Keywords

Introduction

Geopolitics has always been a factor in development debates and development cooperation, and we should not expect this to change (Liao & Lee, 2022; Nath & Klingebiel, 2023; Power, 2019). During the Cold War, ideologically competing powers used development cooperation as a political soft-power tool to fight or cultivate communism. Korea, for example, received generous support from the US due to its geostrategic location in Asia and south of the Soviet-backed Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). Similarly, the Soviet Union (USSR) supported China and Mongolia with large-scale infrastructure projects and signed the “Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation” with India in 1971. In the 1960s, poverty became a global problem and richer countries began to address the basic needs of poorer countries. In 1961, the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC) was established as the main donor forum for coordinating aid from developed countries to developing countries (Bracho et al., 2021). Containing the influence of the Eastern Bloc was a major driving force behind the creation of the DAC (Nath & Klingebiel, 2023).

Far-reaching geopolitical upheavals have characterized international relations in the recent past. The systemic confrontation between China and the US, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the seizure of power during military coups in Niger, as well as earlier in Mali and Burkina Faso, and the complete takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban reveal that the environment for global cooperation efforts has become much more difficult. Global cooperation has taken considerable steps backwards in recent months or years. Populism and autocratic trends in all regions of the world are seriously damaging global cooperation efforts. Scope for finding common solutions—above all in combating climate change—is difficult or even impossible, and in turn itself forms part of international lines of conflict (Klingebiel, 2023). Indeed, there are concerns that geopolitical concerns and fractures pose a fatal impediment to multilateralism (Howe, 2023).

The Global South is to a considerable extent the scene of these conflicts of a political, economic, and often also military nature. In an essential departure from earlier periods, however, countries of the Global South (Haug et al., 2021)—while not a homogeneous group—are now essential co-shapers in international relations (Ishmael (Ed.), 2022). This applies first and foremost to China, but also to India and other actors from the BRICS group and beyond. Beyond large non-OECD G20 members such as India, South Africa and Brazil, the behaviour of smaller states towards Russia and China is of considerable international importance, as shown by the votes in the United Nations General Assembly, or participation in Chinese development initiatives. This is why development paradigms and development policy approaches by Western countries as well as South–South Cooperation providers play a crucial role in this changing context.

The geopolitical upheavals of recent years ultimately affect all policies of OECD countries. Germany and Korea are both members of the OECD, which is typically regarded as the crucial economic coordination platforms of “Western countries” (Bracho et al., 2021). The geographical, political and economic context of both countries is in many ways different, with Korea being part of the Indo-Pacific and Northeast Asia subregion, whereas Germany is very much rooted in the European Union. Both countries have important commonalities, too, such as their strong economic export orientation and close economic links with China.

The new geopolitical trends apply to the classic fields of foreign and security policy, climate and energy policy, but also increasingly to other policy fields, such as the agricultural and science policies of OECD countries. A fundamental aspect of Western development policy is its focus on the Global South. This is a fundamental characteristic and rationale of the policy field (Klingebiel, 2022a). In this respect, the question is of great importance: What does all this mean for development policy concepts and narratives, and likewise for operational implementation?

The Indo-Pacific Region in the Approaches of Germany and Korea

The Indo-Pacific region,Footnote 1 which stretches from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean and includes India, is gaining importance in academic and policy debates. Most countries of the region belong to the “Global South”, and some countries to the OECD (Australia, Japan and Korea). Korea, a country which belonged only 25 years ago to the Global South and was heavily dependent on Official Development Assistance (ODA) for 50 years (1945–1995), plays a special role because of its recent graduation (Howe, 2017: 249).

The Indo-Pacific region accounts for approximately 40% of global GDP, is expected to be the biggest contributor to global growth for the next decades, and sharpens all dimensions of global affairs (security, trade, etc.). Top global economies are based in the Indo-Pacific: China (global economic rank #2), Japan (#4), India (#5), Korea (#13), Australia (#14) and Indonesia (#16). The region is home to 60% of the world’s population.

China’s expanding geopolitical, economic and investment footprint has resulted in multiple strategies, designed implicitly or explicitly to counter China’s rising influence. These include multipronged Indo-Pacific strategies and approaches from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Korea, India, the Netherlands, UK, the EU, the US and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). There is no relevant OECD actor without a current Indo-Pacific strategy, including the US (White House, 2022), the European Union (Joint Communication by European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2021), Korea (December 2022), and the German government guidelines on the Indo-Pacific region (2020). The latest US National Security Strategy (October 2022) mentions the region 32 times. Increasing attention for the region indicates a higher level of geopolitical and economic competition between actors and more sensitive issues for countries expected to benefit from development policies. Many of the responses to China’s challenge have focused primarily on “minilateral” hard security cooperation between three to five like-minded states led by the US (Howe, 2023).

For OECD actors there are three main motivations to focus on the region (DGAP, 2024; Klingebiel, 2022b):

  1. 1.

    Economic dimension in terms of trade and supply chains: For example, the EU and China are close trading partners. In 2021 China alone was the third most important partner of EU exports (10.2%) and the largest partner for imports (22.4%).

  2. 2.

    Security dimension: Taiwan’s security; China’s militarization of the South China Sea; conflicts beyond the direct involvement of China and the neighbouring countries, such as the long-lasting tense situation between India and Pakistan.

  3. 3.

    Climate change dimension: Dynamic economies of the region are among the main global carbon emitters. China alone is responsible for around 30% of all global emissions, India’s global share is around 6% and Indonesia’s 5%.

The Indo-Pacific focus is linked in large parts to China. However, it goes well beyond China. Major OECD actors follow a strategy, which frames China and related sectoral areas in three different ways:

  1. 1.

    China as a partner: The country is needed to meet all regional and global challenges. There is no way to work effectively on the issue of climate change or protection without China’s involvement.

  2. 2.

    China as a competitor: In many cases, the country competes with OECD actors. Competitive patterns are relevant, for example, when it comes to access to raw materials (e.g. in Africa), markets (e.g. in Asia), or political influence (e.g. Asia, Pacific). Competitive features can be observed in many parts of the African continent, among others.

  3. 3.

    China as a rival or a threat: The country is increasingly perceived as offensive and/or aggressive in some areas. This includes, for instance, the militarization of the South China Sea and the relationship with Taiwan. The term “sharp power” (Nye, 2018) is used to describe China’s (and Russia’s) attempts to manipulate and manage information in other countries. “Geoeconomics” as a concept is a strategy of offering economic benefits (e.g. in the context of BRI) to target other countries to influence them.

Development policy has consequently become framed within these geopolynomic narratives. “Geopolynomic” is a term introduced to encompass the intersectorality of geopolitics, geoeconomics, geostrategy, geohistory and other approaches (Howe, 2022). This becomes apparent when analysing the strategies of Germany and Korea towards the region.

Germany

In September 2020, the German government launched its strategy (actually called “guidelines”) on the Indo-Pacific region. To set itself apart from former German approaches, the document emphasizes strongly German “interests” in the region. The document actually starts with (i) interests (such as “peace and security” and “open markets and free trade”) and discusses in addition (ii) principles (such as “multilateralism” and “European action”) and (iii) initiatives (for example, for tackling climate change). The strategy reflects on sustainable development concepts (SDGs, etc.) and to a certain extent on Germany’s development policy approach in the region without giving this policy field much explicit attention. Based on the document from 2020, the German government publishes, on an annual basis, progress reports on the implementation of its Indo-Pacific region strategy.

The release of the first China strategy in mid-July 2023 sparked significant debate in Germany, particularly when compared to the Indo-Pacific region strategy. Conflicts arose in the preparation of the document and the follow-up discussions between those actors in Germany favouring concrete interests (maintaining good trade relationship, etc.) and those highlighting “values” (such as the human rights situation in China). Some of these conflicts were between actors within the German federal government, and also linked to the development of a national security strategy which was prepared in parallel to the China strategy. However, many debates also showed that reality is in many ways much more complex. For instance, an economic de-risking strategy goes beyond a binary distinction between interests and values.

The presence and history of Indo-Pacific engagement of France and the UK is more intense than that of Germany; at the same time there are several similarities (Paskal, 2021). One similarity is the concern that national policies are fractured into two groupings. For a long period, some sections of political and economic communities were looking for closer ties with China, while defence, intelligence and security communities were concerned about China’s influence and strategies domestically and internationally.

Against a background that the Indo-Pacific region strategies of Germany and other OECD countries are at least implicitly driven by China’s rise over recent years, this document is more explicit on Germany’s view and policy approach. The document uses a three-category approach (very similar to the overall OECD framing) for dealing with China: China as a partner, as a competitor and as a systemic rival. The document does not spell out in which category it puts the field of “development” (including China’s development initiatives) and “development policy” (see also Nath & Klingebiel, 2023).

Interestingly, development topics play a crucial role in the German China strategy. Given the fact that China’s rise is closely related to its development paradigm and its connectivity and infrastructure approach (not least to the Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013) the strategy reflects on the topic in several ways. This includes the geoeconomic potential of China’s development initiatives (using trade, finance, etc., for geopolitical purposes). The strategy also presents some areas of continued cooperation in the field of development policy between Germany and China (such as specific triangular cooperation activities and academic collaboration related to development topics).

In addition to the overall strategies of the Federal Government, the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) launched a new strategy on “German development policy with Asia” in December 2023. Interestingly, the paper does not use the Indo-Pacific region as a framing regional concept. And the document emphasizes mainly the topics for Germany’s general development policy since the governing coalition came into power in December 2021. Thus, the guiding aspects of the BMZ Asia strategy are “innovation”, “social” and “feminist”.

Finally, yet importantly, Germany pushes to a large extent connectivity and infrastructure initiatives of the EU, the G7 and beyond. Those initiatives are implicitly, and often even explicitly, responding to China’s engagement in this regard. They typically emphasize the aspects of high-quality infrastructure and sustainability, and sometimes refer to a different set of values coming along the investments.

Those activities include the Global Gateway initiative of the European Union (see the chapter by Keijzer in this volume) and the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, launched under Germany’s G7 presidency in 2022, and brings together several initiatives of the EU, Japan and the US. The Western connectivity and infrastructure initiatives, such as the Global Gateway, include public development funding, but they go beyond public resources and intend to mobilize private sector investments.

Korea

Much of the internal perception of South Korea, as well as the external strategic analysis of its policy options, has focused on the relative weakness and vulnerability of the country in what has been described as one of the most dangerous regions in the world (Calder & Ye, 2010). Indeed, it had long seemed the geostrategic destiny of the country to suffer the fate of a shrimp in the old Korean proverb and get crushed to death in the fight between whales, as has been repeatedly referenced by commentators from all political and paradigmatic backgrounds, across an extended analytical period (Kim, 2006; Lee & Park, 2017; Shim, 2009).

In terms of strategic discourse, the shrimp among whales narrative finds the greatest support from a power political or “realist” view of the world, wherein a small weak state, surrounded by regional and global behemoths, has severely limited options, in the face of a geostrategic operating environment within which, to quote Thucydides (c. 413 BCE), the “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”. Available strategies are traditionally restricted to “balancing’ or “bandwagoning” with the strong. Yet, such are the geostrategic and geoeconomics constraints upon Korea, that the country has been conceptualized as being stuck between a “rock and a hard place’ in terms of its military dependency upon its closest ally, the US, and its largest market and trading partner, China (Kim & Cha, 2016). Pressured by the US strategic “rebalancing” in the region, and China’s geostrategic “wedge” policy platform, rather than balancing or bandwagoning with either, often Korea, has tried to operationalize some form of “hedging” strategy (Chun & Ku, 2010; Kang, 2009; Kim, 2021).

Ultimately this approach was also abandoned with the inauguration of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration. Prior to coming to power President Yoon had made it clear that “rebuilding” Korea’s alliance with the US was to be central to his geostrategic policy commitments and was also a recognition of Washington’s frustrations with the hedging of the outgoing government of President Moon Jae-in (Lee, 2022). Yoon has come off the fence and chosen sides between the whales. For Ramon Pardo, the extent to which this was ever in doubt has been exaggerated by other commentators; he posts that, rather than a strategic dilemma, Seoul was faced with a strategic non-dilemma, and had “long ago decided that when it comes to foreign policy and security, its past, present, and future lies with the US and other like-minded partners” (Pardo, 2022). To try to create some policy space within these hierarchical power constraints, successive Korean governments have striven for a geopolynomic niche role.

The Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003–2008) projected South Korea’s pivotal role as a “balancer” or “hub” in the region to facilitate regional cooperation in the realms of economy and security (Cheong, 2008). During the Lee Myung-bak administration (2008–2013), South Korea’s self-identification as a middle power took a more explicit form (Teo, 2018). Under the overarching slogan of “Global Korea”, the concept of middle power was used to support the aspiration to increase the country’s international influence by enhancing its networking capacity and convening power (Green, 2017). The Park Guen-hye administration (2014–2016) was more reluctant to apply the middle-power nomenclature to its diplomatic posture due to fear of provoking apprehension and/or misunderstanding in the US and China. Yet, even though the use of middle-power language started to diminish early in Park’s term, related geostrategic policies were still pursued, such as the establishment of the middle-power grouping of Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia (MIKTA), and the promotion of the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (Lee & Park, 2017). Among the public and academics in Korea and abroad, the terminology has also been used to describe Korea’s “middle” position between China and the US under progressive administrations in Seoul, peaking with Moon Jae-in’s hedging and bridging endeavours (Kim & Cha, 2016).

Despite abandoning the “betwixt” conceptualizations of Korea’s geostrategic position of his predecessors, Yoon Suk-yeol’s “Global Pivotal State” owes much to their ideational legacy. The details of the policy platform imply a continuation of the broadening of middle-power aspirations and niche diplomatic activities begun by previous administrations to include non-strategic initiatives. But they also reflect an enhanced aspirational role for a Korea seen as more influential than a “mere” middle power. The combination of hard power and soft power in the contemporary discourse is termed “smart power”, and these areas of foreign policy platform construction have been of particular importance in the middle-power discourse (Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2007). Given their lack of compulsory power, middle powers need to pursue “niche diplomacy”, which involves concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having, rather than trying to cover the field, allowing them, therefore, to “punch above their weight” (Henrikson, 2005: 67).

The proposal of the administration of Moon Jae-in (2017–2022) for a Northeast Asia Peace Community (NEAPC) contained three components: a Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Platform (NAPCP), a New Northern Policy (NNP) and a New Southern Policy (NSP). The ambitious aim was to build a sustainable regional system of cooperation with the 10 Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the middle-power grouping of MIKTA, India and Northeast Asian states. President Yoon Yoon rebranded the Moon administration’s New Southern Policy as the Korea–ASEAN Solidarity Initiative (KASI), and has consistently emphasized ASEAN’s significance as an economic and strategic partner. Engagement with the “South” was initially termed an “ABCD Strategy” of advancing human capital, building health security, connecting cultures and digitizing Asian infrastructure, continuing the previous administration’s focus on people, peace and prosperity. Hence, Yoon’s “Indo-Pacific strategy upholds the notion of ASEAN centrality, and promotes ASEAN and its various mechanisms at the central platform for regional cooperation” (Ryu, 2023, p. 11).

The RoK has a significant history of liberal middle-power advocacy in terms of promoting peace, the environment and development in the Global South. Within the Indo-Pacific, Korea has consistently concentrated 30% of its total Official Development Assistance (ODA) on countries within ASEAN. Korea has 26 priority development partners, of which the largest geographical concentration is in Asia (11 countries), with six in Southeast Asia. For Soyeun Kim (2011, p. 805), “the Korean ODA model in particular epitomises Seoul’s strategic positioning (or bridging) between the developed and developing countries. With the model, Korea promotes its distinctive approach to aid while at the same time proclaiming its willingness to be part of global aid efforts”. Even before joining the OECD DAC, “Korea had emerged as the unrivalled leading donor, in absolute amounts, among non-DAC OECD countries” (Chun et al., 2010, p. 790).

In recent years Korea has turned its attention to humanitarian or principled diplomatic and development engagement with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (the CLMV countries). Each of these countries is affected by conflict, and given the high prevalence of poverty has great need for Korean assistance. Korea has made Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam priority partners, and already has extensive humanitarian commitments in Cambodia and Vietnam. Korea has, as yet, only a limited partnership with Myanmar and Laos. The 2019 Commemorative Summit in Busan, however, also served as the First Mekong–Republic of Korea Summit. According to the official publication on the summit, recognizing the growth potential of the region, Korea has cooperated with Mekong countries in a host of areas related to humanitarian niche diplomacy such as public health, rural development and infrastructure.

Since 2017, Korea’s ODA/GNI ratio has been relatively stable. Korea committed to reaching an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.2% by 2020, but the government acknowledged its failure to reach the target in the Midterm Strategy for Development Cooperation (2021–2025), citing worsening public finances. Even this target was rather low when compared to other major OECD economies (Keijzer et. al., 2022: 3). Yet President Yoon aspires to Korea playing a “leading role in the areas that necessitate our part”, and “when we are asked by the international community to participate more, we need to firmly demonstrate our attitude of respect for the international rules-based order”.

Korea has been criticized for focusing too greatly on bilateral rather than multilateral assistance, with the notable exception of the Green Climate Fund, which is based in the country. Given that from one perspective middle-power activism is all about visibility on the international stage, it is not surprising that Korea clings to bilateralism rather than multilateralism. Yet, President Yoon has repeatedly emphasized a desire to work with like-minded partners, so even if multilateralism is not appealing, minilateral geopolynomic cooperation might be an option for the future.

Conclusion

One crucial turning point has been and is the use of the development initiatives initiated by China for offensive geopolitics in the Global South, especially since the 2017 Communist Party Congress (Klingebiel, 2023; Nath & Klingebiel, 2023). The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has been implemented since 2013, has set new standards and expectations for how an infrastructure initiative can massively change countries. Incidentally, this initiative is not only aimed at developing countries, but encompasses a total of 180 countries and institutions. The BRI is a major contributor to raising the profile of the Indo-Pacific region for actors outside and inside the region. However, the role of the region in terms of economic status and future economic potential, population size and the geopolitical power of political actors, is highly related to China, but also goes far beyond the role of the country.

Other Chinese initiatives have been added in recent years, including the Global Development Initiative (GDI) (2021), which is valued by many developing countries. At the beginning of 2023, the Global Security Initiative (GSI), agreed on by the group of BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), was added. The Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), published in March 2023, shows the range of the initiatives and the close links between them.

OECD actors’ Indo-Pacific policies show evolution from an initially supportive view of China’s South–South cooperation, to considering it a key element of the struggle for power in international relations. This is particularly true of the BRI. The Russian invasion of February 2022 acted as an extreme accelerator of overarching trends. This applies above all to the dimensions of geopolitics, geoeconomics and especially to energy and raw material security.

Germany and Korea are both aiming to reinvent their respective identities in international relations. Germany is trying to find its own role as a country with some expectations to shape international agendas. To some extent, in a similar way, Korea is developing further its role as a pivotal state.

Both countries are changing their development approaches in this new context. They have distinct regional and sub-regional geopolynomic rationales as actors within the EU/Europe and NATO on the one hand, and being a divided country in the Indo-Pacific region, based in Northeast Asia, with close economic ties to China and Japan on the other hand. Yet, to a certain degree, the OECD and its role for development topics and development policy coordination links both countries. The US likewise strongly impacts German and Korean politics, not least through the crucial role it fulfils of providing military protection to both countries.