Keywords

Being Magister

If reciprocity defines the relationship between exchangers in society, its quality is also decided by how much has been given and received. Getting too much demeans the recipient in relation to the provider if the recipient is unable to give/pay back; it creates a feeling of inferiority and the one obtaining too much has the least status (Mauss 2002 [1990]: 48). Previous chapters have hinted at such tensions.

Conversely, the one who provides more than others can view her/himself with pride. S/he is a magister, a person with authority whom others look up to (Mauss 2002 [1990]: 95). Having paid the most gives one the upper hand in relation to the other person. The gift has implications when a citizen articulates a reciprocal relation with the state if s/he perceives that s/he has given more than s/he has received. How does the feeling of being magister work out in a society where ideas about equality are said to be profound?

This chapter raises the other side of feeling magister—that it also provides the possibility of evening out perceived injustices. Instead of feeling superior for having paid more in tax in relation to other citizens, the perception of having paid too much makes for ample justification for avoiding taxes in other ways. The inherent challenge in reciprocal relations is here clearly pronounced. If we get the same we should also give the same; if others pay the same they should also get the same. You can even out perceived imbalances, but if you do not pay although you ought to and take although you ought not to, this is below the acceptable level of behaviour.

In this chapter you will get to know the Pillars of Society and the Balance Artists , those who believe in the welfare state and in various fashions provide their fair share, but also have strategies to make sure that it is fair. When they have paid too much, they find ways to even out the perceived status of being magister; when others have not paid enough, this provides the same basis for reasoning. You will also become acquainted with those who have checked out of society; who do not want to either to give to or take from society.

This perception game in terms of paying/avoiding/evading taxation will be addressed as contributive and distributive balancing acts. The emphasis will be on the Limningers and their reasoning about balancing. There are certainly differing opinions at the Agency about why citizens avoid taxes. Although it is recognized that both environment and context have a large impact on behaviour (e.g. tax avoidance), the Agency has no intention of judging citizens’ motives or morals (Skatteverket 2015) Wisely, they state that they have no idea why people make errors; the only thing they can do is to diminish the possibility of erring as much as possible.

Progressive Marginal Tax

Among the Limningers, one of the most common explanations for the existence of svart arbete is the Swedish tax rate, which is perceived as very high by international standards. The Limningers have diverse opinions on the reasons for this, but they almost reached a consensus when talking about taxes. Hasse: ‘I think you feel like that. With the world’s highest taxes, if you get the chance, I think you will cheat, yes you will.’

Sweden is among the top contenders for the highest taxation in the world and has a system of marginal tax on personal income. Marginal tax rates are usually applied to income in countries with progressive taxation schemes, with incremental increases in income being taxed in progressively higher tax brackets. Applying progressive marginal tax rates means that high-income earners pay a larger percentage on the last krona earned than do people with a lower income.Footnote 1 Overall, it also means that the former pay a larger proportion of their total income in tax than those with less income. This is not taking any subsidies or tax deductions into account (see below for an example).

Compare this with a flat tax, or proportional tax, where all income is taxed at the same percentage, regardless of amount. An example is a sales tax, where all purchases are taxed at the same percentage.

Applying a higher marginal tax rate on high incomes is thus one way to redistribute income in society. There are different views about how progressive marginal tax rates impact the willingness to do extra work, acquire additional education or strive for increased income and career benefits. It is therefore in doubt if and how the progressive marginal tax rates have an impact on national fiscal income (e.g. Flood 2015). If the largest part of an increased salary rise goes to tax, the question is to what extent people will strive for better incomes and ceteris paribus pay more taxes (not as a percentage but as an overall contribution). Choosing the ‘right’ level between income distribution and net tax revenue seems to be an eternal question in the Swedish political debate on taxation.

The Nordic countries, together with Belgium, are usually considered as having the highest marginal tax rates, although Sweden has a particular history of a period with exorbitant marginal tax rates, this culminating in 1976. When Astrid Lindgren (author of the Pippi Longstocking books and many, many other children’s stories) discovered that she paid 102 per cent in taxes, she wrote a satirical saga, Pomperipossa i Monismanien, published in one of Sweden’s largest tabloids (Lindgren 1976).

In a clear allegory, the story is about the witch Pomperipossa who resides in a lovely country far, far away, where she writes children’s books. She cares for all her compatriots, as well as for the politicians who have managed to create a society where everybody gets a fair share of the welfare cake. Pomperipossa is happy to participate in baking this cake, contributing more as she earns quite a lot more than the average resident. Yet one year she is told that she will pay 102 per cent in marginal tax. Although she is an author, she knows that so many per cent do not exist! In passing, Lindgren mentions that she can lower her taxes by buying a large house borrowing a lot of money (interest rates were at the time tax deductible and such purchases were used to lower taxes among higher income earners). This was a pinprick to Sweden’s incumbent Minister of Finance, Gunnar Sträng, who had just purchased such a house and could therefore, despite being a high-income earner, lower his taxes. Sträng responded that Lindgren’s contribution to the tax debate displayed ‘a strong unsatisfactory knowledge’ about the tax system, ‘although we do not require Astrid Lindgren to have such knowledge’. Lindgren responded by giving an interview on the radio the following day, saying that she ‘thought that Gunnar Sträng had understood the tax system. But if there is someone who cannot calculate, it is the National Tax Agency, Riksskatteverket; they have sent me the numbers. Sträng can tell stories, but he clearly cannot count. Perhaps we should change jobs, him and me?’ The story of Pomperipossa and the discussion about taxes is said to be a contributing factor to the loss of power by the Social Democrats in the 1976 parliamentary elections—their first loss in forty years. Although Swedes are said to be compliant, there is a limit even for them.

It is a long time since these excessive marginal rates were in place, yet Sweden continues to have high marginal tax rates. Most people do not object to the idea, although there is a heated discussion about the percentages (Björklund Larsen 2017: 9). Income redistribution via progressive marginal taxes is hardly questioned publicly; it is not comme il faut. In private, however, there are many who express qualms about living with the high tax burden the Swedish variety of marginal taxation implies.

Looking at the other side of taxation—the provision of welfare benefits—the same questions can be asked. If individuals who receive means tested benefits see them decreased if more income is earned, what is their motive to earn more? This is sometimes described as an implicit marginal tax rate. It is not in doubt that these issues can create a disincentive for work or promotion and may result in a structural income inequality, as some economists argue—the question is to what extent.

These issues are not peculiar to Sweden, but are seemingly a common feeling throughout the world: that people feel they are paying more than they get for it (cf. Laurin 1986). The amount of tax on work as part of gross national product (GNP) has a high correlation with svart arbete (Skatteverket 2006a: 222). Viktoria, who runs her own business, says:

Of course you connect the tax-rate level with svart money. That is, it is clear to a five-year-old, a teenager—in any case a young grown-up person—that there is some sort of balancing going on. That people and companies try to avoid the taxation rules [when taxes are so high].

Susanne, a public relations (PR) manager, says that she is convinced that we are taxed to pieces in Sweden. People are really fed up with paying taxes on everything, she says. That’s why they buy svart. With the level of tax, there are some who express a feeling that anything which can be taxed will be:

For goodness sake, you shouldn’t pay taxes for something you have already paid for with taxed money. You can’t pay taxes on taxes, it is stupid. That’s how it is with the gas [for the car]. You pay VAT on it. That’s tax on taxes. The [cost of] gas is only a third of what you pay. When you take things like this into consideration, I really think working svart is fine. We don’t protest enough in Sweden. We just clench our fist in our pocket and go on.

Lars obviously does not have much regard for the current state of taxation policies in Sweden. Almost everyone I talked to referred to this one-sided preponderance. Their narratives make up a chorus of annoyed voices, not peculiar to Sweden although easy to voice here, in a nation that has among the world’s highest taxes.

Pillars of Society

Despite these voices of non-compliance, most Limningers actually like and are proud of the welfare state they live in and contribute to. Hasse, a gardener, exemplifies this when he says that he and his wife must be considered model inhabitants, samhällsbärare, Pillars of Society. He pictures himself as a victim who carries the load of others, but somewhat unwillingly. Notions of the Greek god Atlas being punished come to mind. The carrier of society does not, unlike Atlas, carry the weight of heaven and earth himself, but shares the burden with a few others who provide more welfare than they receive within society. Situationally the samhällsbärare can even bring to mind the task of Sisyphus, in the sense that he never seems to benefit from his input to the welfare state. He works and pays his taxes, is hardly ever sick and does not use many of the services provided by the welfare state. So Hasse is proud. He could probably count the sick days of his entire working life on his fingers, and thus infers that he is a net contributor to the welfare state. He works and pays taxes, in contrast to others whom he points out are net recipients, for example those who receive sickness benefits.

Samhällsbärarna (plural) is a category also used by the Agency for those who do not buy svart (Skatteverket 2006b: 33).Footnote 2 Samhällsbärarna are, in the Agency’s depiction, paid less and are less educated than the average Swede; they are mostly women or people placed outside the formal labour market such as students and retired people. These people cannot afford to purchase services formally, but also have fewer needs as they do not own many things; their housing is mostly rental. They are considered very moral in their relation to the state—and as the Agency points out it is not problematic for them to be moral considering that they have fewer assets and thus less need to maintain them. Samhällsbärarna follow laws and regulations and have socialistic leanings. Needless to say, they are much in favour of the Swedish welfare state (Skatteverket 2006a: 174).

What is implicitly assumed to be svart in the Agency’s statement above refers only to private purchases of services from professionals. A pillar supports something and the samhällsbärare in the Agency’s depiction certainly embrace values that uphold the Swedish welfare state. Yet in terms of financial contributions to society—taxes—this group’s support is more modest. The Agency’s notion of samhällsbärare takes on the moralistic tone of strictly law-abiding citizens. This is different from Hasse, who thinks he is fulfilling his commitment to a good, but slightly unjust, society. Hasse is quite content with life, but he wishes there were more people like him. It is important for him to perceive himself as a net contributor. When he works svart—it is always small amounts and at a set price—he points out that he helps other people. While out working, there is often someone in the neighbourhood turning up to ask for help in his garden. It could be cutting down a tree, cutting a hedge or putting some paving stones in place. It takes a few hours, he says, but as he gets older he does such jobs less often. He regards his small involvement in svart arbete as compensation for his overall surplus contributions to society.

Bo can also be regarded as a samhällsbärare, although he differs from the Agency’s definition in most aspects except in his moral stance. Bo is an information technology (IT) engineer and has the position of a director at one of the larger Swedish corporations. ‘I definitely do not like svartjobb,’ he says. ‘I think you have to show solidarity with the state. I am definitely not a Social Democrat … I earn a lot of money and pay an awful lot in taxes, but I really feel it is my duty to do so.’ To pay more than one receives in return has been described as an expression of a reciprocal regime of status (Ledeneva 1998: 150). Such a person is powerful and has an extensive network of connections. They can offer favours that are more or less impossible to reciprocate; thus is their position in society affirmed (ibid.: 153). He is magister: having paid the most gives him the upper hand in relation to others.

Bo is proud of providing more than he gets. He relaxes by working on his summerhouse; he built it more or less himself, he proudly explains. The issues he could not deal with—electricity, plumbing—he bought; with an invoice, it is underscored. He thought quite a bit about what an acceptable purchase of svart arbete could be, knowing what the law states. ‘It has to be the occasional, unplanned recompense,’ he says, adding:

When you give something in return—not directly, mind you—for the unexpected help or from someone you are very close to. The intention is important and such transactions can never be organized. When a craftsman expects the work he does to be paid without an invoice, well then it is unacceptable; then the work becomes svart.

An emphasis on giving more to society than one takes from it is the fundamental trait of these samhällsbärare.

Balance Artists

Unlike the Pillars of Society , the Balance Artist has a more nuanced reciprocal relationship with the state and society in which s/he lives (cf. Björklund Larsen 2011). S/he must perceive a balance between what s/he pays and what s/he gets back from the state, and this can be achieved in various ways.

The reasoning is that there is just too much given to the state. VAT on goods and services is too high, and too large a part of earned income is paid in tax; the state just takes too much of what is perceived as belonging to the private sphere. However, balancing can also work the opposite way, as we saw in Chap. 2. The state’s priorities are wrong and the fiscal revenue is spent in an irresponsible way; on administrative expenses and in particular on the perception that public employees get too much—wages are too high, travel is too expensive, there are too many fringe benefits of a sort that the common employee does not enjoy in his working life.

Börje is a typical Balance Artist. He basically thinks that society is good, but when he encounters unfair treatment, he reacts to it (cf. Björklund Larsen 2013: 425). The needs of ordinary people are not understood by the state, or more specifically by the politicians and bureaucrats ruling the state from Stockholm. So Börje pays his tax through his usual employment as a logician at a major international IT company. In addition he works svart, telling me that ‘he has hammered on quite a lot of houses’. For his services, he has received various materials. There has never been any money as recompense, he says, instead he has picked up some stuff here and there as compensation for helping to build garages and so on. There are so many friends, he says, a great network of acquaintances who know what he can do. And they always find something to offer in return for his services.

Contributive and Distributive Balancing

So how is it that some people, for example those who consider themselves to be Pillars of Society, believe in the state to such an extent that they are willing to provide more in taxes than they ever expect to get back? Why do we see ‘the surrender of individual chances of survival or economic gain, for the sake of an advantage that accrues to all within a given collective, regardless of their own contribution’ (de Swaan 1988: 25)? De Swaan argues that this is not a paradox, but should instead be viewed as a transitional movement. People have an expectation that most of those deemed members of the community will collaborate, and thus contribute. As this is a transitional state of affairs, it implies that they can abandon this effort when it suits them better—for example to buy svart. They are ‘calculating entrepreneurs’ in the welfare state (de Swaan 1988: 229)? Yes, they calculate, but not only for their own economic benefit. The Limningers mostly believe in and are proud of their welfare state; there are just certain individuals and specific governmental practices that promote the incorrect spending of tax revenue. A citizen can do little to correct such practices, so instead s/he can be said to vote informally with her/his wallet to fix such wrong-doings. This is elaborate thinking about the contribution and distribution of tax money, but the notion of ‘calculating entrepreneurs’ puts too much emphasis on market practices. Although there are elements of calculation in the Limningers’ reasoning, I suggest that ‘balancing’ is a more appropriate concept.

Balancing is a perceived notion of equalizing something which is tilting to one side or the other. Think of an old-fashioned market scale with too much weight in one of its bowls, or a see-saw with a larger child sitting firmly at ground level with the smaller child left hanging in the air. Balancing is used here to underscore a process of continuous giving and taking. You will never be quit (Thomas 1991).

Gauging a balance can be described as involving what is exchanged with what is received in return. If these seem equal, the exchange relation is balanced (Befu 1977: 269). This is what takes place within the reciprocal transaction, not through one specific trade but accumulated over time through manifold transactions. When you balance you keep an equilibrium over time; this does not have to be instantaneous, but when the chance arises you take it. As exchangers seldom value what they exchange in exactly the same way (cf. Slater 2002), including social issues can allow these exchanges to be perceived as a ‘positive-sum game’ (Befu 1977: 270). Perception is, of course, crucial here. What is of value for one person does not necessarily have the same value for someone else, as we have already seen in various ways.

It needs to be emphasized that the purchaser’s strategy of maintaining a balance is not with the supplier. The acceptable purchase of svart arbete is voluntary in the sense of agreeing to the transaction with the provider, and the resulting reciprocity taken into account here lies in its relation with the state. It is an imaginary balance, obviously not possible to calculate in numbers but in terms of a discernment of evenness and thus of no less importance.

There are two sides to balancing and engaging; with Mauss, it could be said to consist of reasons for giving and taking. The giving side balances what are perceived as contributions. These are feelings such as I have paid too much money, devoted too much time or conferred too much knowledge already. In short, I have given too much. It also means that others have not done their share, for example by cheating with taxes (which I, of course, have already paid).

Larry effortlessly lists a few synonyms for svart arbete, which leads him on to reflect on the state:

Svart, black, utan kvitto, without receipt, vid sidan om, on the side, or should some of the payment go to Stockholm? Well, I think I said this once. I have sent far too much money to Stockholm. It [talking like this with a customer] was like having a mutual enemy all of a sudden. It was so much easier then.

The justifications for evading taxes are thus manifold, and finding a common justification for why a transaction should be cheaper puts the exchangers in a good mood. Both transactors have done a good deal and saved money for something else, so the reciprocity created by the transaction makes them feel they have slightly balanced out the relationship to the state. It is about getting even—that others who have cheated and been smart are now on a more equal footing. The common enemy is those in power—located in Stockholm, the capital. It should be pointed out that the state is in some sense an imagined foe, as in reality most of the income taxes paid are for, and used by, the local municipality. Only higher incomes are subject to state taxes, whereas VAT and other non-income taxes are for redistribution by the state.

These practices are called contributive balancing. This is based on the reaction to a state that is seen as taking too high a portion of income, and takes place in opposition to the enforced collection of taxes. Viktoria, eloquent and very opinionated about taxes and their impact on society, says what most other people expressed in one way or another as she brings up the contrarian balancing—that what has been paid in taxes is unwisely spent, and intentional or not, public decision-makers do not measure up to the task of redistributing all this money. In this view, taxes paid should provide something in return:

I think that people generally are very irritated that efficiency is so low in society, without being able to put it into words. We are constantly fed news by the media about politicians taking out increasingly higher wages, at the same time arguing for the general pay level to be kept at bay. They get apartments and golden handshakes. Morale diminishes, of course [she laughs], if the role models do not practise as they preach. I do not have anything against paying taxes, but I get irritated over not getting more for them [the taxes].

Viktoria’s reasoning supports the result of a study about the attitudes of Swedes to cheating with taxes. The majority, 65 per cent, justified their behaviour with the response ‘because people in important positions break norms of society’ (Skatteverket 2006b: 39). Thus, if powerful people seem to do wrong, then the ordinary citizen, Svensson, makes up for it when the opportunity arises. Purchasers of svart arbete do not want to pay their dues to the state, because others—who have more—do not, or because they take out more than they should. These are people who could be described as ‘free riders’ (Svallfors 1996: 36).

These feelings are reinforced from the opposite side, the ‘taking side’; distributive balancing . Here, justification concerns others taking or getting too much––those not deemed deserving. Examples are politicians and bureaucrats who use money unwisely; badly, inefficiently, selectively—either for their own benefit or for a specific group of other people. Other illustrations could be citizens who make claims they are not entitled to in terms of subsidies, using social insurance unjustly or claiming unemployment benefits while working (often svart). The distributive balancing seldom originates from direct examples, but rather through rumours, the media and diverse interpretations of reports and evaluations.

There are thus different reciprocal relationships at play here. First of all, what taxes are spent on is seen as relevant. Swedish income tax starts at quite low income levels. Most people pay a high proportional rate, but if they are in need there are different subsidies in compensation. If these taxes are seen to be spent ‘frivolously’, such as high incomes and remuneration for government employees, the informants deem it immoral behaviour. Ordinary taxpayers have worked hard for their incomes and struggle on their own to make ends meet. Seeing taxes spent unwisely hurts. Monika, for example, illustrated her point with absurd incomes and rises for bureaucrats and officials in Chap. 2.

Viktoria sees it from the same point of view:

Well, actually, I imagine that people think the state is cheating them. I think the general perception is that the state cheats them for so and so many krona in taxes. So what do I get for the amount paid? Well, one part goes to all the politicians with their increasingly high wages, to those who are members of committees and boards and get compensated for a few hours of work. And then they get pensions in ten years for one year of work. It is such a tremendously big difference compared with a regular salaried employee. They are not that many, but this doesn’t matter because they are the role models. It is a bit like cheating people for money, I think that people’s morals … well, many justify theirs, they don’t cheat in return but they justify their svart payments and recompense. They think they earn it; they have paid so much but have not got the yield they deserve.

Anita has a similar opinion: —‘As things are now, when you read about those high positioned civil servants and politicians who line their pockets in different ways, it gets more acceptable to do it. If they can take a share, why shouldn’t I, an ordinary person?’ While these practices among the supposed role models continue, svart arbete will continue to exist. Staffan reinforces this view:

It is not that strange that there is such an effect. That’s how you reason when you see role models in society—politicians, high-positioned civil servants, corporate leaders—who take their share in an absurd way and even break laws and regulations. I am convinced that they have an effect on people in general. They think, if the role models can, so can I.Footnote 3

Is there a difference between complaining about contributive versus distributive balancing in analytical terms? If there are perceptions of paying too much, there will also be expectations of getting as much back. On the other hand, getting very little from the state also means that the willingness to contribute is even less. It could be put as a question about the chicken and egg, but in terms of a reciprocal relation it is rather about how the Maori proverb was originally translated: ‘Give as much as you take, all shall be very well’ (Mauss 2002 [1990]: 91). Mauss pointed out in a footnote that the wording is rather ‘as much as Maru gives, so much Maru takes and this is good, good’ (ibid.: 189).

Larry further illuminates contributive versus distributive reciprocity. ‘They cheat me everywhere, so I take a little bit in return. I minimise the damage. I would like to see those who decide, those in power.’ He hesitates, and brings to mind a ‘commercial’ that was shown in cinemas at the time of the interviews. This film clip, paid for by the Agency, shows a decrepit neighbourhood with run-down high-rise buildings, giving an image of a poor ghetto where unemployed no-good youths are running around, mostly spending time having a go at what there is left to trash. Larry describes seeing this advertisement and reflects on it:

You know, when you go to the movies and see some commercial with the message that it is cool to pay taxes and then they push over some park bench. I can understand that, in the best of worlds, it would be perfect. But whom do Swedes cheat, then?

I ask if he is referring to the Agency’s film clip, and he nods and continues:

I’ve been doing jobs for people who work at the Agency. ‘Imagine if they knew about this’, these people say and chuckle. So for a moment … OK, who should be most ashamed in this instance? Maybe I, who have been so nasty as to ask? I don’t know.

This ‘informative’ film clip was one of the strategies to increase tax compliance, and was a warning of what would happen if Swedes did not continue to contribute (compare with the earlier messages from the finance department in the 1950s as described in Chap. 1). Society will deteriorate into declining suburbs drained of regular citizens and Pillars of Society; it cannot continue to maintain a welfare state for those most in need. Redistribution will suffer, and images from poor areas of the Bronx or the riots in Paris’s immigrant suburbs come to mind. These images threaten the idea of the Swedish well-kept, stable and safe People’s Home, folkhemmet, a somewhat ethnocentric pride.

Larry’s justifications highlight the tension between giving and taking. He does not contribute when earning money svart through the work he performs outside his ordinary employment; but neither do the purchasers. They ought to pay VAT as well as a higher price to Larry if the money he earns is to cover social fees and taxes. The purchasers avoid contributing, although they work collecting and organizing tax contributions. This again highlights the difference between private and public roles and the respective purchases one makes in each. If those working to collect citizens’ contributions do not live according to the rules and laws, who does? When Larry meets the enforcers of the tax laws who wish to purchase svart for their private use, he cannot help wondering about the moral contradictions between acting in public and private roles.

Citizens assess the transfers not only in relation to the state, but also in relation to other residents—they compare their contribution with perceptions of what fellow citizens pay, and receive.

To analyse tax compliance, and cheating, as a reciprocal feeling focuses our attention on the relationship between exchangers, not only in a dyadic sense, but as part of the larger community to which they feel they belong. A citizen who lives, works and pays taxes can to a certain extent define her/his bond to the state in terms of reciprocity, of having certain expectations. It is a relationship defined by what the state compensates me and my family with in relation to our contributions, but also compared with what other members of the state, the other inhabitants, are perceived to contribute and receive respectively. With Swedes striving for equality, this also means that it is important for them to keep this relationship in balance, even if this results in the state’s occasional deception. In some cases, it may even result in their seeing themselves as ‘being in the black’, as it were.

Not Paying for Those Who Do Not Pay

There are the ‘double takers’, sitting high upon the see-saw. Those who do not contribute while they simultaneously reap the benefits. As we will see, these practices are seen as completely despicable by the Limningers. This is where the line is drawn to the unacceptable tax evasion. Börje once received help from someone with a disability pension, a man deemed unfit for work and who therefore received a pension for the rest of his life:

Once, I needed help closing a tube to a heater, I’m so bad with the plumbing. So I called one of my contacts. It was this disabled recipient who came. So he got paid by me and also got paid by the state. I only used him once, it was an emergency. So you think about this guy, how you would act yourself and then about the others. Well, it is no good. You have to pay your dues and everything. If you don’t, living on social allowances and working svart is bloody wrong. But if you pay your dues and taxes and then take a little bit apart for yourself [it is OK]. We would not have any entrepreneurship in Sweden if it wasn’t for this [possibility of cheating on dues to the state].

In this sense, the solidaristic notion of being a member of the state is vigorously alive; all citizens should provide according to their abilities, that is through their salary, to the common coffer. What you then do is up to yourself is the common understanding. At first, Börje’s reasoning seems irrational. Cheating on income is presented as morally OK, whereas the other man’s cheating is perceived as depraved. They both can be seen to have their fingers in the state’s, and thus their common, coffer. However, Börje has put in work for which he receives payment. The whole or part of this income is taken on the side. Both the purchaser and the provider get off a bit more cheaply; they have both saved a little on this transaction by not paying the taxes due. Börje pays taxes for most of the work he does; the tax transfer is just reduced a little by his occasional svart job, and he contributes less money than he should to the common coffer. But the man who receives a retirement pension, for being unable to work, earns his living from the state. Even though he is not legally permitted to work, he works extra, which he should not be able to because of his retirement pension. This is morally wrong in Börje‘s view (cf. Frykman and Hansen 2009: 66). Needless to say, the early retired plumber certainly will have his own tales of justification. He might have been forced into early retirement, it might have been against his will and he has thus lost the possibility of a full-time wage. Those regarded as cheaters are those who have not done their fair share in contributing to society before using their free time to earn some extras. In Börje’s view it is the cheating plumber who has his fingers in the coffer, Börje just puts in a bit less than he should—avoiding paying taxes on certain services he buys.

Björn offers a similar reasoning. He makes sure that he pays less than the marked price at the Chinese take-out restaurant. He claims that the meal is not officially accounted for, as the cashier at the restaurant only registers every other meal and he is not going to be overcharged and cheated. Björn did not take the initiative in this deal, but acts upon the opportunity to save a few krona. The restaurant should not benefit both from him paying the full price and then cheating on the state while not registering. The fact that in the end it is the state that loses out is not Björn’s problem.

Lars is just as disillusioned with how citizens use and abuse society for their own private benefit. He told me many stories about how others grab what they need from society, and also about his involvement. The following story was one of many, and can in addition show explicitly how being involved in informally recompensed work practices is a learnt behaviour:

One thing that really bothers me was when I was employed in Gothenburg. We worked for AMU [ArbetsMarknadsUtbildning, a government-funded labour market training centre, especially for craft trades]. Well, you know from the start I was a concrete man [sic!]. But I am always freezing, can never keep warm. Anyway, I had to work outdoors. There is no bloody place on earth so damp and cold, really awful. Anyway, do you remember Linus Jansson? We were working at one site where it was damn cold outside and that bastard stood indoors and hammered panels and teased me. I could have killed him, I was eighteen, nineteen perhaps? So I took this extra course at AMU, to be able to work indoors. One thing led to another and one of the instructors had started a shop of his own. He was really charismatic, but damn blunt. He was a towering bloke, at least two metres tall and weighed at least 140 kg, you know, the kind of person who takes over any room he walks into. No one dared to question anything [he said or did]. So he took us out on svart jobs. He took the best guys, you know I was a concrete man and used to work with these things. There were also bus drivers and shipyard men, but they didn’t know a thing. So he asked me if I wanted to come along. I don’t remember what I got paid. But first I got travel compensation from the dole fund. Then I got paid by him, svart of course. It was great, super.

But there is more. We were there during this course, and when it ended I got a job with his firm. That’s how he managed and made it grow. Just went in and took the guys he wanted. The other instructors had no say, maybe they got a piece as well, what do I know? Everybody who worked in his firm had been at AMU, by the way. He ran a great business, with good guys and we had fun together. Actually, it was a really good time. So we continued working for AMU and did all the jobs there. There was a lot of immigration and other stuff going on, lots of construction at this enormous centre they had in Gothenburg. So we went around, built offices, refurbished and even tore down things we had constructed ourselves. There was nil planning and too much money.

We were even at the home of the boss of the entire AMU Gothenburg and installed a bloody big oak door in his garage. He did not pay five krona for it, of that I’m certain. We built a carport for another boss, AMU paid for the materials and we were paid on the side as you say [svart]. We did so many reconstructions and there was so much money, and as I was already then a bit interested in how society works, I thought it was damn disgusting. Even if I was being paid, it irritated me that government money went on this! They spent so much money that finally there was a directive from above that no invoices could exceed 25,000 for refurbishment. This just resulted in a hell of a lot of 25,000 krona invoices. How bloody stupid can you be?

This is just one of Lars’s many tales about having learnt to work svart and participate in a culture of tax cheating. His story confirms what is considered a general reason for buying svart—disillusionment because of public distribution of tax money. This feeling is especially ripe in this society, which it is argued is marked by a sense of equality. Lars is partly fed up with society. At one point he says: ‘I just want to pay for my house; I want to be free, not having anything to do with society. That would, sometimes, feel bloody nice.’ Lars’s tale recounted here is yet another example of double abuse of the system. The AMU managers reap benefits from the state by having contracts and simultaneously performing such work svart.

Lars provides an example of when balancing does not work. The see-saw is firmly planted on the ground and the participants have left. This is the double-sided emphasis of the give and take relationship, a perceived feeling of being cheated on both the give and the take sides. Being deprived of what is rightly mine brings disenchantment and disillusion. We made acquaintance with Johan in Chap. 2. Society has treated him badly, and cheating back a little is not enough to balance the relationship. He has not much trust left in the state and instead he has more or less checked out from society.

A Fair Society

In Swedish society, where values of fairness and equality are emphasized, the Limningers’ justifications point to situations perceived as unfair, in that some people have advantages that others do not have. For example, craftsmen have services they can exchange with each other, whereas clerks, civil servants, bureaucrats and other so-called white-collar workers have nothing to offer in return. Why should office workers or bureaucrats have to work three to four hours in order to pay for one hour formally (see also Björn’s reasoning on barter in Chap. 3) when the service can instead be bought informally, making the exchange balanced and more equal? One hour for another. In the same vein, the Limningers reason that there are always ‘others’ who earn more and should therefore be able to buy everything formally, with invoices. There are many ways to find justification for a distributive side to balance the contributive side. However, voices are heard saying that, having paid the world’s highest taxes, the welfare provided should be good value for money and distributed evenly.

The Pillars of Society in this chapter are those who give more than they receive. In quantitative terms we can say that they have a positive position on both the contributive side and distributive sides. They work, pay their taxes, do not use much welfare and carry a heavier load in society than most other citizens. Balance Artists have a more nuanced relation to the state and fellow citizens. If they perceive that money is wrongly spent, they make sure to get some income on the side.

A way to maintain the balance is to avoid and evade taxes when you can as some of the Limningers do with their involvement in svart arbete. But there are many other ways; where there have been demands for the transfer of provisions to those in power, there has always been more or less resistance to providing it (e.g. Laurin 1986; Isacson 1994; Pardo 1996; Roitman 2007). It has even been suggested that it is a trait almost as universal for humans as the propensity to exchange (cf. Scott 1990).

Ruben is concerned about the larger picture in society, and thinks that people in general comprehend this:

Most people understand that they should not do it [buy services svart], as in the end we are all afflicted by it. But you know, well I don’t know, but there is cheating in all societies. I don’t think that we can say it is because we have these high taxes. It is some sort of built-in phenomenon, that it is fine to cheat the magnanimous VIPs once in a while. But I have to say that I think it is wrong.

Ruben is not the only one to emphasize the contradictions between acquiring services for private use while still caring about the larger community to which one belongs.

James Scott depicted the resistance of destitute people in societies with large differences in wealth and power. Hidden actions are a sign of resistance which has often, especially in social science, been interpreted as being directed against the public and the official. This resistance is articulated as an expression against formal relations between the weak and the powerful (Scott 1990: 13). These theories are not false, Scott argues, but incomplete, as there are many actions performed by the less powerful which contradict the official version—actions which are mostly hidden. For example, ‘if it were a matter of taxes they prefer evasion instead of open tax riot’ (ibid.: 86).

Can the same type of logic be applied to Swedish tax evasion? There is less in terms of social difference amid Swedes than amid the Malaysians depicted by Scott. Again, perception is key here; the Limningers do not see Sweden as the just society it claims to be, but rather a society where rules and regulations make it possible for the privileged to have and take additional liberties; and these inequalities are said to be increasing. In an ‘equal society’, this could imply that for some in privileged positions (such as Lars’s boss at the AMU) are even less worthy when not contributing their ‘fair share’. Being magister means having the upper hand. But in a society that is supposed to be based on equality, where taxpayers are treated equitably, providing more does not confer status. Although Swedes have greater trust in each other than many other nationalities, this does not necessarily include governmental institutions; by international comparison Swedes do not have greater trust in the judiciary to provide them with honest treatment than any other nation (Skatteverket 2006a: 217, cf. Gribnau 2015).

When the credibility of the state becomes an issue, resentment and distrust are fostered among people. This nurtures a view of actions taken by the state and its institutions as morally disputable (Pardo 2004: 11). The response of ordinary people is to use their own ingenuity, attempting to balance their reciprocal relation to the state. Paraphrases in this context are: lura Sträng—cheating Sträng, a former Minister of Finance; inte skicka mer pengar till Stockholm—stop sending money to Stockholm, the capital; skall nåt av pengarna till Stockholm?—is any of this money bound for Stockholm? staten snålar—the state is stingy; hihi där lurade vi Ringholm—heehee, we cheated Ringholm; och så skall Bosse ha sitt—and Bosse should have his share; jag tycker vi skiter i Bosse—we should not give a damn about Bosse. Bosse Ringholm was at the time of the interviews incumbent Minister of Finance.

So taxpayers avoid and evade taxes, in order to balance their relationship with the state. Regardless of the position they occupy in society, they have a lot to lose in expressing their resistance openly. As Hélene says, ‘this is our way of protesting, even if it is a problem that we cheat some money from the state, which might need it’. This type of reasoning enforces the idea of the state as ‘them’, ‘over there’ and not ‘us’. Lars situates the cheating:

It depends on where you come from, which culture. It is probably culturally conditioned. It is wrong to steal, but not from the state. It is something we have. Maybe it is our way of protesting somehow. It has always been legitimate to steal from the state. Especially if you succeed with a [tax] deduction, then you are a star—such as with a few extra kilometres [when driving to work].Footnote 4 There is even advice in the papers on how to do it.

Most instances of buying svart arbete look like any other work. The same actions can be performed more or less undisclosed to the Agency, although most other people in society know about them; they are accepted. Therefore, it is a better strategy to keep transactions hidden (cf. Scott 1990: 86); they are evasive strategies rather than open protests.

Conclusion

If reciprocity defines the relations between exchangers and status in society, its quality is thus decided by the rules of the gift—the one obtaining too much has least status (Mauss 2002 [1990]: 11). Getting too much degrades the recipient in relation to the provider; not being able to give/pay back creates a feeling of inferiority. Having paid ‘more’ gives one the upper hand in relation to the other, in which the one obtaining too much lowers his status (ibid.: 11). We have borrowed the term of being magister (Mauss 2002 [1990]: 95); it is a person with authority whom others look up to, and here we have used it to think about taxation in relation to ideas about a fair and equal society.

Progressive income taxation is the very definition of the Swedish contemporary welfare state. Progressive income tax means that high-income earners pay a larger share of their income in tax as they contribute more per earned krona than low-income earners do; the tax rate increases with the taxable amount. In this chapter we have seen how the Limningers relate to this fact in a contemporary welfare state where some continuously contribute more and others are on the receiving end. As models for different ways of engaging with the Swedish state, we have identified Pillars of Society and Balance Artists . The former see themselves as net contributors to the state whereas the Balance Artists have a more nuanced reciprocal relationship with the state and society in which they live. It could be said that they balance their dealings when they justify their svart dealings.

There are two sides to balancing while engaging with Mauss; it could be said to consist of reasons for giving and taking. The giving side balances what are perceived as contributions. These are feelings such as I have paid too much money, devoted too much time or conferred too much knowledge already. In short, I have given too much. It also means that others have not done their share, for example by cheating with taxes (which I, of course, have already paid). These practices are called contributive balancing. This is based on the reaction to a state seen as taking too high a portion of income, and takes place in opposition to the enforced collection of taxes.

The other one is the ‘taking side’; the distributive balancing. Here, justification concerns others taking or getting too much––those not deemed deserving. Examples are politicians and bureaucrats who use money unwisely; badly, inefficiently, selectively—either for their own benefit or for a specific group of other people. Other illustrations could be citizens making claims they are not entitled to in terms of subsidies, using social insurance unjustly or claiming unemployment benefits while working (often svart).

There are thus different reciprocal relationships at play. Here they are the result of redistributive taxation policies and of unequal spending of tax revenue. The point is that tax policies invoke different types of reciprocal relationships; between citizens and between citizens and their state. Schumpeter’s proposal, that in order to understand any society and its political life one of the best starting points is the tax system (1954), forgot one important issue. If we study a tax system in order to understand a society, it is clear that we also have to include the exchanges where taxation is avoided; not only the holes and the glitches forgotten by the tax system but how people respond to them in their everyday transactions. We have to look at both sides of reciprocity—both the positive and the negative.