Keywords

In the following chapter, we present some of the more well-known studies on the subject. We begin with the contributions of Ronald F. Inglehart and present the other approaches in alphabetical order of the authors’ surnames.

3.1 Inglehart: Homosexuality and Existential Security

Without question, the work of the late Inglehart stands out in the literature on global value research. Inglehart, in some of his major publications (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart, 2018a, b, 2020) developed an interpretation of global value change based on a well-known two-dimensional scale of global values and global value change. It is based on the statistical technique of factor analysis of up to twenty key World Values Survey variables from the original 900 + WVS survey items. These 900 items cover virtually all major areas of human concern, from religion to politics and from economic to social life. The two Inglehart dimensions are: (1) the Traditional/Secular-Rational dimension and (2) the Survival/Self-expression dimension. In a factor analysis of ten indicators, these two dimensions explain more than 70 per cent of the cross-national variance. Each of these dimensions is strongly correlated with scores on other important variables. For Inglehart and Baker (2000), all pre-industrial societies have relatively low levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce and homosexuality; and tend to emphasise male dominance in economic and political life. There is respect for parental authority and the importance of family life, and these societies are relatively authoritarian. Most of them place a strong emphasis on religion. Advanced industrial societies tend to have the opposite characteristics.

Inglehart et al. (2017), found that that high levels of economic and physical security are conducive to a shift from materialist to postmaterialist values—and that this shift tends to make people more favourable to important social changes. Inglehart et al. (2017) maintain that (1) These value changes occur with exceptionally large time lags between the onset of the conditions conducive to them, and the societal changes they produce—as previous work implies but does not demonstrate. The evidence suggests that there was a time lag of forty to fifty years between when Western societies first attained high levels of economic and physical security after World War II, and related societal changes such as legalization of same-sex marriage. A distinctive set of “individual-choice norms,” dealing with acceptance of gender equality, divorce, abortion, and homosexuality, is moving on a different trajectory from other cultural changes. These norms are closely linked with human fertility rates and require severe self-repression. Although basic values normally change at the pace of intergenerational population replacement, the shift from pro-fertility norms to individual-choice norms is now moving much faster, having reached a tipping point where conformist pressures have reversed polarity and are now accelerating changes they once resisted. Inglehart et al. (2017) test these claims against data from eighty countries containing most of the world's population, surveyed from 1981 to 2014.

Inglehart et al. (2017) also found that people who reject gender equality also tend to reject homosexuality, divorce and abortion, endorsing traditional pro-fertility norms; conversely, acceptance of gender equality, homosexuality, divorce and abortion go together in an individual-choice syndrome. Most societies, as Inglehart et al. (2017) argue, no longer require high fertility rates, and they have dropped dramatically—especially in high-income societies where life expectancy rates have almost doubled in the past century and infant mortality rates have fallen to one-thirtieth of their 1950 level. For many years, it has no longer been necessary for women to produce six to eight children in order to replace the population. But deep-rooted cultural norms change slowly. Virtually all religions that became major world faiths emphasize pro-fertility norms—and they do so vigorously, instilling the belief, Inglehart et al. (2017) maintain that violators of these norms will burn in hell for all eternity.

It was necessary, as Inglehart et al. (2017) argue, to make these cultural sanctions severe because pro-fertility norms require repression of strong natural urges and defining homosexuality as sinful and unnatural imposes repression and self-hatred on gays and lesbians. These norms are no longer necessary for survival, but as Inglehart et al. (2017) maintain, deep-rooted cultural norms resist change. Nevertheless, modernization brings high levels of existential security.

Because all major world religions traditionally supported pro-fertility norms, people with strong religious beliefs, and societies where religion is strongest, will be least likely to support individual choice norms.

3.2 Adamczyk: Cross-National Variations in Public Opinion About Homosexuality

For the widely received study by Adamczyk and Pitt (2009), religion is often seen as an important predictor of attitudes about homosexuality. However, cross-national differences in cultural orientations suggest that the role religion has in explaining homosexual attitudes may depend on a nation’s cultural context. The authors merge ideas from cultural sociology and religious contextual effects to explain cross-national variation in public opinion about homosexuality. Using data from the fourth wave of the World Values Survey and hierarchical modelling techniques, they find support for the micro and macro effects of religion and a survival versus self-expressive cultural orientation. Moreover, they find that personal religious beliefs have a greater effect on attitudes about homosexuality in countries like the United States, which have a strong self-expressive cultural orientation.

While, for example, same-sex marriage is permitted in Canada, Belgium, and the Netherlands, homosexuality is illegal and gay marriage is unthinkable in most African nations. Adamczyk et al. (2009) lament that very little research has been done to explain variation in attitudes about homosexuality in non-Western nations. Research done on the United States typically points to religion as one of the strongest predictors of attitudes about homosexuality. But, because research has primarily been conducted in Christian nations, it is not clear how non-Judeo-Christian faiths shape public opinion about homosexuality. Additionally, work in cultural sociology suggests that economic development and political stability may play a major role in shaping public opinion towards non-normative groups and behaviours, like homosexuality.

To examine the macro and micro level effects of religion and culture Adamczyk et al. (2009) used data from the fourth wave of the World Values Surveys. The sample included adults 18 and over from 40 societies. The key outcome variable is disapproval of homosexuality, which is measured using a single question that asks whether homosexuality can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between. Responses ranged from always wrong = 1 to always right = 10. The variable was reverse coded so that higher numbers indicate more disapproval.

Adamczyk et al. (2009) find that the largest correlation for attitudes about homosexuality is the country survival vs. self-expression index (r = 0.38), which is followed by living in a Muslim-majority country (r = 0.35), and then Muslim affiliation (r = 0.29) and religious importance (r = 0.25). Individual religious importance is moderately correlated with the country survival vs. self-expression index (r = 0.23), Muslim affiliation (r = 0.26), and living in a Muslim-majority country (r = 0.27). Not surprisingly, Muslim affiliates are more likely to be living in a Muslim-majority nation (r = 0.63).

People in older cohorts are more likely to disapprove of homosexuality than people in younger cohorts. Adamczyk et al. (2009) also find that females appear to have more liberal attitudes about homosexuality than men. Likewise, married individuals are more likely to disapprove of homosexuality than single or divorced people. Also, increases in educational attainment are associated with more approving attitudes about homosexuality. At the individual-level, a greater emphasis on survival, as opposed to self-expressive values, is associated with more disapproving attitudes about homosexuality.

Not surprisingly, Adamczyk et al. (2009) maintain, individuals who say that they find religion important are more likely to disapprove of homosexuality, which offers support for our first hypothesis. Compared to Muslims, people with no religion, Catholics, Jews, people who did not identify a religion, and individuals for whom the study did not have appropriate information to categorize them have more approving attitudes about homosexuality. Muslims do not differ significantly in their disapproval of homosexuality from Protestants, Hindus, Buddhists, Orthodox Christians and people who affiliate with a religion.

Compared to people living in Muslim-majority nations, people who live in Catholic and Protestant majority countries have, as Adamczyk et al. (2009) maintain, more approving attitudes towards homosexuality, regardless of the religion with which they personally affiliate. There is no significant difference in attitudes about homosexuality for people who live in a Christian Orthodox, Hindu, or Buddhist as opposed to a Muslim nation.

In nations characterized by a strong survival orientation, public opinion about homosexuality is highly disapproving, regardless of the individual’s personal religious belief.

Consistent with Inglehart (see above), Adamczyk and Pitt (2009) also found that as societies shift their emphasis from survival to self-expression, attitudes about homosexuality become more accepting. In countries that have a stronger survivalist orientation, religiously inspired attitudes about homosexuality are likely to be consistent with secular norms and laws, giving attitudes about homosexuality wide-spread support. As a result, personal religiosity in countries characterized by a stronger survival orientation does not have much of an effect on attitudes about homosexuality. However, Adamczyk et al. (2009) say, when the cultural emphasis within countries shifts to self-expression, secular norms and laws regarding homosexuality become more liberal, providing a greater role for religion to influence attitudes about homosexuality. Hence, as Adamczyk et al. (2009) maintain, personal religious beliefs have a greater effect on attitudes about homosexuality in developed countries like the United States, which are characterized by a high level of self-expression and a diversity of perspectives, than in countries like Zimbabwe, which have a stronger survival orientation.

These findings, Adamczyk et al. (2009), suggest that one may need to reorient our thinking about the relationship between religion, and tolerance for unfamiliar groups. Economic and political stability is likely to make all people within a nation more tolerant of non-normative groups and ideas. However, as economic, and political stability contributes to a self-expressive value orientation, religious attitudes may not become more liberal. Rather than religion having less of an influence on attitudes as nations develop, shifts from survival to self-expression are likely to provide a greater role for religion to influence attitudes. Adamczyk et al. (2009) offer an insight into what the study might expect as countries further industrialize and develop—namely increasing tolerance for homosexuality, but also a stronger relationship between religious beliefs and disapproval of homosexuality.

While Muslims appeared less likely to approve of homosexuality than Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists and people with no religion, they did not differ significantly from Protestants in their attitudes about homosexuality. One reason for Protestants and Muslims similar attitudes may be, as Adamczyk et al. (2009) suggest, the “brand” of Protestantism that is growing in the world today. While the Catholic Church and mainline Protestant denominations have been losing members, conservative Protestant religious groups, like Pentecostals, have been steadily increasing, not just within the United States and Europe, but across the globe. Adamczyk et al. (2009) also think that relative to mainline Protestants and Catholics, conservative Protestants tend to take a literal interpretation of the bible, and they have remained steadfast in their traditional beliefs about sexual morality. Hence, compared to Jews, Catholics and mainline Protestants, conservative Protestants tend to have more conservative sex-related attitudes.

Like Islam, the Catholic Church does not officially support homosexuality. But, unlike Islam, Adamczyk et al. (2009) maintain, the Catholic Church in Europe has experienced declining membership since Vatican II, which may have reduced the power of the church to influence laws, policies, media, norms, family structures and so forth. In Latin America, where the Catholic Church has remained relatively strong, issues associated with economic inequality have gained importance. If the growing number of conservative Protestants and Muslims across the world is any indication, religion’s influence is not declining, even as countries develop and stabilize. However, shifts in the issues of interest to religious leaders and adherents could have, Adamczyk et al. (2009) think, a powerful bearing on the development of national policies and laws, including the legality of homosexuality.

The key outcome variable in the study Adamczyk and Chen (2015), is again disapproval of homosexuality, which is measured using a single question that asks whether homosexuality can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between. The variable was reverse coded so that 1 = always justified and 10 = never justified. Adamczyk and Chen (2015) found that across the five Confucian societies in the World Values Survey, only individual feelings about prostitution and divorce were consistently associated with attitudes about homosexuality. In Confucian nations, according to Adamczyk and Chen (2015), there were no significant relationships between attitudes about homosexuality and values related to behaving properly, conformity, gender roles, and filial piety. There was no consistency in the level of significance for the relationship between traditional gender roles and attitudes about homosexuality.

3.3 Anderson, and Fetner: The Impact of Economic Inequality Across and Within Nations on Attitudes Toward Homosexuality

Using hierarchical linear models fitted to data from the World Values Survey and national statistics for 35 countries, Anderson and Fetner (2008) build on the postmaterialist thesis by assessing the impact of economic inequality across and within nations on attitudes toward homosexuality. It provides evidence that tolerance tends to decline as national income inequality rises. Anderson and Fetner (2008) maintain that attitudes of the working class are generally less tolerant, and contrary to expectations of the postmaterialist thesis, are seemingly unaffected by economic development. Economic development influences attitudes only for those who benefit most. These findings have, as Anderson and Fetner (2008) maintain, political implications, suggesting that state policies that have the goal of economic growth but fail to consider economic inequality may contribute to intolerant social and political values, an attribute widely considered detrimental for the health of democracy.

Inglehart's postmaterialist thesis, as Anderson and Fetner (2008) argue, suggests that liberal values result from democracy, economic development and modernization. Anderson and Fetner (2008) discard this thesis and take the issue with the assumption that national economic prosperity affects all members within a nation in a similar manner. Given the vast differences in economic conditions and life chances according to the income group, social class and occupation, even within rich democracies, Anderson and Fetner (2008) argue that all members of society do not benefit equally from economic development. Following the logic of the postmaterialist thesis, Anderson and Fetner (2008) expect that if those with low economic standing are not completely free of material concerns they will exhibit less tolerance than those with high economic standing. Despite the large body of research supporting the main argument of the postmaterialist thesis, variation in social attitudes among rich nations—or for that matter, among poor nations—regardless of whether they experienced Communist rule in the past or not has not been adequately explained. Anderson and Fetner (2008) also say that the link between the distribution of resources within nations and postmaterialist values has not been sufficiently studied. Since the benefits of economic prosperity are not equally distributed throughout a nation's population, not all experience the freedom from material concerns that is so important to the postmaterialist thesis. Moreover, Anderson and Fetner (2008) argue, there is much variation in the level of income inequality across countries, regardless of level of economic development and democratic tradition. Some highly developed nations, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, have relatively high levels of income inequality compared to other highly developed nations such as the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. A high level of inequality leads to a low level of social trust across all members of society, which in turn leads to low tolerance. Generalized trust pertains to the trust of others in general, or simply put, an attitude of faith in humankind. It is generalized trust that produces more tolerant attitudes toward others, including outgroups.

Anderson and Fetner (2008) now found that per-capita GDP had a very strong positive influence on tolerance to homosexuality when no other contextual variables were included in the statistical models. When other important context variables were controlled for, however, the effects of per-capita GDP were reduced dramatically. Further analysis that allowed per-capita GDP to interact with social class indicated that economic development matters significantly in the expected manner for professionals and managers but not for the working class. The findings, Anderson and Fetner (2008) argue, also reveal that income inequality within countries was negatively related to tolerance toward homosexuality, regardless of social class. Taken together these findings suggest that the postmaterialist thesis requires qualification.

The findings reported by Anderson and Fetner (2008) also suggest that economic inequality undermines social trust, which then produces social intolerance. While Anderson and Fetner (2008) did not measure trust directly, they showed a clear link between high levels of economic inequality and low levels of social tolerance. Similar to Inglehart et al. (2000), Anderson and Fetner (2008) found that former Communist rule has a strong negative effect on attitudes toward homosexuality. Contrary to their argument, however, this “Communist effect” is unrelated to economic development, which was controlled for in the statistical models. This finding, according to Anderson and Fetner (2008) suggests that cultural characteristics, which have less to do with economic development than with a lack of social trust related to Communist oppression, may be responsible for less tolerant attitudes. It is also possible, as Anderson and Fetner (2008) suggest, that the “Communist effect” reflects other related factors such as varying levels of nationalism, the role of churches, and the size of lesbian and gay social movements.

Tolerance for homosexuality is much more likely among professionals and managers than among the working class. This implies that cross-national studies of attitudes and values are, according to Anderson and Fetner (2008), misguided to automatically proceed as if national populations are homogenous in terms of how they react to national levels of economic prosperity. For Anderson and Fetner (2008), class and national prosperity interact in their effects on attitudes. On average, and controlling for other important predictors, the gap in attitudes toward homosexuality between the middle and working classes is greater in countries with high per-capita GDP than in others. Economic development is certainly important, then, but it cannot explain the divergence of attitudes according to social class. For Anderson and Fetner (2008), the postmaterialist thesis does not apply equally to all groups within a particular country—economic development is important, but more so for those who gain most from it.

Although Anderson and Fetner (2008) focused exclusively on attitudes toward homosexuality, they think that there is good reason to believe that results would be similar for many other postmaterialist issues. Overall economic prosperity promotes tolerance among those in good economic positions, while high levels of inequality suppress tolerance regardless of economic group.

3.4 Firdauzi, Hidayat, and Darmawan: The Role of Religion in Explaining Homophobic Attitudes

The study by Indrawan Firdauzi and associates (Firdauzi et al. 2022) assumes that currently, most communities in Southeast Asia are homophobic, and homosexuals suffer considerable rejection. Less than 20% of the community could justify the existence of homosexuals. Moreover, 64% of the people in Southeast Asia believe that homosexuals will not be able to become good parents. 40% of the respondents do not refuse to socialize and live side-by-side as neighbours in their environment despite their non-normative behaviour. Our results indicate that public receptivity toward homosexual Southeast Asia is also relatively low.

The study by Firdauzi et al. (2022) also shows that age influences individual perceptions toward homosexuals differently for each model. Firdauzi et al. (2022) suggest that the older a person is more likely to reject the existence of homosexuality. Also, when people get older, they believe that homosexuals will not be able to be good parents like heterosexual couples. This finding supports several studies that have been conducted in other regions.

The second finding in Firdauzi et al. (2022) shows that someone with a higher religious level has more probability of rejecting homosexuality. A high-level religious person prefers not to socialize with homosexuals, nor do they want to live in the same environment as homosexuals. In addition, a religious person believes homosexuals will never be a good parents when they have kids. Although it has a lower probability value, the results of the country group analysis show that homonegativity still occurs in countries that legalize homosexuality in their constitution. This finding, Firdauzi et al. (2022) argue, is consistent with previous work that found a higher religious people tend to reject the existence of homosexuals in their environment. Firdauzi et al. (2022) suggest that people who access the internet daily have a tendency to be more open to accepting the existence of homosexuals in daily life, encouraging them to believe that homosexuals can be good parents as well as heterosexual couple. In countries where homosexuality is legal, daily internet access shows a very significant increase compared to the probability that appears in the pooled analysis. Countries with vague regulations about homosexuality also show a reasonably high probability of perceptions of homosexuals to be good parents and encourage them to want to socialize with other people homosexuals.

In general, more than half of the people in seven countries in Southeast Asia have a tendency to reject the existence of homosexuality. Most of them, as Firdauzi et al. (2022) maintain, are reluctant to socialize with or be neighbours with homosexuals. In addition, they are less likely to believe that homosexuals will become good parents when they choose to have or adopt children. According to Firdauzi et al., age has a different influence on each model; the older a person, the more likely they will reject the existence of homosexuality. An older person thinks that homosexuals cannot be good parents like heterosexual couples. However, they do not refuse to socialize and neighbour with homosexuals. The level of religiosity has a negative influence on homosexuality. It has the same direction in all models, meaning that a higher level of religiosity will encourage the person not to accept the presence of homosexuals. Also, they believe that homosexuals will not become good parents and tend not to want to socialize and be neighbours with homosexuals. However, in countries that legalized homosexuality, a higher level of religiosity has a lower influence compared to countries that prohibit homosexual behaviour.

3.5 Hildebrandt, Jäckle and Wenzelburger: The Culture Wars on Homosexuality

Hildebrandt and Jäckle (2020, 2023), as well as Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) have achieved a great citation influence by their studies on the subject.

  • Hildebrandt and Jäckle (2020): Focusing on the interaction for several moral attitudes which are part of the World Values Survey (WVS), namely, attitudes toward abortion, divorce, euthanasia, homosexuality and suicide most studies not only confirm the generally assumed idea that the more religious a respondent is, the higher their level of social conservatism tends to be, but find that this effect of religiosity is stronger in more developed countries. As development progresses, both groups (secular and religious) become less socially conservative and thus more tolerant, but secular people do so at a considerably faster rate, widening the gap between the two groups even further. This polarization fuels the “culture war” raging in many developed democracies over issues such as same-sex marriage or abortion law.

  • Hildebrandt and Jäckle (2023): Using data from the seventh wave of the World Values Survey (2017–2021), this article provides evidence that the sex difference in attitudes on homosexuality is not universal, but limited almost exclusively to Europe and the Americas, indicating the need to replicate studies conducted in these societies in global cross-country comparisons. Contrary to predictions of the social role theory or biosocial construction theory, but in line with predictions from evolutionary psychology and a growing number of empirical studies in this field, the sex difference in attitudes towards homosexuality widens with rising gender equality and development, especially when the two coincide.

  • Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015): Although attitudes toward homosexuality have become more liberal, particularly in industrialized Western countries, there is still a great deal of variance in terms of worldwide levels of homonegativity. Using data from the World Values Survey (1999–2004, 2005–2009), Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) seek to explain this variance by means of a multilevel analysis of 79 countries. Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) include characteristics on the individual level, as age or gender, as well as aggregate variables linked to specificities of the nation-states. In particular, Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) focus on the religious denomination of a person and her religiosity to explain her attitude toward homosexuality. The study finds clear differences in levels of homonegativity among the followers of the individual religions.

Hildebrandt and Jäckle (2023) employ data from 56 countries that took part in the sixth wave of the WVS, collected between 2010 and 2014. They measure moral attitudes on the basis of respondents’ ratings of various behaviours on a 10-point scale ranging from 1, “never justifiable,” to 10, “always justified.” For the morality domains of sexuality/partnership and the termination of life, they use the items abortion, divorce, homosexuality and suicide. For the civic morality domain, they rely on respondents’ ratings of benefit fraud, fare dodging on public transport, tax cheating, accepting a bribe in the course of duties, and stealing property. Their measure of the violence dimension is based on responses to one question on unspecific violence (violence against other people) and two questions on domestic violence (a husband beating his wife, parents beating their children).

For religiosity, they use two different measures: “how important is religion in your life” (1 “very important,” 4 “not at all important”) and “how important is God in your life?” (1 “not at all important,” 10 “very important”). The authors contend that their analyses confirm that people’s attitudes toward sexuality/partnership and the termination of life become more polarized as development levels rise. At a lower level of development, religious individuals tend to disapprove of violence and violations of civic morality to a greater extent than secular individuals. At higher levels of development, this gap does not widen but narrows. In these two domains, religious and secular people’s attitudes tend to converge rather than become more polarized. In highly developed countries, the positions do not just converge, but are in fact reversed: The secular show lower approval of violence and greater civic morality than the religious. This group adheres to norms not because they were instituted by God, but because of a morality of reason.

Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) point out that the trend of declining homonegativity in many Western countries is less clear if one looks at other regions of the world. In several countries, such as Turkey or China, the percentage of people who would be opposed to having homosexual neighbours has remained mostly constant. In those countries, the reactions to gay and lesbian people are the same as 20 years ago. Thus, according to the results of the World Values Survey, the average levels of homonegativity lie very far apart from one another in a worldwide comparison. This high level of cross-country variance leads us to the fundamental question: How can the varying degrees of homonegativity be explained? In focusing primarily on religion and religiosity as determinants of homonegativity, Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) take a specific perspective, while well-known determinants of homonegativity such as age or education are controlled for. Consequently, the precise research question for Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) is as follows: How can adherence to a religion and the religiosity of an individual explain his or her homonegativity? For Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015), homonegativity should be understood as an aversion to homosexuality as a social practice or way of life. To measure this concept, Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) use a question of the WVS that asks whether homosexuality can be justified. This question can be answered on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means always justifiable and 10 stands for never justifiable. Some studies identify a further aspect of homonegativity that involves the question to what extent a person exhibits a negative, biased attitude toward gays and lesbians as individuals (going as far as aggressive prejudices and feelings of hate). Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) capture this second aspect of homonegativity using the WVS question whether one dislikes a homosexual person as a neighbour (scale: 1 to 3).

What are the results of the Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) study? The comparison of levels of homonegativity in different countries shows that there are substantial differences in the attitudes of people toward homosexuality.

Men are more homonegative than women, older people more so than young, married more so than unmarried, people with children more so than those without, people with low income more so than people with higher income, people with a lower education level more so than those with a higher education level. If the respondents are divided into groups based on their employment status, students and, contingent on the dependent variable, the self-employed present low homonegativity. In contrast, the attitudes of retirees, housewives, and the unemployed are more negative toward homosexuals. This insight, Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) argue, integrates well into Inglehart’s theory of value change: the more post-material a person is, the lower their homonegativity. There are, as Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) also say, clear differences in levels of homonegativity among the followers of the individual religions: Muslims make up the homonegative end of the scale, whereas Buddhists and atheists are on the other extreme. Regarding religiosity, Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) find that religious people are, in general, more homonegative. This effect is, however, conditioned by religious affiliation. For Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015), the religiosity of a Muslim affects his or her attitudes toward homosexuals more negatively than would the religiosity of a Buddhist. Also relevant for the attitudes toward homosexuality is, according to Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) the nature of religious motivation: Extrinsically motivation strengthens the negative effect of religiosity on attitudes toward gay and lesbian people. The results of the multilevel regression analysis, Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) maintain, show that the aggregate variables help explain the variance with regard to homonegativity. Purely statistically speaking, the most influential aggregate-level variable is whether or not a country is a signatory to the UN Declaration on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.

Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) also conclude that the longer homosexual activities have been compliant with the law, the lower the homonegativity of the citizens. The current legal situation in terms of homosexuality also tends to influence homonegativity, even if the results cannot be claimed as valid for the entire sample of countries. In states where homosexual people have more legal rights, the population presents lower homonegativity. Also for Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015), the level of homonegativity in communist or post-communist countries is significantly higher than in non- or non-post-communist countries. In communist or post-communist countries, an increase in religiosity leads to a less strong rise in homonegativity than in non-communist countries.

3.6 Janssen and Scheepers: Religious Particularism, Religious Salience and Homonegativity

As our empirical work developed, it turned out that the categories used in the empirical study by Janssen and Scheepers (2018), using World Values Survey data to explain homonegativity, became extremely useful. Janssen and Scheepers (2018), when measuring the effect of religion on homonegativity, distinguish between.

  • Religious attendance

  • Religious particularism

  • Religious salience.

These categories are well-known components of the sociology of religion, also in the context of empirical research, using World Values Survey data (Ekici et al. 2015; Filsinger, 1976; González, 2011; Jelen, 1993; Malhotra, 2010; Raiya et al., 2008; Ruiter et al., 2009; Scheepers et al., 2002), and have been largely overlooked in most existing studies on the subject of religion and homonegativity. Such an approach is also well compatible with the perspective of tolerance and ecumenical dialogue, championed for a long time by the German Muslim theologian Mouhanad Khorchide (El Omari et al., 2020; Kasper & Khorchide, 2017; Khorchide, 2015, 2016; Khorchide et al., 2013; Khorchide & Stosch, 2019).

In the influential article by Janssen and Scheepers (2018), the authors contend that religiosity appears to be one of the strongest socializing determinants to explain rejection of homosexuality. This relationship is based on the premise that individuals’ moral attitudes are adopted via exposure to socializing agents—in this respect, religious institutions. Although most religions emphasize that people should respect others, most religions tend to categorize homosexuality as something “unnatural” or “impure”.

To test their hypotheses, Janssen and Scheepers (2018) used the sixth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS). The data were collected in the period 2010 and 2014 in 60 countries around the world, and more than 90,000 respondents participated. The dependent variable for Janssen and Scheepers (2018) was the rejection of homosexuality. Respondents were asked whether they think homosexuality can always or never be justified. Respondents could answer this question by using a 10-point scale ranging from 1 to 10. In the current study, this variable was recoded in a way that a higher score on this scale means that respondents reject homosexuality more strongly, ranging from 1 = homosexuality can always be justified to 10 = homosexuality can never be justified.

To measure religious denomination, Janssen and Scheepers (2018) used the World Values Survey item whether respondents considered themselves belonging to a religion or religious denomination. If yes, which one? A distinction was made between individuals who (0) do not belong to a denomination, (1) Roman Catholic, (2) Protestant, (3) Orthodox (Russian/Greek/etc.), (4) Muslim, (5) Hindu, (6) Buddhist, (7) Other Christian, and (8) Other.

Religious attendance was measured by Janssen and Scheepers (2018) with the following World Values Survey question: “Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these days?” Respondents could answer with (1) more than once a week, (2) once a week, (3) once a month, (4) only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter days, (5) once a year, (6) less often, and (7) practically never. Religious attendance was recoded in a way that a higher score means that respondents have a higher frequency of religious attendance.

Religious particularism was measured by Janssen and Scheepers (2018) with the responses in the World Values Survey to the statement: “The only acceptable religion is my religion.” Respondents had to indicate whether they (1) strongly agree to (4) strongly disagree with this statement. It was recoded in such a way that a higher score means that respondents have stronger religious particularistic beliefs.

To measure religious salience, Janssen and Scheepers (2018) used the World Values Survey item in which respondents were asked to indicate how important religion is in their life. Respondents could answer with (1) very important, (2) rather important, (3) not very important, or (4) not at all important. Religious salience was recoded such that a higher score means that respondents are more religiously salient.

To measure individuals’ authoritarian personality, Janssen and Scheepers (2018) worked with the World Values Survey checklist of 11 qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Respondents had to indicate which, if any, they consider to be especially important (1) or not (0). They could choose up to five. A scale was made with three qualities: “obedience,” “imagination,” and “independence.” First, scores on the qualities “imagination” and “independence” were reversed, because these two are the opposite of authoritarianism. Second, the scores on the three qualities were summed, and the mean score was calculated. Respondents had to have a least a valid score on two out of three qualities to have a valid score on this scale. A higher score on this scale means that respondents have more authoritarian child-rearing values and, therefore, a stronger authoritarian personality.

To measure individuals’ traditional gender beliefs, Janssen and Scheepers (2018) used the following statements by respondents in the World Values Survey: “When a mother works for pay, the children suffer”; “On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do”; “A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl”; and “On the whole, men make better business executives than women do.” Respondents had to indicate whether they (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) disagree, or (4) strongly disagree with these statements. All statements were recoded in such a way that a higher score means that respondents have a more traditional opinion about gender roles.

Education, gender, age, individual’s income and marital status were included as control variables. Initially, 90,350 respondents were included in the data from 60 different countries. However, five countries were excluded from the data, since they had a missing value on the dependent or independent variables. Then the data consisted of 55 countries with a total 84,064 respondents. After listwise exclusion of the respondents with missing values on the dependent and independent variables, the data consisted of 67,648 respondents. Those respondents with a missing value on any variable were excluded, because the number of missing values per variable were relatively small. Most percentages of missing values on a variable were between 0 and 2%.

The country averages regarding rejection of homosexuality illustrate, so Janssen and Scheepers (2018) argue, that countries such as Armenia, Tunisia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia reject homosexuality the most, whereas countries such as Sweden, The Netherlands, Australia, and Spain reject homosexuality less strongly.

For Janssen and Scheepers (2018), religiosity appears to be one of the most important characteristics explaining rejection of homosexuality. Exposure to socializing agents, such as religious institutions, is essential in explaining individuals’ attitudes. The influence of religion on individuals’ daily lives is argued to have become less prominent due to secularization processes, but the general attitude toward homosexuality remains negative in many countries.

It was found that individuals who adhere to any denomination reject homosexuality more strongly than those who do not adhere to a denomination. Hindus reject homosexuality the most, but “other Christians” do not differ from the Hindus. One reason for this finding may be, Janssen and Scheepers (2018) argue, that some of the main Christian denominations have been losing members, while the more conservative denominations are still growing. Janssen and Scheepers (2018) underline that the finding that Hindus reject homosexuality the most is not in line with previous studies.

A higher frequency of individuals’ religious attendance is also related to stronger rejection of homosexuality. For Janssen and Scheepers (2018), individuals who are more integrated into a religious community and therefore are more frequently exposed to traditional norms and values, by attending religious services, more strongly reject homosexuality.

According to the Janssen and Scheepers (2018) study, individuals who have stronger religious particularistic beliefs also more strongly reject homosexuality. Strong religious ingroup favouritism is associated with more unfavourable attitudes toward other religious outgroups and, more generally, with more unfavourable attitudes toward ethnic outgroups. Individuals who have stronger religious particularistic beliefs might feel threatened by the deviating lifestyles homosexuals have that violate their religious norms and values.

Janssen and Scheepers (2018) also found that authoritarianism and traditional gender beliefs are related to rejection of homosexuality. It appears that individuals who adhere to a denomination, who more frequently attend religious services, or who have stronger religious particularistic beliefs have a stronger authoritarian personality and stronger traditional gender beliefs and, consequently, reject homosexuality more strongly.

The influence of religion is argued to have become less prominent in individuals’ lives, since trends of secularization seem to be present in many societies, but the general attitude toward homosexuality remains rather negative. For Janssen and Scheepers (2018), different religions pass on their negative views on homosexuality no longer by actual exposure, but in other, more latent ways as well.

3.7 Roberts: Homonegativity, Postmaterialism, World Society, and Multiple Modernities

The starting point for the widely received study by Roberts (2019) is that public attitudes toward homosexuality have become substantially more favourable in many Western countries, including the United States, over recent decades. Roberts (2019), compares the predictive power of three prominent social scientific theories—Inglehart's postmaterialist thesis, world society theory, and multiple modernities theory (see below) can each be used to generate different predictions about what drives worldwide attitudes.

Roberts (2019) interprets Inglehart's postmaterialist thesis as a contemporary variant on classical modernization theory which maintains that existential security (i.e., the feeling of personal security that results from having one's basic needs met) is the key driver of attitudes on a wide range of social and political issues, including attitudes toward homosexuality.

World society theory, according to Roberts (2019), would offer a global cultural explanation for attitudinal change. World society theory, points to the influence of an expansive and more-or-less unitary “global culture,” embodied, for example, in the elite-level discourses that circulate within international professional and activist communities. In this context, Roberts (2019) maintains that pro-gay discourses have achieved a certain international ascendency in recent decades: in international fora, in professional and activist communities, and at the level of national policymaking. Roberts (2019) also highlights that if global cultural messages have increasingly penetrated to the level of the average person living around the world, then exposure to these messages should be driving a worldwide upswing in the societal acceptance of homosexuality.

Finally, multiple modernities theory is in Roberts’ reading (Roberts, 2019) a general approach that points not to the influence of a single global culture, but to the importance of regional discourses and institutions. The multiple modernities approach would suggest that elite cultural and institutional influences in the Muslim World, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc should promote negative societal attitudes toward homosexuality in these regions, in spite of the more positive discourse to be found at the global level.

Roberts (2019), in her data analysis, concentrates on the World Values Survey/European Values Survey (WVS/EVS), from 1981 through 2012. The Roberts (2019) results show a broad global upswing in societal acceptance of homosexuality over the period 1981 to 2012, both within and outside Western countries. World society theory is supported, in that this widespread increase appears to have been driven in large part by the diffusion of a new global cultural discourse favourable toward homosexuality. The results provide strong evidence, Roberts (2019) argues, that global culture has shaped average national attitudes worldwide. But Roberts (2019) finds that the effect of exposure to global culture was much diminished in more religious societies, presumably because these societies were less receptive to pro-gay messages. And, even as there has been a broad upward trend in the acceptance of homosexuality, the results also show that the attitudinal gap between countries has widened over time. Roberts (2019), finds no evidence for the influence of existential security on attitudes toward homosexuality.

The sample of the study is composed of data from 87 countries. The former Soviet and Eastern Bloc and the West are the best-represented world regions, with 21 countries each. Slightly more than half of the sampled countries, are from other world regions, with: 13 countries from the Muslim World, 12 from Latin America and the Caribbean, 10 from sub-Saharan Africa, six from South and Southeast Asia, and three from East Asia. While not all world regions are equally well-represented, the countries in the study by Roberts (2019), together make up 85 percent of the world's population.

Data on mean national levels of acceptance of homosexuality were sourced from the integrated WVS/EVS.

Roberts (2019) found evidence of a broad global upswing in the acceptance of homosexuality between 1981 and 2012. Change has not only occurred in Western countries. Societal attitudes toward homosexuality became more favourable across most world regions during this period. At the same time, however, attitudes varied considerably between countries. And societies that began the 1981-to-2012 period with the least favourable attitudes actually changed the most slowly, so that the attitudinal gap between countries widened over time.

Roberts (2019) supports the explanatory power of both world society theory and multiple modernities theory. In line with world society theory, both the longitudinal, within-country effects of global cultural exposure and its between-country effects were positively correlated, Roberts (2019) argues, with the societal acceptance of homosexuality. Moreover, the influence of global culture appears for Roberts (2019), to explain much of the overall upswing in acceptance of homosexuality in the sample. For Roberts (2019), the global culture described by world society theory is not just global, in the sense that it flourishes among an elite global stratum or influences national governments, but also in that it penetrates down to national populations around the world.

Although it appears, as Roberts (2019) says, that the attitudes of people the world over are indeed being affected by a common global cultural message, Roberts (2019) found that global culture's influence has not, or has at least not yet, resulted in cross-national convergence around a single attitude toward homosexuality. Thus far, average national attitudes toward homosexuality have in fact become more heterogeneous. More religious societies were in general less accepting of homosexuality. And societal receptivity toward favourable global cultural messages about homosexuality appears to have varied, depending on how religious the society was as compared to other societies. The influence of exposure to global culture (both its between- and within-country effects) was substantially moderated by between-country differences in religiosity: exposure to global culture was more influential in comparatively less religious societies and less influential in comparatively more religious societies. For Roberts (2019), the results indicate that membership in the Muslim World, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc slowed over-time increases in the societal acceptance of homosexuality, as compared to membership in the West. Both global and region-specific cultural and institutional factors thus appear to have acted upon worldwide attitudes toward homosexuality. These cross-regional differences promoted, as Roberts (2019) argues, a trend toward increased divergence in societal attitudes, and thus help explain why the attitudinal gap between countries has widened over time. Roberts (2019) squarely maintains that her study's analyses did not support the explanatory power of Inglehart's influential postmaterialist thesis, which predicts that existential security should promote the societal acceptance of homosexuality. The between-country effect of logged GDP per capita was positive but not statistically significant when included in her full statistical model.

3.8 Van Der Akker: Cohort Socialisation and Homonegativity

Van der Akker et al. (2013), in their influential study, start from the assumption that the changing European political structure towards increasingly close cooperation led to the demand for more universal policies. Van der Akker et al. (2013), are principally interested in disapproval of homosexuality. Since the variation in attitudes concerning homosexuality between countries seems quite large, it is likely that country differences in disapproval of homosexuality not only occur because of differences in composition of the population, but also because of specific national circumstances. The focus of the study Van der Akker et al. (2013), is on the fact that besides religious communities and schools as socializing agents, there is the component of socializing circumstances, i.e., cohort socialization.

Most religions have a rather negative norm towards homosexuality. Since religious people are more exposed to these norms and attach more value to them than non-religious people, Van der Akker et al. (2013), expect that people who participate in religious life, will comply more with the anti-homosexuality norms of the church than people who are not. In addition to the moral norms of the various religious denominations, Van der Akker et al. (2013) maintain, the hierarchical structure of denominations is also considered important for the transmission of norms. When it comes to the Christian tradition, Orthodox Christian churches as well as the Roman Catholic Church can be regarded as more hierarchical than Protestant churches, since the latter only in some countries have influential national boards. Based on these considerations, Van der Akker et al. (2013), venture the hypothesis that Muslims to disapprove of homosexuality the most, followed by Orthodox Christians, Roman Catholics, and Jews. Protestants are expected to disapprove of homosexuality the least.

Moreover, religious involvement indicates the degree to which norms and values are internalized. The more people are involved in a religious organization, the more they will comply with religious norms and values. With respect to homosexuality, Van der Akker et al. (2013), expect that frequent church attendees disapprove of homosexuality more than those who attend church less or never, since the former are more frequently exposed to the negative norms, presumably present in sermons about homosexuality.

Besides religiosity, educational systems are supposed to be socializing agents, also regarding attitudes towards homosexuality. Education is considered to increase people's general knowledge, to stimulate critical thinking and to expand people's frame of reference, which might induce tolerance for those who differ from traditional norms. Educational systems are additionally supposed to inherently teach or strengthen liberal attitudes such as equal rights for homosexuals. As higher educated have been longer and/or more exposed to the educational system, Van der Akker et al. (2013), expect them to be less negative towards homosexuality as compared to lower educated.

Van der Akker et al. (2013), also propose that differences in disapproval of homosexuality can be (partly) a result of cohort socialization. Older cohorts have been socialized in times in which homosexuality was considered a disease or even a sin. In these times, the denial of equal rights for homosexuals was dominant in society as well as in law. The general view towards homosexuality became more tolerant in the 1960s, because of the sexual revolution: homosexuality was no longer seen as immoral.

The disapproval of homosexuality is often associated with right-wing-authoritarianism in psychological research. For Van der Akker et al. (2013), an anti-gay orientation is due to a personality that is strongly against out-groups more in general, and that it has not so much to do with homosexuals per se.

Although an authoritarian personality is mostly associated with intolerance against ethnic minorities, it can be applied to explain negative feelings towards very different out-groups. It appeared to be useful concerning opinions about homosexuals, since they are also considered an out-group that deviates and violates traditional values. Homosexuals are perceived as blocking the establishment of the traditional family. In order to answer the research questions, Van der Akker et al. (2013), used the data from four modules (2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008) of the European Social Survey.

The attitude toward homosexuality was measured with the item “Using this card, please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish.” Respondents could answer on a five-point scale, ranging from “strongly agree” (score 0) to “strongly disagree” (score 4). Due to missing values four percent of the respondents (5,755) were excluded from the analyses.

With respect to the individual level, Van der Akker et al. (2013), claimed on the one hand, that individuals are affected by socializing agents on their disapproval of homosexuality. On the other hand, human values were supposed to determine people's attitude toward homosexuality.

The hypotheses on socialization were mostly supported by the results reported in Van der Akker et al. (2013). The study found that religiosity plays an important role in explaining differences in the disapproval of homosexuality. People with strong religious beliefs and people who attend church often, disapprove of homosexuality more than respectively people with less strong religious beliefs and people who attend church less or non-attendees. Besides, it was ascertained that Muslims disapprove of homosexuality the most. A noteworthy and somewhat unexpected finding regarding denomination for Van der Akker et al. (2013), was that the disapproval of homosexuality is lower among Roman Catholics and Jews as compared to nonreligious people. Lower educated and older cohorts disapprove of homosexuality more than the higher educated and younger cohorts do.

Support for conventionalism and the attaching value to traditions increases the disapproval of homosexuality. For Van der Akker et al. (2013), this is an indication that the theory of an authoritarian personality and the related negative out-group feelings is also relevant in the disapproval of homosexuality.

Van der Akker et al. (2013), also found that people living in (highly) religious countries disapprove of homosexuality more strongly than people living in secular countries, over and beyond their own religious beliefs and norms. The countries’ religious tradition has, however, no significant effect on people's opinion about homosexuality. The national level of religiosity is more important for the explanation of differences in anti-homosexual attitudes as compared to the religious tradition.

According to Van der Akker et al. (2013), the countries’ law on homosexuality affects the attitudes towards homosexuality.

3.9 Whitworth and Moretti: The Varying Effects of Religious Beliefs and Welfare Regimes on Homonegativity

Whitworth and Moretti (2023) start their analysis from the assumption that although homo-positivity, the attitudinal acceptance of homosexuality, has generally increased across Western societies there remains considerable homonegativity across certain regions of the world including Africa, Eastern Europe, and parts of Asia. In addition, there is evidence to suggest that legal and policy protections for homosexuality are far from inevitable, with several eastern European nations showing reversals in previous progress towards homo-positivity between 2018 and 2019. Within nations too, there remains widespread variation in homo-positive attitudes across individuals. Several cross-national quantitative studies have examined the reasons for variation in homonegative attitudes across Europe and globally.

Whitworth and Moretti (2023) claim that current literature neglects possible mediation pathways between those explanatory factors. Religiosity is consistently found to be a major determinant of homonegativity, with the strength of religious belief, the degree of regular participation in religious practices, and religious denomination each playing a role.

Whitworth and Moretti (2023) make use of the Round 9 of the European Social Survey (ESS) released in late 2019 and relating to data collected during 2018. The ESS has been collected bi-annually since 2001 and has well-established survey sampling, data collection, and weighting procedures as well as detailed documentation. The Round 9 survey wave contains data for 36,015 individuals based on strict random probability methods from 19 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia, Switzerland, UK). National samples are representative of the population aged fifteen and over resident within private households, regardless of their nationality, citizenship, or language. Whitworth and Moretti (2023) argue for a mediation pathway between religious beliefs and religious practices. Whitworth and Moretti (2023) include detailed interaction terms between religious beliefs and religious denomination in order to explore the potential for varying effects of beliefs across denominations, in contrast to existing scholarship which assumes uniform effects. Whitworth and Moretti (2023) show that although religious beliefs are important to homo-positive attitudes in all faith groups their effect size differs across denominations. Specifically, other things equal Eastern Orthodox and especially Islamic faith show notably less positive attitudes towards homosexuality at low levels of religious belief while individuals of Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, and other denominations show larger expected increases homonegative attitudes as strength of belief increases compared to other faith groups.

In terms of the socioeconomic drivers of homo-positive attitudes Whitworth and Moretti (2023) claim to have made three contributions to the literature. Firstly, they newly illustrate that education has marked indirect effects on homo-positive attitudes mediated through household income in addition to the direct effects of both education and household income on homo-positivity, evidenced in previous research. Secondly, Whitworth and Moretti (2023) claim to bring new insights into the role of welfare regimes in affecting homo-positive attitudes directly as well as in moderating the effects of low income. The Nordic regime shows the largest positive association with homo-positive attitudes and the Eastern European regime the least positive association, other things equal, with Liberal, Corporatist, and Southern European regimes falling in between those extremes. Thirdly, Whitworth and Moretti (2023) highlight that household income shows a positive association with homo-positve outcomes and that this effect does not vary across welfare regimes despite their markedly differing propensities to mitigate financial risks and losses, particularly at lower income levels. Taken together these findings Whitworth and Moretti (2023) suggest that societal social policy welfare regimes do matter to the shaping of homo-positive attitudes and hence should be included into future research in the field. Finally, Whitworth and Moretti (2023) confirm the relevance of key basic human values to homo-positive attitudes, with Universalism showing a particularly strong positive association with homo-positive attitudes. Whitworth and Moretti (2023) cast doubt on the substantive importance of a country’s legal and policy framework regards homosexuality in either affecting homo-positive attitude directly or in moderating the effects of basic human values on homo-positivity. Despite general strides towards greater acceptance of homosexuality, homonegativity continues to be a challenge in many regions of the world and within certain demographic groups of all nations.