Kurdish Diaspora in Japan: Navigating Kurdish Identity and Activism on Social Media

Abstract

The Kurdish community in Japan offers a dynamic diaspora, where social media plays a pivotal role in expressing and negotiating Kurdish cultural and political identities. This research examines how online communication and social media activism empower Kurdish diaspora members in Japan, facilitating transnational connections, identity expression, and advocacy for Kurdish causes. By exploring the intersection of Kurdish identity, activism, and social media in the Japanese context, this study enhances our understanding of evolving diasporic experiences in the digital age. This study employs a content analysis approach, examining Facebook posts by Kurdish users in Japan and the online activities of civil organisations affiliated with the Kurdish diaspora, to understand the representation of Kurdish identity and activism on social media. The analysis of collected data reveals that Kurdish nationalism is actively expressed within social media platforms, despite limitations such as the predominance of the Turkish language for representing Kurdish nationalism and identity. This highlights the significance of social media in facilitating Kurdish political mobilisation and the resilience of the Kurdish diasporic community in Japan.

Introduction

The definition of diaspora is still being debated among academics. Some academics claim that diasporas are populations that have lived abroad from their country for centuries as a result of tragic events, have a strong national identity, and are involved in active social and cultural activities (Cohen, 1997; Gilroy, 1993). Others, however, propose a broader vision that includes various transnational groups with fluid identities and hybrid cultural practices (Brah, 1996; Vertovec, 1999). This ongoing argument shows the complexities and diversity of diasporic experiences (Brah, 1996; Cohen, 1997; Gilroy, 1993; Vertovec, 1999).

In recent years, a significant number of Kurds have personally experienced migration, becoming actively engaged in the process of leaving their homeland and settling in new countries. The study of the Kurdish diaspora generally is an introduction to understanding transnational relations as well as identity and the desire to return as strategies of immigrants in relation to the country of origin.

In today’s information era, diasporas are no longer defined solely by territorial claims, but rather by the preservation and reconstruction of cultural assets, shared imaginations, and the collective consciousness of their members (Cohen, 1997). The advent of the internet and other modern communication platforms has significantly influenced the contexts and practices surrounding diasporic identity. Through the internet, diasporas gain access to a rich and intricate symbolic environment, enabling them to connect, interact, and express their cultural identities in complex ways (Keles, 2015; Kissau & Hunger, 2010). While the internet provides a platform for diasporas to imagine and establish virtual homes, it also facilitates the clash of national and transnational political ideologies and cultural expressions, leading to counter-expressions of identity (Bucy & Gregson, 2001; Georgiou, 2006).

Online diasporic communities provide an ideal environment for individuals to explore and reassess their cultural identity and political perspectives (Georgiou, 2006). Meanwhile, members of the diaspora may share characteristics such as homeland, language, cultural traditions, history, ancestry, values, and religious practices (Bernal, 2006; Chuang, 2004). However, it is critical to recognise that diaspora groups are varied and incorporate distinct identities within these wider categories. Diasporas are also using cyberspace as a means of voicing political opposition and developing a sense of political identity through participation in political debates (Adamson, 2002; Diamandaki, 2003). There is a growing recognition, among diaspora activists and political organisations, of the internet’s pivotal role as a vital tool in fostering the development of diasporic behaviours within immigrant communities. This is facilitated through the sharing of information and the amplification of political claims (Ekici, 2014). Diasporic societies often have more than one type of a sense of belonging, involving political, ethnic, and cultural identities, as is evidenced by the prominence of political culture in the diaspora (Aghapouri, 2018). Some diasporas place a higher priority on building a political identity due to political concerns, while others place a greater weight on building an ethnic identity. The weighting of each can be changed with context and over time (Karim, 2003).

Through this research, the author analysed approximately 200 Facebook posts from public accounts belonging to individuals and civic organisations associated with the Kurdish diaspora in Japan. The method of post-selection involved examining the last five posts for individuals and the previous ten posts for associations and organisations. Specifically, this chapter analyses the role Facebook plays in the development and representation of Kurdish diasporic identity in Japan and what kind of insight it provides in the transnational space. This chapter argues that everyday transnational communication on Facebook, as a social media, plays an important role in fostering cultural and political identity among Kurdish diasporic community members. This research has been designed based on several stages, such as general monitoring of public online communications, thematic categorisation, content analysis, and determining the frequency of topics and variables within the content that has been shared on Facebook at different times and in response to diverse events.

In summary, the findings presented in this chapter provide evidence that offers support for the hypothesis that Facebook plays a unifying role rather than promoting division and conflict within the Kurdish diaspora in Japan, by facilitating communication and fostering a sense of togetherness.

Kurdish Diaspora in Japan

In the 1990s, Japan lifted visa restrictions for some countries, especially for Iran and Turkey, allowing many young people from these countries to enter Japan without visas. The visa-free entry for Turkey came at a time when the situation of Kurds in Turkey was deteriorating due to political conflicts and unbalanced economic conditions. Japan became a destination for Kurds seeking to improve their situation and find a better life for themselves and their families. However, Japan did not officially open its labour market to unskilled foreign workers, but instead created some “side-doors” to allow them in, such as the status of residence for permanent residents of Japanese descent from South America and the trainee and technical intern programmes (Mori, 1997). However, these side-doors did not apply to Kurds from Turkey, as Turkish citizens and most of the migrants who came to Japan in the 1990s entered as tourists or students and overstayed their visas or worked illegally.

1990 was the starting point for Turkish Kurds to migrate to Japan (Nakajima, 2003). The news spread that Japan was full of job opportunities and easy money could be made. Unskilled labour from low-income Kurdish regions of Turkey travelled to Japan in search of high-paying jobs (Ahmadian, 2020). Looking for a job was one of the common features of many immigrants from different countries coming to Japan in that period, but the situation was more complicated in the case of the Kurds and the reasons for their migration. The Kurds who migrated to Japan during that time had previously moved within Turkey due to political pressure and to escape conflicts between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and the Turkish army. They relocated from regions near the conflict to safer areas. It was during that period that young people from the rural areas of the cities of Gaziantep and Kahramanmaraş in the southeast of Turkey, who suffered from many deprivations such as economic and political problems, tried desperately to get a ticket to Japan (Ahmadian, 2020). Young people who did not even understand the basics of the Japanese language chose to immigrate to a country with strict refugee laws and entered Japan with a three-month visa-free travel, which was enough to enter Japan.

While Kurds have been present in Japan since the 1990s, their numbers have experienced significant growth in recent years. As per most estimates, there were more than 2000 Kurds residing in Japan in 2019, with a majority concentrated in the Kawaguchi and Warabi cities of southern Saitama Prefecture (Ahmadian, 2023). Nearly 30 years have passed since Kurds first arrived in Japan in the 1990s, and, around the region, young Kurds who were born or raised in Japan can be seen (Tokizawa, 2019, p. 5). Legal stays in Japan, such as through marriage, work, or other reasons, have allowed some Kurds to remain in the country for years. However, some Kurds entered Japan without applying for asylum and avoided immigration control (Ahmadian, 2023). Previously, asylum seekers could repeatedly renew their applications, extending their stay and living in uncertainty until a decision was made. But with the new amendment to the Immigration Control Act, passed on June 9, 2023, deportation is no longer suspended after the third application unless “sufficient reasons” are provided (Asada & Sendō, 2023).

Kurds in Turkey have had very difficult periods and painful experiences over the long history of their political struggles and freedom movements. In the late 1980s, as fighting broke out between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish military, unrest intensified, leaving the southeastern part of Turkey in a state of near-civil war (Yilmaz, 2016). In the 1990s, the Turkish government repeatedly bombed and destroyed the area with tanks, claiming that towns and villages in the southeast supported the PKK. Turkish military bombings peaked between 1994 and 1995, displacing more than 3 million Kurds and destroying more than 3000 towns and villages (McDowall, 2021). Many Kurds, whose houses, agricultural lands, and livestock were burned and destroyed, also were forced to migrate to the cities of Turkey and other countries. Many refugees fled to European countries, while some Kurds also emigrated to Japan, because was easier for them to enter Japan during that period due to visa exemptions with the Republic of Turkey (Beşikçi, 2002; Nakagawa, 2001; Nakajima, 2003).

Most Kurds who eventually made it to Japan came from those aforementioned areas of southeastern Turkey. These areas have a history of political violence, including the tragic Marash massacre in 1978. The combination of violence, discrimination, and assimilation policies has contributed to the migration of people from these areas to other parts of the world, including Japan. In rural parts of Turkey, Kurdish communities maintain their tribal, kinship, political, and religious affiliations. Likewise, the Kurdish community in Japan, which originates from similar tribes and neighbouring regions in Turkey, also maintains and strengthens its social bonds over time. The regions they come from in Turkey face many environmental problems at the same time. Its lands are also almost uncultivable due to being covered with thick black stones. Preparing these lands for cultivation is very costly and beyond the means of the residents there. During my field research trip to some of these areas around Gaziantep city in February 2022, I obtained detailed information about the demographic characteristics of the regions in Turkey where the Kurdish diaspora members originated from. During my visit to rural areas in Kahramanmaraş (Marash) and Gaziantep, specifically among the Makhakan (Maxikon) clan, I observed a strong connection between them and the Kurdish community in Japan. Many members of the Makhakan clan, who reside in a village complex located 30 kilometres from Gaziantep, have immigrated to Japan, either with their families or individually. It is worth noting that some of them eventually returned to their hometowns after their time in Japan. Based on the observations made during the fieldwork, it was found that even after returning from Japan, many of the returnees have retained their ability to speak Japanese. Furthermore, their children, who grew up in Japan and attended Japanese schools, can still speak Japanese.

Based on fieldwork and exploration of the Kurdish diaspora’s Facebook usage, the analysis of their posts revealed the intended audiences. Results show that a notable portion, 53.5%, targeted the Kurds in their homeland (see Fig. 10.1). This suggests successful maintenance of a connection between the Kurdish community in Japan and both their community in Japan and their homeland.

Fig. 10.1

Distribution of targeted audiences in the Facebook posts of the Kurdish diaspora in Japan (calculations and graph made by the author)

The Turkish government is generally opposed to the presence and expansion of the Kurdish community in Japan and labels the process of political mobilisation of the Kurds as terrorism, separatism, and extremism (Kyodo, 2022; Rich, 2016). Until 2022, no Kurds had ever been granted refugee status in Japan, which would allow them to settle in Japan permanently (Kyodo, 2022; Rich, 2016). However, on 28 July 2022, a Kurd from Turkey, who was living in Hokkaido, was granted refugee status after an appeals court ruled in May that he would be at risk of persecution if he returned to Turkey, according to the lawyer Koji Yamada (Kyodo, 2022).

The dissatisfaction of the Kurds with the political and social conditions in Turkey, and the numerous conflicts of the Turkish government with the political factions of the Kurds, led to various waves of migration in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which began with migration to neighbouring countries in the Middle East, followed by a large number of people emigrating to European countries, North America, and East Asia, including Japan.

The emergence of the internet and social media has become for members of the Kurdish diaspora a means of gathering and civic participation at the transnational level (Ekici, 2014). Diasporic Kurds have been able to attract greater and wider support from international organisations at the governmental and non-governmental levels through online communication, especially social networks. Social networks have provided a suitable platform for the voices of political leaders and elites to be better heard among members of the Kurdish diaspora, and to provide the necessary potential for cultural identity representation and political mobilisation (Aghapouri, 2018).

Building upon be background described in this section, the levels and types of participation exhibited by members of the Kurdish diaspora on the Facebook social network platform have been further explored. This exploration sets the stage for the next section, where a deeper dive into these aspects will be conducted, and a comprehensive analysis will be provided.

Methodology

Social media has become an important source of data and methodology for social research because it allows researchers to access and analyse the online activities and interactions of many groups and communities (Sloan & Quan-Haase, 2016; Staff et al., 2016). With a focus on this understudied group, this study examines how the Kurdish diaspora in Japan uses Facebook to negotiate their Kurdish identity and activism. As one of the most well-known and widely used social media sites among the Kurdish community in Japan, Facebook was chosen as the focus of the study because it provides a rich variety of content types, including text, images, videos, and links, that can reveal different facets of their online expression and engagement (Wills, 2016, p. 50).

During the monitoring of the online activities of this community, I concluded that the TikTok social network is also common among the members of this community, but preliminary investigations showed that the activities of the community members in the TikTok space are not serious enough to answer the questions used to analyse social media posts created by the Kurdish community in Japan. However, as the primary and preferred social network within the community, Facebook has a prominent role. The vast majority of Kurds in Japan maintain active Facebook accounts and regularly engage with the platform, as do civic organisations associated with the Kurdish community.

In the first stage of this study, ten public pages/groups belonging to Kurdish civil society organisations and institutions on Facebook were identified by searching for keywords such as “Kurds in Japan” in Kurdish, Japanese, English, and Turkish (see Fig. 10.2). This was done in order to get an overview of the level and sentiment of participation on Facebook by diaspora members. The number of followers of each Facebook group was checked separately. Public pages and group pages that are affiliated with Kurdish organisations in Japan, and those that focus more on the promotion of Kurdish political and cultural identity, were found to be more followed by Kurds in Japan.

Fig. 10.2

List of institutional groups and pages on Facebook associated with the Kurds in Japan

In the context of social media research, snowballing is a technique used to identify additional participants or sources of information through referrals or connections within a network (Dosek, 2021). In this study, the snowball method was used to collect a comprehensive list of Facebook accounts associated with Kurdish individuals and civic organisations in Japan. After the initial set of public Facebook accounts was identified, the author searched among the likes, followers, and comments of the initial sources and discovered additional public Facebook accounts and added them to the list.

In the second stage, in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the community’s online activities in the Facebook space, the author selected 100 Facebook posts from personal accounts of Kurdish users and 100 posts from institutional accounts of Kurdish civil society groups. However, due to the fact of applying some filters in the selection of pages and persons, the composition of this selection finally came out as follows (see Fig. 10.3).

Fig. 10.3

Distribution of selected Facebook accounts/pages by types

One of the filters that was applied in the selection of Facebook accounts was to select only people and members who were active on Facebook. For example, individuals whose last Facebook posts were over a year old were excluded from the study as less active users. Since the aim of this research was to obtain the latest status of the Kurdish diaspora members’ online activities in Japan, the publication date of the last Facebook posts was used as a criterion to distinguish between active and inactive users (Fig. 10.4). As an additional criterion for selecting Facebook pages belonging to Kurdish associations and civil organisations in Japan, the frequency of updates, their popularity, and the number of followers were also considered. In general, the public pages that were selected had 200–3000 likes and followers. To protect participants’ information and safety, this study will not disclose names of individual account holders, while the list of institutional pages and groups on Facebook is provided in Fig. 10.2.

Fig. 10.4

The frequency of publication dates of Facebook posts

The Challenge of Data Collection

This research is based on online content analysis using a qualitative method, to provide a comprehensive and visual overview of Facebook activities among the Kurdish community in Japan. Data collection was conducted through designing a database on the Google Forms platform. This database included twelve questions. Before designing the database, the author spent some time scanning and skimming the Facebook posts of the community members to obtain the correct categories and themes. During data entry, after opening each post and checking its quality, the author answered twelve questions for each post separately. For each post, the following information was screened and submitted in Google Forms: post number, publication date, account owner name, account type (personal/institutional), type of shared content (text, image, video, mixed, etc.), general topic of the post, general impression of the post (positive/negative), representation of identity in the posts, representation of activism in the posts, the level of interaction with the community, the language in which the post is written and the type of audience of the posts.

In general, the checkbox field option in Google Forms was used to address the main research questions, which encompassed multiple aspects. This option allows for multiple choices, as each item may not necessarily fit into a single category, and a category may encompass multiple characteristics that need to be included in the responses at the same time. By using checkboxes that allow for multiple choices, it is possible to capture multiple topics, views, languages, or audiences associated with each post. In addition, drop-down menus were used for certain questions to provide options for single selections. These structured question formats allowed for easier and more efficient data analysis, so that responses could be used and analysed to produce quantitative results.

The data collected from Google Forms was then subjected to qualitative analysis, with visual and quantitative data results presented. It is important to note that since this research follows a qualitative approach, the graphs presented below are the result of qualitative data analysis to give a visual and broader perspective on the Kurdish community in Japan.

Identity Representation on Facebook

Facebook is one of the most influential social networks that, despite the emergence of other competitors such as Instagram, Twitter, TikTok, etc., still maintains its position as a main platform for online activities (Meta Platforms, 2023; Statista, 2023a, 2023b). Considering the structural features of Facebook compared to other social networks, at least by observing the Facebook posts of Kurd users, it became clear that Facebook posts provide more offer more possibilities for analysis with regard to everyday issues than Instagram and TikTok. The greater freedom that Facebook has given users to post text, video, and image content simultaneously could be one of the reasons for this. Since Facebook is older than other social networks, this media has become a centre of nostalgic memories and a place to recover and reread memories (Davalo et al., 2015; Zhao et al., 2013). Facebook serves as a virtual space for Kurds in Japan to engage with their past, present, and future identities. They repost photos and videos of their homeland that Facebook has archived and retrieved for them, such as landscapes, monuments, festivals, or historical events. These posts illustrate some of the ways that Kurds use Facebook to interact with their memories and culture. The development of the interactive and network level of this media, along with its other features, has given the users of this media have access to an interactive space where they can express their sense of belonging to a group.

Since the Kurdish diaspora space is far from the original homeland, Facebook has become a key space in the interaction of diaspora members with each other and with their hometowns. The meanings of “being Kurdish” are actively represented in this virtual space. This section discusses the distinct manifestations of diasporic identity among the members of the Kurdish online community in Japan. Examining the Facebook posts of members of the Kurdish diaspora and civil organisations in Japan, first, required a thematic classification to achieve a general and comprehensive analysis of the content of the posts.

Figure 10.5 shows that about 36% of the posts examined had political content, which is the highest rate, as shown on the chart. In other words, 72 out of 200 Facebook posts that were analysed had political features, references, and elements. After the posts with political content, the second place was dedicated to events related to the Kurdish community in Japan with a value of 32% and 64 posts out of 200 posts. The third position (29.5%) was occupied by posts that represented solidarity, and the largest part of this solidarity was related to events that occurred in Kurdish regions in different countries. A category named “Neutral” was included among the post types to allow for ranking or categorising posts that were not directly related to the research topic or did not align with any specific theme.

Fig. 10.5

Distribution of content categories in Facebook posts

In another question, the representation of the elements, signs, and factors that had the closest overlap with the issue of Kurdish identity was investigated. In response to this question, it was possible to choose several options. As can be seen in Fig. 10.6, the content of 84 posts out of 200 posts had identity stimuli. The “identity stimuli” indicate that there were specific signals, inputs, or factors that influenced or provoked a response related to identity. It suggests that various elements or aspects play a role in shaping or triggering identity-related experiences or behaviours among diaspora members. Some of the identity stimuli are considered below.

Fig. 10.6

Frequency of identity variables in Facebook posts

• Use of Kurdish language in posts and comments.

• Sharing news and events related to Kurdistan issues.

• Sharing of cultural content such as music, art, and literature.

• Using Kurdish symbols, flags, or other visual elements.

• Participating in online discussions and debates about Kurdish identity and politics.

• Networking with other Kurds on Facebook.

• Sharing stories and personal experiences related to being Kurdish.

• Expressing pride or solidarity with the community.

• Criticism of negative images of Kurds in the media or society.

By posting photos, videos, stories, and news articles that showcase the diversity, richness, and resilience of Kurdish culture and people, Kurds in Japan seek to create a positive image of Kurds in Japan and foster mutual understanding and respect. Figure 10.6 illustrates the subsets of “Identity Stimuli”, such as: Language, History, Culture, Religion, Symbols, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Identity Struggles. The inclusion of the heading category (Identity Stimuli) and its subsets (Language, History, Culture…) in the database ensured that all possible identity stimuli were separately accounted for. Additionally, this allowed for further investigation into the level of engagement with specific subsets of identity stimuli. The general result of the question about identity shows that “identity stimuli” were generally observed in 84 posts out of a total of 200 posts (42%). Among the more detailed subsets of identity stimuli, we saw that the topic of “ethnicity” (being Kurdish) was visible in 74 posts (37%) and the topic of “culture” was visible in 69 posts (34.5%), in contrast to a topic of “religion” which had the lowest value (1.5%). Religion featured in only three posts out of a total of 200 Facebook posts, two of which introduced positive aspects of religion and one video post related to publishing negative aspects of religion. Although the majority of Kurds in Turkey follow Sunni Islam, some Turkish Kurds are Alevis, a religious minority repeatedly subjected to persecution and discrimination in Turkey (Gezik, 2021). Given that some Alevi refugees live in Japan, it would be logical to expect some religious activism in their Facebook posts; however, no signs of Alevism in the online activities of the Kurds in Japan have been found.

The Role of Language in Maintaining Ethnic Identity

The mother tongue plays a vital role in maintaining ethnic identity, as it is often the primary means of transmitting cultural values, traditions, and beliefs across generations. Therefore, promoting and supporting the use of the mother tongue among migrants/emigrants can have positive effects on their well-being, integration, and cultural diversity (UNESCO, 2022). Research also has shown that emigrants who are able to speak their mother tongue are more likely to have a strong sense of ethnic identity and cultural belonging (Giles & Johnson, 1987). Using one’s mother tongue can create a sense of connection with one’s cultural heritage and can provide a means of expressing cultural values and beliefs (Baker & Jones, 1998). This highlights the importance of promoting and preserving the mother tongue to preserve ethnic identity and cultural heritage. The issue of the Kurdish language and its use among the diaspora Kurds whose origin of migration was Turkey is very challenging. During this research, attempted to investigate the frequency of languages used by Japan’s Kurdish diaspora when publishing Facebook posts. As can be seen in the results of the answers to this question in Fig. 10.7, the language used in the community’s Facebook posts was Japanese with a frequency of 47.4%, followed by Turkish, with a frequency of 25%, Kurdish with a frequency of 20%, and finally English with a frequency of 7%.

Fig. 10.7

Frequency of languages used in Facebook posts

This chart also includes a column for Arabic, which has a frequency of 0.4% and has the lowest scale.

The Japanese language has the highest percentage (47.4%) of use in published posts. However, this does not mean that the majority of members of the Kurdish community in Japan are fluent in Japanese. A field study, as well as a review of Facebook posts, shows that few Kurds in the diaspora in Japan are fluent in Japanese. The high percentage of Japanese language in Fig. 10.7 is due to the frequency of use of the Japanese language by Facebook pages related to Kurdish associations and civic institutions. Most of the Kurdish leaders of civic organisations in Japan can communicate effectively in Japanese, and they publish their posts in Japanese or in multiple languages to raise awareness of Kurds among the Japanese community. In contrast, posts published by individuals are usually a combination of photos and videos without text or with a short text. For this research, the photos and the languages used in the videos were also recorded, and the most used language by personal accounts was the Turkish language (25.0%).

The representation of Kurdish ethnic identity is strong among members of the Kurdish diaspora who are active on Facebook, as shown in Fig. 10.6. But it can be concluded that the emphasis on a collective responsibility to preserve the Kurdish identity is not manifested in the use of Kurdish language. The author also conducted field studies during the field research trip to areas of origin of Kurds in Japan, especially Gaziantep city and its rural areas of Makhakan (Maxikon) in southeastern Turkey, in February 2022. Observations based on the fieldwork showed that Kurds in Turkey and Kurds from Turkey in the diaspora generally are politically mobilised.

Kurdish people in Japan have a strong sense of political and national identity that is distinct from the Turkish state. This is evident from their use of Kurdish symbols, culture, and history, as well as their resistance to assimilation and oppression by the Turkish authorities but the Turkish language is the dominant language among members of Kurdish society, even for daily conversations. This issue has several reasons that are rooted in Turkey’s policies in assimilating the Kurdish language throughout history. The Kurdish language was officially prohibited in Turkey from 1937 to 1991 as part of the state’s assimilation policies against the Kurds. The ban on the Kurdish language was lifted in 1991, but the use of Kurdish as a language of education in both public and private schools remains illegal (Zeydanlıoğlu, 2012). This historical background and a combination of many other factors have caused the transfer of Kurdish linguistic identity from one generation to the next to continue to move away from the Kurdish language. Generally, the Kurdish people’s proficiency in the Kurdish language in Turkey has decreased, and the use of the Turkish language instead of the Kurdish language has become the daily habit. Today, we can see a new type of assimilation that the author named “self-driven assimilation”, which is a voluntary and self-directed process by which individuals actively adopt the dominant culture while maintaining their own identity. This process emphasises the independent agency and choice of individuals in incorporating the cultural norms and practices of the dominant society. However, this process might vary depending on the context and the characteristics of the migrant group. For example, for Kurdish migrants in Japan, linguistic assimilation in a style of “self-driven assimilation” has persisted even after they arrived in Japan, because their daily habit of using a native level of Turkish, a prominent language in their homeland, could not be replaced by Kurdish, a language that they had not spoken widely before or even in Japan.

In some cases, the Turkish language has paradoxically become the language of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey. In general, the issue of Kurdish language among Kurds in Turkey raises a new question of how or to what extent it is possible to represent Kurdish identity and reproduce Kurdish nationalism without the Kurdish mother tongue.

Facebook as a Platform for Political Activism

Facebook groups and pages run by Kurdish non-governmental organisations in Japan have become a central place for discussion of the political issues facing Kurdish immigrants. Some of the major political debates involve: the immigration policies of the Japanese government; criticising the policies of the Turkish government during various events; expressing political solidarity with the opposition parties in Turkey; and showing solidarity with the victims of political and ethnic violence and discrimination in the Kurdish regions. They are published and promoted both on Facebook pages and groups by Kurdish organisations and on the personal accounts of Kurdish community members. As shown in Fig. 10.8, posts containing political engagement have the highest frequency. In other words, 32.5% or 65 of the 200 reviewed posts had content that represented political engagement. In addition, the number of posts that showed solidarity was 63, and the number of posts that represented activities to preserve Kurdish culture was 54.

Fig. 10.8

Frequency of activism variables within Facebook posts

The online activities of Kurdish users and their Japan supporters also contribute to creating and spreading a coherent and inclusive political discourse on behalf of the Kurdish diaspora. One of the reasons for the high number of political posts was the publication of posts in support of the opposition party and the supporter of Kurdish rights in Turkey called “Left Green Party” which were reposted and shared among members of the community. Due to the general election in Turkey on 14 May 2023, the advertising campaigns of the Green Left Party (Turkish: Yeşil Sol Parti, YSP), which were represented by some Kurdish organisations in Japan, increased their political activity on Facebook. Examining the Facebook pages of members of the Kurdish community in Japan showed that advertising banners supporting the Green Left Party were published on the accounts of many members of this community.

The Kurds in Japan showed solidarity with their compatriots in Turkey, who suffered from a big earthquake in February 2023. They started a campaign on Facebook to help the victims and raised about 30 million yen in donations. They also got media attention and cooperation from the Japanese public and the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) in Turkey (Gulbahçe, 2023). This case shows how the Kurds in Japan used Facebook to mobilise their resources and express their solidarity with their fellow Kurds in Turkey.

They use Facebook to establish contacts and relations with Japanese politicians and activists who are sympathetic or supportive of the Kurdish cause. Among the pages and groups that are associated with institutions and civil society organisations with Japanese leaders, many posts are in Japanese, and a significant part of them are related to the launch of campaigns and awareness-raising against the policies of the Japanese government in the revision of the immigration law, which is targeting asylum seekers and their situation.

While the current law ensures that asylum seekers are protected from deportation during the normal refugee recognition process, the revised bill means that the protection will no longer apply after the third asylum claim is closed. For this reason, many issues, including the increased risk of forced evictions, were mentioned in Facebook posts, and campaigns were launched against the passage of this bill. This proposal contradicts the principle of non-refoulement of major international treaties on refugees that Japan is part of, such as the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Convention against Torture (Kasai, 2023). Opposition to the new immigration bill intensified when news of the torture of some Kurdish asylum seekers in Japanese immigration detention centres and the death of a Sri Lankan woman were widely reported in the Japanese news and social media (Slater & Barbaran, 2020; Tauchi, 2023).

Conclusion

This chapter has investigated how and to what extent Facebook can serve as a useful tool for Kurdish diaspora members to explore and represent their Kurdish identity and political awareness. Many of the Kurdish community members in Japan originated from rural areas surrounding the cities of Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş, and Adyaman in southeastern Turkey. For them, social networks such as Facebook provide a way to interact and connect with their homeland, to negotiate their identities, and to expand and strengthen their “Kurdishness”. Facebook also facilitates political and cultural mobilisation among the Kurdish community members and their supporters among Japanese nationals. Kurdish diaspora elites and activists have established Kurdish associations in Japan to promote Kurdish interests and rights, and they have used social media and mass media simultaneously to influence public spheres and produce and represent online content that matches “Kurdishness” in Japan.

The findings of this study help to understand how social networks such as Facebook enable Kurdish diaspora members in Japan to explore and negotiate their identity and culture online. Although this study reveals a paradoxical nature of identity stimuli in online interactions, in which “Kurdish language” and “Religion” occupy the last position while “Kurdish ethnicity” and “nationalism” get high scores, this does not imply a lack of attachment or commitment to the Kurdish heritage. Rather, analysis of the online content shows that the Kurds in the Japanese diaspora primarily use the Turkish language as a borrowed tool to represent their Kurdish identity and nationalism in a context where they face linguistic and cultural barriers.

Social media influences public opinion in Japan, and it can bring attention to shortcomings within the current system, such as deportations, prolonged detention periods, and the low rates of asylum recognition for migrants in Japan. Examples from the findings of the case of Kurdish asylum seekers in Japan clearly show that social media platforms have the potential to increase public awareness and generate empathy towards the challenges faced by Kurdish asylum seekers who experience persecution and violence in Japan as well as their home country (Fujibayashi, 2020).

Based on the findings, the Kurdish community in Japan exhibits unique characteristics and behaviours compared to many other diaspora communities. Unlike those communities that have their own nation-state, the Kurds do not possess a recognised sovereign territory, which intensifies their quest for identity. This distinct feature influences their actions and motivations within the diaspora. For instance, the case of campaigns launched on the Facebook pages of the Kurdish community in Japan to aid earthquake victims in southeast Turkey in February 2023 illustrates their strong sense of solidarity. They collected and sent significant amounts of cash and non-cash donations to support their fellow Kurds in need. Furthermore, the utilisation of the Facebook platform by members of the Kurdish diaspora in Japan to rally political support for the Turkish opposition party, the Green Left Party, during the 2023 general election campaigns showcases their active engagement in virtual campaigns. Additionally, they leverage Facebook to disseminate information and raise awareness among opponents of Japan’s immigration law revision bill. These examples clearly demonstrate how social media has amplified public awareness and fostered empathy for the challenges faced by immigrant minority groups.

The Kurdish community in Japan stands out due to their circumstances of being a stateless group, which strengthens their quest for identity and drives their active engagement in social and political activities within the diaspora. The examples mentioned, such as their support campaigns and political mobilisation through Facebook, highlight the distinctiveness of their experiences and their concerted efforts to address the issues impacting their community.

In summary, this study uncovered the various impacts resulting from the online activities of Kurdish users and their Japan supporters, which primarily revolve around Kurdish cultural identity and political mobilisation in Japan. These activities have three main effects: firstly, they contribute to fostering public awareness and actively combating discrimination within the host society. Secondly, they produce and disseminate a coherent and inclusive political discourse on behalf of the Kurdish diaspora. Lastly, these online activities provide a valuable platform for public diplomacy, facilitating enhanced relations between Kurdish political elites and Japanese politicians and activists.