Abstract
Japan’s strategy of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy—FOIP” stands as a keystone approach in its relationship with the international community and Gulf countries, in particular, in the twenty-first century. The past two decades have shown growing and extensive friendly ties between the Arab Gulf states and Japan. Those ties have been mainly economic which includes significant bilateral trade. More recently, there are emerging signs of security cooperation, cultural exchange, and educational cooperation. In this chapter, I attempt to reveal the idea of FOIP, exploring the future possibilities of cooperation, partnership, and the alliance between Japan and the Arab world.
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Keywords
Japan is an active and influential state in the international arena. Japan’s foreign policy is marked by two conflicting needs; developing good relations with the Arab states and IranFootnote 1 on the one hand, states which are oil producers and are engaged in conflict with Israel, and maintaining Japan’s close alliance with the United States, on the other. This gives rise to the notion that Japan is balancing its dual dependencies on the two sides.Footnote 2
The experience of the “Arab oil embargo” during the 1973 warFootnote 3 by King Faisal bin Abdul AzizFootnote 4 continues to cast a shadow over the decision-makers in Japan (and the world) till today.Footnote 5 It is worth mentioning that King Faisal had clearly warned Japan during the 1972 visitFootnote 6 that Japan’s continued support to US policies in the Middle East would have serious consequences. Yet, the 1973 oil shock came as a complete surprise to Tokyo’s policymakers.Footnote 7
Japan’s desire to avoid conflict and maintain neutrality on various contentious Middle East issues have shaped its policy toward the Middle East region. It has tried to bridge the gap between United States and Arab states.Footnote 8 The Japanese economy largely relies on oil supplies from the Arab region.Footnote 9 Japan’s priorities in the Arab world include:
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1.
Enhancing shared prosperity through fair, reciprocal trade, and private sector investment in the Indo-Pacific.
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2.
Cooperating with regional partners in areas such as energy, infrastructure, and the digital economy.
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3.
Promoting governance and civil society in areas that include preventing corruption; securing nations’ autonomy from foreign coercion; promoting transparency, the rule of law, protecting human rights, and fundamental freedoms.
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Ensuring a peaceful and secure regional order that safeguards navigational rights and freedom in the Arab countries, confronts common threats, protects shared resources, and upholds sovereignty.
Qatar and Japan have been major trade partners since the establishment of their diplomatic relations in 1972. Their relationship is founded primarily on the energy trade, as Japan imports a significant amount of its Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) requirements from Qatar.
However, over the past 40 years, their relationship has developed beyond the energy into education, technology, culture, and humanitarian sector. In the wake of the March 2011 earthquake and subsequent tsunami, Qatar pledged 4 million tons of LNG export to Japan to meet the surge in energy demand in the disaster struck country.Footnote 10
The Japanese “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” FIOPFootnote 11 strategy recognized the pivotal role played by the Gulf Cooperation CouncilFootnote 12 in the global economy. Japan’s new strategy “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” stands as a keystone approach in its relationship with the international community in the twenty-first century.Footnote 13
In geographic terms, contiguous maritime regions are joined. Even if the connections of the narrow passages are encompassed by the peninsular and archipelagic landforms of Southeast Asia and the Australian continent.
Historically, the Indo-Pacific strategy is fundamental in the long-term development of international trade, economy, and complex geopolitical approach in countering China. Japan is adopting strong multilateral diplomacy between the Indian and the Pacific OceansFootnote 14 (Fig. 33.1).
In August 2016, the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo AbeFootnote 15 formally introduced the “Free and Open Indo- Pacific Strategy” at TICAD VIFootnote 16 held in Kenya’s capital Nairobi.Footnote 17 During the ceremony, Abe stated that the “two continents,” Asia and Africa, are rapidly developing. Their potential strength and the dynamism that is born from the confluence of the “two oceans,” the Pacific and Indian Oceans are the cornerstone of stability and prosperity. The Japanese prime minister expressed the intention of Japan to assist in the realization of prosperity in Asia and Africa (See Special Feature “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”).Footnote 18
Abe introduced the FOIP strategy during his first tenure as a prime minister. While delivering the speech, “The Confluence of the Two Seas”Footnote 19 to the Indian parliament in August 2007, he emphasized that Japan and India—are like-minded maritime democracies, and they should promote freedom and prosperity in the “broader Asia.”Footnote 20 This strategy grew alongside the United States, Australia, and other Pacific nations into an immense network which assure the free flow of people, goods, capital, and knowledge.
Japan’s vision integrated more with India’s perspective.Footnote 21 Abe introduced Japan’s vision of a region based on common values of democracy, freedom, and respect for human rights. The prime minister pointed to a “large network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the U.S. and Australia, where transparency and openness are advantages allows the free flow of people, goods, capital, and information.”
Japanese diplomats and experts have built on Abe’s speech that asserts the four main powers: Japan, India, Australia, and the United States.Footnote 22 It demanded concerted efforts to uphold the rules-based regional order, particularly the resolution of maritime disputes, securing the autonomy of trade, and navigation. The new Japanese strategy will pro-actively build peace based on “diplomacy that takes a panoramic view of the world map.”
In parallel, Abe pushed for an “arc of freedom and prosperity on the Eurasian Continent”Footnote 23 to support economic development and democracy and counter the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)Footnote 24 in Central Asia. In addition, Tokyo promoted the establishment of an “East Asian Community”Footnote 25 (Fig. 33.2).
To realize this strategy, there were further strategic cooperation plans with several countries. India enjoys a strong relationship with East Africa and the United States, in addition to its alliance with Australia. Cooperation with India is essential to Japan’s strategy and the relation between both the country was discussed during a visit to Japan by the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi in November 2016.Footnote 27,Footnote 28 Both Prime ministers shared views on developing an initiative toward a stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. Tokyo’s vision of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” and India’s “Act East Policy”Footnote 29 have the potential for a constructive synergy between both the countries.Footnote 30,Footnote 31
1 What is the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”?
The special advisor of the Japan’s Prime Minister, Kentaro Sonoura,Footnote 32 stated during an interview:
A free and open maritime order based on the rule of law is a cornerstone for stability and prosperity of the international community. In particular, the Indo-Pacific region is the core of the vitality of the world with its vast population and economic dynamism.
Japan has been promoting peace and stability in the region by developing the Indo-Pacific region as free and open “international public goods.
Japan is fostering core strategic objectives that include:
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Advocating and establishing free navigation and the rule of law;
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Pursuing economic prosperity by improving connectivity with quality infrastructure development under “international standards,” and;
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Securing peace and stability through capacity-building assistance in the areas of maritime law enforcement and disaster risk reduction.
While Japan targets its FOIP strategy the region encompasses ASEAN,Footnote 33 Bangladesh, India, the Middle East, and finally includes Africa. This region is inhabited by two-third of the world’s population. Economic growth in the twenty-first century is driven by countries in this region; FOIP strategy has the potential to boost economic prosperity of this region in the future.
According to the Australia’s Foreign Policy White Paper, Australia relies heavily on stability in the Indian and Pacific oceans, although Australia’s alliance with the United States remains the keystone in its national security. Canberra is expanding its security partnerships with other partners in the region, especially Tokyo. The security partnership between Australia and Japan is tied by a mutual interest in maintaining the rules-based regional order in the Indo-Pacific.
The Australian Foreign Policy White PaperFootnote 34 adopted the Indo-Pacific strategy, however it was neither tested nor defined except by a footnote definition that describes this strategy as a geographic region that encompasses every continent but Europe. It is a maritime security construct that is considered a part of the military dialogue for some time. It is considered a primary element in response to the challenges the Indo-Pacific region faces.
The new alliance the QuadFootnote 35 which includes Japan, India, Australia, and the United States of America—promotes Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy approach that is centered around the Quad. Moreover, it provides Tokyo with a wider framework for a coherent coalition of democracies in the Indo-Pacific. Japan development relies on enhanced connectivity, prosperity, and security between Asia and Africa. In addition, Japan emphasizes peacebuilding, refugee assistance, and counter-extremism.
As a major partner of the Quad, Australia has a vital role in providing expertise in the field of infrastructure services. For example, Australia worked on construction and operation. It also enjoys the experience in “soft infrastructure,” such as training and institution-building. Tokyo is undertaking this step to mobilize the major financial resources.
Abe’s strategy rests on Quad, Japan, India, Australia, and the United States, or in other terms “democratic security diamond.” Efforts are focused on the Indo-Pacific region to create a new geographic and geopolitical paradigm. The Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy is a concept imbued with the values, principles, and norms of the United States and other members of the Quad. It is underpinning the informal regional order.
This strategic alliance is based onFootnote 36:
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Freedom of navigation and overflight.
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The rule of law.
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Freedom from coercion.
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Respect for sovereignty.
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Private enterprise and open markets.
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Freedom and independence of all nations.
The United States supportedFootnote 37 the commitment of Japan and the EU to reach an agreement on a comprehensive, high-level, and balanced Japan-EU EPA.Footnote 38 The Mr. Alex N. Wong,Footnote 39 Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, explained United StatesFootnote 40 perspective of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”Footnote 41:
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Free:
a- The international plan and the liberation of the Indo-Pacific countries from coercion is exhibited by pursuing the paths that are chosen in the region in a sovereign manner.
b- On a national level, progressive shift of various societies in the Indo-Pacific countries toward openness while promoting good governance in fields that include fundamental rights and prevention of corruption.
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Open:
a- Open Sea lanes and open airways: open sea lanes of communication are the lifeblood of the Indo-Pacific region through which 50 percent of the world trade flow. Particularly, through the South China Sea, open sea lanes, and open airways in the Indo-Pacific, are vital to world trade.
b- Open logistics—infrastructure; there is a lack of infrastructure throughout the Indo-Pacific.
The main points are supporting the infrastructure development in the region. This allows the infrastructure to drive the integration effectively and raises the GDPsFootnote 42 of the constituent economies, not the contrary.
c- Open investment: The United States increased its support to open investment environments and promoted transparent regulatory structures. This openness is not restricted to the United States alone. It also allows local people, innovators, and entrepreneurs to take the advantage of the investment environments.
d- Open trade, fair, and reciprocal trade: These are policies that the United States has backed for decades. The Trump administration also supports these policies.
The Free and Open Indo-Pacific represents a particular vision for rules-based order that governs one of the world’s most dynamic regions: the Indo-Pacific. The region is a hallmark of diverse ethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic, and political groups. It also encompasses a rich history and advancing development.
The Indo-Pacific stresses the increasing importance of the Indian Ocean. Together both oceans shape the channel for global trade and an emerging arena of competition. Bookended by two of the world’s most critical trade chokepoints; the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, the Indian Ocean’s Sea lines of communication connects Asian energy consumers to their suppliers in the Middle East.
As a historian, the resemblance that I found the “East Asian Community” constituted the origin of Abe’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy theory. It is reminiscent of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,Footnote 43 this concept flourished during the imperial period in Japan in the 1930s, and during peacetime.Footnote 44
The doubt created around this concept is accompanied by Tokyo’s ambiguity toward human rights in Southeast Asia and the limitations of this normative framework. Regardless of that, other regional stakeholders, such as South Korea and ASEAN countries, cautiously welcomed this strategy, as the consensus tends toward avoiding antagonizing China.
ASEAN countries are willing to remain neutral between US-Japan and China, who are considered major trade partners and donors in the Southeast Asia region. While Japan is content with recent endorsements of its Indo-Pacific strategy, even is still a long before being recognized by the Quad becomes a coherent driving force.
In its new millennium strategy, Japan invests in three types of support: loans, grants, and technical assistance. Japan also contributes to multilateral aid agencies like the World Bank, United Nations agencies, and the regional development banks. Bilateral aid has always taken the larger part of the aid budget. It is estimated between two-thirds and three-quarters of total annual aid. Also, Japan, through Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF), is in a partnership with the Government of Japan (JapanGov). It provides grants in support of community-driven development and poverty reduction projects that empower the poorest and most vulnerable groups not accessed by other programs and improve their lives through direct benefits.Footnote 45,Footnote 46
2 What are the major obstacles facing Japan’s strategy?
TANAKA, Akihiko | GRIPS faculty directory (n.d.). This part of the study is adopted after an official recommendation due to the amazing scholarly work of 政策研究大学院大学 National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, GRIPS.
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Wide-area connectivity policy.
Enhancing the link between infrastructures in regional countries is an essential goal to expand the social and economic development of the vast Indo-Pacific region. The development of port facilities are required to connect countries by maritime and corridors (roads and railways) that link seas to inland areas.Footnote 47 In Southeast Asia, Japan has contributed to developing traffic infrastructures that stretch between east and west. It is important to connect this with South Asia, while in Africa development is particularly important for the corridor infrastructures that connect inland countries with seas. The rising demand for regional infrastructure has given the actual situation of the development of economies and societies in Indo-Pacific countries. This region also contains countless vital important infrastructures in areas where companies from Japan are neither competitive nor interested to invest or develop in.
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Nurturing human resources.
Japan’s focus in international cooperation has always been on human resources development through the nurturing of human resources from developing countries through long-term training programs in Japan. This has resulted due to the development of the economies of Southeast Asia and China. It is essential to continue welcoming talented individuals from Indo-Pacific countries to Japan could invest in the future leaders. High-level human resources are needed for both public and private sectors in developing countries to avoid falling into the “middle-income trap” and to maintain sustainable growth. Japan’s contribution in this field is valuable.
Japan needs to prepare qualified human resources to for a sound understanding of the Indo-Pacific region. It is essential to encourage enrollment in new fields of education related to the Indo-Pacific region studies various educational institutions. Japanese volunteers in Overseas Cooperation programs and other JICA volunteers are popular programs and highly rated in the Indo-Pacific countries. Furthermore, these actions should be maintaining their activeness.
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Human security and support fragile states.
The Indo-Pacific region has the highest growth numbers. However, this region is home to various political conflicts. For instance, ethnic cleansing of Rohingyas in Myanmar, conflicts in India’s eastern states, Pakistan-Indian border crisis, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and South Sudan. The “human security” of the those who inhabit these areas is vulnerable to massive influx of refugees.
To achieve stable prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, peace must be re-established in fragile neighboring countries and areas, where human security must be improved. Cooperation in Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)Footnote 48 and assistance for peacebuilding by Official Development Assistance (ODA) programs should continue, along with the assistance to conflict-affected countries that are burdened by the influx of refugees, and humanitarian assistance to refugee camps. It is necessary to ensure Japan’s refugee application procedures are appropriate and create a structure that drives Japan to become a host country to refugees.
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(4)
The management of power politics.
An efficient implementation of a free and open Indo-Pacific strategy requires proper management of the relationships among “great powers” in this region. Japan should engage in a classical balance of power policy against China. With such policies, Japan can reduce the possibility of armed conflicts, and it must be implemented even if it is against China’s desire.
Countries in the region must secure and develop moderate defense and maritime law-enforcement capabilities. Japan should provide the needed support for these capabilities and proceed in the security cooperation development with the United States, Australia, and India. This should be done to emphasize close dialogues with China for future management of power politics.
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Seeking wider and multilateral diplomacy.
In the Indo-Pacific region, an umbrella that includes all the concerned regional countries does not exist. It is not constructive to establish international rules. The priority of Japan’s diplomacy at this stage is to launching the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)Footnote 49 11 immediately. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)Footnote 50 must be agreed to strengthen the free trade from the Pacific side.
Yet Japan’s relationships with ASEAN countries that geographically fall in the heart of the Indo-Pacific region are extremely important and should further utilize top-level diplomatic frameworks with the related countries, such as TICAD and the Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM).Footnote 51 The 2018Footnote 52 meetings were attended by 17 countries—Japan, Australia, New Zealand, with other 14 island nations, including the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
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(6)
Create integrated policies with a steady implementation system.
The implementation of a free and open Indo-Pacific strategy is linked to all the departments under Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau, the North American Affairs Bureau, and the Latin American and Caribbean Affairs Bureau. It also works in tandem with government’s ministries and agencies including the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism. Furthermore, it is essential to collaborate with partners organizations to implement projects through JICA and Japan Bank for International Cooperation as well as private companies and NGOs.Footnote 53 It is fundamental to create a system to facilitate collaboration among these diverse stakeholders to implement Japanese policies.
Currently, Japan’s “infrastructure systems” exports are deliberated by the “Economic Cooperation Infrastructure Strategy Conference”Footnote 54 under the Prime Minister. However, the present Economic Cooperation Infrastructure Strategy Conference is not an arena to promote the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, and it cannot only be an advertisement for infrastructure development. Yet, it remains important (let alone exports of infrastructure systems). This strategy has a wider perspective related to world order, and it is not limited to a narrow-minded promotion of Japan’s exports. The whole must be reviewed by the National Security Council (NSC).Footnote 55
In this case, it is essential to create a system that enables the National Security Secretariat of the Cabinet Secretariat and the International Cooperation Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to collaborate. An organized structure is necessary to deal with this vast region. It is necessary to further increase the number of embassies staff throughout the region. As suggested recently by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kono Taro,Footnote 56 it would be a desirable option to provide an official airplane to the foreign minister or establish a mechanism that allows the ministers and the President of JICA to frequently visit foreign countries. Island countries in the Pacific, which are part of the Indo-Pacific region, have never been visited by the foreign minister of Japan. Also, the current network of commercial flights among these countries is inconvenient for a busy foreign minister to set aside sufficient time to visit them.Footnote 57
Finally, the report presents a positive aspect about the Official Development Assistance (ODA)Footnote 58 that was approved by the Japanese Cabinet. Tokyo wanted the vast region to serve the “international public good.” In this regard, Japan will support developing countries in reinforcing maritime law enforcement.
While Prime Minister Abe said Japan will contribute around $2.9 billion to programs providing universal health coverage. This program provide free primary health services to all people and communities around the globe. Universal health coverage is one of the sustainable development goals that U.N. members are trying to achieve by 2030.Footnote 59
Japan has allocated $16.8 billion in ODA, placing it fourth among members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development after the United States, Germany, and Britain. Japan’s robust developmental assistance plays a major complementary role in this region. Tokyo has expertise in designing, planning, and delivering hardware infrastructure. It enjoys a leading edge in research and development areas.
Japan’s “Partnership for Quality Infrastructure” initiativeFootnote 60 involves infrastructure spending, over five years, of around US$110 billion in Asia. In 2016, the initiative was expanded to $200 billion globally (including in Africa and the South Pacific).
Japan will fully mobilize public and private resources, in collaboration with other countries and international organizations in order to address the immense demand for infrastructure development in Asia.
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Japan and the strengthened Asian Development Bank (ADB)Footnote 61 will provide approximately USD 110 billion (more than USD 50 billion from Japan and more than USD 50 billion from the ADB) for quality infrastructure investment in Asia over the next five years.
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This initiative will play a catalytic role in further mobilizing private funding and know-how to realize sufficient infrastructure investment in terms of both quality and quantity.
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Japan will further promote quality infrastructure investment globally in collaboration with other countries and international organizations.
Below is the recent list of the Japanese-sponsored port projects (with approximate Japanese funding in US dollars) that indicates how active Tokyo has been in the Indian Ocean within the past decade:
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Nacala, Mozambique—port ($320 million)
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Mombasa, Kenya—port and related infrastructure ($300 million)
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3.
Toamasina, Madagascar—port ($400 million)
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4.
Mumbai, India—trans-harbor link ($2.2 billion)
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5.
Matarbari, Bangladesh—port and power station ($3.7 billion)
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6.
Yangon, Myanmar—container terminal ($200 million)
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7.
Dawei, Myanmar—port and special economic zone ($800 million)
3 Conclusion
Although Japan may present itself as a non-militarist and politically neutral country, it has still extended its support to US-initiated military operations as well as security plans within the region. These paradox instances were bound to become a predicament at some point.Footnote 62
While Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was visiting the Middle East, he delivered speeches in Saudi Arabia that clearly unveiled the new scheme that was reliant on industrial collaboration and integration. This economic industrial cooperation will allow the merging of the riches of the Gulf States and the competent Arab labor force with the highly advanced Japanese technology and technical know-how. Collaborations as such would delve into new services solar energy, agriculture, and medical care.
Prime Minister Abe allocated around 507 million yen (equivalent to 4.6$ million dollars) in 2020 budget reserves to finance its forces in the Arab region.Footnote 63 A one-year mission in the Middle East, that involves rotating destroyers in rounds over three to four months, could be extended even longer with approval from the Japanese cabinet under the auspice of national security.
Cooperation with the international allies is envisioned through Japanese support and implementation of all UN resolutions. However, this would in no way entail the use of military force in the Gulf, ban on the export of arms and military technology except for the Unites States, hosting of US troops, that include the Seventh fleet, and not less than 20,000 marines whose presence since Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait is strategic to both Tokyo and Washington.Footnote 64
Japan has continually adopted a policy in the Middle East in which it balances its US interests with its own energy needs. It imports almost 90% of its crude oil from the regionFootnote 65 with a trade balance of around $ 24.3 billion in exports and 94.9 billion from imports with the Middle East.Footnote 66 It is important to note that the major trading partners of Japan in the region are the Arab Gulf states along with Iran.Footnote 67,Footnote 68
Former Prime Minister Abe, after resigning for health reasons,Footnote 69 was succeeded by like-minded Yoshihide Suga,Footnote 70 after which the defense budget rose for the ninth year in a row.Footnote 71 One can only interpret this as an intention to further strengthen Japan’s military performance and capacity.
The evident presence of the Japanese military within the Middle East, which was original till January 26, 2021, is expected to continue with the new US administration and in coordination with the Arab Gulf states. Proactive contribution to peace strategy is today a pressing necessity for the Arab world, Japan, and humanity at large. As such, one can only anticipate how the Japanese peaceful military presence as part of the “proactive peace strategy” will further develop.
Notes
- 1.
Takenaka & Sheldrick (2019).
- 2.
Miyagi (2008).
- 3.
Mihut & Daniel (2012, pp. 1042–1048).
- 4.
King Faisal bin Abdelaziz Al Saud (1906–1975), king of Saudi Arabia from 1964 to 1975, was an influential figure of the Arab world known for his statecraft at home and his assertiveness abroad. King Faisal Foundation (KFF) (n.d.).
- 5.
Shwadran (2019).
- 6.
شاهد قبل 46 عامًا.. زيارة الملك فيصل لليابان. (2017). Translation: 46 Years Ago … The Visit of King Faisal to Japan.
- 7.
Nester & Ampiah (1989, pp. 72–88).
- 8.
Miyagi (2008).
- 9.
Japan still reliant on Middle Eastern oil (2020)
- 10.
Qatar friendship fund (n.d.).
- 11.
FOIP is the most important feature of Japan’s foreign policy under the Abe Administration. One of the most important questions is whether this vision aims to contain a rapidly rising China. Along with the amelioration of the relationship between Japan and China, this diplomatic strategy has been evolved from the quadrilateral security cooperation among leading democracies in this region, namely the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, to a more comprehensive regional cooperation. SPF (2021).
- 12.
Gulf Cooperation Council is a regional intergovernmental political and economic union consisting of all Arab states of the Arabian Gulf except Iraq, namely: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The Charter of the GCC was signed on 25 May 1981, formally establishing the institution.
“الأمانة العامة لمجلس التعاون لدول الخليج العربية.” Accessed January 18, 2021. https://www.gcc-sg.org/en-us/Pages/default.aspx.
- 13.
Diplomatic Bluebook (n.d.).
- 14.
The geopolitical concept of Indo-Pacific during the Cold War. After the United Kingdom withdrew its military from east of the Suez at the end of the 1960s, the Soviet Union expanded its military presence and influence throughout the Indian Ocean region. To counter the growing Soviet threat in the region, the US Pacific Command came to cover both the Pacific and Indian oceans in 1972. Since the 1970s, the US Pacific Command has regarded the two great oceans as a unified strategic theater and described it as “Indo-Asia–Pacific.”
- 15.
Shinzo ABE (The cabinet) (n.d.).
- 16.
Ticad VI. (n.d.).
- 17.
(2020, June 5). Tic Ad 6 | 東京のパチンコ店. https://ticad6.net/
- 18.
Diplomatic Bluebook (n.d.).
- 19.
MOFA: Speech by H.E. Mr. Shinzo ABE, prime minister of Japan, at the Parliament of the Republic of India “Confluence of the two seas” (August 22, 2007) (n.d.).
- 20.
The importance of Shinzo ABE (n.d.).
- 21.
Japan-India Joint Statement (n.d.).
- 22.
The Quad.
- 23.
A New Pillar for Japanese Diplomacy: Creating an Arc of Freedom and Prosperity (n.d.).
- 24.
(2021). Shanghai Cooperation Organization. https://eng.sectsco.org/.
- 25.
Towards an East Asian Community (n.d.).
- 26.
A New Foreign Policy Strategy: “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” (n.d.).
- 27.
Prime minister of India (n.d.).
- 28.
(n.d.). https://www.narendramodi.in/.
- 29.
Act East Policy of India (n.d.).
- 30.
Diplomatic Bluebook (n.d.).
- 31.
The New Great Game (2018).
- 32.
Profile of state minister for foreign affairs Kentaro SONOURA (n.d.).
- 33.
History (n.d.).
- 34.
Foreign Policy in Action (n.d.).
- 35.
The four “Democratic security diamond.”
- 36.
McMaster previews Trump’s Asia trip [Video] (n.d.).
- 37.
G7 ise-shima leaders’ declaration [Video] (2016).
- 38.
EU-Japan economic partnership agreement (n.d.).
- 39.
Wong (2020).
- 40.
In May 2016, President Obama made the first visit as a sitting US President to Hiroshima and in December Prime Minister Abe paid a visit to Hawaii. These reciprocal visits symbolized the strength of the Japan-US Alliance and served as an opportunity to demonstrate the power of tolerance and peace between countries that had previously been at war. At the summit meeting held in Hawaii in December, both leaders shared their view on the importance of advancing the Japan-US Alliance to an even higher level, and shared recognition of the importance of expanding the network of alliances such as the Japan-US-Australia and Japan-US-India alliances to preserve stability and prosperity in the region, with a free and open Indo-Pacific. Diplomatic Bluebook (n.d.).
- 41.
Press releases (2020).
- 42.
Gross Domestic Product.
- 43.
Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere (n.d.).
- 44.
My book “The Political History of Japan between the Two World Wars الحـربـين بـين السـياسـي اليـابـان تـاريـخ العـالمـيتـين” (ISBN 978-614-402-555-0) covered in detail that historical era. In Arabic it was published till now in two editions, the English version has been edited to be released soon.
- 45.
Japan social development fund (n.d.). World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/japan-social-development-fund.
- 46.
Staff Writer (2017).
- 47.
Towards region-wide seamless connectivity in Asia and the Pacific (n.d.).
- 48.
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) (n.d.).
- 49.
What is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)? (2018).
- 50.
Regional comprehensive economic partnership (RCEP) (n.d.).
- 51.
Pacific islands leaders meeting (PALM) (n.d.).
- 52.
The 8th Pacific islands leaders meeting (PALM8) (n.d.).
- 53.
Non-governmental Organizations.
- 54.
Meeting of the management council for infrastructure strategy (the Prime Minister in action) (n.d.).
- 55.
National Security Council (NSC) (n.d.).
- 56.
Taro KONO (The cabinet) (n.d.).
- 57.
Diplomatic Bluebook (n.d.).
- 58.
Official development assistance (ODA) (n.d.).
- 59.
Transforming our world: The 2030 agenda for sustainable development: Sustainable development knowledge platform (n.d.).
- 60.
Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (n.d.).
- 61.
ADB (2021).
- 62.
How ABE used the IS hostage crisis to push security reform (2015).
- 63.
Staff (2020).
- 64.
Japan and the Persian Gulf (n.d.).
- 65.
"Japan: Oil imports by country (2020).
- 66.
Japan trade balance, exports, imports by region 2018 | WITS data (n.d.).
- 67.
Iran was the No.4 oil supplier for Japan until 2011 sharing 9.8% of Japan’s total oil import in 2010 and 7.8% in 2011, and No.5 with a 5.2% share as of 2012. Agency for Natural Resources and Energy 2011, 2012; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iran Basic Data. Japan and the Middle East After the Arab Spring (n.d.).
- 68.
Gulf-Japan Ties, Beyond the Energy Sector (n.d.).
- 69.
On the resignation of prime minister of Japan Shinzo ABE (2020).
- 70.
Suga Yoshihide (1948), a Japanese politician who became the leader of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) and prime minister of Japan in 2020. Yoshihide SUGA (The cabinet) (n.d.).
- 71.
Defense budget (n.d.).
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Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge the support, motivation, and inspiration provided by the ambassadors and staff of the Japanese embassies in Beirut, Doha, and Riyad. Depending on their precious recommendation I had access to the official documents published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan to enrich my research. Upon their patronage, this study is based on original sources provided by Tokyo.
In alphabetical order, I am honored to reveal the extraordinary embracement of these Leading Japanese diplomats in the Middle East to achieve “Japan and the Gulf States: Friendship Prospects under the FOIP Initiative,” hoping for a better understanding between Japan and the Gulf States:
I. H.E. Fumio Iwai, the Japanese ambassador to KSA (discussing the original proposal of revealing FOIP to the Arab public, academic society, and decision-makers on 29-7-2021, with approval to use his personal approach in the research).
II. H.E. Matahiro Yamaguchi (Former Japanese ambassador to Lebanon), Japan—MOFA. (Providing documents through National Diet Library Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan)
III. H.E. Seiichi Otsuka (Former Japanese ambassador to Qatar), Japan—MOFA. (First recommendation for my study, especially that His Excellency was based in both Beirut and Doha, while he is now in Tokyo).
IV. H.E. Takeshi Okubo, the Japanese ambassador to Lebanon. (Following up my study on a routine basis).
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AlBadawi, H. (2023). Japan and the Gulf States: Friendship Prospects Under the FOIP Initiative. In: Rahman, M.M., Al-Azm, A. (eds) Social Change in the Gulf Region. Gulf Studies, vol 8. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7796-1_33
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