Abstract
As a P5 country and an Indo-Pacific nation, France aims to act as a balancing power that would offer an alternative to the choice between China and the United States, which is increasingly faced by countries around the world, especially in the Indo-Pacific. The “Macron Doctrine” is set to make France consolidate its role as a balancing, united, radiant, influential power, a driving force for European autonomy that preserves the multilateral mechanisms based on international law. The trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS) shock of 2021 was a blow for Paris, but France distances itself from upholding a continued U.S. dominance, and defines its strategy as complementary with that of the U.S. Seeing China as a destabilizing factor in the Indo-Pacific (French Defense Strategy 2021) and a systemic rival (National Strategic Review 2022) of liberal international order, France supports a multipolar order that would allow for it to pursue its own approach, while also reducing China’s influence in the region.
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Upholding the rules-based orderFootnote 1 is a significant objective of the French Indo-Pacific (IP) strategy that was unveiled in 2018.Footnote 2 France was the first European country to adopt such a strategy. The vast region is indeed identified as a key arena where international norms are being challenged, and the future world order, shaped by the US-China rivalry, is at play. France is also a resident power in the IP, with overseas territories in the Indian and Pacific oceans, 1.5 million citizens, and a large exclusive economic zone (EEZ).Footnote 3 The preservation of the rules-based order in the IP thus participates in shaping a favorable geostrategic order and relates to France’s national interests in the region, as well as to Paris’ universalist ambition.
Stating, along with Hans Kundnani, that the rules-based order includes three pillars: the security, the economic, and the human rights orders, we argue that France, due to its sovereign interests in the area, is primarily focusing on the security dimension of the rules-based order and expects to promote the economic and human rights dimensions more efficiently through the EU Indo-Pacific strategy.Footnote 4 France was indeed the leading engine behind the adoption of such strategy. This paper aims at analyzing the significance of the rules-based order for France’s IP strategy and discusses its recent developments and challenges.
China’s Challenge to the Rules-Based Order and Macron’s Diplomacy: Two Important Drivers for the French Indo-Pacific Strategy
In the past decade, several developments in the IP region have been closely monitored and have served as catalysts to prompt the definition of a French strategic vision. In particular, the advance of China in the South China Sea and the risks it posed to the freedom of navigation and the peaceful resolution of disputes is one important element, as well as the development of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (2013) that spreads all the way to the Indian ocean and Europe.Footnote 5 The opening of a large Chinese base in Djibouti in 2017 was a wake-up call, and the various implications of China’s BRI convinced the Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy of the necessity to better define the national interest and strategy vis à vis China, including in the Indo-Pacific.Footnote 6 The 2017 Strategic Review of Defense and National Security clearly acknowledged the risks of China’s rise, in terms of strategic ambition (“becoming the dominant power in Asia” and “surpass[ing] the American power”); military buildup (“the Chinese army […] is now more than four times higher than that of France”) and challenge to the rules-based order (in particular in the South China Sea, “where Beijing invokes “historical rights” and employs methods such as the reclamation of certain islets”).Footnote 7 The French Defense Strategy in 2021 describes the expansion of China as a destabilizing factor in the Indo-Pacific, shifting the balance of power, challenging democratic values and triggering strong security concerns.Footnote 8 The National Strategic Review of November 2022 clarifies the vision of China as a systemic rival—“[…] the Chinese regime believes that Western leadership in the international order has weakened and that it can weaken it further by using its new influence. […] such questioning irrigates fields which are political (propaganda on the decline of the West), economic and technological (predation, trade war), military (growth of the nuclear arsenal, modernization of the PLA, areas of support abroad), and diplomatic”—and notes with concern the growing strategic convergence between Beijing and Moscow.Footnote 9 France, a P5 country and an Indo-Pacific nation, is legitimate to act as sovereign power and also a responsible stakeholder in the area.
Upon his arrival in 2017, President Macron indeed made clear that he wanted to restore France’s global influence by upholding its values and principles and for Paris to be a central player for global governance and multilateralism.Footnote 10 This approach is reaffirmed by Macron in the latest Strategic Review: “By 2030, I want France to have consolidated its role as a balancing, united, radiant, influential power, a driving force for European autonomy and one that assumes its responsibilities by contributing, as a reliable and supportive partner, to the preservation of multilateral mechanisms based on international law.”Footnote 11 The “Macron Doctrine” is based on a sense of deep crisis of the world order: “We see that we have a crisis with the multilateral framework of 1945: a crisis in terms of its effectiveness, but, and it is even more serious in my opinion, a crisis in terms of the universality of the values upheld by its structures.”Footnote 12
Russia and China are clearly identified as powers that play down human rights and liberal values and principles. Macron has repeatedly underlined, especially during its visits to France’s territories in the region, the risks of a Chinese hegemony and the need for Paris to develop its own approach in the Indo-Pacific and act as a credible power there.Footnote 13
In the Indo-Pacific, France is thus primarily committed to support the security dimension of the rules-based order—especially maritime security. France is also, however, committed to environmental security as a key focus. Only a modest mention of the human rights appears in the 2022 IP Strategy referring to the respect of these rights in implementing France’s public development assistance projects.Footnote 14 The “values” dimension of the French IP approach should be understood broadly, as the promotion of international law and a democratic process emphasized at the inter-state level (in the form of a new multilateralism), rather than at domestic level (allowing an inclusive approach aiming at federating a maximum of like-minded partners). The economic dimension of the rules-based order is to be carried out primarily at the European level, as France has only limited means to promote connectivity, and as the EU has the exclusive competence on trade.Footnote 15
Advancing the Three Pillars of the Rules-Based Order, with a Focus on Security
At the core of France’s principle-based approach in the IP are the freedom of maritime and aerial circulation and the respect of international law, especially at sea.Footnote 16 Freedom of Navigation (FON) stands out as one of the key concerns for France: any disruption of the vital maritime routes would indeed be dramatic for European economic and trade security.
Accordingly, France supports the strict application of the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), contributes to actions against crime at sea, and is keen on actively demonstrating its commitment to the FON. In 2016, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, then Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian emphasized the need to discourage unilateral coups de force in the China seas, for fear that such actions might expand in other areas like the Mediterranean Sea.Footnote 17 Thus, while not taking sides on sovereignty matters, Paris has consistently sent its ships to the South and East China Seas in recent years, through the passing of the Jeanne d’Arc mission or the surveillance frigates based in New Caledonia. In June 2019, the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle was dispatched to Singapore. The French Minister of the Armed Forces, Florence Parly, then promised that French vessels would sail at least twice a year in the South China Sea and will continue upholding international law in a “steady, non-confrontational but obstinate way.”Footnote 18 In the beginning of 2021, a French nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) patrolled the area, demonstrating the capacity to deploy far away, in coordination with strategic partners, “to affirm that international law is the only rule that is valid.”Footnote 19
From the same perspective, France aims to develop maritime surveillance capabilities in the region, as Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is a requirement for better managing one’s own sovereign territory and EEZ but also to ensure the safety of international waters, SLOCs, and FON. In this way, maritime surveillance (contributing to enhance environmental security) is an enabling approach to act in the region, with partners, for the common goods, but also to uphold norms and strengthen territorial control.Footnote 20
Paris has strongly pushed the European Union to adopt its own Indo-Pacific approach, announced on September 16, 2021.Footnote 21 France is eager to coordinate at the EU level in the Indo-Pacific because an EU approach works both in synergy with France (particularly on maritime security)Footnote 22 and also as a complement to the French strategy. Indeed, the EU has significant capacities to support sustainable development, infrastructures and capacity building through its 2018 EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy, and its Global Gateway Initiative announced in December 2021.Footnote 23 The EU, as a trade superpower, has also a greater leverage in this domain (especially by concluding Economic Partnership Agreements) and Brussels is also looking to become a strategic player on critical technologies. The EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy has a strong focus on building resilient value chains, especially in semiconductors, including by possibly setting up a deal with Taiwan. In addition, standards setting in trade, digital domains and emerging technologies, “in line with democratic principles,” is one of the prior objectives of the EU’s IP approach. The EU has also been a consistent defender of human rights, not least of all with the set of sanctions adopted in March 2021 vis-a-vis China to protest the large-scale arbitrary detentions of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.Footnote 24 The Indo-Pacific strategy also mentions that “the EU will continue to protect its essential interests and promote its values while pushing back where fundamental disagreements exist with China, such as on human rights.”Footnote 25
Working with the EU level will allow France to promote a more holistic strategy in the region and facilitate France’s vision to act as a balancing and mediating power, providing an alternative to the Sino-US competition.
A “Balancing Power”? Strategic Autonomy and the Aims to Foster a Stable Rules-Based Order
France (and the EU) is advocating a strategic autonomy on the international scene, including in the Indo-Pacific. Paris has indeed been uncomfortable with a Washington IP policy that has been Sino-centric, military-based, and confrontational. Instead, it is promoting an independent and inclusive IP strategy, reflecting a slightly different vision of what should be a stable, rules-based order. Rather than upholding continued U.S. dominance, France supports a multipolar order that would allow for it to pursue its own approach, while also reducing China’s influence in the region.
In addition, Paris considers that the US-China rivalry (in addition to China’s own assertive moves) is a disruptive factor,Footnote 26 and aims to mitigate the negative side-effect of the growing polarization by fostering a multipolar and multilateral region governed by the rule of law: “Beyond any logic of blocks, we therefore intend to champion a third path in the Indo-Pacific, for responding to today’s upheavals with all well-intentioned powers.”Footnote 27 President Macron emphasizes that France should be a “balancing power”Footnote 28 (puissance d’équilibre(s)), not aligned, but acting independently and offering an alternative out of the bipolar confrontation.
This explains why France, while maintaining close and dynamic strategic partnerships with the four members of the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), has so far refused to be politically associated with the grouping. Not only the Quad is perceived by some as an anti-China coalition, but Paris prefers to keep its options open and promote its own initiatives. France’s IP strategy is thus based on a number of close partnerships, founded upon common values and similar interests, and strives to build up a network in order to mutualize capacity and have a greater impact. Partners includes India, Japan, the U.S. and Australia (to a lesser extent after AUKUS), but also Indonesia and Singapore, among others. Southeast Asia being the main ground for the Great Game between China and the U.S., ensuring its resilience to resist the Chinese expansion and mitigate the Sino-U.S. competition is key. In addition, Paris promotes an “effective multilateralism, based on the rule of law and the rejection of coercion” to “encourage cooperative approaches, rather than operating via blocks.”Footnote 29 France is indeed an active member of a number of regional organizations in the Indo-Pacific.Footnote 30 Minilateral and ad hoc groupings are also considered useful as an “effective form of multilateralism” and should be privileged to discuss and adopt a shared understanding and common principles to tackle issues, from climate change to governance of the commons (oceans, internet).
The AUKUS Shock and the Sustainability of France’s Approach
This middle way approach of France in the Indo-Pacific is not without challenges. The announcement of the the trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS) in September 2021 was a shock. Paris was never consulted, nor notified in advance, despite the historic importance of the deal and the huge implications for France’s interests, not least the brutal termination of the submarine contract with Canberra. AUKUS provoked a crisis of confidence in France’s relations with its three key partners and also shed light on the divergences regarding the best way to salvage the rules-based order and address the China challenge.Footnote 31 It called into question France’s strategic positioning in the Indo-Pacific, and the risk of being side-lined as the Sino-U.S. rivalry was deepening, pushing for alignment with the U.S. For Paris, it only urged the Europeans to accelerate the path towards better defining and protecting their interests.Footnote 32
Actually, the demonstrations of European support and solidarity with France in the wake of the AUKUS shock were fewer than expected, and various criticisms were voiced—more or less openly—by politicians in EU member countries disapproving of France’s “Europeanisation” of the AUKUS crisis.Footnote 33 Indeed, a number of Eastern European countries are very much dependent on the U.S. for their security. These countries support a European engagement in the Indo-Pacific as a quid pro quo for a lasting American security commitment in Europe, and want to avoid unnecessary tensions with their ally.
These reactions show the reluctance of European partners to align with an IP approach that favors strategic autonomy at the expense of the relationship with Washington. Paris will have to make its position explicit: strategic autonomy is often interpreted as the sign of a wavering commitment to the IP, or of an equidistant positioning between the U.S. and China—which it is not. France must be clear that it shares Washington’s core values but wishes to keep some room to maneuver vis à vis certain U.S. choices driven by interests Paris might not share.
Working on a close coordination and a complementarity with the U.S. will thus be key in implementing a French and EU policy in the region. Upholding the rule of law at sea is a key issue in the Indo-Pacific, but not all the issues—including but not limited to the law of the sea, sustainable development, climate security, fisheries management, piracy—relate to hard security. Europeans have a very limited military capacity to commit to the IP, but have extensive expertise and experience in these subjects. France and the EU can thus demonstrate their added value by working as a complement to the United States’ more militaristic approach in the IP.
Conclusion
France’s Indo-Pacific strategy aims to build up a stable region governed by the rule of law, to protect itself against threats (including from China) and to mitigate the risks of great powers competition in a key area. It reflects important concerns about its core national interests and identity, pertaining to sovereignty, but also to its values and diplomatic status. From this perspective, the Indo-Pacific is both an area to exercise this strategic autonomy and enables a narrative to support France’s ambition to act as a European power with global reach, actively supporting a rules-based order, and act as a “balancing power.”
Considering this constructivist dimension of France’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific somewhat explains the gap between the political rhetoric of an Indo-Pacific “priority” for France and the reality of the resources to engage in this area.Footnote 34 Some in Paris have questioned the relevance of an IP strategy.Footnote 35 Actually, this approach also serves the broader French diplomatic agenda under Macron: to ensure France’s relevance and status in the coming world order. The pandemics, or the war in Ukraine have not changed the French calculus but rather exemplified the importance of the developments in the Indo-Pacific for France’s interests and the interconnection between the Asian and European theatres. The growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait, however, urge France to explain should an open conflict break out, which would have global destabilizing consequences.
Notes
- 1.
French official documents (xxxx).
- 2.
Emmanuel Macron (2018).
- 3.
France is a resident power in the region (xxxx).
- 4.
Hans Kundnani (2017).
- 5.
Hugo Meijer (2021).
- 6.
Alice Ekman (2018).
- 7.
Strategic Review of Defense (2017).
- 8.
China’s close relation (2019).
- 9.
The National Strategic (2022).
- 10.
Discours du Président (2017).
- 11.
The National Strategic (2022).
- 12.
Emmanuel Macron (2020).
- 13.
In this region of the globe (2018).
- 14.
In a global (2022).
- 15.
The French Development Agency (AFD) (xxx).
- 16.
France’s Indo-Pacific (2022).
- 17.
Jean-Yves Le Drian (2016).
- 18.
Discours de Florence (2019).
- 19.
A series of tweet (2021).
- 20.
Thibault Fournol (2019).
- 21.
Joint Communication (2021).
- 22.
The EU ministerial (2022).
- 23.
Team Europe (2021).
- 24.
EU imposes (2021)
- 25.
The EU strategy (xxxx).
- 26.
Chinese-American (2022).
- 27.
Foreword by Jean-Yves Le Drian (2021).
- 28.
Discours du Président (2019).
- 29.
France’s Indo-Pacific (2022).
- 30.
France is part of the Indian (xxxx)
- 31.
The United States (xxxx).
- 32.
France hopes to salvage (2021).
- 33.
Pacte Aukus (2021).
- 34.
The Indo-Pacific region (xxxx)
- 35.
Jean-Dominique Merchet (2018).
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A series of tweet by Florence Parly on February 8, 2021 and Xavier Vavasseur, “A French Navy SSN Patrolled the South China Sea,” Naval News (9 February 2021).
Alice Ekman [Eds.], “La France face aux Nouvelles Routes de la Soie chinoise,” Etude de l’Ifri, October 2018. Available at: www.ifri.org; “Les nouvelles routes de la soie,”Trésor-éco, n°229, Direction générale du Trésor, Ministry of the Economy and Finance (October 2018). https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/1f64b246-7e41-4284-8de5-b079aecb5b7e/files/7fb43132-5583-4e63-917a-8e2a505c909a.
Between 2021 and 2027, Team Europe, meaning the EU institutions and EU Member States jointly, will mobilize up to 300 billion euros of investments for this initiative: See the webpage of the European Commission dedicated to the Global Gateway: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/global-gateway_en.
China’s close relation with Russia in challenging democratic values, its enduring support to North Korea, its strategic partnership with Pakistan, the ongoing borders issues with India as well as the territorial disputes in the East and South China seas generate deep-seated concerns regarding the implications of China’s actions.” France’s Defense Strategy in the Indo-Pacific (2019) p. 8.
Chinese-American strategic competition and the behaviour of certain regional actors, giving priority to bilateral arrangements and power relations in order to favour their own national interests, contribute to the breakdown of the international order, while global challenges are requiring greater cooperation from States. The risks of uncontrolled escalation are great in this region, which lacks crisis regulation mechanisms. In line with the principles and values demonstrated in its international commitment, France works for a multilateral international order that is based on the rule of law. 2022 Strategy, p. 10.
Discours de Florence Parly, ministre des Armées, Allocution au Shangri-La Dialogue (1st June 2019). https://www.defense.gouv.fr/salle-de-presse/discours/discours-de-florence-parly/discours-de-florence-parly-ministre-des-armees_allocution-au-shangri-la-dialogue.
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EU imposes further sanctions over serious violations of human rights around the world, Council of the European Union (March22, 2021) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/03/22/eu-imposes-further-sanctions-over-serious-violations-of-human-rights-around-the-world/.
Foreword by Jean-Yves Le Drian, in France’s Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs (April 2021a) https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/photos-publications-and-graphics/publications/article/france-s-partnerships-in-the-indo-pacific-apr-2021a.
France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy 2022, p. 3.
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France hopes to salvage EU autonomy from submarine deal wreckage, The Financial Times (September 21, 2021b) https://www.ft.com/content/049638c2-ccf9-4fea-a860-203a7e26c566.
France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy 2022, p. 3.
French official documents and decision-makers are generally using the term of “rules-based order” rather than “liberal international order,” in order to prevent any misunderstanding on the meaning of “liberal” in this context and also avoid antagonizing non-democratic countries.
France is a resident power in the region, maintaining territories both in the Indian Ocean (Islands of Mayotte and La Réunion, the Scattered Islands and the French Southern and Antarctic Territories) and the Pacific (New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia and Clipperton Island), with 1.5 million citizens living there and in other countries in the region (approximately 200,000 people), and more than 90% of its large EEZ (9 million km2) located in the two oceans. France maintains a military presence of 8,000 personnel to take care of this vast area.
Hans Kundnani, “What is the Liberal International Order?” Insights, GMFUS (3 May 2017) https://www.gmfus.org/news/what-liberal-international-order#_ftn13.
Hugo Meijer, “Pulled East. The rise of China, Europe and French security policy in the Asia-Pacific,” Journal of Strategic Studies (2021).
In this region of the globe, China is building its hegemony step by step. […] We should work with China […] to intensify exchanges and seize all the opportunities, but if we don't organize ourselves, it will soon be a hegemony that will reduce our freedoms, our opportunities and that we will have to endure.” (Author’s Translation—Check the original delivery) Discours du Président de la République Emmanuel Macron sur la Nouvelle-Calédonie à Nouméa (5 May 2018) https://www.elysee.fr/front/pdf/elysee-module-2070-fr.pdf. Referring to China without naming it, in Papeete: “But I tell you very clearly, in the times that are opening up, woe to the little ones, woe to the isolated, woe to those who will have to endure influence and incursions of hegemons that will come to seek their fish, their technologies, their economic resources. (Author’s Translation —Check the original delivery.) Discours du Président de la République à Papeete, Tahiti (28 July 2021) https://www.elysee.fr/front/pdf/elysee-module-18162-fr.pdf.
In a global context where the universal nature of human rights is being called into question, France supports protecting these values, particularly in the Indo‑Pacific, as part of its commitment to the rule of law. France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy 2022, p. 14.
Jean-Yves Le Drian, Minister of Defense, France—Statement for the fourth plenary session: The challenges of conflict resolution, 15th Asia Security Summit, The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore (5 June 2016). Retrieved from https://www.iiss.org/events/shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2016.
Jean-Dominique Merchet, “L’‘axe indopacifique’ est-il un piège pour la France ?” Blog Secret Défense (November 2, 2018).
Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (September 16, 2021) https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/jointcommunication_2021_24_1_en.pdf.
Pacte Aukus : il est temps que l’UE se positionne, Courrier International (September 27, 2021), or Ido Vock, Why EU support for France over Aukus has been muted, The New Stateman (September 22, 2021).
The National Strategic Review (November 2022a) http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/communiques_presse/revue-nationale-strategique-2022a/
The National Strategic Review (November 2022b) op. cit.
The French Development Agency (AFD) is primarily focusing on environmental projects in the region and therefore cannot promote connectivity in other ways or through other projects.
The EU ministerial Forum on the Indo-Pacific held in Paris on February 22, 2022, announced that a EU Coordinated Maritime Presence will be soon set up for the first time in the Indo-Pacific, precisely in the Northwestern Indian Ocean. Between 2021 and 2027, Team Europe, meaning the EU institutions and EU Member States jointly, will mobilize up to 300 billion euros of investments for this initiative: See the webpage of the European Commission dedicated to the Global Gateway: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/global-gateway_en.
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The United States is an ally and a major Indo-Pacific player with which France wishes to maintain close cooperation. Our approaches may diverge, as shown by the AUKUS affair, but we are seeking synergy between our Indo-Pacific strategies. The aim is to contribute to our shared goal of an open, stable region, based on the rule of law,” on the website of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/asia-and-oceania/the-indo-pacific-region-a-priority-for-france/article/indo-pacific-questions-and-answers-on-france-s-regional-strategy.
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Pajon, C. (2024). France’s Indo-Pacific Approach: Salvaging the Rules-Based Order and Staying Relevant. In: Hosoya, Y., Kundnani, H. (eds) The Transformation of the Liberal International Order. SpringerBriefs in International Relations. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-4729-4_6
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