Keywords

In summary, the conclusion of our study is that with a share of 12.0 per cent of the total number of hate crimes registered by the OSCE in the countries of the European Union, it is necessary to analyse the drivers of homonegativity also for security policy considerations. The findings presented in the second chapter of our analysis, those of international organisations and NGOs, as well as the already available, frequently cited and proven quantitative studies discussed in the theoretical part of our work, all come to this conclusion. Our own empirical research has now confirmed this finding, in some cases dramatically, and we have also been able to show that it is not so much religion as restrictive interpretations of religion and religious particularism that have contributed to an increase in homonegativity. The proven effects may be smaller than the public debate suggests, but religiously motivated political extremism will challenge the acceptance of LGBTQ+ communities even more than before in the coming years and, as Vidino and Meleagrou-Hitchens (2022) have already shown, will also lead to terrorist actions against these communities. The proportion of the world's population that is not only homophobic but also characterised by restrictive interpretations of religion is well over 10%, and in this respect poses a real future threat to the political and social stability of democratic societies, particularly in the West, where LGBTQ communities enjoy greater freedoms.

However, the religious communities of the major Christian denominations in Europe and in the democratic societies of the West resolve issues such as the admission of homosexuals and LGBTQ people to sacred ministries or to a church wedding, it is imperative that the other major denominations, and this is especially true of Christian Orthodoxy, and also Islam in the countries of the West, distance themselves from any discrimination against LGBTQ people and reject any form of anti-LGBTQ violence.

7.1 Homonegativity and Tolerant Social Gender Norms in Multicultural Western Democracies

In the following table, which is based on the statistical studies in the previous chapters, we first want to draw a picture of homonegativity based on the rejection of homosexual neighbours in some Western democracies. We compare the overall situation with homonegativity among the Muslims and the Orthodox, noting that the table can of course only be interpreted in the context of Table 4.2 on the probability of error. Only in Cyprus, Greece and Slovenia do the data deviate somewhat from the general hypothesis that respondents with a Muslim or Orthodox socio-cultural background are more homonegative than overall society (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1 Homonegativity in western democracies by comparison

Figure 7.1 shows the rate of homonegativity by denomination in the Western European countries of Austria, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland, where the data situation allows a relatively meaningful comparison between total homonegativity, Muslim homonegativity and Orthodox homonegativity.

Fig. 7.1
A cluster bar graph. Austria. Total country, 12%. Muslims, 22%. Orthodox, 19%. France. Total country, 7%. Muslims, 9%. Germany. Total country, 7%. Muslims, 14%. Orthodox, 14%. Great Britain. Total country, 5%. Muslims, 12%. Switzerland. Total country, 6%. Muslims, 17%. Orthodox, 17%.

Homonegativity by religious denomination in Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland

7.2 Political Measures to Strengthen the Rights of the LGBTQ+ Communities

At a time of multiple threats to liberal democracy and rising anti-Semitism, we believe it is highly appropriate to develop a perspective to strengthen the rights of LGBTQ+ communities in multicultural societies. With LGBTQ+ communities now the target of 12 per cent of all hate crimes in the European Union, it is time to stop ignoring the threat that violent and especially religiously motivated violent homonegativity poses to the long-term stability of free and democratic societies. Our research has shown that in all the global samples we have used, more than half of the world's population can be classified as homophobic, and that 12.8% of the world's population not only disapprove of having a homosexual neighbour, but also strongly believe that it is an essential part of democracy for religious institutions to interpret the law. 1.2% of the world's population now not only believe that it is an essential part of democracy for religious institutions to interpret the laws, but also strongly believe that political violence is justified.

In our research, our results safely suggest that on the positive side, policy interventions on the following fronts will lead towards more tolerant gender norms and support for democracy:

  • gender empowerment and closing the gender gaps

  • Labour force participation rate of migrants (both sexes) and older workers

  • Rule of law

  • Corruption avoidance

  • world class universities

  • social security expenditure

  • public education expenditure.

On the negative side, we found that structures of civil and political liberties violations, the carbon dependent economy, and support for Putinism all are not conducive to a climate of tolerant gender norms and support for democracy.

We showed that the following factors determine homonegativity:

Religious particularism:

0.167

Secularism:

−0.223

Religious tolerance, no restrictive gender norms:

−0.493

We also found that one of the most important drivers of the homophobia and xenophobia factor was the belief that in a democracy religious authorities should interpret the laws. The most important blocks against the homophobia and xenophobia factor were the rejection of male privilege in politics, economics and higher education and the belief that in a democracy women have the same rights as men.

Finally, it should be noted that the conclusions of a recent study (Solomon et al., 2023) on ‘political Islam’ and homonegativity also apply to our study. We agree with Solomon et al., (2023), that the challenges to inclusive policies for LGBTQ + communities range from discriminatory legal frameworks and societal stigma to limited access to healthcare and lack of adequate legal protection. Our own empirical evidence—throughout this publication—underlines the importance of what Solomon et al., (2023) call the ‘intersectional lens’, which allows us to capture the overlapping dimensions of marginalisation experienced by LGBTQ+ people, taking into account their sexual orientation, gender identity, race, religion, class and other intersecting factors.

We also agree with Solomon et al., (2023) that legal reforms, policy changes, social awareness initiatives, educational efforts and community empowerment will become very necessary. Challenging discriminatory laws will be essential, accompanied by advocacy for inclusive policies that protect the rights and well-being of LGBTQ+ people. We also agree with Solomon et al., (2023) that challenging stereotypes and creating safe and inclusive spaces for marginalised communities to freely express their identities and access support services is paramount. These authors are also correct in insisting that external stakeholders, including international businesses, multinational corporations and the global community, have the potential to influence and contribute to transformative change.

In summary, the main and most robust conclusion of our study is that, with a share of 12.0 per cent of the total number of hate crimes registered by the OSCE in the countries of the European Union, it is necessary to analyse the drivers of homonegativity also from a policy perspective on religiously motivated political extremism. The findings presented in the second chapter of our analysis, those of international organisations and NGOs, as well as the already available, frequently cited and proven quantitative studies discussed in the theoretical part of our work, all come to the conclusion that the relationship between homonegativity and a restrictive interpretation of religions needs to be investigated. Our own empirical research has now confirmed this finding, in some cases dramatically, and we have also been able to show that it is not so much religion as such but restrictive interpretations of religion and religious particularism that have contributed to an increase in homonegativity. The proven effects may be smaller than the public debate suggests, but religiously motivated political extremism will challenge the acceptance of LGBTQ+ communities even more than before in the coming years and, as Vidino and Meleagrou-Hitchens (2022) have already shown, will certainly lead to terrorist actions against these communities.

However much the religious communities of the major Christian denominations in Europe and in the democratic societies of the West resolve issues such as the inclusion of gay and LGBTQ people in sacred ministries or in a church wedding, it is imperative that the other major denominations, and this is especially true of Christian Orthodoxy and Muslim communities in the countries of the West, distance themselves from any discrimination against LGBTQ people and reject any form of anti-LGBTQ violence.

Although the proven percentage of violent religiously motivated homophobes in the world system is only 1.2% of the world's population, this is a global army, just like the violent ones against other victims, capable of threatening the foundations of political stability in the countries of the West and preparing to restrict the rights of LGBTQ communities.

Ultimately, the world today is faced with the stark alternatives of a world modelled on Sir Karl Popper's social philosophy of a free and democratic society (Popper, 1991, 2012; Popper et al., 2000) or totalitarianism, which, especially in the West, is increasingly influenced by Islamist radicalism in the tradition of Sayyid Qutb (Qutb, 1990, 2000; Qutb et al., 1979, 2006, 2008).

If we have succeeded in drawing attention to this phenomenon at a time when the resilience of the free world is under great strain (Tausch et al., 2023), our work will have achieved its goal.