mental phenomena, including presentations, judgments, emotions and (eventually defined as a separate class) will, Blaustein instead focused solely on presentations. Of course, in his writings, one finds some clues that he preferred Twardowski’s four-class taxonomy over Brentano’s three-part division²; however, again, there is no in-depth discussion of this categorization. Instead, Blaustein formulated an interesting and original analysis of different classes of presentations. With these ideas in mind, the present chapter aims to introduce the basics of Blaustein’s descriptive psychology by discussing the sources, main ideas, arguments, and development of his theory of presentations. By doing so, I will explore the theoretical background of his philosophy,³ but a few remarks are necessary here.

As Barry Smith noted, “[t]he influence of […] Twardowski on modern Polish philosophy is allpervasive and almost all important Polish philosophers in the early decades of the present [i.e., twentieth] century went through the hard training of his courses in Lvov.”⁴ Smith’s comment also seems to hold for Blaustein, whose theory of presentations bears the mark of Twardowski’s philosophy. In general terms, by “presentation” Blaustein understood—like his Lvov teacher—a term for mental phenomena which intend an object.⁵ He also explicitly accepted Twardowski’s taxonomy of presentations divided into images⁶ and concepts. He referred to this general idea on a few occasions, mainly in his early texts, such as in his book on Husserl (1928),⁷ in a talk given at the 289th plenary meeting of the Polish Philosophical Society in Lvov (1929),⁸ in two books, Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations] (1930)⁹ and Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne [Schematic and Symbolic Presentations] (1931),¹⁰ and in the text “O naoczności jako właściwości niektórych przedstawień” [“On Intuition as a Feature of Some Presentations”] (1931).¹¹ In spite of these general remarks, Blaustein also referred to detailed theses and observations formulated by his teacher, chiefly to Twardowski’s theory of images but less to the theory of concepts. This being said, I will proceed in the present chapter as follows: first, I will analyze Twardowski’s theory of presentations (also in the context of Brentano’s and Meinong’s accounts of presentations); next, I will discuss Blaustein’s assessment of Twardowski’s theory; finally, I will consider Blaustein’s original taxonomy of presentations.

4.1 Twardowski on Presentations

4.1.1 Twardowski’s Viennese Theory of Presentations

In Twardowski’s early philosophy, one finds a Brentanian notion of presentation (Vorstellung) as a basic mental phenomenon whose function consists in intending an object.¹² In his earliest works, Twardowski struggled with the ambiguity of this general definition. For instance, his habilitation thesis, Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen [On the Content and Object of Presentations], began by emphasizing an important ambiguity of the term “presentation.” He wrote:

When one talks about “presentations,” one can sometimes understand by this expression the act of presenting; sometimes, however, one can mean by it what is presented, the content of the presentation. And hence it has become customary to use instead of the expression “presentation” one of the two expressions “act of presenting” and “content of presentation” whenever the smallest possibility of a misunderstanding exists.¹³

As the text above indicates, the term “presentation” designates, according to Twardowski, either (1) “the act of presenting” (Vorstellungsakt)¹⁴ or (2) “the content of a presentation” (Vorstellungsinhalt). However, the latter is ambiguous since—as Twardowski explained, following Alois Höfler and Alexius Meinong in this context¹⁵—the term “content of a presentation” can refer to “what is presented” (Vorgestellte), which denotes either (3) an “immanent” (immanente) or (4) a “non-immanent object” (nicht immanente Objekt). In a strict sense, then, “content of a presentation” refers to “immanent object,” understood as a “mental image” or “idea.” “Content of a presentation,” thus defined, does not in a strict sense refer to a “non-immanent” or “transcendent object.” which, in turn, is “the object of presentation.”

Smith summarized Twardowski’s position in opposition to Brentano, for whom “contents” and “objects” seem to be identical; in contrast to Brentano, Twardowski attempted to show that both elements are distinct.¹⁶ If Brentano was right, one falls into ontological psychologism as the non-immanent object is reduced to a mere psychic entity. To avoid this consequence, Twardowski offered to understand content as mental “images” which play a role of mediating objects, which in turn refer to the object itself, i.e., the non-immanent object. Accordingly, any act of presentation has both content and its object, even if the object does not exist in the real world.¹⁷ However, if the existence of the object of a presentation is not necessary for the act itself to present its immanent object (i.e., the content), Twardowski solved Bolzano’s paradox of objectless presentations.¹⁸ It is noteworthy that Twardowski’s theory influenced not only Polish philosophers, e.g., Tadeusz Kotarbiński and Stanisław Leśniewski, who built their ontologies as reactions to Twardowski’s rich ontology,¹⁹ but also Alexius Meinong and Husserl.²⁰

The basis of Twardowski’s theory of presentations can be traced back to his doctoral dissertation, which was written under Brentano in Vienna but was defended in 1891 under Robert von Zimmermann: Idee und Perception. Eine erkenntnis-theoretische Untersuchung ans Descartes [Idea and Perception. An Epistemological Study of Descartes]. In this early work—in a Brentanian fashion²¹—Twardowski interpreted Descartes from a descriptive-psychological point of view and defined two distinct types of knowledge: ideas and perception.²² According to Twardowski, Descartes famously defined the criterion of truth as “clear and distinct perception,” but at the same time, he referred to “clear and distinct ideas,” which seemed to suggest that both types of knowledge, i.e., perception and ideas, were different. Given this apparent epistemological dualism, Twardowski’s main purpose was to determine whether perception and ideas have something in common or rather present two irreducible types of knowledge.²³ To do this, Twardowski first introduced an important distinction, namely, a sentence (Satz) and a proposition (Urteil). Next, he held that a sentence is a linguistic object correlated with a proposition on the side of the psyche; yet, they both refer to a clear and distinct perception,²⁴ so it is impossible to identify a proposition with perception itself.²⁵ Whereas a proposition can be true or false, perception cannot be true or false. In this context, Twardowski noted that an idea should be understood as a presentation (Vorstellung), i.e., as the content of what is presented in an act; however, for Descartes, this definition is unjustified:

For Descartes, “idea” means presentation, he calls it “tanquam imago rei” […] and “res ipsa cogitate, quatenus est objective in intellectu” […]. If an idea is tantamount to a presentation and indeed in the presented fragments, it is understood in the meaning of the content of a presentation; then, following Arnauld, perception is understood as the act of presenting. However, this also fails if one accepts that there exist contents of presentations which are presented by the senses, while for Descartes, presentation is an action of the soul but not of the senses.²⁶

From reading this passage, one might hold that Twardowski already struggled with the ambiguity of the word “presentation” in his doctoral dissertation. However, if an idea cannot be the object of perception, Twardowski concluded that perception is not the same as ideas and is irreducible to a mere presentation.²⁷ Thus, the “clear and distinct” Cartesian criterion of truth also has to be differentiated as follows: whereas “distinctness” concerns both ideas and perception, “clearness” holds for perception only; ideas can at least be adequate. For the most part, the relation between perception and ideas is intentional, and they are not identical. In this attempt at a clear distinction between ideas and perception, Twardowski later connected images more with intuition than with ideas or conceptual content.

4.1.2 Twardowski’s Account of Images as Concrete Presentations

The latter idea, which was expressed for the first time as early as 1892, led to Twardowski’s major idea, which was thoroughly elaborated by him a few years later (in 1898) in an important book, Wyobrażenia i pojęcia [Images and Concepts]. While commenting on his own work, Twardowski emphasized that its purpose was to build a unified theory of presentations which encompasses both concepts and intuitions or images.²⁸ As such, of course, this work developed the Brentanian heritage, i.e., Brentano’s theory of presentations: after all, the thesis that presentations encompass both concepts and images is implicitly present in Brentano’s Psychologie²⁹ and was explicitly elaborated in the 1884/85 course on logic.³⁰ It is important to note that in the latter course, Brentano introduced the theory of concepts in the context of the phenomenon of judgments, which, in turn, he conceived of as psychic phenomena that are based upon presentations. In “Lecture VII,” Brentano recalled the notion of psychic phenomena already known from the 1874 book, i.e., as something given in inner perception, non-spatial, and intentional.³¹ Next, he classified presentations as (1) intuitions (Anschauungen), i.e., the presentations of outer perception, (2) the presentations of outer imagination (Phantasie), (3) those of inner perception (Wahrnehmung), and (4) those of inner imagination.³² In this context, Brentano defined abstract presentations and concepts; according to Hillebrand’s notes, the definition is as follows:

By abstract presentations one has in mind presentations that have been obtained by a kind of simplification from other ones, and we include these among the presentations from experience, whereas the a priori presentations are independent of experience. They are either individual, and then they are a priori intuitions, or general, and then one calls them a priori concepts.³³

Thus, concepts were regarded by Brentano as a sub-class of abstract presentations; these presentations arise on the basis of “simplification” of other presentations. If the presentation is individual and independent of experience, it is an a priori intuition; if the presentation is general yet independent of experience, it is an a priori concept. Brentano also discussed the characteristics of intuitions which contain the following elements in their content: sensory quality, intensity, location, and time.³⁴ In his lectures, Brentano examined how one can construct abstract concepts, such as the concepts of continuum, direction, and angle. He showed that concepts are constructed in a series of generalizations of intuitions on the basis of noticing relations of equality and difference. For instance, one can construct the concept of a concrete color in contrast with the concept of another color or the concept of spatiality. To have a concept of a concrete color, one has to have a concrete intuition of this very color. As I will argue later, many of Brentano’s ideas from the 1884/85 course on logic, in which Twardowski took part, can also be found in the latter’s early text on Wyobrażenia i pojęcia [Images and Concepts].

Twardowski’s 1898 book is clearly structured: in Sect. 1–2, Twardowski introduced basic terminological divisions; next, in Sect. 3–10, he examined the main features of images and their scope, and he addressed the question of the limits of imaginability; in Sect. 11–16, he examined different types of concepts; finally, in Sect. 17, he concluded his train of thought, and he summarized his main arguments.³⁵ In his work, Twardowski connected image–concept division with a dual mode of presenting objects. This idea originated from Aristotle’s opposition between an imagined object (φαντάσματα) and a mere thought (τὰ νοητά). Later, in Twardowski’s opinion, this opposition was reestablished by Descartes, who differentiated imagination (imaginatio) and pure cognition (pura intellectio).³⁶ Both modes of presentation have different characteristics, since the former presents the object of presentation as somehow sensorially present as, speaking metaphorically, flickering in front of the mind’s eye, while the latter is not sensory present at all. In other words, Twardowski drew a sharp distinction between imagining and thinking. Indeed, there are objects that cannot be imagined, yet one thinks of them by using concepts. One can imagine, e.g., a triangle; however, one cannot imagine more complex mathematical figures, e.g., a myriagon, i.e., a polygon with ten thousand sides (Descartes’s example), even if one understands what such an object is supposed to be like. Both phenomena, however, function as presentations. With this in mind, Twardowski referred to German philosophical terminology and introduced an important differentiation: whereas images (Anschauungen) are concrete and direct presentations, concepts (Begriffe) are general and indirect.³⁷ Thus, (1) presentations (Vorstellungen) are mental phenomena which intend their objects, yet they can function as either (2) images (Anschauungen), i.e., concrete, direct, and intuitive presentations (anschauliche Vorstellungen), or as (3) concepts (Begriffe), i.e., general, indirect, and non-intuitive presentations (unanschauliche Vorstellungen).

Twardowski’s distinction is based on descriptive-psychological differences drawn in the contents of presentations. In this regard, his ultimate aim is to show that images are a necessary condition for concepts, as they both, i.e., images and concepts, have the same content which, however, is experienced differently. Nonetheless, before examining this issue, Twardowski critically assessed some popular views on images. First, he rejected Hume’s thesis that images are the results of impressions. Twardowski noted that “[…] we speak of color or sound impressions when they reach our consciousness through the effect of stimuli. On the other hand, we speak of color or sound images realized without any stimuli.”³⁸ Twardowski’s point here is that images do not consist in recollecting stimuli or restoring impressions. Moreover, Twardowski denied that an image in consciousness can be viewed as a statement or a judgment; after all, as he argued, the imagined object can be given without a belief which affirms its object as existing, and thus it can be experienced without a judgment (in Brentano’s sense). Finally, images cannot be described as the recollection of certain perceptions since the imagined object is given as a whole, e.g., as a table, and not as a set of given colors and shapes. Twardowski was clear here: a whole cannot be understood as a sum in a mathematical sense; instead, parts of images are integrated into a whole.³⁹ Given this criticism, Twardowski stated that images consist neither in restoring impressions nor in recollecting perceptions but rather can be understood—at least as a provisional definition—as a synthesis of impressions. Twardowski explained this as follows:

As a synthesis of impressions, image still remains distinct from impressions. The difference between images and impressions, however, is not that an impression occurs under the influence of external stimuli and without such stimuli. It consists in the fact that describes wholes which are combined from elements, and impressions are just these elements. The relation of image to impressions is that of a whole to its parts.⁴⁰

For him, images are therefore wholes composed of impressions, wherein impressions are parts of certain wholes. As he put it, parts are unified into one whole or they conjoin with each other. Thus, the whole, which is composed of its parts, has a different character, as wholes are different than their parts and cannot be comprehended as a mere sum (in a mathematical sense) of their parts. One might rephrase Twardowski’s point here in mereological language as follows: impressions are inseparable from images, yet they are still distinguishable (as identified due to a description). On the basis of this preliminary definition, Twardowski formulated a key insight into his theory of presentations: if images are indeed syntheses of impressions, it is possible to define different types or classes of images depending on the status of the constituent impressions. After all, as already stated, impressions build the contents of presentations, and they can be experienced differently while presenting their objects. With this idea in mind, we can examine Twardowski’s classification of images.

To begin with, (1) the first class of images is connected to impressions directly caused by stimuli; Twardowski called this class of images perceptive and states that they are the most original images in regard to other classes of images, as here a synthesis of impressions refers directly to what is actually experienced.⁴¹ This class of images clearly resembles Brentano’s classification of intuitions (Anschauungen) as the presentations of outer perceptions where the synthesis of impressions takes place. (2) Images included in the second class synthesize impressions which are not directly caused by stimuli but refer to restored impressions which were originally directly experienced; this class of images is called reproductive, and here a synthesis of impressions refers indirectly to what was actually experienced, i.e., it consists in the synthesis of restored impressions. (3) The third class of images is also based on indirect impressions, but unlike images included in the second class, restored impressions here do not refer to original experiences which took place in the past; rather, the combination forms new images which were never experienced. Twardowski called this class of images creative, and he held that these syntheses of impressions refer indirectly to what was actually experienced; however, they do not reproduce restored impressions, and they consist in a new combination of original impressions.⁴² It is worth noting here that both classes of images just described, i.e., reproductive and creative, refer in the end to the first class of images, i.e., the perceptive ones. After all, whether dealing with reproductive or creative images, one still has to use restored impressions, only in a different way: whereas reproductive images restore what was perceived, creative images combine what was perceived, even though it was never experienced. Finally, (4) the fourth class of images refers not to impressions as such but to mental phenomena which are innerly perceived. Twardowski called this class of images introspective, and he stated that here a synthesis of impressions does not happen, the object is given in inner perception. This last class of images includes images which are directed toward mental objects. By holding this, Twardowski agreed with Brentano, who, in his analysis of Aristotle’s φάντασμα, identified presentations which are founded on inner perceptions.⁴³ Twardowski held that these images are less adequate or distinct than other classes of images.⁴⁴ However, it is difficult to deny the possibility of presenting, for example, an image of one’s own joy (a mental object); if this is indeed the case, according to Twardowski, there are images which are not understood as a synthesis of impressions.

In light of Twardowski’s four-partite taxonomy, the preliminary definition of image as a synthesis of impressions has to be revisited since it holds only for classes (1), (2), and (3). This does not hold for class (4). To show what is common across all classes of images, Twardowski noted that introspective images are still a synthesis of multiple relatively simple elements. On this basis, he offered the following general definition of images:

Thus, one can say that all imagery, of mental and physical objects alike, is an integration, synthesis, complex of numerous elements, in which the objects imagined are given to us in their parts. For physical objects, these elements are called impressions; for the corresponding elements in mental object imagery, we have no name.⁴⁵

As a result, in his theory of presentations, Twardowski accepted that the following features are common to all classes of images: (1) concreteness (konkretność), i.e., a compact integration of elements synthesized in an image; (2) manifestness (Anschaulichkeit, poglądowość), i.e., “[…] the relation of any image, concrete as it is, to experience (perception) as the primary source of imagery”⁴⁶; and (3) sketchiness (ogólnikowość), i.e., “[t]he property by which an image brings out some features of imagined objects more vividly, others less vividly.”⁴⁷ The last feature means that an image is always a sketch which cannot present its object absolutely adequate; to phrase it differently, one cannot refer to every aspect or all of the features of the presented object, since the object is presented only in a vague way. For Twardowski, then, images consist in unifying or synthetizing features or aspects of the presented object. To explain this, Twardowski referred to Meinong’s view of abstraction.

4.1.3 An Excursus on Meinong on Presentations and the Question of Twardowski’s Representationalism

Meinong, who studied in Vienna in the 1870s, was influenced by Brentano. Under Brentano’s guidance, Meinong focused on Hume’s philosophy.⁴⁸ In 1877, Meinong wrote his Habilitationsschrift on Hume’s nominalism, and in 1882, he wrote another text on Hume’s theory of relations. Both texts resonated in Twardowski’s theory of images.⁴⁹ Meinong stayed in Vienna until 1882, when he was appointed at the University of Graz. Under Brentano’s guidance, Meinong used descriptive psychology as a methodological tool in the object theory he developed.⁵⁰ However, diverging from Brentano, Meinong opted for a two-class classification of experiences into intellectual and emotional.⁵¹ Twardowski also influenced Meinong. For instance, Meinong reinterpreted Brentano’s idea of immanent objects, reading this theory in light of the Twardowskian object–content divide.⁵² Meinong and Twardowski corresponded from 1893 for more than two decades, informing each other about their new developments in philosophy.

In general, Meinong understood presentations as a class of elementary lived experiences (Erlebnisse), which are part of intellectual experiences. Like Brentano, Meinong held that presentations are given in immanent and thus direct perception; he also claimed that all lived experiences are based upon presentations. There is, however, an important difference between Brentano and Meinong in regard to the claim that experiences are intentional. According to Marek, “Meinong is not completely sure whether ‘being directed to something, to an object’ is common to all experiences. But Meinong stresses the point that experiences like representations […] are usually directed to an object.”⁵³ For Meinong, presentations are always given as parts of other, more complex experiences, e.g., judgments, assumptions, emotions; presentations directly (unmittlebar) indicate their object.⁵⁴ Presentations thus described are purely passive and immediate.⁵⁵ In his early studies on Hume, Meinong blurred (at least in regard to terminology) the content–object division by stating that the term “object” (Objekt) is equivocal, as it can refer either to an “immanent object” (immanentes Objekt) or to an “object of presentation” (Vorstellungsobjekt).⁵⁶ Nonetheless, already in Logik, written together with Höfler, Meinong suggested that intentionality cannot be understood in terms of mental in-existence but rather in terms of a transcendent relation to an object; what is immanent is content (Inhalt), not objects.⁵⁷ In his later texts, especially in the treatise “Über Gegenstande höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung”⁵⁸ [“On Objects of Higher Order and Their Relationship to Internal Perception”] or in Über Annahmen⁵⁹ [On Assumptions], Meinong explicitly accepted the distinction between the mental content (Inhalt) and the object (Gegenstand) within presentations (Vorstellungen). Following Dale Jacquette,⁶⁰ one may hold that Meinong owed the more precise language of the content/object distinction in his later texts to Twardowski, though, to reiterate, the distinction is also present in his earlier texts.

Meinong used two basic pairs of attributes to describe presentations: (1) the concrete–or–abstract category and (2) the particular–or–general division. For him, a presentation is concrete if it presents all of the qualities of its object; otherwise, it is abstract. Next, a presentation is particular if it refers to an individual object; otherwise, it is general. Against this background, Meinong described different classes of presentations. To begin with, he described the presentations of outer perceptions as concrete and particular; as such, they are also described as intuitive (anschaulich).⁶¹ By contrast, concepts are to be described as abstract presentations; curiously enough, Meinong denied that all abstract presentations are per definitionem non-intuitive (unanschaulich) since there are abstract intuitions and intuitive concepts. What makes concepts intuitive is how they are composed of partial presentations in relation to a unified complex (Komplexion). As early as the 1880s, more precisely in his Hume-Studies II, Meinong claimed that the essence of concepts lies in their content (Inhalt); presentations, including abstract presentations, i.e., concepts, are built in the associative process of combining partial presentations that, in turn, indicate different attributes in their content.⁶² A partial presentation arises as abstract due to abstraction, which consists in focusing on some features (or a feature) of an object and omitting other features.⁶³ Thus, a concept is a complex presentation of different presentations combined into one mental unity. Importantly, complexes are produced on the basis of a concrete subject which unites partial presentations. As such, concepts are produced, similar to fantasy presentations.⁶⁴ If the synthesis or combination fails, i.e., partial presentations are not united and cannot be intuitively given, the produced complex is non-intuitive (unanschaulich).⁶⁵ All in all, Meinong distinguished four classes of concepts: (1) abstract concepts, (2) concrete concepts, (3) general concepts, and (4) particular concepts.

I will not discuss Meinong’s classification here⁶⁶; instead, it suffices to recall that Twardowski explicitly declared in his studies on images and concepts that he was inspired by Meinong’s theory.⁶⁷ Indeed, as shown in Sect. 4.1.2, Twardowski referred to Meinong’s idea of abstraction, which consist in highlighting some features of the imagined objects while other features of those very objects are omitted. In general, Twardowski agreed with Meinong that some features of the imagined object are presented as more vivid than others, but he denied the consequences of Meinong’s idea that all images should be comprehended as more or less abstract. In contrast to Meinong, Twardowski held that even if an image combines features, thus produced unity is concrete, even though it is sketchy; in any case, it is not abstract. An image is sketchy in the sense that it presents a certain object without referring to a certain defined and individual object but rather to any object which generally resembles the imagined one. In this regard, Twardowski drew an analogy between imagining and painting: the relation between sketchy images (which do not present all of the features of a certain object, e.g., in memory) and ideal (Twardowski’s phrase) images (which present all of the features of a certain object equally) is analogous to the relation of a sketch to a completed painting which presents all of the details of the depicted objects.⁶⁸

It can be argued that in order to describe the relationship between content and objects, Twardowski argued for a sort of mereological view of both elements which resulted in his resemblance representationalism. In this regard, one follows Ryan Hickerson, who holds that in his Habilitationsschrift Twardowski formulated the basics of resemblance representationalism, which holds that “[…] a representational content represents in virtue of a specific sort of representational relation holding between that content and the represented object, viz. resemblance.”⁶⁹ Generally, Hickerson differentiates two types of representationalism: (1) proxy-percept representationalism, which classifies immanent percepts as representations of extra-mental objects, and (2) mediator-content representationalism, which classifies contents as representations of extra-mental objects, although contents are not percepts.⁷⁰ Hickerson argues that Twardowski was a representationalist in the latter sense; however, his version of this doctrine was unique, as he held that “[c]ontents were supposed to represent objects in exactly the way that pictures represent landscapes.” Hickerson applies his thesis to Twardowski’s Habilitationsschrift; however, given Twardowski’s doctrine just sketched, Hickerson’s thesis can be extended and applied to Twardowski’s Wyobrażenia i pojęcia [Images and Concepts] as well. All in all, when presenting something, one creates an object (image) that presents (on the basis of resemblance) something due to its content. Of course, Twardowski’s point was not that contents are the same as pictures—he drew a parallel or an analogy by suggesting that contents are quasi-pictures and function as symbols of extra-mental objects. The resemblance relation is the basis of images, as they are founded on an image which, as Twardowski clearly stated, should present an object that resembles the object which should be produced in imagining. Some features can be added to other parts united in a new image, but the resemblance relation is still the basis. In other words, Hickerson’s thesis holds for Twardowski’s 1898 doctrine of images.

4.1.4 Twardowski on Concepts as Compound Presentations

In § 10 of his Wyobrażenia i pojęcia [Images and Concepts], Twardowski clearly stated that one’s ability to imagine something is limited.⁷¹ Given the analogy between imagining and painting discussed in the previous section, Twardowski held that perceptive and reproductive images have clear limits: only perceivable (i.e., representable) parts can be combined into one unity. More nuanced cases are creative images. According to Twardowski, creative images are produced in a three-phase process: (1) one invokes perceptive or reproductive images of an object resembling the object one is attempting to create imaginatively; next, (2) one mentally ascribes a feature (or features) to the imagined object that it initially does not have—and, finally, (3) one combines this feature with the imagined object to create a concrete unity.⁷² By claiming this, Twardowski accepted Meinong’s view on the process of creating images.⁷³ However, Twardowski slightly changed Meinong’s example of a red chalk board, described in his text on fantasy presentations; instead, Twardowski described the phenomenon of imagining a green ball as large as a billiard ball.⁷⁴ To have a creative image of this very object, one invokes two sketchy reproductive images of a billiard ball and a certain green object. Next, one abstracts the green color as a feature and strictly combines it with the imagined ball. As a result, one creatively imagines an object that is concrete and manifested in one’s experience as a green ball as large as a billiard ball. In this regard, Twardowski determined the limits of creative images; if the combination of features with an initial reproductive image cannot be accomplished, one does not have a creative image at all. For instance, if one wishes to imagine (in the sense of creative images) a round square, one fails, as it is not possible to unify the features of being-round and being-square as a whole.

Against this background, in § 10 of his Wyobrażenia i pojęcia [Images and Concepts], Twardowski put forward the thesis that concepts are presentations which arise on the basis of images which cannot be unified as wholes. By claiming this, Twardowski followed in the footsteps of Meinong, who held that presentations can lose the feature of manifestness if there is incompatibility (Unverträglichkeit) between parts, which should be unified as a whole.⁷⁵ In any case, for Twardowski, if an attempt to imagine a round square fails, one can still refer to the very object with a concept. It is precisely in this sense that images are necessary conditions of concepts. Twardowski understood the image of a round square as a unity of a basic presentation which, together with a presenting judgment, builds a unified whole. The whole thus defined is a concept.⁷⁶ In what follows, I will look closer at Twardowski’s theory of concepts and his classification of different types of concepts.

At bottom, Twardowski introduced his idea of concepts in the context of the three-phase process of producing creative images; however, in the case of concepts, the last phase, i.e., unification, is crucial: if unification fails, a presentation cannot be manifested, and thus, it is not an image. Like in the case of creative images, concepts are first formed on the basis of reproductive images in which an object resembling the object of the concept is presented. Next, one mentally adds an abstracted feature to the imagined object. This mental operation is instantiated by a judgment in which it is stated that the imagined object has (or does not have) a relevant feature. In a strict sense, one does not have to judge that the object has this very feature; one can merely present to oneself this very judgment.⁷⁷ To ascribe a certain feature to an object means for Twardowski that one presents to oneself a judgment which states that the object has the relevant feature. Twardowski described the presented judgment as the imagined judgment and in this context holds that concepts are compound wholes which are composed of (1) a basic image, more precisely, a reproductive image in which an object that resembles the object of the concept is presented, and (2) an imagined judgment (or judgments) which states that the imagined object has a relevant feature (or features). In short, a concept is a compound of two presentations, i.e., a basic image and an imagined judgment.

Twardowski was clear that abstraction plays a central role in producing concepts. Generally, he agreed with, among others, Meinong that abstraction is connected with the phenomenon of attention in which one is unable to present all of the features of the object in one moment. As shown in Sect. 4.1.3, this phenomenon suggests that images are general. Twardowski held, however, that this idea requires further examination. Thus, for him, abstraction consists in breaking down a unified set of features and comprehending them as distinguishable.⁷⁸ However, as he proceeded, to perceive a difference between two features means to judge this relation. Abstraction is therefore a mental action (of judging) that produces a concept with abstracted features; the produced concept is composed of two parts: (1) the general image of an object which has the feature one wants to present and (2) the imagined judgment that this very feature is separate. In the end, Twardowski concluded, “[m]ental phenomena […] in which we present in abstracto to ourselves features of objects have distinguished characteristics of concepts and thus they cannot be regarded as images.”⁷⁹ Against this background, it is worth drawing a contrast between images and concepts: whereas the former are sketchy, though non-abstract, the latter present their objects in abstracto. Here, then lies a sharp distinction between Twardowski and Meinong: whereas the former saw abstraction sensu stricto as limited to concepts alone, the latter adopted a broader conception of abstraction beyond concepts, e.g., in regard to fantasy presentations.⁸⁰

All things considered, concepts are for Twardowski mental (compound) objects. To make the use of concepts more efficient, however, one does not have to constantly invoke the mental operation of producing relevant concepts; one can use names instead. Names are linguistic expressions that are correlated with relevant concepts. As such, they enable one to omit the problem of recuring identification of concepts (understood as mental objects).⁸¹ In this context, Twardowski defined two types of conceptual presentations: (1) a symbolic presentation if one combines a basic image of the feature and an image of the concept’s name and (2) a semi-symbolic presentation if one has an imagining of the name without basic images. Thus, the process of producing concepts ultimately leads to the efficient use of relevant names and, more generally, language. According to Twardowski, one can think without words;⁸² however, this approach would be inefficient.

In his Wyobrażenia i pojęcia [Images and Concepts], Twardowski used two (partly overlapping) classifications of concepts: (1) analytic–or–synthetic concepts and (2) particular–or–general concepts. Whereas the former uses the criterion of the type of mental action that produces relevant concepts (analysis or synthesis), the latter is based on different referential functions of concepts (particular or general objects). First, a concept is analytic if it presents an abstracted feature or relation belonging to a certain object; this type of concept arises in a mental analysis or abstraction that consists in identifying parts of an imagined unity.⁸³ In turn, a concept is synthetic if it presents a synthesis of two or more abstracted features or relations ascribed to the basic image; this type of concept arises in a mental synthesis or combination that does not produce a concrete unity. Among this class of concepts, Twardowski listed the following sub-classes: (a) regular synthetic concepts that combine basic images with analytic concepts (e.g., the concept of a feudal system),⁸⁴ (b) negative concepts that combine basic images with imagined negative judgments, i.e., judgments that state that an object does not have the abstracted feature (in this regard, Twardowski referred to the example of a geometrical point, i.e., a concept of a point without extension),⁸⁵ (c) contradictory concepts which combine basic images with imagined judgments that ascribe abstracted features to one impossible (in Meinong’s sense) object (e.g., the concept of a round square), (d) relational concepts which combine basic images with imagined judgments that ascribe abstracted relations to an object,⁸⁶ and (e) logical concepts which are fixed combinations of basic images and relevant analytic concepts; at the linguistic level, logical concepts are ideally expressed by definitions.⁸⁷

Regarding the second classification, i.e., particular–or–general concepts, in his book, Twardowski argued against the widespread conviction that concepts should be understood as general in contrast to images which are traditionally comprehended as particular. He held that, from a psychological point of view, not all concepts are general, as there are also particular concepts. First, Twardowski understood particular concepts as concepts that refer to one and only one defined object. Next, he determined general concepts to be concepts that refer to more than one object or to undefined objects. He inquired into the difference in content of both types of concepts and, to address this question, he described the phenomenon of producing a general concept of a triangle as such.⁸⁸ Basically, he determined two phases in producing this presentation. First, one establishes a synthetic presentation in which there is a basic image of a triangle and the imagined judgments regarding features of the imagined triangle. This, however, is a particular concept, as features are ascribed to the triangle that is currently imagined. Second, among the imagined judgments, one focuses only on those that ascribe features common to all triangles, and by doing so, one also rejects judgments that ascribe defined and particular features; as a result, one establishes a general concept of a triangle. In short, general concepts are defined as concepts in the content of which there are no judgments ascribing particular features and thus as compound presentations which combine basic images with imagined judgments and with an additional judgment that states that the features ascribed to the object are general. By contrast, particular concepts are those which ascribe (in their content) features to one and only one object and thus are compound presentations which combine basic images with imagined judgments and with an additional judgment which states that the features ascribed to the object are particular. An example of such a concept is the concept of “the tallest tree in the world.” Importantly, among general concepts, one can list both synthetic and analytic concepts; in the latter case, one has a concept of an abstracted feature that is common to a few or many objects.⁸⁹

In § 17 of his book, Twardowski juxtaposed images with concepts by highlighting the main differences between them and their functions for the mind. He held that concepts cannot substitute images which are characterized by their manifestness; however, images are not general, and for this reason, the mind is rendered inefficient if only particular images are used. Accordingly, “[…] concepts comprehended in extenso are a transitional phase between direct imaging of objects and symbolic imaging.”⁹⁰ Concepts therefore gain an advantage over images, and ultimately, they are substituted by imagined terms that refer to the concepts they initially denoted. Although linguistic expressions are non-mental, both images and concepts are, for Twardowski, mental phenomena.

4.1.5 A Remark on Twardowski’s Account of Presentations as Actions and Products

To date, Twardowski’s theory of presentations has rested on the sharp contrast between the presenting act and “what is presented,” including both immanent and non-immanent objects. This division can also be found in Twardowski’s later analysis, namely, in the 1911/12 essay “O czynnościach i wytworach. Kilka uwag z pogranicza psychologii, gramatyki i logiki” [“Actions and Products. Some Remarks from the Borderline of Psychology, Grammar and Logic”]. Twardowski began his essay with some general, non-controversial remarks. He noted that some words form specific pairs, e.g., “to walk” and “the walk,” “to think” and “the thought,” or “to lie” and “the lie” etc.⁹¹ The words “to walk,” “to think,” “to lie” etc., designate an activity, whereas “the walk,” “the thought,” “the lie” etc. designate a product of the related activity. On a linguistic level, then, the distinction between activities and products rests on the distinction between verbs and nouns. Actions and products are divided into three main classes: (1) physical (e.g., “to walk” and “the walk,” etc.); (2) psychical or mental (e.g., “to think” and “the thought”); and (3) psychophysical⁹² (e.g., “to lie” and “the lie”). Products of different actions can be either enduring or non-enduring. The former products last longer than the respective action which originated the product, e.g., a painting as a product of the action of painting. The former products, in turn, endure only if the corresponding actions endure and stop existing with the actions themselves, e.g., the walk happens only if one is walking. Twardowski claimed that there are no enduring psychic products, yet “[…] the psychophysical product becomes the external expression of the mental product.”⁹³ Thus, the products of psychophysiological actions—which connect the psyche with non-mental objects⁹⁴—can be either durable (e.g., a drawing as the product of drawing) or non-durable (e.g., a judgment as the product of judging). To adapt this theory to the field of presentations, one can argue that while the presenting act is a psychophysiological action, “what is presented” is a product of this action; in addition, “what is presented” can be either a durable product (an external or non-mental object) or a non-durable product (an immanent or mental object). This reformulation of Twardowski’s theory of presentation later inspired Blaustein in his original research.

4.1.6 Further Developments of Twardowski’s Theory of Presentations in 1924

As shown in Sects. 4.1.2 and 4.1.4, Twardowski formulated the basics of his classification of presentations in the 1898 Wyobrażenia i pojęcia [Images and Concepts]. On the basis of this book, in 1902, he gave a talk—“Über begriffliche Vorstellungen” [“On Conceptual Presentations”]—at the University of Vienna.⁹⁵ On this occasion, however, he “[…] presented the theory of concepts set forth in this [1898] book, boiled down to the most essential points.”⁹⁶ Subsequently, the German text of his talk was translated into Polish and published as a separate book in 1924. Twardowski stated that he did not publish the new edition of the 1898 text for a reason, as “[p]reparing a second edition of this book would have involved numerous changes in the arguments that serve to introduce the exposition of the theory of concepts proper, even though the theory’s essential content, as put forth in that book, and subsequently in the essay, seems to me to have retained its soundness.”⁹⁷ Arguably, the changes referenced in this note may have concerned the clarity of some of theses, and it is hard to say whether they imply a revision of the early theory of presentations. Certainly, Twardowski claimed that the essential points of the theory of concepts, i.e., non-intuitive presentations, are still correct. The 1924 edition is entitled O istocie pojęć [The Essence of Concepts] and is important for another reason. It became a point of reference for Twardowski’s students, who also commented on the book and, more importantly, on the theory of presentations, e.g., Czeżowski⁹⁸ or Blaustein.

Indeed, in O istocie pojęć [The Essence of Concepts], one finds the basic division between intuitive (images) and non-intuitive (concepts) presentations. However, the main problem of the text is limited to the latter: “[…] how […] non-intuitive, or ‘conceptual,’ presentation comes about, how the mental fact of non-intuitive presenting something to oneself ought to be described.”⁹⁹ In this context, Twardowski referred to Meinong’s (discussed in Sect. 4.1.3 above) theory of presentations, and he discussed the example of the mental phenomenon of presenting a red chalk board. This example concerns the production of a new image on the basis of two others, i.e., a presentation of any board and a presentation of redness. The former is an instance of a reproductive image of a regular black board that was ultimately seen in the past, while the latter is a more complex presentation in which one presents to oneself first a red ball and second one understands that the red color of the ball should be ascribed to the board. This complex presentation refers in the end to redness as an abstractum, i.e., to the color red as such. Against this background, a presentation of a red board arises as a combination (Zusammenfassung) of two presentations into one complex (Komplexion) which combines concrete and abstract presentations into one whole. For Meinong, this new presentation can be either intuitive or non-intuitive depending on the connection between basic presentations. If the connection is more coherent, the new presentation is intuitive; otherwise, it is non-intuitive or conceptual.

In Twardowski’s view, Meinong’s idea is basically true, i.e., conceptual presentations are established as complex mental states which combine different presentations and which have a character dependent on the connection of these basic presentations.¹⁰⁰ However, Meinong’s terms of “more” or “less coherent” connections are, in Twardowski’s assessment, enigmatic and thus require more thorough analysis. For example, Meinong wrote about “consummated” and “indicated” combinations to express different stages of fullness of presentation. To overcome the confusion that arises with Meinong’s theory, Twardowski descriptively analyzed these presentations by identifying three parts of these phenomena: (1) the basic presentation, (2) the change made in it, and (3) the emergent intuitive presentation, which is the result of combining parts (1) and (2). Part (1) is described as the “material” of the new combination. Usually, this material is a concrete presentation, e.g., a reproductive presentation (a remembered image). Within the material, one aims at changing one or more parts by subsuming them with other parts. In Meinong’s example, discussed above, the material is the reproductive presentation of a black board, and the color is the very element that one wants to change. Part (2) is based on the judgment that one or more parts of the basic presentation have to be changed. Twardowski followed Meinong in describing the phenomenon as one realizing that one or more changes have to be introduced and thereby holding that one presents to oneself a corresponding judgment, i.e., one presents to oneself that an object has to have different features.¹⁰¹ For Twardowski, this is not a judgment that is actually made by someone, but it is precisely a mere presented judgment. On a linguistic level, the presented judgment is preceded by the term “that,” and as such, it is a nominalized expression. In the example discussed above, one realizes that the board is red. Twardowski claims that, on the basis of parts (1) and (2), an intuitive presentation can emerge, more precisely, a new productive image. However, if the combination of (1) and (2) does not emerge, a non-intuitive or conceptual presentation arises. Consequently, Twardowski defined a concept (in the broadest sense) as “[…] a presentation of an object which is composed of a (basic) presentation of an object that is similar to the object at issue and of presentations of judgments that pertain to that similar object.”¹⁰²

In Part 3 of O istocie pojęć [The Essence of Concepts], Twardowski differentiated three classes of non-intuitive presentations: (1) analytic concepts, (2) synthetic concepts, and (3) negative concepts. To begin with, analytic concepts emerge by means of analysis or abstraction if one presents to oneself characteristics, properties, or relations which are instantiated by objects but which cannot be presented by themselves.¹⁰³ For this reason, one has to combine an intuitive presentation of a concrete object which has the characteristic, property, or relation to be presented and a presented judgment that the concrete object does not possess these characteristics, properties, or relations. In consequence, one produces the non-intuitive presentation or concept of that very characteristic, property, or relation. In turn, synthetic concepts arise by combining new characteristics, properties, or relations with intuitive basic presentations. In this case, one can synthesize or add new properties to the presented object that are not presented in the basic presentation. Twardowski classified negative concepts as intermediate between analytic and synthetic concepts. For him, “[…] negative concepts are always characterized by the presence of one or several presented negative judgments which deny certain specific characterizations of the object of the basic presentation.”¹⁰⁴ In this case, one presents to oneself an object and combines this presentation with one or more negative judgments that the object should not have certain characteristics, properties, or relations. An example of such a negative concept (discussed also in the 1898 book) is the concept of a mathematical point, i.e., the concept of a point with no extension at all. Of course, negative concepts can be viewed as a sub-class of synthetic concepts, only with exclusively negative judgments. Twardowski stated that there is no clear-cut division between negative and synthetic concepts.

In that same work, Twardowski formulated more general psychological laws concerning the nature of thinking. He was aware that his theory of concepts did not describe a common view of concepts. After all, it is hard to imagine that every use of any concept should be preceded by a complex series of mental operations which consist in producing basic presentations and presented judgments.¹⁰⁵ Instead, one uses speech and symbolic and semi-symbolic thinking, which is rooted in language and is more economical for using concepts. For instance, abstract concepts, including concepts of properties, have their respective names. One can use these names instead of performing a sequence of mental operations. In this regard, Twardowski put forward the hypothesis that one can use presentations of the correlated names of abstract concepts instead of a presentation of a given concept’s object. This, as Twardowski emphasized, direct presentation of words is possible due to the very concept that is correlated with the word. This way of thinking is more economical because it establishes rigid connections between words, presentations, and presented judgments. However, symbolic thinking has a different structure than non-intuitive presentations, as symbolic thinking consists of three parts: (1) a presentation of words or verbal expressions, (2) a basic presentation, and (3) the presented judgment.¹⁰⁶ In thinking, one can use symbols, i.e., the parts included in group (1), which connect the whole sequence of all three elements. In the end, as Twardowski held, symbols can also substitute for all presented judgments, which are parts of the contents of concepts. Thus, as shown, a descriptive analysis of non-intuitive presentations led Twardowski to formulate more general laws of thinking. Importantly, Twardowski’s idea from his O istocie pojęć [The Essence of Concepts] that we can use symbols as distinct presentations was used by Blaustein in his aesthetics. This topic will be discussed later in Chap. 8.

4.2 Blaustein on Twardowski’s Theory of Presentations

4.2.1 References to Twardowski in Blaustein’s Writings

As mentioned before, Blaustein’s theory of presentations bore the mark of Twardowski’s theory of presentations. Blaustein seemed to follow his teacher in comprehending any presentation as a mental phenomenon which intends its object or, on many occasions, he referred to Twardowski’s taxonomy of presentations as divided into images and concepts. These general references, however, were connected in Blaustein’s writings to more detailed formulations of Twardowski, chiefly to his theory of images; they were less connected to the theory of concepts. First of all, Blaustein broadly used the Twardowskian schema of the act–content–object by claiming that a mental phenomenon or an act intends an object through content, which he referred to as “presenting content.”¹⁰⁷ Presentations, then, present their objects because presenting contents intend a certain intentional object. Given that presentations can be either intuitive (in the case of images) or non-intuitive (in the case of concepts), this division is possible because of the different functions of the presenting content. According to Twardowski,¹⁰⁸ Blaustein, for instance, ascribed manifestness to intuitive presentations that are founded on perceptual images. Here, the presenting content is understood as sensory content. However, even if presentation is a complex act, it is given as a whole that unites its parts. For this reason, one sees, say, a table and not the sensory contents which present the table. In this case, contents are to be understood as the appearance (wygląd or widok) of the object. Blaustein wrote:

Presenting contents have a variety of shapes and sizes; they are colored in different planes, and they rest or move at different speeds in various directions. Depending on what the presentation content is and what is happening with it, one says about the object that it is black or blue, round or square, large or small, that it rests or moves at a higher or lower speed in one or another direction. Of course, it is not only what the presentation content is and what is happening with it that determines the attribution of such or other features to the object. Past experience also plays a major role here; however, the content of a presentation is one of the decisive factors.¹⁰⁹

Therefore, if presenting content indicates objects, one can also speak of “adequacy” or “inadequacy” in relation to the object. A presentation of an object as a perceptual presentation is adequate only if the parts of the content refer to corresponding parts of the object. This idea also originates from Twardowski’s idea that images are combinations of parts. I will discuss this problem later on. For now, let me add that Blaustein also accepted Twardowski’s thesis that image presents its object only if the parts synthetized in the image are united as a whole.¹¹⁰ Last but not least, Blaustein claimed—again following Twardowski—that the presenting content does not refer directly to a sensory basis in the case of recollecting something or imagining something. By claiming this, Blaustein generally accepted his teacher’s taxonomy of images as divided into perceptual, reproductive and creative (although he omits introspective images). He also referred to the thesis that there is a difference within the presenting content in perceptual and other images. The crucial fragment of Blaustein’s 1930 Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations] is as follows:

The differences between the two types of content are introspectively given to everyone, although their conceptual recognition is a very difficult task. However, one of the differences is easily noted. The sensory content of perceptive images is given whether we want to see it or not: its shape, size, type of coloring, and the company in which it appears are independent of us; the conditions of its appearance are beyond us. The sensory content of secondary images, in principle, does not possess these features: it is more subjective and dependent on us in regard to both its appearance and disappearance as well as its size, shape and color. These terms are obviously not enough. The difference we are looking for is—as Twardowski emphasizes—a qualitative one and belongs to the order of elementary differences that are noticeable in [someone’s] experience but which cannot be described or determined. Despite this, we are easily aware of whether we are dealing with sensory content of perceptive or secondary imagination (see the script of the lecture on “Psychology of Thinking” from 1908/9).¹¹¹

Blaustein referred here to Twardowski’s lectures from the winter and summer semesters of 1908/09. In these lectures, Twardowski attempted to question the quantity approach to images by showing that it fails to describe clear differences between primary and secondary images. According to his approach, the difference between both types of images lies in a property of their “vividness” (żywość). Twardowski showed that this approach is false since one cannot properly describe the difference in content; the reason for this lies in the fact that the difference is rather qualitative, given in introspection, and thus direct. It cannot be grasped indirectly, e.g., by words. In this context, Twardowski mentioned an example of a fortissimo sound, once actually heard, later just recollected: the latter cannot be different in terms of quantity since this would amount to an absurd thesis that the recollected sound is a pianissimo sound. For this reason, the difference between both types of images is rather qualitative.¹¹²

Blaustein’s other clear references to Twardowski’s theory of presentations can be found in his original theory of schematic and symbolic presentations. First, Blaustein referred to the Twardowskian idea that mental phenomena are based upon presentations; he described the genesis of schematic and symbolic presentations as a synthesis of basic images and presentational judgments, yet these phenomena—taken as a whole—do not constitute an intuitive presentation.¹¹³ Second, he held that the object of such presentations can be understood as a product (wytwór) in Twardowski’s sense.¹¹⁴ To be precise, they are psychophysical products produced by psychophysiological actions or acts. Schemas and symbols thus defined arise in corresponding acts, but they do or at least can exist independently of these acts. For instance, if one draws a map (Blaustein’s example), the act of drawing is founded on one’s thinking (mental or psychic act), yet the act causes physical actions, i.e., movements of one’s hand; moreover, the product of these acts, i.e., a map, is a durable product of this complex psychophysiological process.

4.2.2 A Critical Assessment of Twardowski’s Theory of Presentations

To date, Blaustein has seemed to follow Twardowski. Like his teacher, Blaustein maintained that presentations are mental phenomena which encompass both images and concepts and can be both intuitive and non-intuitive; he also referred to Twardowski’s idea of content: he accepted and used a tripartite taxonomy of images, and he adapted the product–action dichotomy, not to mention that he also adapted Twardowski’s qualitative approach to images. Given the variety of listed continuations and borrowings, one might have the impression that Blaustein’s reading of Twardowski is uncritical, but this impression is misleading. An interesting criticism of Twardowski’s theory of presentations can be found in Blaustein’s Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations].¹¹⁵ In § 7 of his book, Blaustein referred to Twardowski’s taxonomy of presentations as divided into concepts and images; next, images are divided into primary and secondary images, whereas secondary images are divided into reproductive and creative images. However, Blaustein asked, what is the criterion of these divisions? To put it differently, how, if at all, did Twardowski argue for this taxonomy? To address these questions, Blaustein referred to the general thesis that every act is composed of two non-self-sufficient parts, i.e., quality and matter. However, Twardowski’s taxonomy rests on neither quality nor matter. It cannot be quality because, for instance, concepts and images are—according to Twardowski—presentations. In other words, if quality were the criterion of the division, both concepts and images should be included in two different and distinct classes of mental phenomena. Blaustein argued:

As far as quality is concerned, one can refer to introspection, which shows that the quality of, e.g., reproductive image, and a concept do not differ. We see no difference in the way these two types of acts relate to the object. Both make the object present. If the difference between perceptive, reproductive and creative images and concepts were in their quality, the listed types of presentations would not form a uniform, idiogenic class of mental acts, while each of these types would be classified in the classification of mental acts as classes of mental acts equal to judging, experiencing feelings, presenting, etc.¹¹⁶

As the text above indicates, neither quality nor matter are criteria of Twardowski’s taxonomy. After all—as Blaustein argued¹¹⁷—different images can have the same matter. The same matter can be present in perceptual images, recollection, and creative imagination. The matter is the same in the sense of an identical object to which different images refer: in every act, the object is composed of the same features, e.g., one sees a table as brown and tall (the perceptual presentation); later, one recollects the previously perceived table as brown and tall (the reproductive presentation); finally, one presents the table as brown and tall in a different environment (the creative presentation).

Blaustein maintained that if neither quality nor matter is the criterion for Twardowski’s taxonomy, one can find it in the presenting content or the intentional object or in their mutual relations. Despite this hypothesis, the taxonomy is more complex, and for this reason, it has to be decomposed into three more specific divisions: (1) a division of presentations into images and concepts; (2) a division of images into perceptual (primary) and non-perceptual (secondary) images; and (3) a division of non-perceptual (secondary) images into reproductive and creative images.¹¹⁸ Blaustein’s key insight in this context is the thesis that in each of these divisions, Twardowski should have used a different criterion. In § 7 of his Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations], he stated:

The first division is made at the basis of the different relation of the presenting content to the intentional object in images and concepts. In the former, the presenting content is adequate in relation to the object; in the latter, it is inadequate. […] The second division is made at the basis of the variety of elements of the presenting content, which are sensory contents. […] The third division is made at the basis of the diversity of intentional objects in reproductive and creative images. Here, we come across a source of very difficult issues, hitherto not sufficiently explained. An important fact for reproductive images is that their object is recognized as identical to the object of some past presentation.¹¹⁹

In sum, although Blaustein referred to many elements of Twardowski’s theory of presentations and used them in a different framework, he also found the theory problematic. The Twardowskian taxonomy of presentations lacks clear criteria that can be used to differentiate types of presentations. In this context, Blaustein’s main goal was to define such criteria. Therefore, Blaustein’s critical assessment can be read as an attempt to build a unified theory of presentations, i.e., a theory that adapts clear criteria for its taxonomies.

4.3 Toward a Unified Theory of Presentations

Blaustein’s criticism of Twardowski’s theory of presentations has shown the need for clear criteria to define different classes of presentations. Of course, as stated above, Blaustein adopted and used Twardowski’s basic classification of presentations as divided into images and concepts; he seemed to be perfectly aware that the classification of images and concepts is widely accepted by descriptive psychologists since it is intuitive; however, the criteria of the classification are again unclear.¹²⁰ To show this, he accepted Twardowski’s idea that whereas images are intuitive, concepts are non-intuitive. Next, he stated that the feature of intuitiveness is basic and, as such, seems to be connected to sensations, which are intuitively given in an experience. But, as he pointed out, there are presentations which are based on sensations but which are non-intuitive at the same time. In this context, Blaustein referred to the example of the word “God”: even if one reads the word and, for this reason, one experiences sensations as presenting content, i.e., black marks printed on white paper, it is unjustified to claim that the intended object is intuitively given.¹²¹ Other examples which show the need to enlarge Twardowski’s classification come in Blaustein’s works¹²² from the field of aesthetics: (1) while perceiving a statue made of marble, one sees not the marble as such but the character represented by the statue¹²³; (2) while perceiving a theater play, one sees not the actor as herself but the character played by her¹²⁴; (3) while watching a movie in the cinema, one sees not the phantoms displayed on the screen but the action which is happening “in” the movie¹²⁵; (4) while hearing a radio broadcast, one hears voices which represent non-present objects;¹²⁶ and finally, (5) while perceiving a painting, one sees not sensations of chaotic shapes and colors but what is represented in the painting or “on” the canvas.¹²⁷ In all these cases, perceptual presentations (in Twardowski’s sense) are at play, though they intend non-present objects, which seems to suggest that reproductive or creative presentations are also at play. In this regard, Blaustein claimed that these examples show that there are also other presentations sui generis that are non-reducible to Twardowski’s classes. This holds especially for aesthetics. Blaustein’s point was that if one attempts to describe the aesthetic experience, one should enlarge Twardowski’s taxonomy by adding other types of presentations. For this reason, Blaustein postulated enlarging and reformulating Twardowski’s classification. To do this, his taxonomy was based on the criterion of how the presenting content is correlated with the presented object. In his works, while investigating the basic criteria for the class of presentations, he wrote about the adequacy or inadequacy of the presenting content (in relation to the intentional object).

In 1930, in Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations] and in “O naoczności jako właściwości niektórych przedstawień” [“On Intuition as a Feature of Some Presentations”], Blaustein referred to the Twardowskian understanding of how presenting content does intend its object: certain elements of presenting content refer to certain corresponding elements of the intentional object.¹²⁸ An example of this relation that was provided by Blaustein is perceptual presentation, in which the presenting content functions as if it were an image or an appearance (wygląd) of the presented object. In this regard, Aleksandra Horecka clarified as follows:

The presenting contents of the presentation of an object present the object of this presentation. When we are looking at a board we have a perceptual presentation of the board. The presenting content of the board presents a real board. This content makes up the appearance (view) of a real board. Therefore the appearance of an object presents this object.¹²⁹

However, this clarification still seems to be incomplete. Admittedly, at least in the case of perception, the presenting content is an appearance, and as such, it combines the sensory content, e.g., color marks, and—according to Blaustein—Gestalt qualities.¹³⁰ But, one could still ask what Blaustein meant by stating that the presenting content refers to or corresponds with the presented object. To phrase it differently: what are the relata of this relation? In the text “O naoczności jako właściwości niektórych przedstawień” [“On Intuition as a Feature of Some Presentations”], Blaustein considered this question and—while commenting on how to understand the presenting content in perceptive, reproductive (both, as already stated, discussed by Twardowski) and imaginative images—he held the following:

Presenting contents have a variety of shapes and sizes, and they are surfaces of various colors which rest or move at various speeds in various directions. Depending on what the presenting content is and what is happening to it, the object is said to be black or blue, round or square, large or small, that it rests or moves at a greater or lesser speed in this or that direction.¹³¹

This passage is supposed to show that presenting content functions as if it had phenomenal qualities which are experienced in a certain phenomenon. Blaustein ascribed phenomenal qualities or features to content, such as “having a shape,” “having a size,” “being colored,” “moving,” or “resting.” As already stated, phenomenal qualities can be formed in a certain way, so they can be combined with certain Gestalt qualities. Taken as a whole, these qualities are formed as the appearance (wygląd) of what they present. In any case, they are all terms which determine or indicate their relatum, i.e., the presented object. More precisely, they determine the qualities or features of the object as presented in the relevant presentation. Thus, to address the above question (what are the relata of the relation between the presenting content and the presented object?), on the one hand, one has to indicate (1) the experienced qualities as experienced, and on the other hand, (2) the qualities or features ascribed to the object. These are then the relata or elements of the relation discussed by Blaustein.

With these ideas in mind, according to Blaustein, the relation between the presenting content and the intentional object can be either adequate or inadequate. As he claimed, “[…] the presenting content is adequate to the object if every (or almost every) element of the content corresponds to a certain element of the object.”¹³² Blaustein explained that the phrase “almost every” is necessary since there are elements of presenting content which are ascribed to content as content, and for this reason, the elements do not correspond to elements of the object as an object. For example, the feature of “being a mediatory entity in a mental act” is a feature of the content as content which does not correspond to any similar or analogical feature of the object as an object.¹³³ Blaustein stated that any perceptual presentation should be described as adequate. However, adequacy can be either absolute or relative:

Content is absolutely adequate if every (or almost every) element of the content corresponds to a certain element of the object and each (or almost every) element of the object [corresponds to] a certain element of the content. Content is relatively adequate if indeed every (or almost every) element corresponds to a certain element of the object, but not vice versa.¹³⁴

To be precise, adequacy is absolute if the dyadic or two-place relation between the elements of the presenting content and the elements of the object are symmetrical; in turn, adequacy is relative if the relation is asymmetrical. In this context, Blaustein held that, for instance, sensations are absolutely adequate presentations, while images of physical objects are only relatively adequate presentations. Sensations are the experienced elements as such, e.g., the sensation of a black and white surface which is flickering in someone’s experience while reading this sentence. Blaustein held that here, the content and the object are strictly connected. In other words, all the elements of the presenting content correspond with all the elements of the presented object. In turn, images of physical objects, e.g., an image of a human head seen in profile, contain only the elements of the presenting content which correspond to the actually given side of the object, whereas the object as such also includes other elements which are not actually presented but are merely apperceived. Simply stated, one does not see a physical thing from all sides at once. Thus, someone’s perceptual image is admittedly adequate, yet only relatively so.

Furthermore, in contrast to adequate presentations, “[t]he presentation is inadequate if at least some (and only a few) elements of the content correspond to certain elements of the object.”¹³⁵ The presentation is inadequate if it is not an objectless presentation; Blaustein is clear that any inadequate presentation always has its intentional object, but there is no strict correspondence of elements between the presenting content and elements of the object. However, as with adequate presentations, an inadequate presentation can be either absolute or relative. A certain presentation is absolutely inadequate if no element of the presenting content corresponds to any element of the object; in turn, a certain presentation is relatively inadequate if some (and only a few) elements of the presenting content correspond to certain elements of the object. An example (yet only indirect) of an absolutely inadequate presentation is the process of reading: if the presenting content consists only of words—which do not imitate a sound, so which are not onomatopoeias—the object of the presentation is presented absolutely inadequately.¹³⁶ In turn, an example of a relatively inadequate presentation is the presentation of a triangle in general; in this case, some elements of the presenting content correspond to certain elements of a particular triangle which can be drawn in a notebook.

In his classification of adequate and inadequate presentations, Blaustein wanted to include presentations such as a symbol, a schema,¹³⁷ or the perception of an actor who is performing a fictional character. In all these cases, the content quasi-presents its object: one sees a symbol but its object is not given due to the presenting content, which rather corresponds with its closer or proper object; a symbol refers rather to another object, as in the case of a sandglass, which can represent the passage of time. Next, if one sees a schema, e.g., a map, she or he perceives the lines which present its object (say, a city) in modi quasi. Finally, if one watches an actor, one sees the actor and the fictional character performed by the actor; nonetheless, the fictional character can be presented not directly but in modi quasi. Therefore, the function of content can be understood in two ways: it functions either as the presenting content or as the quasi-presenting content. Blaustein held that a unified classification of presentations has to refer to both divisions: (1) adequate or inadequate and (2) presenting or quasi.¹³⁸ The latter pair of content corresponds with Blaustein’s general idea—taken from Brentano and Twardowski—of founding mental life on intuitive or experienced elements. As presented above, for Twardowski, concepts arise if one fails to present the object in intuition. Therefore, phenomenologically speaking, concepts are unfulfilled intentions. Analogically, for Blaustein, even if one uses concepts, one presents something but only quasi-inadequately. In a review of Blaustein’s Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne [Schematic and Symbolic Presentations] that was published in Przegląd Humanistyczny [The Humanistic Review] in 1931, an unknown reviewer rightly pointed out that Blaustein’s key insight into the nature of psychic phenomena is that there is a tendency toward intuitive fulfillment:

In addition to the tendency to think economically, which produces signitive thinking that is carried out with the help of signs, e.g., words in speech, the opposite tendency—according to the author—is also present in our thinking, namely, the tendency to be intuitive. The desire for intuitive presentation is clear in relation to objects which are abstract or at least difficult to imagine for some reason. This tendency creates artifacts of concreteness and intuitiveness in the form of diagrams and symbols.¹³⁹

Hence, inadequate presentations have a tendency to present their objects as intuitively present; however, the object cannot be presented in its essence since it is abstract. In this context, Blaustein’s idea is to include quasi-inadequate presentations, i.e., presentations which intend an object; even if the object cannot be intuitively given, one presents to oneself an artifact with which to intend the object. In this case, the artifact becomes a concrete and intuitively given surrogate of what is unpresentable.

As a result, Blaustein’s classification of presentations is divided into at least four cases: (1) adequate presentations, (2) quasi-adequate presentations, (3) inadequate presentations, and (4) quasi-inadequate presentations. On this basis, in § 53 of his Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations], Blaustein formulated the following classification of presentations¹⁴⁰ (Schema 4.1):

Schema 4.1

Blaustein’s classification of presentations in Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations]

Clearly, Blaustein’s classification, which adopted the criteria described above, as formulated in his Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations], was richer than Twardowski’s taxonomy. Whereas Blaustein identified eight classes of presentations, Twardowski indicated only three (or, at best, four). Twardowski omitted inadequate presentations in general, suggesting that if a presentation fails to present its object, it becomes a concept, i.e., an abstract presentation. Nonetheless, Twardowski’s classes are included in the schema as types of adequate presentations; more precisely, they are—to employ Blaustein’s language—(1) relatively adequate presentations (i.e., perceptual presentations), (2) quasi-adequate reproductive presentations (i.e., reproductive presentations) and (3) quasi-adequate creative presentations (i.e., creative presentations). In a review of Blaustein’s book, Adam Wiegner explicitly stated that the theory discussed in Przedstawienia imaginatywne [Imaginative Presentations] is a significant elaboration of Twardowski’s ideas formulated in the 1898 book Wyobrażenia i pojęcia [Images and Concepts] and later summarized in the 1924 book O istocie pojęć [The Essence of Concepts]; in this context, he added that Blaustein’s main contribution lies in the concept of imaginative presentations and their use in aesthetics.¹⁴¹ Indeed, by enlarging Twardowski’s taxonomy, Blaustein was able to describe a wider scope of aesthetic experiences, e.g., watching a theater play (imaginative presentation) or contemplating a symbolic painting (symbolic presentation). Blaustein’s key insight consists in showing that presenting content plays different roles in different types of art. If one watches a theater play, the presenting content seems to function in the same way as in the case of perceptual presentation since it functions as an image of the object; however, the proper object is not what one sees on the stage. Therefore, presenting content does not present its object adequately. Analogically, if one contemplates a painting with a symbolic meaning, the presenting content once again founds one’s experience, but the object of what one sees is beyond what is given. Here, the presenting content also does not present its object adequately. As Blaustein put it, the presenting content functions here quasi-inadequately. All these issues, however, do not concern me here. I will discuss Blaustein’s aesthetics later in Chap. 8.

***Blaustein’s theory of presentations is complex. In general, it can be summarized as follows: (1) a presentation is a simple intentional act, i.e., an act which intends its object; (2) it includes two inseparable parts (quality and matter); (3) quality, however, determines a certain act precisely by being a presentation which is different from, say, a judgment; and (4) matter determines the directedness of the act, i.e., its intention as directed toward a certain object. These general theses came from the Brentanian heritage, not only from Brentano but also from Twardowski and (less) from Husserl. Therefore, following Miskiewicz, it is true that “[…] what’s most interesting about Blaustein’s theory is the fact that his theory of direct presentations is based on a development that can clearly be traced back to Brentano’s original theory.”¹⁴² Nonetheless, these theses do not justify Twardowski’s taxonomy of presentations divided into two main classes, i.e., (1) concepts and (2) images, while images are divided into four subclasses: (a) perceptive, (b) reproductive, (c) creative and (d) introspective.¹⁴³ Blaustein held that neither matter nor quality is the criterion of clear divisions. On this basis, his central idea was to ask about the relation between contents and objects; more precisely, between the presenting content and the intended object. Consequently, he differentiated (1) adequate and (2) inadequate presentations and (3) presenting and (4) quasi-presenting acts. Blaustein’s taxonomy of presentations was richer than that of Twardowski; it can also be used in aesthetics since it enables one to describe a broader scope of aesthetic experiences. However, even if the Brentanian framework of this theory is clear, it is unjustified to claim that Blaustein’s theory was reducible to Brentano or Twardowski. In fact, the opposite is true since there were new elements in Blaustein’s theory which were absent in both Brentano’s and Twardowski’s theories. What also differentiated Blaustein from this tradition was his phenomenological tendencies. After all, his theory of presentations is not a Brentanian-style theory per se, i.e., it is not focused on acts. Blaustein always referred to the object and asked for the ways of givenness or modes of manifestation (Gegebenheitsweisen) of the object. The phenomenological viewpoint adopted by Blaustein in his philosophy was therefore an emphasis placed on experience, its specific object, and, even more importantly, on how the object is constituted: how does one understand an object which is presented in an experience? What is the structure of this experience, and what is someone’s subjective way of experience? These questions refer to his account of the method of phenomenology, which will be discussed in the following chapter.