Abstract
We report experimental results on the effect of leadership in a voluntary contribution game. Consistent with recent theories we find that leading-by-example increases contributions and earnings in an environment where a leader has private information about the returns from contributing (Hermalin in Am Econ Rev 88:1188–1206, 1998; Vesterlund in J Public Econ 87:627–657, 2003). In contrast the ability to lead-by-example has no effect on total contributions and earnings when such returns are commonly known. In our environment the success of leadership therefore appears to be driven by signaling rather than by nonpecuniary factors such as reciprocity.
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This paper was started while the authors were visiting the Harvard Business School during the fall of 2000. We are grateful for their hospitality and financial support. Vesterlund acknowledges support from the National Science Foundation and Potters from the Royal Netherlands’ Academy of Arts and Sciences. We thank Henrik Orzen for assistance in conducting the experiment. We also thank David Cooper and an anonymous referee who helped us improve the paper. Finally we thank Chris Anderson, Jim Andreoni, John Duffy, Simon Gaechter, Ernan Haruvy, Muriel Niederle, Jack Ochs, Elke Renner, Al Roth, participants at ESA-meetings (Barcelona, 2001), the Leadership and Social Interactions Workshop (Lyon, 2003), SITE (Stanford, 2004) and seminar participants at Alabama, CMU, Duke, Keele, Maryland, Nottingham, NYU, Pittsburgh, OSU, and York for valuable comments.
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Potters, J., Sefton, M. & Vesterlund, L. Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study. Economic Theory 33, 169–182 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0186-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0186-3