Toward a Phenomenology of Media

Abstract

In his aesthetics, as shown in Chap. 8, Blaustein formulated a sophisticated theory of the aesthetic experience and the aesthetic object. However, the value of his approach was evidenced not only by theoretical examinations but also by detailed and rich descriptions of different aesthetic phenomena. Whereas in the previous chapter I was interested in the basics of Blaustein’s aesthetic theory, the present chapter concerns its concrete applications; more precisely, I will outline his phenomenology of media as an example of the application of descriptive tools in the analysis of cinema and radio experiences. In doing so, I want to discuss Paul Majkut’s thesis that “[p]henomenological media studies begin with Roman Ingarden’s investigations into the ontology of a literary work, but extensions of ideas that were confirmed to print media are easily made to other media.” I attempt to show that Majkut did not take into account Blaustein’s contribution to the field, which was developed in the same period as Ingarden’s theory and which (contrary to Ingarden) directly addressed media (film and radio) experiences. Blaustein’s input was noticed by, for instance, Jan Czerkawski (together with Antoni B. Stępień and Stanisław Wielgus), Zofia Rosińska, Wioletta Miskiewicz, Jagna Brudzińska and, more recently, by Joanna Pluta. Czerkawski et al. called Blaustein “a pioneer in psychology pertaining to film and radio.” In this vein, Rosińska and Pluta also described him as a “pioneer” in studies on the reception of media and its influence on the human mind. Miskiewicz noted that Blaustein “[…] kept an active interest for research in […] media communication” and his research “[…] anticipated (with great subtlety) many theories, such as Wollheim’s ‘seeing-in’ in aesthetic theory and McLuhan’s ‘the medium is the message’ well known in media study.” In her text on aisthēsis and phantasma, Brudzińska identified Blaustein as the author of the “[…] first phenomenological theory of media,” in which he analyzed “[…] the mediating function of imaginative consciousness.” These views require a brief comment.

In his aesthetics, as shown in Chap. 8, Blaustein formulated a sophisticated theory of the aesthetic experience and the aesthetic object. However, the value of his approach was evidenced not only by theoretical examinations but also by detailed and rich descriptions of different aesthetic phenomena. Whereas in the previous chapter I was interested in the basics of Blaustein’s aesthetic theory, the present chapter concerns its concrete applications; more precisely, I will outline his phenomenology of media as an example of the application of descriptive tools in the analysis of cinema and radio experiences. In doing so, I want to discuss Paul Majkut’s thesis that “[p]henomenological media studies begin with Roman Ingarden’s investigations into the ontology of a literary work, but extensions of ideas that were confirmed to print media are easily made to other media.”¹ I attempt to show that Majkut did not take into account Blaustein’s contribution to the field, which was developed in the same period as Ingarden’s theory and which (contrary to Ingarden) directly addressed media (film and radio) experiences. Blaustein’s input was noticed by, for instance, Jan Czerkawski (together with Antoni B. Stępień and Stanisław Wielgus), Zofia Rosińska, Wioletta Miskiewicz, Jagna Brudzińska and, more recently, by Joanna Pluta. Czerkawski et al. called Blaustein “a pioneer in psychology pertaining to film and radio.”² In this vein, Rosińska³ and Pluta⁴ also described him as a “pioneer” in studies on the reception of media and its influence on the human mind. Miskiewicz noted that Blaustein “[…] kept an active interest for research in […] media communication”⁵ and his research “[…] anticipated (with great subtlety) many theories, such as Wollheim’s ‘seeing-in’ in aesthetic theory and McLuhan’s ‘the medium is the message’ well known in media study.”⁶ In her text on aisthēsis and phantasma, Brudzińska identified Blaustein as the author of the “[…] first phenomenological theory of media,” in which he analyzed “[…] the mediating function of imaginative consciousness.”⁷ These views require a brief comment.

The sources of Blaustein’s studies on imaginative presentations—and thus on media— can be found in his 1927/28 fellowship stay in Berlin, when he reported to Twardowski that he recognized “[…] differences in the lived experiences of a cinemagoer and a theater viewer”; in this context, he referred to the “rich” structures of the imaginative presentations that are at play here.⁸ These early interests were developed in his 1928 book on Husserl, where Blaustein had already noticed that presenting content can function differently in relevant conscious acts. However, as has already been shown, this content theory was fully developed later in the 1930 Przedstawienia imaginatywnne [Imaginative Presentations] and the 1931 Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne [Schematic and Symbolic Presentations]. In these books, Blaustein discussed the basics of his theory of presentations, and on a few occasions he referred to the example of film or watching a movie in a cinema to explain or illustrate the nuances of his views.⁹ A full exposition of his theory of the film experience was subsequently presented in the 1933 Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego [Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer]. The study provided a detailed description of the structure and the course of the film experience. Given that the sources of the phenomenology of film can be found in the 1930s, for instance, in Ingarden or Sartre,¹⁰ Blaustein is indeed one of the forgotten pioneers of film phenomenology. It is worth noting that in 1936/37, he also published a series of articles in the Polish journal Ruch Pedagogiczny [The Pedagogical Movement], which explored the educational role of cinema.¹¹ In any case, in 1936, Blaustein started paying more attention to the radio experience by considering whether the term “theater of imagination,” which was used by Polish scholars at that time, was fully justified.¹² In 1938, he published O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego [On the Perception of Radio Drama], which contained insightful views on the structure of the radio phenomenon. The book contained concrete practical tips for directors of radio broadcasts that should be applied to improve their reception by audiences. It is important to keep in mind that Blaustein’s analysis, which emphasized the imaginative experiences of radio, preceded contemporary studies in the phenomenology of listening that were formulated, for instance, by Don Ihde.¹³ Nonetheless, as we will soon see, Blaustein, in contrast to Ihde, claimed that listening to the radio is more a perceptual experience than a purely imaginative one. Blaustein’s 1933 and 1938 publications have already been discussed to some extent in the previous chapter. However, I was interested in them only insofar as they discussed elements of Blaustein’s aesthetics. Currently, my ultimate aim is to present his studies in a more systematic fashion, i.e., the main ideas, arguments, and results of both works.

9.1 Blaustein on the Film Experience

According to Blaustein, a study of psychic life can be developed either as a study of a certain type of lived experience which is present in different situations or as a study of all types of lived experiences that occur in a defined yet typical situation. The former approach consists in analyzing, for instance, aesthetic experience despite the particular situation in which it occurs; the latter approach serves to examine different types of experiences, e.g., presentations, emotions, or the intellectual components involved in a certain situation. In his Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego [Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer], Blaustein adopted the latter research strategy to investigate the different types of experiences of a cinemagoer.¹⁴ He believed that a detailed analysis of the various elements of these experiences can enable one to subsequently identify the lived experiences which are specific to a cinemagoer and are different from the experiences of, for instance, a theater spectator, a book reader, or a music listener.¹⁵ He suggested that a cinemagoer has lived experiences that are sui generis; it is seemingly precisely for this reason that the phenomenology of a cinemagoer is irreducible to other contexts.

Blaustein began his book with a few technical and methodological restrictions. He first assumed that a film lasts 1.5 to 2 hours. He analyzed both a silent movie and a non-silent movie. Curiously enough, he did not give any concrete examples of movies; instead, he generally referred to movie genres, e.g., to a crime movie as such. This fact shows a significant change in relation to his earlier studies, which—as discussed in Chap. 8—were full of concrete examples of works of art. Second, he avoided all questions concerning the causal factors that determine someone’s perception of a film, e.g., their previous experiences, psychological dispositions, etc. Instead, he explicitly offered to adapt a descriptive procedure which serves to analyze the whole set of experiences lived by a cinemagoer while watching a movie, with the emphasis put on this person’s pleasure. The central subject matter of his study is “the subjective emotional states of a viewer as a viewer” (subiektywne stany uczuciowe widza jako widza).¹⁶ Third, Blaustein noted that the psychology of a cinemagoer thus defined is the basis for the aesthetics of the cinema experience. By claiming this, he declared that he followed Moritz Geiger, for whom aesthetics is based on “scientific psychology” (wissenschaftliche Psychologie).¹⁷ However, statements like these strongly suggest that Blaustein’s position is actually closer to Franz Brentano’s and (early) Kazimierz Twardowski’s methodological psychologism, which consists in founding philosophy and thus aesthetics on psychology.¹⁸ This suggestion is even more justified if one takes into account the fact that Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego [Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer] refers to the well-known Brentanian three-part division of mental phenomena; after all, the book is divided into two parts, of which the first (§§ 2–5) concerns presentations, while the second (§§ 6–10) concerns judgments (or intellectual functions) and emotions. In light of this, the two following subsections address both directions of Blaustein’s studies.

9.1.1 Presentations and Their Objects: The Question of Phantoms

In his descriptions of a cinemagoer’s experiences, as discussed in Chap. 4, Blaustein adopted a three-part division of lived experiences: as wholes composed of content, an act, and an object. The presenting contents of this type of experience are visual and auditory sensations, which are presented “on” a cinema screen. Regarding visual sensations, Blaustein held that they are based on changing phantoms, i.e., colorful surfaces or shapes seen “on” the screen.¹⁹ He described this experience as a permanent game of lights and shadows. These phantoms are apprehended in relevant acts, and on this basis, they can have a twofold reference: (1) one can ascribe the game of lights and shadows to imaginative objects seen “on” the screen, namely, as the very objects’ feature, or (2) one can comprehend them as phantoms of the objects themselves. The difference arises if (1) the movie is viewed by a cinemagoer as a movie or (2) it is understood as a representation of non-fictional and non-imaginative objects, as in the case of a documentary movie. Blaustein rejected the idea that one “sees” colorful objects in black and white films if one supplements gray-scale objects with colorful fantasy presentations; he argued that non-intuitive, i.e., signitive, presentations are added to the basic presentations, i.e., gray-scale phantoms.

To describe this basic level of experience, he referred to Wilhelm Schapp’s Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung [Remarks on the Phenomenology of Perception] and attempted to use Schapp’s results. In his treatise, Schapp held that perception is object-directed and direct in its essence; the very object of perception is things (Dinge).²⁰ Of course, one first sees colors which are placed in the world, yet as Schapp put it, things are not “[…] mere complexes of colors and shapes.”²¹ Colors are rather comprehended as features of things. Schapp even went a step further by claiming that on the basis of visual features, one ascribes further non-visual features which connect different forms of experience. He wrote:

We see out there how the honey sticks to everything with which it comes into contact; how the water falls back, how it flows and is mobile—liquid. We see how elastic the iron of the tuning fork is; we see the lightness of the feather and of the smoke carried away by the wind. We see the consistency and heaviness of the iron weight that digs into the sand. All of this stands before us originally in our perception.²²

This passage shows that, for Schapp, perception is direct or immediate. It serves to ascribe visual and non-visual features to perceived things. Schapp described auditory sensations in an analogous way: voices can present things directly, i.e., as located in the sphere of voices (Tonraum).²³ Moreover, according to Schapp, sounds can present non-acoustic features of things; for instance, one hears the “metallicity” of iron.²⁴

Blaustein’s reference to Schapp can arguably be explained if one notices that they both operated with a similar model of perception. For them, perception is an object-directed and immediate experience that refers to objects. Additionally, they identified a dual structure in the form of content and objects. In this regard, Blaustein understood the former as presenting content and the latter as the intentional object; Schapp, in turn, described them as the presenting (das Darstellende) and as the presented (das Dargestellte), respectively.²⁵ Blaustein also adopted Schapp’s idea that visual and auditory experiences serve to ascribe non-visual and non-auditory features to objects: “[f]or the psychology of a cinemagoer it is important […] that although one experiences only visual and auditory sensations, objects on the screen are given […] as smooth, fluid, elastic, wet, etc., that there are objects given to [the cinemagoer], though one does not see them, yet one hears, etc.”²⁶ However, Blaustein made three notes on Schapp’s view.²⁷ First, a cinemagoer experiences only gray-scale phantoms. Second, one hears only the sounds recorded in the movie; however, this means that one hears only a selection of sounds which are more diverse in comparison to the natural world, i.e., sounds which were not recorded. Third, he questioned the idea that fantasy is a necessary element of film experiences; in contrast to Schapp, Blaustein held that this form of experience is strictly perceptual in character, and he doubted that someone’s experience while watching a movie in a cinema is a fusion of perceptual and fantasy (creative, in Twardowski’s sense²⁸) images.²⁹ In sum, Blaustein generally accepted Schapp’s ideas, yet he introduced a few modifications to adjust them to the specificity of film.

To date, phantoms have been described as the basis of presenting content which serves to indicate an object. Next, according to Blaustein, a cinemagoer does not see phantoms as such; put differently, phantoms are not apprehended as the reproducing object (the screen together with the phantoms “on” it) but rather as an appearance (widok) of the imaginative object or the reproduced object.³⁰ The reference is founded on the cinemagoer’s attitude toward the object: if one perceives the movie as a movie, one apprehends imaginative objects, but if one focuses on the objects represented by the movie, as, e.g., in a documentary, one is directed toward reproduced objects. To describe this phenomenon, which is specific to a cinemagoer, Blaustein used the term “observation,” understood as attentive living through relevant imaginative presentations. Therefore, strictly speaking, one watches a movie if one observes objects represented on a screen. These objects are characterized by their spatial and temporal relativity. Blaustein held that although objects displayed on a cinema screen can be viewed from many perspectives, the actual point of view is dependent on the point of view of the camera. Next, he added that time perspectives are also relative since time in a movie does not have to correlate with natural time in the world because, e.g., there are time gaps between subsequent scenes. All these relative features are ascribed to the world represented in the movie. Blaustein referred to the world that is inherent to the movie as the imaginative world. However, the world filmed in a movie has a specific orientation, i.e., it is presented from the perspective of a camera. Blaustein attempted to explain this with a reference to the phenomenon of projecting (rzutowanie) the cinemagoer’s body into the imaginative world as if they were standing where the camera filmed the reproduced objects.³¹ Interestingly, Blaustein noted that the perception of a movie also depends on the viewer’s position in the cinema.

Taking this into account, it is clear that in Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego [Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer], Blaustein used and (if needed) rephrased the general ideas formulated in his aesthetic theory. As already shown in Chap. 8, the imaginative world is understood by him as an ordered set of imaginative objects which are perceived by a cinemagoer if he adopts an appropriate attitude toward objects and events represented “in” the movie. In this regard, he claimed that a cinemagoer can present diverse objects to himself: for instance, one sees nature, a moonlit night, the bottom of the ocean, etc.³² In short, in a movie, one can “see” objects that are also present in the natural world. Moreover, the film experience can be even richer since it enables one to “see” non-natural objects, e.g., a minotaur or Pegasus. In addition, a movie that contains music can present general or schematized objects, e.g., human suffering or joy. What connects these different objects is their “alien” character. Blaustein held that the imaginative world manifests itself as “alien” in relation to the surrounding or natural world. The fact that the lights are off in the cinema serves to help the viewer focus their attention on the screen and thus on the movie.³³ Blaustein suggested that darkness in a cinema is not a mere technical factor, as it helps to intensify the viewers’ aesthetic experience.

Finally, it is worth noting that the first part (§§ 2–5) of Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego [Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer] addressed the question of presentations. Of course, cinemagoers’ experiences are dominated by perceptual presentations which are based on both visual and auditory sensations. However, the lived experience can be associated with fantasy (or creative) images or memory (or reproduced) images.³⁴ The former is useful for filling gaps between scenes in movies. In this regard, Blaustein analyzed a simple example: a character presented in a movie reads a letter, gets into a car, drives through the night, and arrives at her house; one does not see the moment when she leaves her apartment, nor the entire route, etc. Blaustein held that one can fill these gaps in fantasy, yet this happens rather “rarely.” He argued that if there is no clear suggestion in a movie that fantasied elements should be added that were not originally present in the movie,³⁵ fantasy is unnecessary in this type of experience. Additionally, memory can serve as a supplementary factor for a cinemagoer. For instance, remembering previous events enables one to follow the present scene. Blaustein held that a cinemagoer’s experiences can also include schematic or symbolic presentations. The former enables one to present typical features of certain objects, whereas the latter provides symbols due to the symbolizing objects given in a movie. Again, all these presentations are unnecessary elements of the experience of a cinemagoer.

9.1.2 Intellectual Functions and Emotions in the Cinemagoer’s Experiences

As stated above, the second part (§§ 6–10) of Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego [Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer] addressed the question of the roles played by judgments and emotions in the experiences of a cinemagoer. Judgments are involved in understanding the movie, while emotions are the basis for, among other things, aesthetic experiences. Blaustein first discussed judgments by holding that they serve to help the viewer understand the series of images in a movie as parts of larger wholes; more precisely, one comprehends subsequent scenes as parts of the action in a movie.³⁶ Here, understanding an action means judging it yet without believing that this judgment is true or false. In this context, Blaustein used Meinong’s term “assumption” (Annahme),³⁷ and he claimed that the process of understanding takes place without further creative or reproduced images. In short, only judgments are necessary to understand the perceived movie. They are also helpful in understanding a character’s psychic life. Blaustein referred to the general idea that psychic life can be expressed in individuals’ facial expressions, gestures, physiognomy, or words.³⁸ The scope of the expressions is dependent on the form of the movie. To begin with, actors in silent films cannot act with the tone of their voice, while subtitles present the mere words that are spoken. In turn, actors in movies with sound can act using the tone of their voice, and music also plays an important role. In this context, Blaustein referred to Ingarden, for whom actors first and foremost express their emotions rather than their intellectual experiences.³⁹ This leads to the thesis concerning the “hegemony of the emotional sphere” in the cinema experience. Of course, intellectual understanding is an important factor in the cinemagoer’s experience, but it is overwhelmed by emotions. However, again, emotions can be understood by a cinemagoer.

In this regard, Blaustein devoted a separate section (§ 8) to discussing the role of music in the cinemagoer’s experience. His emphasis on music was a significant contribution to film studies in Poland before the outbreak of World War II.⁴⁰ The dominant film theory in Poland was formulated by Karol Irzykowski in 1924. In his book, Dziesiąta muza. Zagadnienia estetyczne kina [The Tenth Muse. Aesthetic Topics in Cinema], Irzykowski argued that the cinema experience is mainly a visual experience; he used a metaphorical phrase by stating that cinema serves to “satisfy the hunger of the eyes.”⁴¹ Blaustein explicitly referred to Irzykowski’s position, but he claimed that the auditory experience is equally important for a cinemagoer.⁴² Therefore, why are auditory experiences and music important? For Blaustein, music is the main component expressing emotions. He wrote:

The hegemony of the emotional sphere over the intellectual sphere in film makes the viewer’s participation in a film’s action dependent mainly on his understanding of the emotional states of the characters presented in the cinematic action, on properly empathizing with these feelings, and on co-experiencing these moods and feelings. The music which accompanies a film, if it is properly selected, improves both. Melodies can be happy, sad, lively, or solemn; while they accompany the acting of the actors, who try to express these moods with their facial expressions and sometimes with their statements, they also make this task much easier.⁴³

Music puts the cinemagoer in a suitable mood. It can emphasize the emotions expressed by an actor, or it can show changes in someone’s psychic life. In this regard, the major scale serves to express cheerful moods, whereas the minor scale expresses sad moods. Importantly, music can intensify not only presented emotions but also real, underlying emotions. If one understands someone’s emotions, one can present them to oneself due to assumptions. However, music—while introducing a certain mood—can invite someone to understand and experience real emotions. Blaustein held that the role of music is evident if one first watches a silent movie without any accompanying music and then again with music. He stated that music is often not noticed by cinemagoers because they are focused mainly on visual experiences. This, however, does not mean that music is inessential for the experience; to the contrary, it is an important factor which shapes the cinemagoer’s experience.

Blaustein agreed with Ingarden in emphasizing the role which the emotional sphere plays in the film experience. However, unlike Ingarden, who devalued non-aesthetic emotions as insignificant, Blaustein held that non-aesthetic emotions are as important as aesthetic ones. However, this claim of Blaustein—following Marek Haltof—was an original contribution to film studies in Poland.⁴⁴ As Zofia Rosińska explained, “[t]he non-aesthetic elements of the cinemagoer’s experience play a much more important role than in experiences based on the contemplation of any other work of art. However, non-aesthetic feelings obviously do not make an aesthetic experience impossible.”⁴⁵ In this respect, in § 9 of his book, Blaustein discussed feelings such as admiration, boredom, and pleasure or erotic and moral feelings such as patriotic enthusiasm or moral disgust, among others. For example, in regard to the phenomenon of pleasure, following Blaustein, there may be two sources. First, it can arise from seeing unknown places. In his comment, Blaustein emphasized that this form of pleasure has its psychic basis in the imaginative presentation, which constitutes the perceptive experience of seeing the imaginative object for the first time.⁴⁶ Second, pleasure can arise from understanding the action in a film if one follows a sequence of scenes; in turn, if a movie is “too complicated,” illogical, or full of contradictions, one feels displeasure.

All feelings, both aesthetic and non-aesthetic, are characterized by their intensity; however, in Blaustein’s view, non-aesthetic feelings should not surpass aesthetic feelings in terms of their intensity.⁴⁷ If this is the case, however, and non-aesthetic feelings—called by Blaustein, following Stephan Witasek, “quasi-aesthetic factors of pleasure” (pseudoästhetische Genussfaktoren)⁴⁸—dominate in the cinemagoer’s experience, the viewer’s aesthetic experiences are abandoned. Consequently, cinemagoers are dilettantes in regard to aesthetic experiences. This assessment advanced by Blaustein was borrowed from Geiger, who began his Zugänge zur Ästhetik [The Approaches to Aesthetics] with an attempt at defining the sources of dilettantism, which Geiger stated arises when values are experienced that are ascribed to a work of art yet are inadequate for it, and these inadequate lived experiences are apprehended as aesthetic.⁴⁹ In Blaustein’s opinion, this form of aesthetic dilettantism is widespread among cinemagoers. In this context, another less noticeable problem is that non-aesthetic feelings refocus cinemagoers’ attention on the inner (non-aesthetic) feelings that they live through instead of on the (aesthetically beautiful) objects represented in the movie.⁵⁰ To describe this phenomenon, Blaustein referred once again to Geiger and his differentiation between “inner concentration” (Innenkonzentration) and “outer concentration” (Außenkonzentration).⁵¹ Whereas the former consists in an attitude toward feelings which arise with the contemplation of a work of art, the latter is completely different and consists in observing the details of art objects. Blaustein held that films make it easier to focus on someone else’s feelings rather than on objects.

The fact that the cinemagoer’s perception involves non-aesthetic feelings, however, does not mean that aesthetic experiences are impossible here. In § 10 of his Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego [Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer], Blaustein analyzed the aesthetic and, as he put it, “semi-aesthetic” experiences of a cinemagoer. In general, aesthetic experiences arise with the pleasure of apprehending art objects as beautiful. How is this possible? According to Blaustein, objects presented in a movie are beautiful due to the way (sposób) in which they are presented.⁵² This, of course, depends on technical factors, e.g., how the camera operator filmed the objects represented in the movie or how the operator composed the background. Blaustein emphasized that aesthetic experiences are based on acts of comprehending the appearances (wyglądy) of objects seen “on” the screen. The emphasis put on appearances is not accidental here. This means that the aesthetic experience is even more intense for a cinemagoer after adopting a certain attitude toward the film: one has to be focused on the imaginative objects and the imaginative world. Blaustein was clear that this attitude “gives special aesthetic pleasure.” Only due to this attitude does one feel the pleasure which arises in the perception of dynamic sequences or scenes presented on the cinema screen. If one comprehends a series of images as a whole, i.e., the movie is well composed and structured, one also lives through an intense aesthetic experience. From Blaustein’s point of view, the composition can put the viewer in the appropriate mood. Next, the mood becomes a symbol of relevant feelings, but this requires an adequate presentation, i.e., a symbolic presentation which constitutes a relation between the symbolizing object (i.e., the mood) and the symbolized object (i.e., a certain feeling). Of course, as shown above, the mood can be constituted not only on the basis of the beautiful composition of a movie but also by the accompanying music, which serves to amplify feelings.

In his discussion of the structure of the cinemagoer’s experiences, Blaustein also referred to aesthetic experiences based on the pleasure which arises from participating in a movie’s action. In this regard, he explored two forms of subjective states: (1) one feels that one can experience in the same way as the movie characters, but only if one is in an analogous situation, or (2) one subjectively empathizes with the movie character and feels as if one is another person.⁵³ In his discussion of the idea of “empathy” (Einfühlung), Blaustein referred mainly to Johannes Volkelt’s aesthetic studies,⁵⁴ and he stressed that one can adopt this empathic attitude to experience different feelings, such as sympathy, antipathy, compassion, anger, contempt, outrage, respect, or comradery. By doing so, a film can encourage one to think of oneself. This issue, as we will see in the following section of this chapter, will be addressed by Blaustein to explore the educational role of film.

Blaustein held that aesthetic experiences consist in focusing entirely on sensations; this means, however, that one adopts an attitude toward the imaginative world as such. This function consists in giving a rest to the cinemagoer, who can forget about her everyday life and experience intense aesthetic feelings.⁵⁵ In the description of the phenomenon of “taking a rest,” Blaustein explicitly referred to Geiger’s theory of aesthetic illusion (Schein). In his early text “Ästhetik” [“Aesthetics”], Geiger found the sources of a theory of aesthetic illusion in Schiller’s philosophy.⁵⁶ The theory holds that the illusion arises with irreality (Irrealität) and with the specific ways of the manifestation (Gegebenheitsweisen) of what is presented (Dargestellten) in the work of art; more precisely, the illusion is founded on the phenomenon of the pictorial nature (Bildhaftigkeit) of what is presented. This gives the impression that one can experience the fullness of life (Fülle des Lebens) more intensely than in natural life. Geiger held that the psychological basis of this experience is that one comprehends the aesthetic as a “mere” illusion—as a mere “play.”⁵⁷ Again, in Blaustein’s view, Geiger’s theory of aesthetic illusion was adequate for describing the phenomenon of “taking a rest” that is involved in the cinemagoer’s experience. Blaustein, however, was aware that a movie serves to guarantee entertainment to the cinemagoer, and as such, it can be characterized as a source of momentary pleasure rather than a source of authentic happiness.⁵⁸ In the conclusion of his 1933 book, Blaustein claimed that all of the phenomena described by him are unified or merged (zlane) into one whole. For this reason, the cinemagoer’s experience is not—to use his phrase—atomic.⁵⁹ If non-aesthetic feelings dominate the sense of sight, the entire lived experience is not aesthetic, and the movie is aesthetically worthless. However, if aesthetic feelings dominate the actual perception, the entire lived experience may be called aesthetic. As shown above, this conclusion is deeply rooted in the analysis of the subjective ways in which objects are manifested in the cinemagoer’s experience.

9.1.3 Remarks on the Educational Role of Film

Whereas the 1933 book Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego [Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer] explored the structure and elements of the cinemagoer’s experience, Blaustein’s later study on the educational role of film, which was published in 1936/37, exceeded the borders of descriptive-psychological analysis. This series of three articles, which were originally published in Vol. 26 of Ruch Pedagogiczny [The Pedagogical Movement], can be regarded as an application of his earlier theoretical considerations to address the question of how to organize the educational process to improve the quality of cinemagoers’ experiences. In this 1936/37 study, Blaustein explicitly referred to the main theses of his 1933 analysis. For instance, he showed that if the cinema experience is based on intense feelings, it can have a much stronger impact on its viewers than, e.g., books have on potential readers; additionally, he used language known from his descriptive psychology, including “the imaginative world,” “symbolic presentation,” etc.⁶⁰ Given, however, that cinema can indeed have a significant impact on cinemagoers, his task was to examine film’s negative and positive impacts. Against this background, he aimed to formulate regulations concerning how to educate young people. Of course, even though Blaustein referred to a series of his 1933 descriptive-psychological ideas, the 1936/37 analysis was mainly pedagogical. Therefore, with this in mind, in the present section, I will reconstruct the main ideas of his study.

Blaustein’s examination is divided into three parts: (1) a discussion of the negative impact of film, (2) an exposition of the positive impact of film, and (3) an attempt to formulate advice on how to design the teaching process to improve young cinemagoers’ perceptions of film. To begin with, he listed nine factors which show the negative impact of film. (1) Displaying a movie in a cinema means that the viewer is less involved or less active because she does not have direct contact with the actual actors. In this context, Blaustein contrasted the cinema experience with a theater viewer’s experience, which is more intense and is founded on collective reactions to the play.⁶¹ Next, (2) films often affect sexual instincts (directly, as in erotic movies, or indirectly), yet this can be problematic if young viewers are also present. (3) A movie might involve crimes, or criminals could be represented as positive characters; a film is not long enough to condemn these crimes. (4) Films present a false view of the world and human beings. For instance, movies present human life as a coherent and clear structure, whereas natural life, as Blaustein put it, “[…] manifests itself as a chaos of events.”⁶² Moreover, films reproduce stereotypes by presenting men as active and women as passive, etc. Of course, the cinemagoer’s experience—as shown in Blaustein’s 1933 book—is founded on assumptions, but the goer often believes in the “truth” of the film. In Blaustein’s assessment, “[…] a kitsch and false pathos, so frequently present on screen, can easily instill insincere and exaggerated feelings in young viewers.”⁶³ (5) If a film is banal, i.e., the action and characters are superficial or the composition is irrational, it reduces the intellectual level of the young viewer. (6) For Blaustein, films are designed for a mass audience, but this implies that they are superficial; in turn, one gets a clear message that education is pointless because one feels pleasant in the cinema without receiving any education in the process. (7) Given that it is easier to watch movies, one stops reading books. (8) Films do not stimulate the viewer’s fantasy, as they provide ready-made images. Finally, (9) theater has also become less popular because the cinema experience is less challenging.

As already stated, the second part of Blaustein’s study concerns the positive impacts of film. In this regard, he listed six factors. (1) He acknowledges that film can increase someone’s knowledge about the world—after all, films present to viewers events or objects that are hard to observe in everyday life.⁶⁴ Film creators, then, should guarantee a high level of presented knowledge. Furthermore, (2) film can teach a young viewer, for instance, how to observe objects or the meaning of gestures and facial expressions. By doing so, films can improve one’s intelligence. (3) As analysis of the cinemagoer’s experience has shown, film isolates aesthetic objects and thus intensifies the aesthetic experience of these objects. This is possible since film induces cinemagoers to perceive the objects in the world of the film “as if they were an image.”⁶⁵ This, in turn, enables one to experience the aesthetic illusion that constitutes the aesthetic experience. (4) Due to the presentation of characters’ fates, films can encourage one to think about one’s moral life. Blaustein writes that “[f]ilm can […] inspire the self-confidence or courage to overcome oneself and the awareness that one’s sacrifice and efforts are not pointless, that suffering will be meaningful—in a word, that it is worth being noble and even worth living.”⁶⁶ Furthermore, (5) film gives the viewer a rest since it induces her to live through an aesthetic experience; this means that one does not think of the “struggle for existence.” Finally, (6) one experiences pleasant emotions while perceiving imaginative objects for the first time.

Given the negative and positive factors which form the cinemagoer’s attitude, in the third part of his study, Blaustein discussed the question of how film can be used by a teacher in the teaching process. In general, teachers should intensify the positive factors listed above and help young viewers understand these negative factors.⁶⁷ Therefore, a teacher—in Blaustein’s view—should assess false knowledge presented in a movie and show how films present objects in a certain way. In short, there is no view from nowhere. Next, the teacher can explain the symbolic meaning of relevant scenes or characters.⁶⁸ The teacher should train young cinemagoers to evaluate any film and its particular elements; if the viewers are critical, they will disregard worthless films and watch artistic ones. In this regard, Blaustein held that “[b]y becoming aware of the sources of their aesthetic experiences, young viewers will develop their aesthetic taste and intuitive criteria of beauty and ugliness; they will learn to critically express aesthetic judgments and become capable of justifying them.”⁶⁹ He believed that this task is realistic if the teacher discusses with students films that they have watched. Consequently, this attitude would help to overcome—as he wrote, following Stanisław Ossowski—the “aesthetic impotence”⁷⁰ of young cinemagoers.

To sum up, Blaustein seemed to suggest that the negative impact of films on young viewers stems from the fact that cinema is a form of mass culture. However, his discussion has a rather hypothetical character, and his often radical assessments are poorly argued. In addition, Blaustein referred too often to common knowledge or popular views on cinematic art. Nonetheless, it can be argued that his text was rooted in its historical context, i.e., a discussion of the educational role of film, which he was pioneering in the 1920s and 1930s.⁷¹ With this in mind, one can identify Blaustein’s contribution, but its value is again mainly historical. What is important for us, especially in regard to the question of the phenomenology of the media experience, is that he formulated his study on the basis of his descriptive-psychological analysis of the cinemagoer’s experience. Therefore, even if many of his particular diagnoses are outdated, the idea of applying phenomenological tools (broadly understood) seems to be surprisingly current.

9.2 The Phenomenon of Listening to a Radio Drama

Blaustein’s studies on the phenomenon of listening to a radio broadcast spanned the years 1936–39 and were summarized in his O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego [On the Perception of Radio Drama], a French translation of which was subsequently published in Kwartalnik Psychologiczny [The Psychological Quarterly].⁷² In general, the popularity of radio grew in the 1930s. Polish Radio was founded in 1925, and the regional station in Lvov started broadcasting in 1930.⁷³ In the 1930s, Witold Hulewicz, a Polish writer, literary critic, and publisher, became the literary manager of Polish Radio. In 1935, he worked with playwriters to produce radio dramas, which he sometimes called radio broadcasts (słuchowiska radiowe), i.e., purely acoustic performances that are an independent form of the literary work of art.⁷⁴ In his 1935 text on radio drama, Hulewicz used the phrase—originally coined by Zdzisław Marynowski, a Polish writer and former literary manager of Polish Radio—the “Theater of Imagination” (Teatr Wyobraźni) for this genre of literature, which was originally devoted to radio.⁷⁵ In Blaustein’s opinion, however, the phrase popularized in Poland by Hulewicz was misleading since it suggested that the experience of listening to the radio is possible as a result of imagination; in contrast to Hulewicz, Blaustein suggested that the radio experience built a specific form of perception which directly presents its objects.⁷⁶ To show this, in his 1938 study, Blaustein focused on the experience of listening to the radio; more precisely, he discussed not a radio report or a running commentary but rather the phenomenon of hearing a radio drama that lasts approximately 30 minutes.⁷⁷ In sum, in O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego [On the Perception of Radio Drama], he addressed the following topics: the question of the acoustic content of the radio experience and its apprehension (§ 1); how the imaginative world of radio drama is constituted (§ 2); whether the phrase “the theater of imagination” is appropriate (§ 3); how mental states are expressed in radio drama (§ 4); the perception of radio drama as a dynamic process (§ 5); and to what extent the perception of radio drama constitutes the aesthetic object (§ 6). Given the thematic scope of Blaustein’s work, it comes as no surprise that—as in his studies on film—Blaustein also referred to many elements of his theory of presentations in his study of the phenomenon of the radio experience.⁷⁸ In this regard, however, his research tasks were not purely theoretical, as he aimed to formulate practical rules to improve listeners’ way of perceiving a radio broadcast. In this section, I address Blaustein’s descriptive-psychological account of the phenomenon of listening, as well as the practical application of his descriptive analysis.

9.2.1 The Structure of the Radio Experience

The main problem discussed by Blaustein in his O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego [On the Perception of Radio Drama] was formulated as follows: how does one perceive a radio drama?⁷⁹ In this regard, he made a twofold clarifying restriction. First, he declared that he used the term “perception” (percepcja) instead of “observation” (spostrzeganie) deliberately since the perception of a radio drama is a complex lived experience that includes non-intuitive presentations. In turn, observation is exclusively formed from intuitive presentations. Second, he referred to the Brentanian classification of mental phenomena and clearly limited his analysis to presentations. He explicitly stated that neither emotions nor judgments are included in the perception of a radio drama.⁸⁰ To phrase it differently, the perception of a radio drama is a basic lived experience which includes different—intuitive and non-intuitive—presentations and which can create emotions or judgments. As such, of course, the form of perception at issue has an intentional structure.

In § 1 of his study, Blaustein showed that the presenting content of these experiences, i.e., sensations, are purely auditory and include murmurs (szmery) and sounds (dźwięki).⁸¹ However, one does not apprehend them as tones in the same way as when listening to music. Rather, one perceives murmurs and voices as sounds made by living creatures or by things. The act, then, apprehends the presenting content, which indicates “its” object. However, from a subjective point of view, one does not perceive content, i.e., sensations, as such but rather as objects. For this reason, Blaustein held that one perceives objects in a radio drama directly or “intuitively” in propria persona (osobiście); for instance, one perceives the sound of the river, the tumult of the fight, the clatter of the steam machine, etc. Of course, all of the sounds included in a radio drama may be chaotic and, as such, meaningless (or objectless). However, if they are adequately designed (due to effective editing) and the listener is therefore able to apprehend them as correlated with their objects, they can present a defined quasi-vision or—as Blaustein puts it—“acousion” (akuzja) of the represented situation.⁸² This, in turn, enables the constitution of the world of objects represented in the radio drama. I will return to the question of the represented world shortly, but for now, it is important to understand what Blaustein means by the term “acousion.”

The term “acousion,” which was one of Blaustein’s original contributions to the study of the radio experience and which is noticed in today’s media research but is not discussed in detail,⁸³ describes the complex phenomenon of listening to a radio drama. The term was coined in parallel with the term “vision,” which refers to a purely visual experience. If one sees an object surrounded by other objects, one has a visual experience of all these objects in terms of experiencing a mental picture or a vision. In turn, if one hears a murmur through which an object can be perceived, one has an acoustic experience of the object in terms of experiencing an acoustic space or an acousion. Acousion, then, refers to the specific auditory way of presenting objects heard by the listener. Blaustein’s point here is that one does not “see” the object represented by sounds while listening to a radio drama; rather, one “hears” the represented objects. With this in mind, one should read the following fragment of O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego [On the Perception of Radio Drama]: “[…] to perceive a radio drama, one has to have auditory experiences of ambient sounds, such as a ringtone or the wind, as well as an understanding of the words and sentences uttered by the characters of the radio drama.”⁸⁴

Of course, the auditory experience can be accompanied by visual images; however, according to Blaustein, perceptual or intuitive presentations are unnecessary for perceiving a radio drama. It is precisely for this reason that he rejected (in § 3 of his book) the suggestion present in the phrase “theater of imagination” that the radio experience consists in fantasy presentations; instead, it is more appropriate to refer to a radio drama with the phrase “acoustic theater” or “radio theater.”⁸⁵ In this regard, Eusebio Ciccotti explained that “[…] ‘radio theater’ is not limited to an elaboration of images produced by the imagination and, thus, perceived by it; but is also presented as a broader aesthetic activity, so broad as to also include non-perceived images that originate from the archives of memory.”⁸⁶ Therefore, again, acousion describes a first-person way of presenting heard objects given in apprehended auditory sensations. It is worth noting that Blaustein also included verbal sounds in acousion, such as words or sentences. If one hears a word, however, one apprehends not only its sound but also its meaning. This requires an adequate, i.e., signitive (or non-intuitive), presentation. I will discuss this later on. For now, it should be noted that acousion also ranges over melodies or music, both of which can be useful in presenting, e.g., emotions.

As stated above, according to Blaustein, acousion constitutes the world represented by relevant sounds or murmurs. He addressed this topic in § 2 of his book. To begin with, he noticed that one differently apprehends sounds heard in a radio report and those heard in a radio drama. While listening to the former, one places the represented objects in the same surrounding world as the listener. However, if one listens to the latter, one does not believe that the represented world is identical to the surrounding world. Rather, the world represented in the radio drama is fictional. Therefore, even if one believes that the sounds one hears are authentic, one does not believe in the existence of the world being represented. Blaustein described this phenomenon in the following way:

Hearing the sound of a ringing phone, we do not think that someone is calling in our real world; the background sound of a departing train does not convince us that a train has actually taken off, while listening to a human conversation, we do not feel that we are listening to people speaking “seriously.” The real objects which we consider to be the source of sounds and murmurs, such as people, telephones, etc., are apprehended by us as reproducing objects which represent someone. This is how not only people but also inanimate objects become actors. In this way, new worlds are constituted for the listener that are alien to the real world that surrounds one and are not connected to the real world in time or space.⁸⁷

The quoted fragment of O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego [On the Perception of Radio Drama] should be read in the context of Blaustein’s aesthetic theory. Here, presentations have a dual object, i.e., the closer or proper object and the distant or improper one. The former is the representing object, while the latter is the represented object. In the above fragment, Blaustein referred precisely to these elements of his theory. In the case of listening to a radio drama, if one hears (or apprehends) sounds or drones as acoustic or auditory content, these sounds or drones are the closer or proper objects which one “truly” hears; as such, they function as representing factors in one’s experience. However, if one hears (or apprehends) sounds or murmurs as sounds or murmurs of represented objects, e.g., the sound of a ringing phone or the rumbling of a departing train, these sounds or murmurs are distant or improper objects that one does not hear “truly.” He was clear in claiming that “[i]f there are no ‘reproducing objects,’ if there is no representation, then of course no imaginative world is constituted.”⁸⁸ In this regard, Blaustein noticed a shift in focus: one does not hear “mere” sounds, but rather, e.g., a phone ringing or a train departing “directly.” He described this shift as “objectifying” (uprzedmiotowienie) heard sounds or drones, and he held that here one hears sounds as the sounds of some objects.⁸⁹ Stated differently, the listener changes her attitude toward what is experienced; she is focused on the reproduced objects instead of the reproducing objects.

According to Blaustein, the represented world is constituted for the listener’s consciousness as the imaginative space of the radio drama. This is possible since the sounds and murmurs one hears are recorded closer to or farther away from the microphone. This gives the listener the impression that some objects, i.e., the represented objects, are represented in the fictional space as closer to or farther away from the listener. Therefore, one “measures” these distances in the fictional space, and the listener projects herself into the imaginative world—of course, not into the real world, e.g., the radio studio where the microphone is placed. Of course, this space is given originally as a purely auditory space, i.e., it is given in the form of acousion. It seems that Blaustein was right to say that the space is not oriented: there is no left or right side, unless one imaginatively presents the world to oneself in a visual way.⁹⁰ In any case, even if only a few sounds are heard by the listener, they give some suggestions regarding how to represent the imaginative world of the radio drama. Blaustein wrote:

The ticking of a clock, a knock on the door, a window closing: these all inform the listener that she “is” in the apartment; other murmurs and sounds [inform] that she is in an overcrowded café or at the opera house before the performance starts. The content of the dialog may include further suggestions so that the listener immediately operates with a schematic situational plan. The center of the spatial world centered around the microphone has distant parts. The departing train does not fall into an abyss but proceeds along a path; the storm rages somewhere outside the cottage, which is represented only by the rustling of trees swaying in the wind or the noise of rain or hail.⁹¹

The imaginative world constituted in the listener’s experience therefore has inherent horizons. This also holds for (imaginative) spatiality and for (imaginative) time. Even if a radio drama lasts 30 minutes, this period represents, e.g., weeks, months, or even years in the imaginative world. The sounds or drones one hears, however, do not present the entire imaginative world. In the fragment quoted above, Blaustein was clear that the world is a schematic object. By claiming this, he adapted Ingarden’s idea that a literary work of art involves spots of indeterminacy.⁹² Ingarden—and, following him, also Blaustein—understood these as gaps in content that cannot be filled by further acts.⁹³ In O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego [On the Perception of Radio Drama], one reads that a radio drama contains many spots of indeterminacy, and for this reason, it has a schematic structure; however, the listener does not have to intuitively remove these spots. As Blaustein put it, creative images are unnecessary here. For instance, technically, the listener does not have to present to herself the appearance of the characters represented in a radio drama.

Blaustein claimed that the imaginative world can be constituted not only by non-verbal sounds or murmurs. Verbal descriptions or the dialog of the represented characters can also contribute to the imaginative world. As already mentioned, verbal sounds such as words or sentences can be a part of the listener’s acousion. However, all of the elements that cannot be “heard” due to non-verbal sounds and that are constituted on the basis of a verbal description (given, e.g., by the narrator of the drama) are represented on the basis of signitive perception. As such, signitive presentations provide non-intuitive representations of meaning.⁹⁴ This topic was discussed by Blaustein on October 15, 1936, as part of Ingarden’s aesthetics seminar, during which he presented a talk on the radio experience.⁹⁵ In his critical remark on Blaustein’s idea, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz claimed that it is misleading to classify the perception of a radio drama as signitive. In Ajdukiewicz’s opinion, this form of perception takes place only if the one listens to a drama which is read by a reader; however, this is comparable to a situation in which one reads a book or a drama oneself. In response, Blaustein held that signitive perception can be a part of the whole lived experience of the listener; e.g., one perceives the action of a radio drama due to signitive representations, i.e., due to words uttered by actors.⁹⁶ Next, Ajdukiewicz clarified that listeners follow the action of a radio drama and do not follow what the actors are talking about. The latter is the object one “hears,” and as Ajdukiewicz put it, this is “a second layer,” which is less important than the action itself. Blaustein seemed to agree with this clarification only partially since he held that actors can talk about their inner psychic lives, e.g., about their emotions, and this layer is accessible only due to the actors’ verbal reports. It is for precisely this reason that it is misleading to hold that the perception of a radio drama excludes signitive perception; rather, this perception is the part which builds the complex phenomenon.

The Ajdukiewicz–Blaustein exchange showed that the scope of the intentional objects of the radio experience can include the psychic lives of the characters represented in radio dramas. Blaustein addressed this topic in § 4 of his 1938 book. He noted that radio drama—unlike a theater play or film—presents only a few selected and characteristic situations in which the relevant character reveals her psychic life and her mental states. This limitation is necessary due to time constraints. Blaustein put forward the thesis that technical restrictions mean that a radio drama often presents a character’s inner life explicitly and directly; after all, radio is limited in its capacity to represent the imaginative world.⁹⁷ For this reason, many radio dramas are, as Blaustein put it, “homocentric,” i.e., they are focused on the human being and her inner life. To show someone’s inner life, radio drama operates with the human voice (e.g., its emotional tinge), uttered words, and dialog. The listener can apprehend both how characters are talking and the meanings of uttered sentences. Of course, clues about a character’s psychic life may take the form of non-verbal sounds, e.g., of hitting a table, a cry, a laugh, etc. However, the main representation of a character’s inner life is the voice. For Blaustein, the voice expresses someone’s mental state. As he observed:

A voice may sound as if it is “tired,” “apathetic,” “intense,” “energetic,” “gentle,” or “firm,” it may reveal—regardless of the meaning of what is said, but in connection with the situation—anxiety, depression, excitement, agitation, anger, concern, despair, love, amazement, delight, humility, embarrassment, joy, compassion, contempt, etc. … A voice also reveals the age, gender, and temperament of the speaker, the way in which they express themselves—their “personal culture.” A voice, which might be “soft” or “hard,” resonant or hoarse, etc., can also cause the listener to like or dislike the speaker.⁹⁸

The quoted description concerns how a voice can be apprehended to present a character’s inner life. Of course, the list of different styles of speaking may include the vocabulary used by the dramatic character; however, again, the way in which acoustic content is presented is an important factor in the listener’s experience.

Regarding the question of inner life, it can be noted that Blaustein referred to Volkelt’s theory of empathy to describe how the listener understands the character’s psyche. This empathic attitude consists in experiencing together with the character represented in a radio drama. The music that accompanies dramatic actions is a factor in facilitating empathic attitudes. However, according to Blaustein, given that music and verbal sounds are both acoustic, it is difficult to follow them simultaneously.⁹⁹ On this basis, he postulated that music should be comprehended only as a preliminary element which puts the listener in a suitable mood. Music, as Blaustein wrote, “infects” (zaraża) the listener with the atmosphere of the setting in which the action takes place and which is represented in a radio drama.¹⁰⁰ All in all, he held that the fact that the listener apprehends only acoustic sensations does not preclude the possibility of presenting someone’s inner life.

9.2.2 The Ontology of a Radio Drama

In Sect. 8.4.2, I argued that phenomenology (in a broad sense) in Blaustein’s aesthetics, i.e., how one experiences an object, determines ontology. To use the Brentanian-Twardowskian language, one can say that presentations determine objects in his theory. This thesis also holds for his study of the radio experience. Indeed, how one lives through acoustic sensations determines the object represented in said experience; after all, representing objects are correlated with represented ones. This, of course, implies the ontological status of radio drama. First of all, it is a multi-strata object which includes four layers: (1) the acoustic layer, (2) meaning unities (this layer is built from the meanings of uttered sentences), (3) imaginative objects, and (4) the stratum of appearances (wyglądy) of these objects.¹⁰¹ Layer (1) includes the acoustic sensations originally experienced by the listener. Layers (2), (3), and (4) are constituted on the basis of layer (1) because they arise in the act of apprehending the presenting content. Thus, layer (2) is accessible if the listener comprehends acoustic content as meaningful verbal voices. Layer (3) arises with the listener’s active attempt to fill in the spots of indeterminacy that are inherent in the content of radio drama; here, one imaginatively presents to oneself (of course, due to one’s acousion) the imaginative world. Layer (4) is accessible due to the listener’s perception of the action of a radio drama without an intuitive presentation of concrete objects; this layer corresponds to the schematic structure of radio drama. Again, every stratum is correlated with relevant acts of the listener. Therefore, these strata are accessible because the listener adopts different attitudes toward the presenting content.

In § 1 of his O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego [On the Perception of Radio Drama], Blaustein formulated a four-part classification of different genres of radio broadcasts. This classification, as we will soon see, was based on how one experiences the sounds or background sounds heard in radio dramas. Blaustein indicates (1) non-imaginative broadcasts, (2) imaginative broadcasts, (3) imaginative and “homocentric” broadcasts (sometimes called “dramatic broadcasts”), and (4) music broadcasts.¹⁰² Ciccotti explained that “[t]he first category includes reportage, interviews, radio news and educational programs. Here, we follow the editing of sounds, voices and noises from the real world, all of which should be easily recognizable in order to comprehend the message.”¹⁰³ Additionally, the perception of these types of radio broadcasts does not constitute the imaginary world; the represented object is located by the listener in the same surrounding world. In short, no imaginative presentations are included in the perception. More precisely, the listener comprehends the reproducing objects (sounds or murmurs) as referring to the represented objects that exist in the real world. The second group includes types of radio broadcasts which require references to represented objects that exist in a fictional or imaginative world. This group covers non-homocentric radio dramas in which non-verbal sounds or murmurs are the main element that constitutes the imaginative world. For instance, the listener “hears” someone knocking, a door creaking, the wind blowing, etc. Here, the listener’s fantasy intuitively constitutes the imaginative world present to her. Ciccotti suggested that brief verbal phrases or short musical pieces should be included in these radio dramas.¹⁰⁴ However, again, the work of art cannot be homocentric. In turn, the third group places the human being or one’s inner life at the center of the work of art. Therefore, in addition to non-verbal sounds or murmurs, verbal sounds are also present. This group refers to radio broadcasts that constitute the imaginative world (due to the listener’s acousion) and are homocentric. As already stated, radio dramas mainly serve to present the character’s inner life. In addition to uttered words, music can also serve to present the relevant mood. The fourth group, of course, also includes sounds and murmurs, but they are apprehended as elements of melodies or music. This category includes transmissions of live concerts. Ciccotti held that here a concert is presented without any editing,¹⁰⁵ yet Blaustein himself seemed to leave this issue open. He probably would have argued that music broadcasts can include both live and recorded transmissions. In any case, the perception of this type of broadcast does not require the constitution of an imaginative world because it refers to real events. The listener can aesthetically experience the musical work of art.

In § 5 of his 1938 book, Blaustein discussed another aspect of the structure of radio drama. He stated that, in contrast to a painting or a monument, a radio drama is a dynamic work of art.¹⁰⁶ This implies that radio dramas have a phasic (temporal) structure and that the perception of the drama develops over a certain period of time. This, however, requires that the listener focuses for some time on what she hears. In addition, particular sounds are apprehended by the listener in a certain structure. For instance, the listener first “hears” someone knocking, next a door is creaking, and finally the wind is blowing, etc. This temporal order or sequence of sounds is possible to apprehend because one remembers what one has heard in previous moments. Therefore, although sounds are originally given at every moment, one lives through them as a whole or as a united object. For this reason, Blaustein held that the perception of a radio drama is not limited to the “present” (bieżąca) phase of the drama but also encompasses remembered phases.¹⁰⁷ Here, one notices a strict parallel between the ontological structure of radio drama (as a temporal object) and the way in which it is experienced; given this, it should not come as a surprise that the perception of radio drama also has a phasic structure. To describe this phenomenon, Blaustein referred to Ingarden’s idea of “living memory” (żywa pamięć), which determines the listener’s experience as a continuum of subsequent events. Blaustein stated that while listening to a radio drama, “[…] every new ‘now’ is embraced not only by the past but also by the future—not only by past events but also by anticipated events.”¹⁰⁸ Therefore, every moment “now” is accompanied by temporal horizons: one remembers what one just heard but one also anticipates subsequent sounds. Ingarden’s theory of “living memory,” which resembles Husserl’s phenomenology of inner time consciousness, was formulated by Ingarden in § 36 of Das literarische Kunstwerk, where he referred to Bergson when analyzing the temporal structure of experience.¹⁰⁹ Blaustein used this theory to describe the perception of radio drama.

Given the temporal structure just described, Blaustein held that one can adopt a dual attitude toward a radio drama. The listener can be focused either on the current moment or on the expected or anticipated phases. Blaustein called the former attitude contemplative (kontemplatywna) and the latter expectative (ekspektatywna).¹¹⁰ He added that an expectative attitude is adopted by the listener after the action of the drama is presented and not at the very beginning of listening to the broadcast. These subjective methods of presentation enable the director to change the pace of the action. The listener’s perception is therefore receptive and depends on the pace of the radio drama. In this regard, pauses are interesting. On the radio, pauses are always very short, and as such, they do not provide enough time to think about dramatic actions. Blaustein stated that silence in radio is ambiguous: it can refer to the structure of the dynamic work of art (e.g., silence at the beginning of a radio drama), or it can refer to silence in the imaginative world (e.g., characters stop talking). Overall, the phasic structure of radio drama implies that the listener experiences it as a continuum or unity.

9.2.3 The Aesthetic Perception of a Radio Drama

§ 6 of O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego [On the Perception of Radio Drama] is devoted to the aesthetic characteristic of the perception of radio drama. Blaustein begins with the remark that aesthetic perception can concern both artistic and non-artistic objects; simply put, a radio drama does not have to be a work of art to constitute an aesthetic experience. Like in his general aesthetic theory, Blaustein also held that the listener is an active subject of aesthetic experience, which should not be considered a mere passive emotion. He wrote: “[t]he aesthetic experience, however, is not a mere emotion created on the basis of a passive and purely receptive perception of an object; [it is] an experience that actively shapes its object because it depends on the qualities that reach the subject’s consciousness and what she overlooks.”¹¹¹ Of course, Blaustein did not reject the idea that an aesthetic experience can be based on qualities that are (objective) properties of an object. In this regard, his key insight was that aesthetic experience depends upon the first-person activity of the listener, i.e., on the ways of perception (sposoby percepcji). After all, even a work of art can be a mere “consumable,” i.e., an experience focused on non-aesthetic emotions. However, a shift in the way it is experienced can constitute an aesthetic experience for the listener.

Blaustein explained that the active role of the listener is evident in the constitution of the imaginative world. The constitution of the imaginative world as aesthetic depends on the following factors: (1) relevant ways of constituting the imaginative world; (2) relevant ways of filling the spots of indeterminacy that are inherent to the structure of radio drama; (3) ways of intuitive presentation of the imaginative world (not only visual but also on the basis of acousion); (4) co-empathic experience with the characters of a radio drama; and (5) understanding the inner lives of the represented characters.¹¹² Blaustein also listed further aesthetic qualities of radio broadcasts that can intensify the listener’s aesthetic experience: (6) the acoustic layer is well designed and, as such, provides the listener with many clues regarding how to construct the imaginative world; (7) the tone of voice or the uttered words are adequately selected to express the relevant mental states; and (8) dynamic construction of the dramatic action. Blaustein noted that properties (6)–(8) are apprehended not only when the listener is focused on the represented objects but also when one is focused on the representing objects, i.e., on the acoustic layer of the radio drama. However, in his opinion, if one is strongly focused on the latter, the aesthetic character of the experience might fall away. For this reason, the most important factor grounding the listener’s aesthetic experience is the listener’s attitude toward the imaginative world. This is a necessary yet not sufficient condition. In this context, Blaustein once again referred to the fact that radio dramas can be the object of, as he put it, pure consumption, i.e., perception without aesthetic emotions that contains many “gaps” (luki), i.e., spots of indeterminacy that are not actively filled by the listener. As Blaustein explained, “[c]onsumption does not require such a full apprehension of the perceived object as aesthetic perception does.”¹¹³

It is worth noting that Blaustein’s analysis of the aesthetic perception of radio drama showed a clear difference between his approach and Ingarden’s view of the aesthetic experience. Three points can be listed here. First, they disagreed on how to understand the aesthetic object. For Ingarden, the aesthetic object does not represent a material object but is a newly constituted (or “created”) object; this is possible due to the relevant aesthetic experience which arises together with a preliminary emotion.¹¹⁴ By contrast, Blaustein held that aesthetic perception is a fusion of passive (or receptive) and active elements. He held that the perceived object is “out there” (zastany) but is not “created” (stwarzany); thus, the perception of a radio drama is based on perceptual and imaginative presentations that are mainly passive, but later, fantasy (creative) or schematic presentations come into play.¹¹⁵ Therefore, for Blaustein, the radio drama, as an object perceived by a listener, is identical to the aesthetic object; the latter is in fact the original object, yet it is actively changed by the listener. Second, they disagreed on how to understand the first phase of the aesthetic experience. For Ingarden, aesthetic experience is based on a preliminary emotion, while for Blaustein, emotion is not enough since it is always accompanied by a perceptual act. Third, both philosophers assessed anticipation differently. Whereas Ingarden held that anticipation often ruins one’s aesthetic experience since it breaks with the current moment, Blaustein stated that anticipation is a significant factor in the aesthetic value of radio drama. Nonetheless, even if Blaustein rejected some of Ingarden’s ideas, O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego [On the Perception of Radio Drama], as we have seen above, adapted and developed other themes from Das literarische Kunstwerk.

9.2.4 An Outline of Blaustein’s Application of Descriptive Analysis

Blaustein clearly stated that his analysis of the perception of radio drama is mainly a theoretical project. Nonetheless, the original Polish version of the book ended with a list of practical conclusions, including concrete guidelines regarding how to plan a radio drama to improve its reception. He lists a total of 23 suggestions.¹¹⁶ Importantly, the majority of these are formulated on the basis of his study of radio perception. With these ideas in mind, it can be argued that Blaustein applied his first-person analysis of the phenomenon of the radio experience to a non-theoretical context. In short, he applied phenomenology or descriptive-psychological tools to media studies. Let me look closer at Blaustein’s guidelines to show how he used the concrete results of his analysis.

First, (1) Blaustein suggested replacing the phrase “theater of imagination” with “radio theater.” The argument for doing so is psychological in nature, as imagination is an unnecessary element of the perception of radio drama. It follows that (2) the structure of a radio drama might encourage the listener to employ her visual imagination to visualize the action, yet the director cannot assume that every listener will do this. (3) The structure should be focused on the acoustic strata of the broadcast since, as shown by Blaustein, the psychological basis of the listener’s experience is acousion. (4) Every type of radio drama—as defined in Sect. 9.2.2—can be considered a potential aesthetic object. (5) Descriptions are less important than the acoustic “atmosphere” of a radio drama. (6) It is not recommended to change the setting of a radio drama since broadcasts are too short to present a multitude of places. (7) The time represented in the imaginative world can be different than that in the real world because the imaginative world has inherent temporal horizons. However, (8) the priority in this regard should be the action’s dynamism to facilitate the dramatic structure of the broadcast. For this reason, (9) a speaker should not comment on or explain the action; otherwise, the dynamism will be lessened. (10) Perception of a radio drama that is focused on the current moment is based on auditory sensations. (11) Every radio drama has its “own” time horizon, which is inherent to the imaginative world and, as such, does not have to be broadcast live. (12) Since the listener cannot focus her attention during the entire broadcast, it is recommended to include a limited number of characters.

Furthermore, (13) due to the perception of radio drama being specific to the medium, the presentation of a character’s inner life is different than in real life. Nonetheless, (14) in homocentric (i.e., centered on human beings) dramas, one has plenty of acoustic tools with which to present the psychic lives of characters. Moreover, (15) acoustic tools are more intense than visual tools; therefore, acoustic tools make it easier to empathically experience the drama’s characters. (16) Verbal words and music cannot be effectively perceived at the same time. Music might be used to sketch the relevant (emotional) “atmosphere.” (17) Given that a listener is often too tired to follow a radio drama’s action in detail, the broadcast should be rather short. (18) The perception of radio drama is focused on the current moment; therefore, reproductive presentations are almost absent. However, a broadcast cannot refer to the listener’s memory too often. (19) As shown, the listener can adopt a dual attitude that is either contemplative or expectative, whereas the former is primarily aesthetic, the latter is focused on non-aesthetic emotions. To improve the listener’s aesthetic perception, one should encourage the listener to listen to the same radio drama again. (20) The whole perceptive lived experience also includes preliminary phases and subsequent phases; any broadcast should take into account this horizontal structure to form relevant acoustic objects while perceiving it. (21) Radio dramas should not focus on the consumption of non-aesthetic emotions; rather, they should improve aesthetic experiences. (22) To do this, the content of a radio drama should be isolated, i.e., the broadcast should not include a radio audience. Finally, (23) the listener’s perceptual abilities and aesthetic sensibilities improve as they engage with the material; given this, different radio dramas can present different levels of the work of art depending on the audiences they are intended for.

Almost all of the listed suggestions are deeply rooted in Blaustein’s descriptive-psychological analysis of the perception of radio drama. He referred to the first-person perspective, i.e., the listener’s experience, to justify even technical recommendations: for instance, limiting the number of characters represented in a radio drama or the time limit. In a nutshell, for Blaustein, descriptive-psychological analysis of the phenomenon of listening to the radio can play an important role in non-philosophical contexts. In conclusion, it can be argued that the 1938 book actually serves to apply descriptive tools to formulate concrete practical recommendations for radio drama directors. Therefore, by revealing the structure of the listener’s experience, Blaustein was able to show how a radio drama should be structured and built to improve its reception. Of course, I do not claim that the value of the 1938 book on radio lays in this clear attempt to implement descriptive tools. My point is that this practical tendency is an important aspect of Blaustein’s philosophical enterprise. This conclusion mirrors Wioletta Miskiewicz’s general idea of two trends in Blaustein’s work: theoretical and applied.¹¹⁷ Whereas the theoretical aspect of his work concerned the main concepts and the methodological basis of describing conscious experience, his applied analysis used these theoretical tools to analyze concrete phenomena, such as how to encourage an aesthetic attitude in radio audiences or to determine an artistic practice. It is clear that the 1938 book O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego [On the Perception of Radio Drama] was one of his applied works.***

The present chapter has discussed Blaustein’s phenomenology of media experience as an example of detailed studies of selected aesthetic phenomena, i.e., the cinemagoer’s experience or listening to a radio drama. My task was to develop the opinion formulated by many scholars who have claimed that Blaustein was a pioneer in studies on the perception of media.¹¹⁸ I have attempted to show that one may comprehend these studies as phenomenological in a broad sense, namely, as an application of descriptive tools in revealing the structure and character of the first-person experience of media. Of course, Blaustein explicitly wrote about the “psychology” of the cinema experience, and he emphasized that his analysis of the listener’s experience took place on the border with “psychology.” However, he referred in these contexts to his descriptive psychology, which is phenomenologically grounded. To phrase it differently, Blaustein was not interested in the cinemagoer’s or listener’s experiences as natural phenomena; rather, he inquired into the phenomena as such. As a result, he explored the ways of givenness or manifestation (Gegebenheitsweisen) of mediated objects. Therefore, his analysis was not psychological in a strict sense but philosophical through and through. He descriptively analyzed how one experiences film or radio drama.

Given this, his phenomenology of the media experience can be summarized as follows: (1) Media experiences are complex phenomena, i.e., they include different types of mental phenomena, yet they form a unity of a higher order. Therefore, they include presentations, emotions, and judgments. Consequently, (2) every type of media experience is sui generis. This means that there is no general structure of media experience as such; instead, it is diverse, depending on different ways of the givenness of objects. As shown above, the cinemagoer’s experience is based mostly on visual presentations, whereas the listener’s experience is based mostly on acousion. (3) For Blaustein, media experiences are direct, meaning they are perceptual. For instance, one sees a train at the station on the cinema screen, or one hears a train departing from the station in a radio drama. Next, (4) the object of a given media experience is accessible due to the relevant attitude that is adopted by the cinemagoer or the listener. Blaustein was clear that one could refer to the closer or the distant object. Therefore, one experiences colorful shapes on the cinema screen or acoustic sensations, but one can apprehend these shapes or sounds as components that represent objects. (5) Media experiences constitute fictional or imaginative worlds which have inherent spatial and temporal properties. (6) As such, they refer to schematic objects which can be filled by the on-going contemplation of the cinemagoer or the listener; their acts fill spots of indeterminacy. (7) Media experience has a temporal or phasic structure. Both film and radio drama are experienced in on-going acts. (8) Moreover, the media experience is also dependent on non-mental factors or contexts, including darkness in the cinema or the dynamism of a radio broadcast. Furthermore, he maintained that (9) a media experience can serve as the basis of an aesthetic experience, but (10) it is more frequently the basis of non-aesthetic consumption. Finally, (11) the phenomenology of the media experience can be applied in non-philosophical contexts, e.g., to reveal the educational role of film or to define concrete recommendations regarding how to improve the listener’s perception of a radio drama. With these ideas in mind, it can be concluded that both Blaustein’s works discussed in this chapter— Przyczynki do psychologii widza kinowego [Contributions to the Psychology of the Cinemagoer] (1933) and O percepcji słuchowiska radiowego [On the Perception of Radio Drama] (1938)—presented a consistent development of his philosophical enterprise, which was focused on the descriptive and systematic analysis of lived experiences.