Introduction

North KoreanFootnote 1 diplomacy seems to be exploring new means of communication as part of its strategy to diversify their diplomatic toolbox (Grzelczyk, 2017, p. 131). Social media (specifically YouTube) is becoming an element of its soft power structure worldwide. Although it is not the first time the country has attempted to enter the social media sphere through YouTube, one specific channel seems of particular interest to the study of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) public diplomacy strategy. In this most recent attempt at social media diplomacy, the North Korean authorities have allegedly launched the New DPRK YouTube channel, as reported by the Yonhap News Agency as recently as April 2023 (Yonhap News Agency, 2023).

In a country where internet access is severely restricted (Park and Lim, 2020, p. 124), this article attempts to shed some light into how North Korean peaceful diplomacy works—a field of studies generally left aside for other topics (Grzelczyk, 2017, p. 131)—, considering the specific case of the New DPRK YouTube channel. Although North Korea has approached public diplomacy through several means (Grzelczyk, 2017, p. 144), their approach through YouTube has gone mostly under-studied.

This article opens with a brief introduction of the theoretical and methodological aspects of the conducted research, highlighting the main concepts and categories used for the direct analysis of the videos uploaded by New DPRK within the specified time frame. During the writing of this article, the New DPRK YouTube channel was taken down from the platform, presumably due to its failure to comply with YouTube terms of service. Similar instances have occurred in the past with other North Korean channels, which has hindered research activities of this sort (Park and Lim, 2020, p. 140). For example, the ‘Echo of Truth’ channel (O’Caroll, 2021) faced a similar fate and was even referenced in the tags used by the New DPRK account, as will be addressed later on this paper. Despite these complications, new channels pursuing similar objectives have emerged, creating a cycle in which North Korean media on YouTube comes and goes, due to violations of YouTube’s terms of use. These complications should be considered for further research and cases similar cases to New DPRK should be evaluated. A plausible solution, as was the methodology of this study, is the creation of a database and an archive of videos to avoid potential takedowns by YouTube corporate authorities, thus preserving this important resource for the understanding of North Korean internet presence.

Based on the selected theoretical basis and the empirical research conducted, I will attempt to determine—through the analysis of the obtained data—whether the North Korean strategy used in the New DPRK YouTube channel follows the traditional definitions of public diplomacy or whether it is an example of a propagandistic attempt. Furthermore, I will explore if and how the New DPRK experience can be used as a case study to further the ongoing debates on the field of public diplomacy. Primarily, I will establish how this case study relates to the digital and social media practices adopted by public diplomacy efforts worldwide. The terms ‘public diplomacy’ and ‘propaganda’ will be properly defined and differentiated in the theoretical section of this article.

Methodology and theory

When analysing North Korean activity online, it is important to note that collecting non-biased information regarding the country seems particularly difficult (Warf, 2015, p. 111). With this difficulty in mind, I shall proceed with the methodological explanation.

The sample used for this analysis consists of a total of 96—formerly—publicly accessible videosFootnote 2 published by the YouTube channel New DPRK between November 10, 2019, and May 30, 2022. The analysis of the data obtained was conducted on June 9, 2022. The sample was evaluated on the basis of 12 different categories that will be properly described in the results chapter of this article, with the addition of particular commentary on certain aspects of specific videos.

The Amnesty International ‘YouTube DataViewer’ digital metadata tool was usedFootnote 3 to obtain video metadata. To ensure the accurate translation the videos (specifically those without embedded English subtitles), automated translation services such as Google Translate were employed, as well as privately contracted professional translators.

Regarding the theoretical basis of this article, the most significant concept employed is the definition of public diplomacy provided by Nye Jr. (2008, p. 94). According to this author, public diplomacy has a determinant effect on the soft power a country can exert over the civilian population of other countries, as the objective of public diplomacy is to transform the assets of a country into soft power tools (Wei, 2020, pp. 1–5). These are two concepts strongly intertwined (Golan, 2013, p. 1251). In short, soft power is an instrument governments use to organise their resources with the purpose of mobilising and attracting audiences in other countries towards the emitting country (Nye Jr., 2008, p. 95).

In line with the aforementioned definition of soft power by Nye Jr. (2008), this diplomatic tool emanates mainly through three different types of assets a country has. As stated by Wei (2020):

…the soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad) and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority). Public diplomacy plays an important role in the process of transforming soft power resources into soft power (Wei, 2020, p. 3)Footnote 4.

These three types of assets can cast a wide net of possibilities when analysing a particular piece of media and its relationship with soft power as part of a public diplomacy action. However, as will be evidenced in later sections, these categories will prove insufficient in the analysis of the New DPRK case. This could be due to either the limitations in Nye’s theory of soft power or, more likely, the failure of New DPRK to adapt to a public diplomacy framing.

It is also worth mentioning that ‘compared with the traditional inter-governmental diplomacy, the subjects and objects of public diplomacy are more extensive, the specific diplomatic forms more diverse and the implementation period of some forms of public diplomacy is longer’ (Wei, 2020, p. 10). It is important to state that when countries seek an approach to public diplomacy, they must find a specific niche for their actions and North Korea is no exception (Grzelczyk, 2017, pp. 139–140).

Given that this work delves into the area of studies of public diplomacy, it is important to mention how this case relates to the most important debates in the discipline at the time of writing this article, namely the debates regarding why and how public diplomacy operates in relation to the digital realm and social media.

In this sense, an important contribution to the field is the work by Manor and Huang (2020), Digitalization of Public Diplomacy: Concepts, Trends, and Challenges, which examines the impact of digital technologies on diplomatic action, a process defined as ‘digitalization of public diplomacy.’ (This …) a process that reaches larger populations yet it segments the publics into different media. This work focuses on how new digital tools employed in digital public diplomacy impact the norms and values of the diplomats or foreign ministries in charge of pushing foreign policy forward on the internet. This is particularly interesting since the digitalisation of public diplomacy is understood as seeking more transparency—something not necessarily ensured by the New DPRK case given its rigid structure—but also as driving uncertainty due to the internet hindering media consumers when distinguishing truth from fiction, and identifying State-driven narratives.

Another important work to determine how technological innovation creates new power dynamics for public diplomacy is offered by Manor and Pamment (2024), which states how Ministries of Foreign Affairs may lose their monopoly on managing external affairs on the internet due to the creation of new media (Manor and Pamment, 2024, p. 49). This is something the diplomatic authorities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea do not appear to be particularly eager about, as will be evidenced in the New DPRK case study.

Furthermore, as comprehensive sources linking the theoretical tools I use with the broader ongoing public diplomacy debate, I utilised several key sources. These include studies on the impact of technology on traditional public diplomacy (Hai Liaw et al., 2020); definitional clarity in the digital context of public diplomacy and its theoretical implications (Huang, 2020); specific types of online content used as public diplomacy—mainly imagery and visual data—and their distinctive impacts on social media users (Manor, 2023; Bjola and Manor, 2024); and the impact of the interfaces, capabilities and algorithms of dominant social media platforms on the content produced for diplomatic purposes by various State actors (Gincheva, 2024).

the works of Hai Liaw et al. (2020), who analyse the impact of technological advancements on traditional public diplomacy; (Huang, 2020), who examined the pending issue of definitional clarity in the digital context of public diplomacy and its theoretical implications; (Manor, 2023) and (Bjola and Manor, 2024), who made substantial contributions to the field regarding specific types of online content used as public diplomacy—mainly imagery and visual data—and their distinctive impacts on social media users; and (Gincheva, 2024), who analysed the impact of the interfaces, capabilities and algorithms of dominant social media platforms on the content produced for diplomatic purposes by various State actors.

Although this article does not aim to measure the effectiveness of North Korean public diplomacy but rather to examine its characteristics as part of a case study, it is nevertheless worth mentioning—for the sake of comprehension—that public diplomacy seeks to change the attitudes and behaviours of the target audience toward the emitting country (Merickova, 2013, p. 3). It does so through soft power, which inherently involves a significant challenge: the effectiveness of the practice depends on the opinion of the receiving audience (Merickova, 2013, p. 2). As a result, and specifically in the North Korean case, the selection of the target audience for public diplomacy efforts is key to their effectiveness (Grzelczyk, 2017, pp. 135). I will draw brief conclusions about through some of the data obtained in our analysis.

Finally, it is worth briefly addressing the use of social media by state actors and its efficiency. The main contribution to this topic is by Surowiec-Capell (2024), who observes how the advancement of digital technologies has led propaganda and public diplomacy to adapt to hybrid media landscapes (Surowiec-Capell, 2024, p. 272). Although there is some overlap between public diplomacy and propaganda, the latter is not as open to ‘dialogue’ through the internet (Surowiec-Capell, 2024, p. 280). This could indeed be counterproductive for state use of social media and undermine attempts such as New DPRK, highlighting inefficiencies in North Korea’s use of social media, often missing the opportunities these platforms offer for less structured communication.

Having clarified these main theoretical and methodological notions, we can now move forward to the data analysis section of our paper.

Data analysis

The results will be divided into three categories to observe the different aspects of this case in depth. The sections will be general video metadata (language, subtitles and usage of tags), public diplomacy elements (topics, soft power resources and the addressing of high politics issues) and aspects specific to North Korea (presence of the country’s leaders and of ideology and party symbolism)

A brief introduction regarding the importance of every set of results will be added at the beginning of each subsection.

General video metadata

The general video metadata analysis will allow us to define key aspects regarding the technicalities of the videos produced by New DPRK. The objective is to understand whether the videos follow a fixed or shared set of characteristics that hint at the content adhering to defined objectives and production procedures, instead of a ‘hit or miss’ attempt at internet public diplomacy.

Language

This parameter references the language spoken in the original video and does not include the subtitles, which constitute a separate analysis element.

Out of 104 videos analysed, a total of 90 were voiced in Korean, with another partially voiced in Korean and containing fragments in Chinese. Seven of the videos were in Chinese, and five were in English. Finally, one of the videos had no voicing at all.

This result shows that the New DPRK’s videos confidently exhibit a local production aimed at portraying a ‘truly Korean’ view of the country. It is, in a way, an attempt to depict the supposed day-to-day life of North Koreans from a North Korean perspective. However, as we will see in the subtitles section, this content is also intended to be viewed outside of the ‘Hermit Kingdom.’

Subtitles

The presence of subtitles and the languages selected for them indicate New DPRK’s attempt to reach an international audience. Furthermore, the choice of languages sheds light on the target audience intended by the video creators.

100 out of the 104 analysed videos employ subtitles, while the four remaining use no subtitles at all.

Out of the 100 analysed pieces, 61% were captioned exclusively in English, 19% in both English and Chinese, 18% exclusively in Chinese and 2% in English and Korean, as it can be observed in Fig. 1.

Fig. 1: Language of subtitles.
figure 1

Source: Self-made based on the ‘New DPRK’ YouTube videos.

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Another particular aspect worth mentioning is that out of the 100 captioned videos, 83 had subtitles embedded in the video itself, while only 17 had been subtitled exclusively through the YouTube closed caption tool. This shows a clear intent to create content aimed at foreign audiences from the production and editing phase of the New DPRK project. The choice of languages does not seem accidental either. English is the most widely spoken language in the world, hence facilitating the reach to larger audiences in different countries. Chinese, in turn, is the language of North Korea’s most important ally. Therefore, portraying a friendly vision of North Korea to Chinese audiences, encouraging to uphold this alliance despite North Korea’s aggressive stance in the international order, is likely a key reason behind this choice of languages.

The final conclusion to be drawn from the subtitle analysis is that, although English seems to be the chosen language to reach as broad an audience as possible, there is also a specific interest in sharing content with Chinese audiences. This suggests that North Korea is trying to maintain a close relationship with China, and that its authorities seem to include its population in the equation through social media content. Another example of this is the presence of New DPRK on Chinese social networks such as BiliBili, Weibo and Ixigua, where the videos are also uploaded to reach Chinese audiences. This is worth noting due to the aforementioned dynamic of North Korea-China relations. We believe further study could provide deeper insight into the level of interaction between message emitter and audience on these Chinese social networks, particularly when comparing the YouTube case analysed in this paper to Nort Korea’s presence on other social media networks.

Usage of tags

Tags can help target a specific audience through Youtube’s search tool, assisting the algorithm in promoting New DPRK’s content to audiences interested in the tagged topics. For an in-depth analysis of the importance of tags in North Korean internet content, I strongly recommend the seminal work by Park and Lim (2020) on this matter.

Regarding the specific case of New DPRK’s videos, 62.50% of the videos do not use the tagging tool, while the remaining 37.5% do, as illustrated in Fig. 2.

Fig. 2: Use of YouTube tags.
figure 2

Source: Self-made based on the ‘New DPRK’ YouTube videos.

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As observed in Fig. 3Footnote 5, although the tags used cover varied topics, the clear majority of them mention either ‘North Korea,’ ‘DPRK,’ or ‘Pyongyang.’ This suggests that the YouTube channel aims to appear as a search result for people looking for videos about North Korea. By using these tags, the New DPRK videos are more likely to gain traction and views on this social network. To a point, perhaps as an attempt to counter the majority of content on Youtube, which generally shows a more negative side of the DPRK.

Fig. 3: Table with use of tags and number of mentions.
figure 3

Source: Self-made based on the ‘New DPRK’ YouTube videos.

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It is worth mentioning that some video tags, such as ‘echo’ or ‘echooftruth,’ make reference to a YouTube channel that was terminated by the platform’s authorities for violating their terms of service (O’Caroll, 2021). This constitutes potential evidence supporting the accusation that the North Korean government is behind these YouTube channels and suggests a sort of continuity between these different public diplomacy efforts on the YouTube platform.

Public diplomacy elements

The analysis of the presence or absence of elements of public diplomacy in the content posted by New DPRK will be key to determining whether the YouTube channel is indeed a public diplomacy practice or a tempered propaganda policy with international reach.

The analysis of the subsequent parameters will also allow us to determine to what extent, if any, the New DPRK’s videos correspond with the aforementioned definitions of public diplomacy and in which aspects they differ, if applicable.

Finally, it will also contribute to a broader understanding of which particular soft power elements mentioned by Nye Jr. (2008) North Korea is attempting to highlight for promoting a positive view of the nation under the international spotlight of social media.

Topics

Some of the topic categories listed (news, education, culture and commercial promotion) have been borrowed from the seminal work on this subject presented by Park and Lim (2020, p. 128). The remaining topic categories listed are of our own production, as I seek to expand the analysis further than the aforementioned article. As seen in Fig. 4, the topics addressed by the New DPRK videos are rather varied, but they mostly aim to promote the successes or appeals of North Korea in specific areas. Sports, culture, commercial promotion and education are just some of the topics addressed by the analysed videos. They seemingly attempt to portray to the world a supposedly high standard of living, as well as the natural or historical beauties of the country.

Fig. 4: Table with topics, number of times a topic was mentioned and % of times a topic was mentioned.
figure 4

Source: Self-made based on the ‘New DPRK’ YouTube videos and (Park & Lim, 2020).

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The selection of topics is diverse, yet it fails to address the more well-known aspects about North Korea, such as its armed forces, as well as any ongoing news about the country in the period analysed. This aspect will be more thoroughly addressed in other sections, but the topics covered in the New DPRK’s videos appear to have been selected to shape a broader image within the realm of international public opinion regarding North Korea on the internet. Not an image focused on sanctions, human rights violations, or military threats, but rather centred around the cultural, economic, day-to-day life and touristic aspects of the country. Alongside an important focus on the explanation of ephemerides in North Korea—sometimes overlapping with the more ideological aspects of the North Korean government—, this adds another layer of knowledge that North Korea is trying to show as a representation to foreign audiences.

Needless to say, the mere presentation of something by New DPRK in their videos does not guarantee an unbiased or truthful portrayal of the selected topics. While this inference can be made from watching the New DPRK videos and considering the North Korean context and its government’s intentions, it’s important to note that this study did not generate empirical data to support such a strictly personal observation. However, authors such as Park and Lim (2020, p. 139) seem to agree with the fact that videos can be used to portray distorted views of North Korean reality.

Soft power resources

According to the theory introduced by Nye Jr. (2008), a country can use its soft power resources to push its foreign policy objectives. Soft power emanates from three main sources: culture, political values and domestic policies and foreign policy (Nye Jr., 2008, p. 96).

These resources can then be utilised to assert soft power strategies over other countries, such as in public diplomacy.

In the case of our study, I tried to determine whether this theory applied to the content posted by the New DPRK YouTube channel. The results were varied.

Although many of the pieces used cultural and political values, and domestic policy resources in their content, none of the analysed videos directly addressed the foreign policy resource of soft power. Additionally, and most notably, a significant percentage (22.12%) of analysed videos could not be categorised as employing any of the soft power resources defined by Nye.

Most of the videos that do not fall under any category of soft power resource relate the topics of commercial promotion or everyday life activities in North Korean society. However, they notably fail to address aspects of domestic policies and culture that would place these videos under other categories in this study. Although these videos may contain elements that could have categorised them into one of the soft power resource categories, they fail to connect the elements shown with the deeper resources described by Nye in the aforementioned theory. For example, some everyday life actions do not exhibit any cultural connection to the country or do not seem to be part of a bigger cultural trend, and therefore appear as vague actions in a void. The same occurs with some, though not all, commercial promotion pieces, which seem to showcase a certain industrial capability but do not link it to any specific domestic policy or decision the New DPRK’s videos. These are but two examples that illustrate New DPRK’s failure to align with widely shared views of the use of soft power in public diplomacy, as it can be observed in Fig. 5.

Fig. 5: Soft power resources used.
figure 5

Source: Self-made based on the ‘New DPRK’ YouTube videos and (Nye Jr., 2008).

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This fact raises more questions than answers, some of which may even exceed the scope of this study. I will now examine three possible explanations to this outlying information.

Firstly, does this imply that North Korea is using an ineffective or subpar soft power strategy with New DPRK? The absence of any soft power resources (as defined by Nye) in 23 of the videos could indicate that they are ineffectively producing content with the intent of implementing a public diplomacy and soft power strategy, essentially ‘wasting’ viewing time by not incorporating any of the soft power resources a country relies on, according to the Nye’s theory.

Another possibility—although less likely, I believe—, is that Nye’s theory on soft power resources is incomplete, or at least does not apply to the particularities of this specific case. While it serves as a valuable tool for analysing New DPRK’s videos, it may not fully encompass all the materials within the scope of this research.

The third possibility, and the one I believe to be the most likely, is that the New DPRK pieces fail to adapt to the categories introduced by Nye because they are closer to being acts of foreign propaganda, with no attempt at creating communication channels between emitter and receiver. As such, they probably do not delve into soft power as deeply as they would in a full-fledged public diplomacy strategy.

As this is a case study and not a paper that attempts to create a theoretical framework on soft power, nor does it seek to analyse the effectiveness of North Korea’s public diplomacy efforts or its characteristics through the use of a specific tool, I will not do any assertions regarding why so many pieces could not be classified under Nye’s categories. Further research with a different focus is needed to answer that particular question, which could be of significant importance for strengthening soft power studies.

What can be affirmed based on the data analysed is that culture seems to be the preferred soft power resource used in New DPRK videos. These videos not only discuss North Korean traditions and ephemerids, but also show aspects of the day-to-day life of certain North Koreans (mostly from Pyongyang), as well as other aspects of the national culture such as art, music, cuisine and sports.

Addressing of high politics issues

Generally, public diplomacy efforts try to avoid addressing the issues of ‘high politics.’ The effectiveness of public diplomacy actions addressing these kinds of topics has been brought to question in the past (Wei, 2020, p. 2). In this case, I considered not only issues such as armed conflict—which generally garners the most attention when it comes to North Korean news—but also the relations with South Korea, Japan and the United States, the development of nuclear weapons and the Covid-19 Pandemic, which coincided with the timeframe of the execution of this analysis.

In our data, I found out that a resounding 90.38% of the pieces did not address the issues of ‘high politics,’ as the theory sustained. Among the remainder, 9.62% of the pieces did include content related to this issue. A few specific pieces are worth mentioning.

The video Primary School Preparation | Normal North Korea Family | New DPRK, published on May 12, 2020, mentions the DPRK’s policies regarding protective measures against the Covid-19 Pandemic, specifically tackling the issue of protecting school children. Another example is Let’s see reconstruction from typhoon in DPRK | New DPRK, published on September 25, 2020, which not only positively highlights the figure of Kim Jong Un, but also showcases the capabilities of the North Korean armed forces, especially their logistic capacity and soldiers’ commitment to the defence of the country and the reconstruction of areas affected by natural disasters.

Further examples regarding the mention of high politics issues were found in the sampled material. I have only cited these two specific pieces for illustrative purposes.

Aspects of New DPRK video analysis specific to North Korea

In this short section, we will dive into some of the aspects of our data analysis that are specific to the North Korean case; that is to say, the presence or absence of current or past leaders of the country. Furthermore, I will consider the mention of any type of the state-sponsored Juche ideology, as well as socialism, communism, the Workers Party of Korea and other legal political parties in the countryFootnote 6. Lastly, the author will briefly mention some contextual commentary made in some of the videos related to local developments in North Korea during the time the New DPRK videos were posted, mostly in the days leading up to the 8th Workers Party of Korea Congress in January 2021.

Presence or mention of the North Korean leaders in the videos

To analyse this parameter, I divided the prominence of Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il and Kim Jong-Un into three categories: absence, protagonic presence and secondary presence.

By absence, I understand the complete lack of direct or indirect reference to any of the North Korean leaders.

Protagonic presence refers to a direct mention by name or epithet—such as ‘respected/beloved leader’ and similar phrases—, or a direct focus on images presented in the video in a central way to the piece itself, clearly focusing on the status of the North Korean leaders.

Finally, under secondary presence, I categorised the presence of the leaders without direct mention. This means that they appear in the DPRK videos through writings, portraits, party pins and other similar imagery. They appear as part of the ‘environment’ or background of the video, with no direct reference whatsoever to these elements.

Finally, I understand as absence the lack of any of the aforementioned elements and portrayal dynamics of the DPRK’s leaders in the analysed videos.

As observed in Fig. 6, a majority of New DPRK videos do not portray the country’s leaders in any way. Yet, this majority is slim, reaching only 52.88%. The remainder of the videos portray the leaders of North Korea either protagonically or in a secondary role, although mostly through the former method.

Fig. 6: Presence or mention of the North Korean leaders in the videos.
figure 6

Source: Self-made based on the ‘New DPRK’ YouTube videos.

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This is particularly interesting because a public diplomacy strategy would typically try to avoid the more controversial aspects of a country from an international perspective, such as the cult of personality surrounding the leaders of North Korea. And although a majority of the videos follow this line of thought, they do so by a smaller margin than previously expected. The recommendation by public democracy literature to create more politically ‘neutral’ content appears to have its flaws in the North Korean case, based on the presented evidence.

The local idiosyncrasy of portraying the local leaders in a highly positive [and present matter] light seems to permeate into the foreign policy strategy of North Korean public diplomacy efforts. This aspect could potentially diminish the appeal or acceptance of New DPRK’s videos due to the presence of the controversial figures of the North Korean leaders, which could harm the perception of the foreign audiences.

Mention of ideologies or the official political parties

Probably as an attempt to make the content of the videos made by New DPRK as ideologically neutral as possible to appeal to larger audiences, the mention of any kind of socio-political ideology is mostly absent. Only 13.46% of the analysed pieces mentioned either Juche, Socialist or Communist ideology. This is a remarkable absence considering that, according to authors like Alexander (2021, p. 199), ideology has historically been a key element of North Korean public diplomacy and is also cited as being key to the survival of the North Korean State (Grzelczyk, 2017, p. 132), especially in an international scenario where states seem to have long abandoned the ideologies that could resemble North Korean Juche Socialism.

However, based on the evidence collected from the New DPRK YouTube channel, 86.54% of the pieces analysed did not show any signs of ideological symbology whatsoever. This seems to show a contradiction between North Korea’s internal policies and the previous literature on the state’s public diplomacy efforts.

New DPRK: public diplomacy or propaganda?

Based on the data obtained in the analysis, some elements of the New DPRK YouTube channel hint at a collision between the two terms mentioned in this subtitle, especially regarding user interaction with the message emitters.

On one hand, we can see how New DPRK portrays a view of North Korea that points towards a public diplomacy action. The depiction of different aspects of North Korean policies, values and cultural facets—far from the sphere of ‘high politics’—along with the attempt to reach English and Chinese-speaking foreign audiences, could indicate an attempt by North Korean authorities to end the ‘cartoonized’ view of the country on the global stage (Seo and Thorson, 2016, p. 19). This image has resulted in North Korea becoming an actor with an ever-shrinking plausible audience willing to engage with them internationally (Alexander, 2021, p. 198). As Grzelczyk (2017, p. 145) stated:

Because of the DPRK’s Kim leadership, the human rights abuses, general instability and irrationality associated with the Korean peninsula and North Korea, there are serious limitations to the soft power capacities that the DPRK can produce and can broadcast.

This highlights the challenges in the effectiveness of New DPRK as a public diplomacy strategy, particularly if we measure effectiveness in public diplomacy as ‘whether or not it improves or enhances the public of target country’s evaluation of a particular aspect of the implementing country’ (Wei, 2020, p. 1).

While assessing effectiveness is not the objective of this study, it is important to note that the structural limitations imposed by New DPRK, such as banning interaction with users on YouTube, may hinder the effectiveness of public diplomacy efforts by North Korea. Doing so creates a self-imposed limit on the potential for creating a consensual and interactive community that could explore less commonly discussed aspects of North Korean culture, a possibility that YouTube facilitates (Park and Lim, 2020, p. 128).

One could argue that this indicates a reluctance on the part of North Korean government authorities to relinquish control of this aspect of its foreign policy to a potentially autonomous actor, perhaps reflecting its internal tendencies to centralise power and decision-making. This centralised approach has also raised concerns among other states when it comes to public diplomacy (Iosifidis and Wheeler, 2016, p. 155; 169–170). If we consider that eliminating the opportunity for interaction via YouTube is already detrimental to the interplay with potential foreign audiences for the New DPRK channel, the intimidating image of North Korea in the international arena further discourages potential audiences from engaging with this public diplomacy strategy (Park and Lim, 2020, p. 139).

In this regard, New DPRK seems to adhere to a more traditional method of public diplomacy, whereas [in the opposite in current] contemporary models of public diplomacy communication emphasise stronger interaction and even a horizontal perspective (Wei, 2020, p. 2), which North Korea appears not to have adopted. It is a state-to-audience approach rather than a people-to-people method, which aligns more closely with traditional public diplomacy (Grzelczyk, 2017, p. 135). Consequently, North Korea seems to follow a more conventional approach to public diplomacy (Grzelczyk, 2017, p. 141), albeit with certain limitations as previously mentioned. Problematically, these limitations may position New DPRK more as a propaganda tool than as a genuine effort in public diplomacy, based on the aforementioned current debates within the field. This is not necessarily due to irrational policy-making but rather the stronger constraints imposed by the unique aspects of the North Korean case. The evidence collected in this study suggests that the particularities of North Korean society and government limit the effectiveness of their public diplomacy efforts on the Internet.

These restrictions also reflect a neglect of the digital tools that technological developments have made available to state actors in the realm of social media. This may be due to the less centralised and controlled environment they are part of (Gincheva, 2024, p. 250). In detriment of North Korean internet diplomatic influence, this lack of expertise in the field of internet public diplomacy also seems to affect the efficiency of using the tools provided by Youtube, such as tagging, reaching a specific target audience, or employing soft power more efficiently, as can be preliminarily concluded based on the New DPRK case.

Most importantly, because of the limitations on interaction via the New DPRK YouTube channel, it would likely be more accurate to label this particular medium as a tool of foreign propaganda rather than public diplomacy, let alone an instrument of new public diplomacy. Understanding that foreign propaganda is considered to overlap with public diplomacy definitions (Hicks, 2021, p. 6), with the key difference being a ‘two way engagement with the public’ (Hicks, 2021, p. 6).

Based on this, the point made by Nye Jr. (2008, p. 108), I agree that if a public diplomacy effort devolves into a propaganda operation, it may backfire on the emitting country by further impoverishing its image on the international stage and, with it, its soft power projection. The line between public diplomacy and a ‘stage-like’ propaganda piece seems to be thinner than expected, at least in this particular case.

According to Shaw (2020, p. 207), propaganda can be understood as an instrument for influencing popular opinion in favour of the North Korean regime, as part of a deliberate effort to direct public opinion towards its preferred narrative. New DPRK seems to fit this description. It also appears to fall under the definition of ‘soft propaganda,’ understood as propagandistic content presented and concealed through entertaining formats (Zou, 2021, p. 201), such as the YouTube channel analysed in this study. Yet both of these possibilities, as well as several other avenues of researchFootnote 7, deserve studies of their own to fully explore cases analogue to the one presented by New DPRK. This could bring the field of public diplomacy closer to possible theoretical generalisations and shed light on an otherwise relatively unexplored area of studies.

Conclusions

North Korean public diplomacy, at least in the case of the New DPRK YouTube channel, is flawed and limited as a public diplomacy tool—if it can even be considered one and not merely a propaganda tool—as suggested by the contrast between the evidence analysis and the theoretical background of this article. The limited use of interactive tools between the message emitter and the receiving audience contrasts directly with the effects that current public diplomacy approaches aim to achieve. As stated by Park and Lim (2020, p. 140), other North Korean YouTube experiences seem to be more focused on conveying political propaganda rather than engaging with users.

In general, North Korean public diplomacy does not seem to be focused primarily on the internet yet. However, there are signs of growing interest among decision-makers regarding the subject (Alexander, 2021, p. 203).

Further case studies are needed to fully determine whether a consistent public diplomacy strategy by North Korean authorities through means such as YouTube actually exists. These studies should not only address the question of how successful or numerous these attempts may be through different YouTube accounts but also answer the question of how well these attempts adapt to our current theoretical frameworks.

Regardless, the evidence collected during the research conducted for this case study and the subsequent analysis presented a unique opportunity to glimpse into the mindset behind North Korean public diplomacy efforts, a facet of its foreign policy often overshadowed by the movements and alignments of the (regime of the) ‘Hermit Kingdom’ in the international arena.