Keywords

1 Introduction

Academic articles often deal with the impact of virtual societies represented by the Internet and social media, on facilitating certain changes in real societies (physical societies) (Turkle, 1997). This theme is especially evident in developing societies, covering the impact of the globalized virtual world on their languages, fashions, traditions and other areas. While I agree with this to some extent, real societies are vastly different from one another. Some of them are conservative, whereas others are liberal and open. While the impact of virtual society may be directly and easily appreciated in a liberal society, in a conservative society, the influence or change may not appear without the facilitation of political authorities.

Moreover, in some societies, even if there is communication with the virtual world, the change must first take place in real society before being reflected in virtual society. For example, Saudi women have been using the Internet and social media since 2001. Although the Saudi woman has been acquainted with other cultures and international fashions for more than 15 years, it is worth noting that she has committed herself to appearing in the Black Abaya that she has worn in public life for several decades. Then, even if she were to make any changes to the Abaya, it would have to be in compliance with the restrictions imposed on it. Changes in the colour and design of the Abaya only appeared clearly after obtaining the rights included in the Saudi Vision 2030, and with the set of Saudi political leadership decisions regarding the rights of Saudi women with an economic and social dimension. This included reducing restrictions related to the black Saudi Abaya, which had a direct impact on the colour and design of Saudi women’s clothing in the real community, and this change was then transmitted in the virtual community.

Clothing is an aspect of material culture that provides visual cues to the changes taking place within the environment (Rabolt & Forney, 1989). Therefore, the political changes that gave Saudi women a wide range of rights, including easing restrictions related to the Black Abaya, were a result of economic changes related to the drop in oil prices. Given that Saudi Arabia is a rentier state, the drop in oil prices had an impact on the Saudi leadership’s decisions regarding the rights of Saudi women, which contributed greatly to the material identity of women. One of their newly acquired rights was the ability to choose the colour and shape of their clothes in their practical life. This effect was consequently reflected on social media.

This chapter attempts to present the economic factor in Saudi society that positively affected the economic and social rights granted to Saudi women in the Saudi Vision 2030 and the Saudi leadership’s decisions related to Saudi women. Then it considers how these decisions were reflected in the nature of Saudi women’s clothing in traditional society first, before such changes emerged in virtual society. The aim is to shed light on the fact that in conservative Saudi society, changes related to material identity began first in traditional society and then extended to virtual society, not the other way around. When rights were granted to Saudi women and the restrictions on the Black Abaya eased in traditional society, this occurred first in her daily life and then spread to the virtual world of the Internet and social media.

Interaction of Saudi women in real and virtual society, simultaneously with use of the Internet and interactions on social media, reflects their commitment to the restrictions imposed on them by Saudi society for decades, especially after benefiting from generous oil revenues from 1938 onwards. Oil prices started fluctuating a few years before King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud took the throne on 23 January 2015 and these fluctuations continued during his reign. The decline in oil prices and the lack of international demand for oil led the Saudi political decision-makers to turn to economic diversification to reduce dependency on oil as an essential resource. This change was positive and in the interest of the Saudi women, who entered as primary actors and participants in the process of economic diversification and were given a number of economic and social rights, including the right to choose their clothes in accordance with the nature of their occupation and new daily working lives. This change was then reflected in the way Saudi women presented themselves in virtual communities.

This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part deals with Saudi women before 2016 and explains that their material identity in terms of the Black Abaya did not change significantly for many years, despite their use of the Internet and social media. In the second part, we examine the relationship of the fluctuation and decline of oil prices with the nature of the decisions of the political authority in favour of the economic and social rights of Saudi women. The third part explains the contribution of these decisions to easing the restrictions on the Saudi Abaya in real society. The final part then shows the decrease in the influence of the Saudi authorities on the minds of Saudi women and how the wearing of the Abaya was adapted to different colours and designs, with the extension of its presentation on social media sites. I follow these parts with the conclusion.

2 Saudi Women Before 2016: The Presence of the Internet and the Absence of Its Influence

Some scholars argue that women should be analysed in the context of the political projects of contemporary countries and their historical transformations, such as the discovery and exploitation of oil (Meijer et al., 2012). Indeed, oil is the moving factor behind any political, economic and social change that occurs in Saudi Arabia (Al-Khateeb, 1998). The rise or fall of oil revenues in rentier countries greatly affects all aspects of the State. Generous oil revenues over the past decades enabled the House of Saud to develop various fields, such as education, health, construction, port construction and more. Since the establishment of the Third Saudi State in 1932, the legitimacy of the rule of the House of Saud was closely linked to its religious and Wahhabi message (Buchan, 2015). Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy (there are no political parties) linked to the Sharia, which in turn was formed by Wahhabism. Since Sharia is complemented by a wide range of customs, the demands for social change take on a political, and in some cases, an anti-religious, aspect (Buchan, 2015). At the same time, gender segregation is a significant characteristic of public and social life in Saudi Arabia (Al-Saggaf, 2004). This rule applies to all aspects of social life, such as hospitals, schools, shopping malls, libraries and restaurants (Al-Saggaf, 2004).

Saudi society considers the hijab an indisputable religious duty and a symbol of the depth of religious conviction and solidarity with other Muslim women (Pharaon, 2004). Without it, women are considered to move away from the basic commitment to their own identity, while the veil is seen as a way to bridge the gap between men and women (Pharaon, 2004). In public, women in Saudi Arabia are legally required to wear an Abaya with a shayla or a rectangular head scarf (Lindholm, 2010). Women in Saudi Arabia thus adhere to the norms of religion and tradition with reinforcement from the visual symbol provided by traditional Saudi dress, the Abaya and the veil (Rabolt & Forney, 1989). With strict moral penalties imposed on women who do not dress appropriately in public places by the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention, women can only be seen dressed differently from the traditional norm on special occasions and situations where no men arepresent (Rabolt & Forney, 1989).

Meanwhile, access to the Internet has also been historically restricted in Saudi Arabia. Despite the existence of the Internet in Saudi Arabia since 1999, the Saudi authorities did not allow its use to either men or women until 2001 (Human Rights Watch, 2006). Saudi authorities have blocked more than 200,000 websites, and Saudi Arabia is considered the most aggressive country in the region regarding the policies followed in blocking network sites—be it pornographic sites, sites related to gambling or drugs, or sites with political themes, such as the Amnesty International website, which includes criticism of the human rights violations in Saudi Arabia (Human Rights Watch, 2006). Flickr, a photo-sharing site, has also been blocked (Human Rights Watch, 2006). Article 6 of the Kingdom’s Anti-Cyber Crime Law also stipulates imprisonment for the “production, preparation, transmission, or storage of material impinging on public order, religious values, public morals, and privacy, through the information network or computers” (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2007).

However, access to social media is now possible, which is known to bring changes to the way people interact (Ellison et al., 2007). It opens opportunities for identity formation and interaction, which differ from those available to individuals in offline environments (Alsaggaf, 2019). Additionally, the rapid development of communication technologies brings different cultures closer (Karacor, 2009). It is worth noting that identities established via technology are often cross-border (Bostrom & Sandberg, 2011). Despite these opportunities, the influence of Saudi women was still limited when it came to making a change to her Black Abaya, due to their compliance with the restrictions imposed on them in Saudi society.

Before 2016, Saudi society exercised power according to Foucault’s theory of disciplinary power, concerning the correction of the spirit of the criminal, to give the power of mind over mind (Foucault, 1978). Foucault argues that Bentham’s Panopticon works to make prisoners take responsibility for regulating their behaviour (Foucault, 1978). Thus, the prisoners will behave in the manner prescribed by the institution at all times (Foucault, 1978). Therefore, even after their release from prison, the prisoners will act as if they are still under surveillance (Foucault, 1978). The prisoners (community members) are thus themselves the holders of power and exercise self-control in line with the requirements of the authorities. This interaction exists at all levels of society and is evident in Saudi Arabia. When Saudi women interact, whether in traditional society or on social media (virtual society), their minds monitor their interactions according to the controls of the Saudi authorities in particular and Saudi society in general. Thus, when Saudi women use social media, the Panopticon effect continues to influence them, creating a state of conscious and permanent monitoring, ensuring the automatic operation of power (Foucault, 1978).

According to Goffman’s interpretation (Goffman, 1978) of the presentation of the self in everyday life, the Saudi woman, even if she interacts as an actor, uses metaphors borrowed from drama in front of the virtual audience (Goffman, 1978). The interaction of Saudi women through their individual behaviour in virtual society is characterized by a display of a desirable image in both the front and back theatre that Goffman refers to (Goffman, 1978). When the actor is in the foreground, she is aware that she is being observed by the audience and will consequently observe certain rules and social traditions (Goffman, 1978). Consequently, Saudi women display the behaviour they are accustomed to in prison, or in general under strict rule, which satisfies the public (other users), and this audience is mostly members of Saudi society. Although there are neither guards nor prisoners in the clearly virtual Panopticon, there are guards and prisoners alike, watching each other and implicitly judging each other while sharing content. It is noticeable through two dominant features of Saudi women’s interaction on social media: firstly, they use a pseudonym highly distinct from their first and last name (Guta & Karolak, 2015), and secondly they deal with different social media platforms according to the different levels of their interaction with men in real society, which are restricted by customs and traditions (Guta & Karolak, 2015). Meanwhile, if topics related to the headscarf or the Abaya are discussed online, such discussions are limited to the virtual world (Guta & Karolak, 2015), without any effect on real society, and are bound by the controls imposed by Saudi society.

3 The Impact of the Economic Factor on the Saudi Decision-Makers’ Attitudes Towards Women

The Saudi Vision 2030 and the decisions of King Salman and his son, His Highness Prince Mohammed bin Salman, related to women emerged as the result of negative changes in the Saudi economy that coincided with the ambitions of the Prince. Saudi Arabia is a classic rentier entity whose life cycle has been linked to the extraction (at low cost) of its natural resources (oil and natural gas) and their sale (at a high price) abroad (Ehteshami, 2013). Since the discovery of oil in 1938, the rule of the House of Saud depended on providing generous revenues to their people in exchange for loyalty without accountability for their internal and external policies.

Since the second half of 2014, oil-rich countries in the Middle East and North Africa, including Saudi Arabia, have seen their expected revenues diminish by billions of dollars as oil prices declined. They enjoyed high oil prices for a long period from 2010 to 2014, averaging nearly $100 per barrel of crude oil. In contrast, global average prices were roughly $50 a barrel from 2015 through early 2018 (Moshashai et al., 2020). The impact on the Saudi government’s public finances, and thus the economy, was profound (Grand & Wolff, 2020). Government revenue fell sharply to about $133 billion in 2016, less than half of the nearly $320 billion revenue in 2013 (Grand & Wolff, 2020). Economic growth decreased from 6% in the first quarter of 2014 to 2% in the third quarter of the same year; it recovered somewhat in 2015, then dulled in 2016, and eventually took a negative turn in 2017 (Grand & Wolff, 2020). Between mid-2014 and 2016, the nation’s stock market value fell by half (Grand & Wolff, 2020). With declining oil revenues, the government budget fell into a deficit, reaching 14.8% of GDP in 2015 (Grand & Wolff, 2020). Oil prices are not expected to record a significant increase, as overall demand is less than before (CNBC, 2020 ) (Fig. 36.1).

Fig. 36.1
A line graph of the G D P Growth of percentage versus years from 2012 through 2021. It plots a line with a downward trend that has several peaks and dips.

Fluctuation of Saudi GDP during the last five years (IMF, 2020)

Full size image

In December 2015, the McKinsey Global Institute released a report analysing the Saudi economy in the wake of the oil recession (McKinsey Global Institute, 2015). The report provided terrible predictions for the economic future of Saudi Arabia (McKinsey Global Institute, 2015). The institute predicted a rapid rise in unemployment, a decline in household income, and a deterioration of the financial position of the national government (McKinsey Global Institute, 2015). The report identified a crucial need to implement diversification, moving away from a rentier economy to accelerate the transition to a more market-based approach, facilitated by substantial government investment (McKinsey Global Institute, 2015). Eight different sectors were identified in the report as potential areas of competitive advantage: mining, minerals, petrochemicals, manufacturing, retail and wholesale trade, tourism, hospitality, healthcare, finance and construction (McKinsey Global Institute, 2015).

The changes in oil prices and its economic impact also coincided with political changes, with the accession of King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud on 23 January 2015 (SPA, 2021). He simplified the formulation of government policy and decision-making and abolished 14 royal councils, which were replaced with the Council for Political and Security Affairs and the Council for Economic and Security Affairs (Sasapost, 2015). On 21 June 2017, the King issued several royal orders, including the appointment of his son, Prince Muhammad bin Salman, as the Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense (Media Gov Sa, 2015). Shortly after taking office, Mohammed bin Salman ordered the arrest of a group of personalities, including clerics, dissidents and journalists (Human Rights Watch, 2017). In November 2017, he arrested a further 49 prominent personalities, including current and former princes and ministers, on charges of corruption (BBC News, 2017). The official local media outlets framed the corruption campaign as historic, and it was supported by the Council of Senior Scholars in Saudi Arabia, who described it as a historic reform matter (المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات، 2017).

The Saudi leadership, including King Salman and the Crown Prince, were intent on changing the Kingdom’s international image and were fully aware of the need for economic diversification (Grand & Wolff, 2020). They viewed the economic challenges not as a crisis but as an opportunity to initiate a structural transformation of the Saudi economy, which was already underway (Moshashai et al., 2020). In April 2016, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman announced an ambitious list of reforms under Vision 2030 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2016). The reforms aimed to bring about major changes within Saudi society and its economy by enabling Saudi citizens to form a larger part of the productive workforce in the Kingdom, while diversifying revenues (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2016). The economic goals within the framework of the vision aimed to increase the share of non-oil exports to 50% of government revenues and to increase the share of the private sector in the local economy from 40 to 65%, all by 2030 (Moshashai et al., 2020).

Vision 2030 was an ambitious reform plan established at a national level, despite declining oil revenues impeding the implementation of its projects. One pioneering idea of the Saudi leadership was to give women their rights in the same vision, which was undoubtedly reflected by their increasing involvement in the Saudi labour market. Women constitute almost half of the population of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where the percentage of females was 42.56% in 2016 and 42.52% in 2017 (الهيئة العامة للإحصاء، 2018). In addition, Saudi women make up more than 50% of university graduates (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2016),However.they represent only 14% of the workforce (Courington & Zuabi, 2011). The vision pledged to continue developing the talents of Saudi women, investing their energies and enabling them to obtain appropriate opportunities to build their future and contribute to the development of Saudi society and its economy (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2016). In addition, a goal was established of raising the participation rate of Saudi women in the Saudi labour market from 22 to 30% and providing job opportunities for nearly one million Saudi women by 2030 (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2016). In contrast to the isolation and exclusion they were subjected to earlier, these policies appear to be in the interest of the participation of Saudi women in building a new Saudi society (Eum, 2019). Youth and women are seen as winners in Saudi Vision 2030. Among other goals, the vision aims to harness the economic power of women (Reed, n.d.). Consequently, women were given the right to engage in the Saudi labour market according to moderate controls, which will impact the Saudi economy and help achieve Saudi Vision 2030.

Saudi Vision 2030, which was launched from a country whose economy relied mainly on oil revenues, was subject to challenges because Saudi Arabia was already far from the peak of oil (Goldthau, 2013) but close to the curse of resources. According to Ross (Ross, 2001), oil hinders democracy, especially in countries rich in natural resources, such as Saudi Arabia, which relied on oil as its main source of income for several decades. This created an implicit social contract with the people, and the House of Saud did not consider the difficulties of relying on oil as a primary resource for generations.

I argue that the drop in oil prices and the reduction of the Saudi economy’s dependence on it benefited Saudi women. It facilitated greater involvement in the labour market, with the issuance of social decisions that reduced the social restrictions imposed for many decades. This involvement in the labour market will pave the way for women’s political participation in any future democratic transition process.

Although economic diversification has been a priority in Saudi economic policy since the 1970s, the implementation of a series of five-year development plans to establish six new economic cities, first presented in 1970, did not achieve the required objectives (Kinninmont, 2017). This is because policies aimed at easing the structural fiscal burden and reducing reliance on government spending can be seen as undermining the implicit social contract (Kinninmont, 2017). Therefore, such efforts are often weakened or delayed when oil prices rise (Kinninmont, 2017). Thus, the same relationship that the House of Saud pursued with their people, providing subsidies and imposing restrictions on women, continued because there was no need to effectively include women in the Saudi economy. Conversely, Vision 2030 and the concurrent lack of demand for oil, alongside the prediction of decreased international demand, indicated the growing presence of Saudi women as key players in the Saudi economic development process. It cannot be overlooked that Mohammed bin Salman’s decisions regarding Saudi women creates a positive image of him, especially in Western countries, to convince them of the openness of Saudi Arabia and change the stereotype in the West regarding Saudi women’s rights, including the right to choose their own clothes.

4 Changing the “Black Abaya” Material Identity in Real Society

The inclusion of Saudi women in Saudi Vision 2030 was followed by a set of decisions by King Salman and his son Muhammad which greatly facilitated the involvement of Saudi women in work, diversifying the available job opportunities. It also gave them the right to choose the clothes they wore in accordance with Islamic regulations and lifted the limits of the black colour of the Abaya. These accompanying decisions brought about a great change for Saudi women in their daily lives in real society.

The launch of Saudi Vision 2030 was followed by a set of socially-focused decisions in favour of Saudi women, from the Saudi political leadership, which women had been demanding for many years. For example, King Salman issued a statement on 26 September 2017, allowing Saudi women to drive according to the rules of Islamic law (Okaz, 2017). The decree came into force on 24 June 2018 (CNN Arabic, 2018). Between the issuance of the decree and its implementation, in March 2018, Mohammed bin Salman stated that Islamic Sharia did not obligate women to wear the Black Abaya and that Saudi women may choose their clothes, provided that they are respectful and decent (Al Arabiya, 2018). Importantly, this statement came within the framework of bin Salman’s return to moderate Islam. He had previously said that “We will revive our true moderate and tolerant Islam” (SPAENG, 2017b) and “We will not waste another 30 years in dealing with extremist thoughts” (SPAENG, 2017a). The statement about the Abaya appeared clearly in terms of its colour and design. Other colours began to be introduced and its design changed. It should be noted that before Mohammed bin Salman’s statement regarding the Black Abaya, some simple colours had already been introduced. However, the women who wore these colours were denounced by the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice for their violations. As a result of Mohammed bin Salman’s statement, women are no longer subjected to the campaigns of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, due to a reduction in the authority’s powers.

In addition to other social decisions related to the rights of Saudi women, in August, 2019, women over the age of 21 were allowed to obtain their passports and travel the same way as a male, without the need for the consent of her guardian (Aawsat, 2019). As with the shift in the attitudes towards the Black Abaya, these decisions were preceded by a reduction in the powers of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (BBC, 2016).

The easing of restrictions on the Saudi Abaya and otherwise would not have had any real effect if issued unilaterally, without a set of supporting decisions to ease its implementation. The accompanying set of decisions are all factors that enabled the implementation of the decision to reduce restrictions on the material identity of Saudi women and change it in real society. Thus, the change is based on its initiation in Saudi society through its political leadership. There is no doubt that this internal change in Saudi society, facilitated by the political leadership, helped Saudi women obtain the rights they had been demanding for many years. The decision to ease restrictions on the Saudi Black Abaya and to give women the right to drive a car (BBC News, 2018), among others, have helped introduce more women to the labour market, making it possible that a diversified economy, comprising both men and women, can emerge. In turn, these real societal shifts have facilitated changes in attitudes generally.

5 Saudi Women and the Reduced Effect of the Panopticon

Within the framework of the abovementioned decisions, the Saudi Ministry of Commerce took a number of measures and introduced programmes to empower women and encourage their participation in various aspects of economic life. The aim was to increase their presence in economic and developmental activities, in order to promote sustainable development and to achieve the Kingdom’s Vision 2030, encouraging women’s participation in the national economy (Gov.SA, n.d.). Among the most prominent of these programmes and procedures was the establishment of business centres for women characterized by the application of the comprehensive employee concept within a new and advanced work environment that relies on modern technologies that facilitate procedures and save time for businesswomen (Gov.SA, n.d.). Women can also easily start a business after the cancellation of a guardian’s approval requirement and the implementation of equal procedures for both men and women. They can open commercial records, apply for trademark registration, reserve business names, engage in self-employment, and register business agencies, and are also allowed to engage in all activities that men engage in (Gov.SA, n.d.).

The decisions issued by the political authority had a great impact on the mind and perception of Saudi women, as these rights originated from the authority itself and not from any another source. It ensures that men do not dominate them or hold them accountable to the authorities like before. Consequently, after the issuance of the series of decisions in favour of Saudi women mentioned above, a significant change was observed in the “Black Abaya” material identity in real society. Changes in the daily life of women in Saudi society are evident through the change in the colours of the Abaya and the way it is designed. It indicates a decrease in the influence of the Panopticon on the mind of Saudi women compared to the years before 2016. The Abaya has evolved in line with the rights given to women by the political authority in real Saudi society, though many Saudi women still wear the traditional black Abaya by choice.

By 2021, Vision 2030 had removed many legislative barriers, which gradually reduced cultural and societal barriers, making Saudi women visible, present, and engageable in airports, ministries, security services, companies, shops and the media (الخليل،2021). The nature of these jobs, on the one hand, and the reduction in restrictions on the Abaya in terms of colour, on the other, contributed to shifts in the colour and design of Saudi women’s clothing in their real society, and their use of social media reflected these economic, political and social changes.

After the decisions of the Saudi leadership, the changes in the design and colour of Abayas by Saudi women were met without any reservations or raids by any party. This is in contrast to previous years, when Abaya shops were raided by the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice to ensure their adherence to the black colour code and a wide, simplified design (Alsudairy, 2020).

The vision and accompanying legislation reflected positively on the reality of Saudi women, according to international reports, official statistics, and local indicators (الخليل،2021). Globally, Saudi Arabia jumped up 56 ranks in the “Women, Business Activities, and Law” report issued by the World Bank in 2020, and rose a further 37 ranks in 2021 (الخليل،2021). Officially, labour market statistics from the General Authority for Statistics showed an increase in the participation of Saudi women in the labour force, from 25.9% in the first quarter of 2020 to 33.2% in the fourth quarter of the same year. It also showed a decrease in the unemployment rate for Saudi women to 24.4% during the fourth quarter of 2020, compared to 30.2% in the previous quarter (الخليل،2021). Locally, according to the “Indicator of Women’s Participation in Development” issued by the National Observatory for the Participation of Women in Development in 2019, the results showed that Saudi women’s participation in economic development increased by 54% (الخليل،2021).

6 Conclusion

The economic factors represented by fluctuating oil prices was the main influence on the Saudi political leadership’s decisions regarding Saudi women’s rights, realized through their inclusion in Saudi Vision 2030 and their contribution to economic diversification policies. The set of decisions accompanying the decision not to abide by the Black Abaya facilitated the implementation of the emergence of a new material identity for Saudi women, commensurate with the nature of their work in the new economic fields made available to them by Saudi Vision 2030. The easing of restrictions on Saudi women towards their material identity in real society, allowing them the freedom to choose their own clothes, was in turn reflected in their appearance in virtual society.

Foucault’s theory helps us attain an understanding of Saudi society and the decades-long domination of the Saudi elite in shaping Saudi minds, especially Saudi women’s minds. Furthermore, Goffman’s theory explains that the Saudi woman, when interacting in virtual society, presents herself according to the limits imposed on her in real society (as per the Panopticon) and does not play other roles outside the boundaries set by this society. The rights given to Saudi women by the Saudi authorities and their increased access to public spaces in real society were then reflected in virtual society.