Abstract
We study economies endowed with a market structure, where coalitions can form within each market but have no enforcement possibilities across markets. A standard cooperative game cannot be defined in this case. We develop a certain equilibrium notion which ties together the cores of the different markets. We provide an existence result and an application to economies with asymmetric information.
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Thanks are due to the referees of this journal for useful suggestions. An early version of this paper was presented at the SWET 2018 workshop. I am grateful to the organizers and to participants for very constructive comments.
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Koutsougeras, L.C. Coalitions with limited coordination. Econ Theory 73, 439–456 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01302-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01302-z